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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE CRIMINAL/CRIMINOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
OF VERTICAL ARRANGEMENTS - PART II 
"Basically all our similarities are different. "' 
A)INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine first the informal resolution and individual exemption of 
vertical arrangements. Then, DGIV's approach to the trial and sanctioning of vertical 
agreements will be assessed. 
B)PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE - INFORMAL RESOLUTIONS - COMMISSION 
POWERS 
1)Types of Informal Resolution Z 
In order to evaluate the informal resolution of distribution arrangements it is intended 
to examine here: 
a)those formally prosecuted cases already discussed which appear to have 
received some form of plea-bargain', and ; 
b)a selection of distribution cases which have been negatively cleared. 
2)The Commission's Approach to Informal Resolutions 
It is intended to examine here the Commission's enforcement approach in the above- 
mentioned cases and consider whether DGIV characterises, constructs and analyses 
these cases differently to other formally prosecuted cases, resulting in a different 
method of resolution. First, the Commission's classification and legal assessment of 
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informal settlements will be discussed, then the factors influencing informal resolution 
will be evaluated. 
a) Classification and Analysis of Informal Resolutions 
As discussed above, the formally prosecuted cases subject to negotiated settlement 
were classified as criminal/quasi-criminal and were subject to limited legal and 
economic evaluations. This is certainly true of cases like Viho and Dunlop/Slazenger. 
Indeed, Viho was described and analysed as a 'per se' offence6. 
This is in stark contrast to DGIV's treatment of those cases receiving 
clearance. Here, the Commission appears to have characterised the cases as entirely 
administrative matters and adopted a reasonable and helpful approach towards the 
notifications. This is particularly evident in DGIV's lenient attitude towards clauses 
likely to infringe Art. 85(1) '. This generous approach is echoed in DGIV's 
interpretation of Art. 85 and its analysis of these agreements. In each case, the 
arrangement contained clauses likely to offend the Metro criteria $ and thus restrict 
competition. Six of these agreements contained restrictions designed to prevent 
parallel imports '. Four included quantitative restrictions regarding turnover, stocking 
or promotion requirements 10. Two openly attempted to impose an resale price 
maintenance (rpm) system, whilst three agreements employed selection criteria which 
exceeded the boundaries of objective necessity and were open to abuse ". In each 
case, DGIV's response to these violations was not to treat them as having an anti- 
competitive object and commence formal prosecution. Instead, it employed alternative 
tactics. In two cases, DGIV used the malleability of the criteria under consideration to 
place a favourable construction on the offending terms enabling them to fall outside 
Art. 85(1) 12. In Villeroy Boch, stocking, promotion and minimum turnover 
requirements, usually regarded as unacceptable quantitative restrictions, were 
described by DGIV as "not strictly qualitative", but not appreciably affecting 
competition 13. Elsewhere, DGIV began negotiations aimed at modification 14. 
Following modification, the agreements were subject to a similar formalistic analysis as 
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occurred under formal prosecution, with the result that all agreements were found to 
fall outside Art. 85(1). 
The rationale underlying DGIV's approach in these cases is far from clear. Largely, the 
Commission's interpretation and analysis is the same. Clauses exceeding the Metro 
criteria are held to infringe Art. 85(1). But here, the DGIV's response is very different. 
In these cases, DGIV is prepared to use its control of enforcement to place a 
favourable case construction on distribution terms and undertake negotiations aimed at 
modification and informal resolution rather than formal prosecution. 
b)hfiriencing Factors 
This section will examine the possible factors affecting the likelihood of an informal 
resolution and apply them in the vertical context in an attempt to shed some light on 
DGIV's variable approach. The main factors which will be considered are : the type of 
violation involved ; termination or modification of the conduct ; notification of the 
agreement and the firm's co-operative attitude 15. The influence of termination or 
modification of the practice on informal settlement is unclear. All seven negatively 
cleared cases underwent modification, whilst in five of the possible plea-bargains, the 
offending conduct was terminated 16. But, negotiated settlement does not necessarily 
require termination. In Dunlop/Slazenger, DGIV were unsure whether the conduct 
had been terminated, but some form of bargain appears to have occurred ". 
Nor does the type of violation seem to control the likelihood of a settlement. 
Cases involving export bans and similar restrictions, clearly regarded elsewhere by 
DGIV as criminal activity, received very different treatment here. Five of the 
negatively cleared cases containing such restrictions were negotiated, six of the 
formally prosecuted cases were bargained, whilst a further four formally prosecuted 
cases were enforced against in full 18. Similarly, attempts at rpm or price 
discrimination, generally treated by DGIV as inherently anti-competitive, underwent 
very different forms of enforcement 19. Two negatively cleared cases attempting to 
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impose rpm were modified, six formally prosecuted cases using bans to maintain price 
differentials were bargained, whilst a further four formally prosecuted cases were 
enforced in full 20. Further discrepancies exist in DGIV's approach to quantitative 
restrictions such as minimum turnover requirements and attempts to impose class of 
customer restrictions. Again, the same pattern of differential treatment occurs. 
Notified agreements in SZG, Kentwood, Murat and Villeroy Boch, imposed 
requirements relating to minimum turnover, promotion and stocking. Villeroy Boch 
also imposed customer restrictions. Yet, these cases were negotiated and modified. In 
contrast, the notified agreements of Ideal and Grohe imposed similar restrictions, but 
were formally prosecuted in order to elicit modification Z'. A similar pattern of 
differential treatment is seen in DGIV's approach to the requirements that distribution 
systems must not be operated discriminatorily and must not impose excessive 
restrictions 22 
Notification has been suggested as a possible factor influencing DGIV's 
choice of enforcement method 23. Again, the weight of this factor is dubious. All seven 
cases receiving negative clearance were notified, but so were several other cases 
in the study. The former were negotiated and modified, the latter were formally 
prosecuted 24. 
A further influencing factor which seems particularly important to DGIV is 
what it describes as a 'constructive attitude'. Here, assistance with investigation, 
relinquishing the right to a hearing or a willingness to take remedial action may affect 
both the mode of enforcement and the type and level of sanction imposed. In the 
study, all seven negatively cleared cases clearly co-operated by modifying their 
agreements. The Commission rewarded this with the negative clearance of their 
agreements 25. In several formally prosecuted cases, the firm's co-operation and 
willingness to institute compliance programmes resulted in a plea-bargain and 
reduction of fines 26. In other cases where evidence of a plea-bargain is less clear, co- 
operation did earn some reduction in fines Z'. But, co-operation does not always 
guarantee the Commission's leniency. In Ford, the undertaking waived its right to a 
hearing. This co-operation went unrewarded Zg. 
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C)PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE - DEFENCE RIGHTS 29 
It is now necessary to consider the ambit of defence rights in informal prosecution. As 
with horizontal cartels, defence rights will be assessed by examining the legal value of 
informal settlements. As the limited legal security of negotiated settlements has been 
explored fully in Chapter 5, it will not be examined further here. Instead, this section 
will concentrate on assessing the legal value of both negatively cleared cases and 
comfort letters30. It will then go on to consider the implications of this evaluation on 
the informally resolved cases under consideration, noting the effect of DGIV's 
enforcement choices and the private nature of settlements on defence rights. 
Comfort letters are of limited legal value 31. The main cases examining the 
legal security of comfort letters are the Peifirmes cases 32. These cases concerned the 
notification of selective distribution systems. After modification, comfort letters were 
issued. Their legal value was challenged in the national courts and the question was 
referred to the ECJ under Art. 177 39. The manufacturers involved argued that comfort 
letters had the status of individual exemption and were binding on national courts. 
The ECJ rejected these claims, holding that they were merely administrative letters 
indicating DGIV's opinion and not binding on the Commission or national courts ". 
The ECJ's formalistic approacli in these cases has been criticised. The Court's ruling 
appears to have been based on non-compliance with Reg. 17 (primarily the issue of 
publication). It thus avoided having to rule on whether in substance a comfort letter 
was equivalent to a decision ". Stevens argues that this formalistic approach ignores 
the fact that comfort letters may be decisions under Art. 189 and therefore reviewable 
"acts" under Art 173 36. Caselaw would suggest that although this is possible, the issue 
is far from settled ". 
Concerns over the poor declaratory value of comfort letters led, in 1982, to the 
introduction of 'formal' comfort letters 38. However, as formal letters are rarely used 
they have done little to allay concern over the legal value of comfort letters 39. 
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In summary, comfort letters are without real legal significance. As they are not 
"decisions" and may not be "acts", they are not reviewable by the Court. They do not 
bind the Commission, national courts, competition authorities nor third parties. But, 
they do bind defendants. 
In contrast, negative clearance is a decision of the Commission 40. DGIV's 
decision here means that the agreement is not caught by Art. 85 because it does not 
restrict competition or has no appreciable effect on inter-state trade. Limited 
Commission resources mean that such decisions are only issued in borderline cases 
where issues of political, economic or legal significance are involved 41. As 
decisions, firms involved in negative clearance have the right to be heard and have full 
rights of appeal 42. However, pressures placed on defendants during the course of 
resolution proceedings may significantly undermine the legal security of these apparent 
safeguards. DGIV's broad construction of violations, its formalistic analysis, 
limitations on disclosure, the threat of prosecution and/or substantial fines and 
undisclosed political influences may result in firms involved in all types of informal 
settlement feeling constrained to settle on the Commission's terms 43. Consequently, 
no cases in the study challenged the resolution of their agreement". The study of the 
negotiated settlement of horizontal violations noted DGIV's inclination to suspend 
rather than terminate proceedings and to place defendants accepting a settlement under 
constant Commission review. There is no evidence of this occurring in any of the 
plea-bargained or negatively cleared vertical cases. 
The curtailed legal value of informal settlements indicates an absence of 
procedural protection for defendants involved. The apparent advantages to the 
Commission and the disadvantages to defendants have been reviewed fully in Chapter 
5. Broadly, the defendant's position is characterised by an absence of natural justice. 
He has no right to be heard, no right to disclosure and no right to an independent 
tribunal. Negatively cleared cases are little better off. In practice, the rights they have 
are not exercised in return for negotiation and modification of their agreement. In 
contrast, DGIV controls every aspect of informal resolution. Its strong bargaining 
position allows the Commission to pursue political and pragmatic goals in the absence 
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of procedural controls or appellate review. The disparity between the two positions 
has provoked trenchant criticism and calls for reforms enhancing the legal status and 
transparency of resolution proceedings 45. In particular, Stevens asserts that DGIV's 
current use of comfort letters is "unacceptable" as it routinely places expediency 
before legal certainty 46. Nevertheless, comfort letters, and indeed other types of 
informal resolution, continue to be a "crucial tool" in the Commission's enforcement 
policy 47. 
D)CONCLUSION - INFORMAL RESOLUTIONS 
It is clear from the above examination that all distribution agreements are subject to 
the same broad interpretation and formalistic analysis. Clauses offending the Metro 
criteria are classified as criminal/quasi-criminal. Thus, as in horizontal cartels, the 
characterisation of the behaviour controls construction, evaluation and the need for 
enforcement. But, it does not appear to dictate the method of enforcement. 
Numerous examples exist in the study of similar restrictions being treated dissimilarly. 
Some are negotiated, modified and given negative clearance. Some are prosecuted 
and bargained, whilst yet others are subject to the full weight of the Commission's 
prosecution powers. Why these differences occur is not immediately clear. The 
evaluation of possible factors influencing the likelihood of an informal reslution has 
shed no light whatsoever on the rationale underlying DGIV's enforcement choices. 
What it has illustrated is the breadth of the Commission's discretion over enforcement. 
The arbitrary nature of DGIV's choices is equally clear. No two cases illustrate this 
better than AEG and Kemwwood "$. On notification, Kenwood contained several 
offensive clauses of a type which DGIV is usually only too willing to openly prosecute 
in the interests of deterrence ". Yet, DGIV negotiated a settlement. In contrast, in 
AEG, whose distribution system had operated successfully within EC competition 
rules for several years, was formally prosecuted following allegations of 
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discrimination. Surely, cases like AEG, where the basic agreement is fundamentally 
sound are eminently suited to negotiation and modification rather than formal 
prosecution. Contrasts like this seem to give credence to AEG's claims of prejudice 
and injustice. 
In addition, the study has illustrated that this highly discretionary approach 
takes place largely in the absence of guaranteed procedural safeguards. DGIV's 
curtailment of defence rights has enormous resource value, permitting the 
Commission's enforcement choices to proceed unhindered and enabling DGIV to elicit 
the settlement it desires in the vast majority of competition cases. 
Whilst DGIV's enforcement choices are impossible to reconcile with objective 
criteria, the study has suggested that they are entirely consistent with DGIV's 
incremental manipulation of the law for political and pragmatic objectives. The 
Commission's domination of the process, the absence of transparency surrounding 
settlements and the lack of accountability over enforcement choices all permit DGIV 
to select the most expedient prosecution method and achieve as political or pragmatic 
an outcome as it requires in the absence of any real challenge. In particular, the 
enormous pragmatic benefits to be derived from this streamlined appproach may 
account for the lack of consistency in DGIV's enforcement choices. Consequently, 
which method of enforcement will be employed in any individual case is largely 
unforseeable. This has' a significant impact on legal certainty. It also affects the 
ultimate classification of distribution agreements, resulting in notable differences of 
characterisation. Those agreements subject to negotiation appear to be administrative 
matters ; those formally prosecuted as criminal offences. This examination of informal 
resolutions suggests that this characterisation may have significantly more to do with 
the arbitrary nature of DGIV's enforcement choices and its pursuit of political and 
pragmatic goals than the content of the agreement. 
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E)PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE - ART. 85(3)-COM IISSION 
POWERS so 
This section intends to examine the Commission's approach to the individual 
exemption of distribution agreements. The arrangements under consideration 
comprise all such agreements recently exempted by DGIV. Thus, the data derived 
from them will be numerically completes'. 
It is proposed to evaluate DGIV's classification and assessment of individual 
exemptions by examining the conformity of these arrangements with the Metro 
criteria. At each point, DGIV's justification for exemption under Art. 85(3) will be 
discussed. During the course of this discussion, the Commission's attitude to these 
individual exemptions will be compared and contrasted with its approach in other 
distribution cases. 
1)Classification and Assessment of Individual Exemptions 
a) Cross Supplies 
All the exempted agreements were closed systems banning sales to non-authorised 
dealers and some required that sales records be kept in order to monitor compliance 
with the system S2. Some of these agreements also placed restrictions on active sales 
in another dealer's territory . Third parties in four cases complained that closed 
distribution systems served to increase market rigidity and hinder parallel- trade 54. 
These concerns were dismissed by the Commission. Instead, DGIV insisted that these 
requirements were indispensable to the maintenance of the system and provided 
dealers with an incentive to commit resources to pre- and after- sales services, though 
in most cases DGIV imposed reporting condititons 55. Elsewhere, closed distribution 
systems have received negative clearance 56. In comparison, similar monitoring 
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requirements have been construed by DGIV as indirect export bans and formally 
prosecuted 57. Nevertheless, in G-endig, DGIV asserted that such verification 
requirements do not have an independent anti-competitive character58. 
b)RPM/Price Discrimination 
In AMP, the agreement contained price-fixing clauses. In its Art. 177 ruling, the ECJ 
took a lenient view, maintaining that some rpm was necessary because of the special 
characteristics of the market. Consequently, such agreements were suitable for 
exemption S9. Despite maintaining its general opposition to price-fixing, DGIV has 
stated its intention to grant AMP an exemption, once again citing the special 
characteristics of the market 60. This approach is in stark contrast with the 
Commission's normal view which condemns price-fixing as possessing an inherently 
anti-competitive object without any examination of its market context. Certainly, all 
distribution cases containing export bans seeking to support price discrimination and 
the two negatively cleared cases attempting to impose rpm were attacked by DGIV 61. 
c)Cuslomer Restrictions 
In Grwzdig and Saha, restrictions were placed on wholesalers reselling to private 
customers. This was held to fall outside Art. 85(1) as the provision merely reflected 
the proper division of functions between wholesalers and retailers 62. Moreover, in 
Ivoclar, sales were restricted to dentists, laboratories, universities and hospitals. 
Similar restrictions were placed on wholesalers in Ideal and Grohe, allowing sales only 
to plumbing contractors 63. In all three cases, DGIV admitted that the provision 
infringed Art. 85(1) because it restricted the commercial freedom of the parties. 
However, the manner in which DGIV proceeded to deal with the issue varied 
considerably. In Ivoclar, DGIV granted an individual exemption, finding that the 
restriction was necessary to achieving substantial improvements in the distribution of 
Ivoclar products and ensuring a prompt supply to dentists. In addition, the restriction 
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helped to maintain professional standards of usage from which consumers would 
benefit. In their defence, Ideal and G"ohe advanced similar arguments to those DGIV 
had used to support the exemption in Ivoclar. But DGIV's response here was to find 
that the provision was a "serious restriction" of competition the disadvantages of 
which heavily outweighed any efficiency gains in distribution. Moreover, it insisted 
that such a requirement was not indispensable as sale and installation were two entirely 
separate functions'. 
d)Qialitalive/Quantitative Criteria 
In several agreements concern was expressed that the selection criteria exceeded 
objective requirements or were open to abuse 65. In Yves St Laurent and Parfums 
Givenchy, the notified systems made admission to the system dependent on the 
manufacturer deeming an outlet in a given area economically viable. In both cases, 
third parties complained that the vague nature of the selection criteria could result in 
discriminatory treatment. In each case, DGIV negotiated a modification of the criteria 
so that outlets meeting the qualitative criteria must be admitted within a specified time 
period, thus eliminating the possibility of discrimination 66. In Saba II, it was argued 
that the admission criteria were discriminatory because they effectively excluded 
modern forms of retail outlets like discount stores. Moreover, the fact that the 
manufacturer had sole control over admissions was felt to increase the likelihood of 
abuse 67. Consequently, DGIV required modification of the selection process so that 
the admission decision could be delegated to wholesalers, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of arbitrary practice. In contrast, in Villeroy Boch, DGIV issued negative 
clearance to a system which gave the producer sole control over admissions". 
A major challenge to DGIV's approach to admission criteria came in Metro II 
who argued that Saba's system was applied arbitrarily and that DGIV had failed, in 
granting exemption, to take proper account of the effect that the concentration of 
distribution systems on the market had on competition. Metro's submissions were 
dismissed. On the issue of market rigidity, the Court held that Metro had failed to 
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establish that the concentration of systems had effectively hindered workable 
competition. Nor had it advanced sufficient evidence to show that the discriminatory 
operation of Saba's system was anything other than isolated instances 69 
In contrast, in AEG, a formally prosecuted case, DGIV insisted that the the 
small number of cases involved did not establish the non-systematic nature of the 
apparent discrimination. Here, the burden was on the defendant to prove that there 
was no general policy of discrimination70. In all of these exempted cases, DGIV 
justified exemption by stating that the admission criteria brought distribution 
improvements by ensuring that only dealers who were able to meet professional 
standards and were able and willing to maintain the brand image were admitted to the 
system". Elsewhere, other admission criteria have been treated very differently. For 
instance, in Grundig, requirements to display and stock a full range of products were 
held to be quantitative, but were exempted. Yet, in Villeroy Boch, an obligation to 
display goods attractively and not too close to competing brands and to maintain 
continuity of supply was held to be qualitative and negatively cleared 
A number of agreements imposed quantitative restrictions relating to minimum 
turnover, stocking and promotion requirements. In particular, Yves St Laurent and 
Parfimrs Givenchy imposed obligations covering all three requirements 73. Third 
parties in these cases criticised these requirements as restricting the number of dealers 
who could enter the market and likely to increase market rigidity74. DGIV agreed that 
the obligations did restrict competition because they resulted in dealers meeting the 
qualitative criteria being excluded from the system because they could not satisfy these 
additional quantitative criteria 75. Again, DGIV held that the requirements were 
necessary to achieve various distribution efficiencies, these advantages being of benefit 
to consumers76. 
Other agreements imposing similar obligations have been alternatively 
negatively cleared or formally prosecuted. In Villeroy Boch, the highly competitive 
nature of the market permitted stocking and promotion requirements to be negatively 
cleared despite their restrictive nature. Conversely, similar obligations in Ideal and 
Grohe resulted in formal prosecution". 
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e)Product 
In Grtindig and Saha, it was argued that distribution systems for consumer electronics 
were no longer required in view of their quality and reliability78. Nevertheless, DGIV 
granted exemptions in both cases on the basis that such technically sophisticated 
products necessitated selective distribution. In IBM, whilst granting negative 
clearance, DGIV doubted whether computer products would always require the 
protection of a selective distribution system. In Ivoclar, a distribution system for 
dental products was granted exemption on the basis that it ensured prompt supply and 
professional use of such products. Conversely, in Ideal, a system for the distribution 
of plumbing fittings was refused exemption. DGIV held that the products were not 
sufficiently technically sophisticated to warrant selective distribution, despite 
assertions that the system was needed of ensure professional standard of fitting 79. 
F)PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE - DEFENCE RIGHTS 
This section will examine the existence and scope of defence rights in the context of 
the individual exemption of distribution systems. As decisions, individual exemptions 
give defendants the right to be heard and a right of appeal 80. However, the fact that 
individual exemptions are negotiated settlements places limits of the exercise of these 
rights. Often, these procedural safeguards are waived in return for negotiation and 
exemption of the agreement. An insistence upon procedural rights risks enforcement 
by formal prosecution 81. This relinquishing of defence rights is evidenced in the study 
by a complete absence of formal challenges to DGIV's enforcement approach. Thus, 
once again, negotiations may be conducted in conditions most advantageous to the 
Commission. In this context, DGIV utilises its control of enforcement to impose 
conditions on exemption, enabling it to exercise long-term control over the 
undertakings involved. In four of the exemptions in the study, reporting conditions 
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were imposed 82. Whilst in AMP, conditions relating to price-fixing and classes of 
customer supplied have been outlined 83. 
G)CONCLUSION - ART. 85(3) 
This examination of the Commission's individual exemption of distribution agreements 
reveals that DGIV does treat these cases differently to other vertical agreements. 
Those restrictions contrary to Metro criteria are still held to infringe Art. 85(l), but 
here, they are exempted rather than formally prosecuted or negatively clear as has been 
the case with other agreements in the study. Whether DGIV's justifications under 
Art. 85(3) are sufficient to explain these differences is open to debate. Examination of 
the study reveals that DGIV's assessment of these exemptions is again very formalistic. 
Thorough economic evaluation is invariably absent 84. As a result, the quality and 
quantity of evidence relied upon in support of DGIV's findings is often both limited 
and bland in nature with little reference to a clear standard of proof. Typically, the 
Commission's justification for an individual exemption says little more than the 
arrangement will produce an efficient distribution system of competent dealers which 
will serve to enhance brand image and/or maximise exploitation of the market. These 
advantages permit DGIV to view normally inherently anti-competitive requirements as 
having no independent anti-competitive character and as being indispensable to the 
achievement of the aforementioned benefits. In consequence, competition is not 
eliminated. 
Chard has criticised the Commission's formalistic analysis under Art. 85(3) as 
less than satisfactory. He asserts that it is an inadequate basis for assessing the true 
pro/anti-competitive effects of an agreement. The same problems with evaluation 
relating to the perceived pro/anti-competitive nature of qualitative/quantitative 
restrictions discussed in formal prosecution apply equally here ". He argues that this 
had resulted in an over-strict application of Art. 85(3) with the consequence that many 
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Commission decisions have hindered rather than enhanced competition 86. Goebel, 
too, has criticised the formalism of both the Commission and Court, particularly the 
Court's deference to DGIV's often inadequate fact-finding/economic analysis and their 
failure to tackle important legal issues 87. He has also criticised DGIV's paternalistic 
approach to consumer benefits, arguing that, as market investigations into consumer 
preferences are cheap and easy to undertake, there is no need for DGIV to assume it 
knows what is best 88. Both DGIV's and the Court's refusal to delve into the role 
played by market rigidity in the elmination of competition has been condemned. Both 
institutions have avoided examining the nexus between the need to protect 
distribution methods and that of maintaining adequate levels of competition89. 
The Commission's formalistic treatment of distribution cases seeking individual 
exemption has produced further examples of similar restrictions being treated 
differently. For instance, the provisional decision in AMP which permits price-fixing 
conflicts with DGIV's enforcement of other distribution arrangements. In AEG, both 
the Court and Commission expressed concern that selective distribution systems could 
be used for price-fixing and punished AEG accordingly90. DGIV's explanation in AMP 
that the special characteristics of the market justified the exemption do not seem to 
defend adequately its decision here, particularly in the light of DGIV's refusal to 
exempt crisis cartels attempting rationalisation by price-fixing and who can also boast 
special market conditions. 
The flexibility of both the Metro criteria and the conditions of Art. 85(3) give 
the Commission considerable latitude in granting individual exemptions, allowing it to 
exempt technically anti-competitive agreements where it is politically or pragmatically 
desirable to do so. In particular, the significant pragmatic benefits accruing from this 
approach may account for DGIV's enforcement choices. However, this policy also 
creates significant legal uncertainty. The apparently arbitrary nature of DGIV's 
enforcement makes it difficult to forecast whether or not a particular restriction will 
infringe Art. 85(1) and how DGIV will apply Art. 85(3) to it. The Commission's 
reasoning under Art. 85(3) gives little indication of the precise factors controlling 
decision-making, whilst the lack of transparency surrounding exemption negotiations 
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only exacerbates matters. DGIV's erratic approach also affects the final classification 
of these arrangements. Once again, the Commission's negotiation of such cases gives 
the individual exemption of distribution agreements an administrative character. As 
noted previously, this may owe more to DGIV's unpredictable exercise of its 
discretion than the restrictive content of the agreements. What does remain constant is 
the limited character of defence protections. Here, they are constrained by the 
negotiated nature of the exemption process, again highlighting the disparity between 
prosecution and defence positions. Nevertheless, these deficits do serve a purpose. 
All play their part in assisting DGIV to secure its political and pragmatic objectives. 
H)CONCLUSION - ALL METHODS OF PROSECUTION 
Before undertaking the criminology analogy of the prosecution of vertical cases, the 
Commission's overall approach to the prosecution of distribution cases and the effect 
on defence rights will be summarised. 
DGIV's prosecution of vertical cases is characterised by its arbitrary nature and 
disparate outcomes. But, some common ground does exist. The study has shown that 
all distribution agreements undergo the same broad construction and formalistic 
analysis. Provisions offending the Metro criteria are classified prima facie as 
criminal/quasi-criminal. But, whilst this initial characterisation controls the need for 
enforcement, it certainly does not dictate the type of enforcement or the eventual 
outcome. The Commission's subsequent prosecution choices disclose numerous 
examples of similar agreements receiving disparate treatment. Those selected for 
formal prosecution are classified as inherently anti-competitive and treated as criminal 
matters. These cases receive uncompromising prosecution and significant fines. 
Elsewhere, in the face of similar restrictions, DGIV pursues an eminently more 
reasonable course, seeking the negotiation and modification of problematic clauses. 
So, whilst such restrictions are initially classified as criminal, the Commission's 
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treatment of them is entirely administrative. As a result, such cases are individually 
exempted or even negatively cleared. The basis of DGIV's approach is unclear. The 
study has shown that the Commission's choices cannot be reconciled with the Metro 
criteria. Nor do the justifications in case reports adequately explain the differences in 
treatment. Invariably, DGIV's reasoning here has been anodyne and contradictory. 
All this suggests that this disparate approach owes more to the Commission's erratic 
use of its discretion than the actual content of the agreement. This policy has led to 
two particular problems. First, DGIV's repeated refusal to undertake searching 
examination of the true pro/anti-competitive effects of distribution agreements leaves 
its decision-making economically dubious. Secondly, DGIV's failure to explain fully 
the reasons behind its choices and its inconsistent treatment of restrictions, 
particularly those relating to turnover, stocking and promotion, create significant legal 
uncertainty. Consequently, which prosecution method a given case will receive and its 
eventual outcome are unforseeable. The fact that DGIV is able to vary its 
enforcement method at will, without reference to objective criteria and with such 
disparate results, raises questions over the equity of the Commission's choices. Indeed, 
that DGIV's choices are impossible to reconcile with objective criteria suggests that 
the real rationale is hidden from review. One must question why the Commission feels 
obliged to conceal it. 
DGIV's enforcement choices have a major impact on the scope of defence 
rights. The Commission consistently views defence rights as entirely a matter of 
administrative fairness. This allows DGIV to control the breadth and effectiveness of 
procedural safeguards and to ensure that enforcement needs remain paramount. In 
particular, the Commission's attitude to the disclosure of information significantly 
curtails the defendant's ability to mount a meaningful defence. Moreover, in all forms 
of informal settlement, including negative clearance and individual exemption, the 
defendant is even more vulnerable. Complaints over the absence of procedural 
protections or refusals to relinquish existing rights risk incurring the displeasure of the 
Commission. A more formal method of prosecution is likely to follow. 
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Most importantly, the study reveals DGIV's enormous discretion over all 
aspects of prosecution ; classification, case construction, prosecution method and 
ultimately outcome. Whilst the Commission has never articulated the true rationale 
underlying its inconsistent approach, the case study bears evidence suggesting that 
DGIV's interpretation of competition rules has been tailored to meet political and 
pragmatic goals. By creating uncertainty over the construction and application of 
Art. 85, the Commission fashions for itself a considerable advantage, increasing its own 
prosecution chances, whilst diminishing the defendant's ability and opportunity for 
successful challenge. Step by step, this policy of uncertainty and inconsistency ensures 
the cost-effective control and eradication of all hindrances to integration. So, whilst 
this strategy may produce some economically questionable decisions, it nevertheless 
continues to serve the 'higher' goal of political unity and ultimate control by the 
Commission. 
I)CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALOGY - PROSECUTION 
0 
As a full criminological analogy was undertaken in the discussion of horizontal cartels, 
this section will briefly examine the similarities between the Commission's prosecution 
of vertical violations and that of the English criminal process, assessing DGIV's 
conduct against traditional models of criminal justice9'. 
Both systems display a similar approach to prosecution. Both possess a 
discretion to prosecute which is used to the system's advantage. Both employ the 
flexibility of the law to construct and analyse cases in a way which ensures the 
required result ; whether this may be conviction or resolution. Each system possesses 
and employs various methods of prosecution. Whilst many cases are formally 
prosecuted, each jurisdiction shows a preference for informal resolutions. This is 
particularly evident in the Commission's approach towards distribution arrangements. 
DGIVs plea-bargaining, individual exemption and negative clearance of many such 
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cases discloses a strong preference for negotiated settlement. However, in neither 
jurisdiction are defendants able to forcast with any certainty which method of 
prosecution they will undergo. 
Both jurisdictions have a similar approach to defence rights. Every 
opportunity is taken to limit the scope for and effectiveness of defence challenges to 
the prosecution momentum. Specifically, each system uses its dominance of the 
process to curtail the amount and quality of evidence available to defendants. In each 
process, defendants involved in informal resolutions are constrained to waive defence 
rights and negotiate settlements in the absence of procedural protections. Most 
fundamentally, each system employs its control over enforcement to ensure that 
neither substantive nor procedural rules hinder enforcement. As a result, in each 
jurisdiction the disparity between the prosecution's significant powers and the 
defendant's weak procedural rights is evident. 
As the problems and consequences of this approach have been examined in 
Chapter 5, they will not be explored further here. Instead, a brief analysis of the 
Commission's approach against traditional criminal justice models will be undertaken. 
The discussion of horizontal noted that both processes adhered to the crime control 
model. A similar pattern is illustrated here. At prosecution, the emphasis for crime 
control is on the speedy cost-effective prosecution of defendants. Guilty pleas and 
bargaining are particularly important. Once again, the end justifies the means. Thus, 
the promotion of political and pragmatic aims validates DGIV's domination of 
enforcement and the use of its powers to increase conviction prospects and curtail 
defence rights. These twin objectives also legitimise the Commission's ambiguous 
interpretation of the substantive law, its formalistic analysis and preference for 
informal resolution, all of which assist in the attainment of DGIV's desired outcome 
with minimum cost and effort. Again, it must be concluded that for the Commission 
crime control is paramount. In the long term, this may mean that similar consequences 
to those seen in the English justice system are equally inevitable. 
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J)PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE - TRIAL AND SENTENCE - COMMISSION 
POWERS 
The following discussion will examine how the Commission exercises its powers of 
decision and sanction in vertical cases, considering the impact of the violation's 
classification and DGIV's case construction on the type and level of sanction imposed 
As the background information on the trial stage of proceedings has already been 
provided in an earlier chapter, this section will concentrate on the findings of the case 
study. 
1)Decisions 
Once again in the study, the Commission made consistent use of its powers to order 
termination and impose conditions controlling the defendant's conduct. Of the sixteen 
formally prosecuted cases, in six cases DGIV imposed 'cease and desist'tlike effect' 
orders. In a further nine cases, DGIV made 'cease and desist' orders alone'. Of these 
cases, two features are noteworthy. First, the increased level of co-operation by 
defendants involved in distribution cases meant that many violations were terminated 
prior to the Commission's decision. Thus, in five cases, DGIV's 'cease and desist' 
order was of declaratory value only ". Secondly, in three cases, the Commission took 
the opportunity to impose conditions ensuring the permanent eradication of the export 
ban 94. For instance in Camera Care, DGIV ordered the termination of particular 
conduct relating to the export ban and required Hasselblad to inform distributors and 
dealers that cross supplies were permissible, and that they were free to set their own 
prices. In addition, Hasselblad were obliged to inform the public that there would be 
no discrimination with regards to after-sales service of parallel imported goods. 
Moreover, Hasselblad, under threat of a periodical penalty payment, were required to 
inform DGIV within three months that these measures had been carried out" 
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In distribution cases, DGIV's discretion under Art. 3 was used quite clearly to 
secure economic integration, specifically requiring termination of any conduct 
hindering this objective. This ability to exert continuing control over the commercial 
activities of undertakings is penal in both nature and use. Whilst the precise impact of 
the Commission's case construction on decisions is difficult to establish with any 
clarity, it would seem that the formalistic assessment of distribution agreements serves 
only to augment the criminality of the conduct. This inevitably affects the type and 
level of sanction imposed. 
2)Fines 
a)Pactors Influencing Fining 
As noted previously, the guidance controlling DGIV's fining powers provides it with 
extensive freedom in the choice and weight of factors influencing its fining decision. 
This section will first consider those factors in the case study which the Commission 
treated as aggravating and then those as mitigating the level of fine imposed"'. 
i)Intenlion/Negligence 
In the study, DGIV's classification of these violations was unequivocal. In the 
majority of formally prosecuted cases, the Commission had no doubt that the offence 
was intentional. In Sandoz and Dunlop/Slazenger, DGIV was more equivocal, finding 
that the violation was either intentional or negligent. In Viho, the infringement was 
characterised as "at least negligent" 97. This is a remarkable finding for an offence 
described and prosecuted throughout as a per se offence. Though it is perhaps less 
remarkable given that Viho was the subject of a plea-bargain. This case serves to 
illustrate the significant impact that plea-bargaining has on the ultimate degree of 
culpability. 
The Commission provided very little evidence to support its conclusions. 
Invariably, DGIV circumvented the evidential problems encountered in establishing 
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culpability by stating that, given the clear-cut nature of the law in this area, the firms 
should have been aware of the illegality of their conduct ". In contrast with horizontal 
cartels, there was little direct reference to the covert or systematic nature of the 
conduct. But, in all cases, evidence that undertakings took active steps to prevent 
parallel trade and pressurised dealers served as evidence of the deliberate nature of the 
offences ý'. 
Only one firm challenged DGIV's finding. In MDF, Pioneer argued that the 
violation was not intentional as it was unaware of the illegality of the conduct. The 
ECJ dismissed the submission holding that Pioneer must have been aware that the 
conduct was liable to restrict competition and that this was sufficient to support a 
finding of intent10°. 
The study again indicates that both the Commission and Court are prepared to 
accept a general awareness of anti-competitiveness as establishing the requisite degree 
of culpability upon which to impose a fine. Under this formula, very little is required 
to prove the'intention' found in most cases. In these cases, this awareness of illegality 
seems to be based on little more than a statement that the law in this area is very clear. 
This approach suggests that DGIV's formalistic assessment of distribution 
arrangements extends to cover issues of culpability. Under this view, all export bans 
have an anti-competitive object and are therefore intentional in nature. Thus, the 
classification of the offence dictates the degree of culpability, and thus the level of fine 
imposed, with little substantive evidence required to support this conclusion. Plea- 
bargaining seems to have a potent effect, attenuating both the legal responsibility and 
moral culpability for the violation. 
ii)Gravity 
As with horizontal cartels, this section will examine how the behaviour of the parties 
and the anti-competitive impact of the violation affected DGIV's evaluation of the 
gravity of the offence. 
With regard to the behaviour of the parties, factors revealing a willingness and 
determination to breach competition rules will increase the gravity of the offence. 
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Such components include the knowledge, role and conduct of each party, the 
systematic nature of the offence and evidence of recidivism101. 
DGIV's evaluation of factors influencing fines displayed the same lack of depth 
here as illustrated in the evaluation of horizontal violations. Both aggravating and 
mitigating factors were alluded to without any further discussion of their relevance or 
impact, making assessment of the Commission's approach difficult. A number of 
recurring themes were evident. These will be examined in further detail. 
The firm's awareness of the anti-competitive nature of its behaviour was 
referred to frequently as an aggravating factor, often indicating a deliberate intention 
to infringe 102. However, as already discussed, this factor owes more to DGIV's 
formalistic assessment than direct proof of intention. 
The role played by the respective parties also affected the assessment of 
gravity. In most cases, the producer, as the driving force behind the ban, was singled 
out for heavier fines 103. The Commission's attitude towards the effect that coercion to 
participate in a export ban has on the assessment of gravity is unclear. In some 
instances, DGIV has treated such pressure as mitigating but not entirely exonerating 
the behaviour 104. Elsewhere, coercion has entirely exonerated a party To make 
matters worse, this conflicting approach has often occurred to different firms involved 
in the same case. Little explanation for the difference is provided, though size and 
financial status seem relevant 106. In Fisher Price, no fine was imposed on Toyco who 
had played an active but subsidiary role under pressure in enforcing the ban. DGIV 
cited the small size and financial problems faced by the firm as the reasons for its 
decision. In Dunlop/Slazenger, AWS had played a similar role and was in 
considerable financial difficulty. Here, DGIV only reduced the fine 107. 
A further aggravating factor is a firm's refusal to terminate the conduct or 
assist with enforcement. Given the high levels of co-operation and voluntary 
termination in the case study, only limited evidence of non-cooperation exists. In 
Dutlop/Slazenger, DSI refused to terminate the offending behaviour despite several 
warnings from DGIV. Moreover, it encouraged other firms to co-ordinate replies to 
DGIV 1°8. 
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Systematic abuse is viewed as especially aggravating. In the context of 
distribution agreements, this willing determination to breach competition rules is seen 
in the form of parties taking active steps to hinder parallel trade and coercing dealers 
to participate in export bans by threatening termination of dealerships and refusing to 
supply dealers who will not co-operate. These tactics were noted as aggravating 
elements in all cases receiving a fine 109. In this context, DGIV has used case 
construction to evade limitation periods, thereby increasing the duration and gravity of 
the offence. In Dunlop/Slazenger, Viho and Sandoz, whilst the Commission did not 
use the term complex infringement, it did employ the same appoach. Here, DGIV 
insisted that documents obtained must be read together and can be taken as proof of a 
"continuous course of conduct", thus extending the duration of the infringements 10. 
This case construction serves to heighten the perception of the criminality of the 
defendant's conduct, directly impacting upon the evaluation of gravity. 
Certain features, namely collective responsibility and recidivism, which served 
to increase the gravity of horizontal offences, were not evident here. Though, DGIV 
has used the reasoning behind the concept of complex infringement to increase the 
culpability of vertical offences. Case construction affects the assessment in other 
ways. By classifying these violations as inherently anti-competitive, DGIV's formalism 
and broad construction of restrictive conduct serves to increase the perception of the 
calculated and wilful nature of the violation directly affecting the assessment of 
gravity. 
Few cases appealed against the Commission's evaluation of their conduct. 
MDF directly challenged DGIV's assessment of gravity, asserting that it was entirely 
arbitrary and bore no relation to the nature and duration of the violation or the specific 
conduct of the parties. In response, the ECJ simply upheld DGIV's absolute discretion 
in evaluating fines "'. 
In order to assess the anti-competitive impact of the violation, DGIV generally 
takes into account issues such as the nature of the violation, the importance of the 
product and firms involved and the overall legislative and economic context 112 . 
The 
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Commission tended to refer briefly to these issues in the study, but provided little 
additional information on how it affected its reasoning. 
As with horizontal cartels, the nature of the violation was an important factor. 
In the study, DGIV consistently condemned export bans and similar restrictions 
having as their objective the partitioning of markets as being a "flagrant breach of the 
rules" 13. Although, the level of the fines imposed in these cases varies considerably 14. 
In assessing the impact on the market, DGIV takes into account the importance of 
both the product and the firms participating. All cases involved noted that the 
infringement concerned a major producer on the market, but failed to explain the 
precise relevance of this factor 1'. 
The importance of the product to the economy received little consideration. 
Presumably, this is because distribution agreements, unlike horizontal cartels, do not 
deal with major industrial products liable to undermine the economy. Though in 
Camera Care, DGIV did take into account the high individual value of the product 
and the fact that the anti-competitive impact on users might be considerable 16. The 
economic effect of the practice on the market received equally scant analysis. 
Invariably, the Commission simply stated that the violation was serious but failed to 
explain the actual impact of the conduct on the market "'. Indeed in Camera Care, 
DGIV openly admitted that it had been unable to assess the precise economic effect of 
the conduct "$. In AEG, it was noted that the conduct had raised prices 19. 
The legislative and economic context of the offence is also significant. 
However, other than to refer to the market position of those involved, the economic 
context of the offence received little attention 120. In John Deere, the Commission did 
note that the agricultural machinery sector was in a depressed state 12'. Whilst in 
Sandoz, DGIV noted, in mitigation, that the market structure had been affected by 
domestic legislation 122. The legislative context did merit discussion. In all cases 
receiving fines, the gravity of the offence was increased considerably by the fact that 
the conduct hindered market integration'Z'. 
The Commission's approach to the assessment of gravity is of some concern. 
Analysis of anti-competitive impact is extremely limited. Further doubt is cast on its 
349 
validity by the fact that the problems inherent in assessing market impact are 
exacerbated by the limited nature of DGIV's formalistic assessment. Moreover, the 
Commission's antipathy towards export bans allows its formalistic evaluation of anti- 
competitive object to be substituted for proof of anti-competitive impact. In several 
cases, DGIV did not discuss anti-competitive impact, but simply relied on a statement 
that the violation was of an inherently anti-competitive type. The close nexus between 
the various components involved in the assessment of gravity means that anti- 
competitive impact is further augmented by DGIV's formalistic assessment of the 
wilfulness of the firm's conduct. The case study also illustrates that the Commission's 
political objective has a direct impact on its evaluation of gravity. Overall, the study 
reveals that DGIV's characterisation and construction of the violation in the earlier 
stages of enforcement significantly enhances the perceived gravity of the offence. The 
concern is that much of this finding is based on the Commission's formalistic 
assumptions and prejudices rather than sensitive analysis. 
iii)Duralion 
The duration of the conduct must also be taken into consideration. In theory, the 
longer the duration, the greater the fine124. In the study, those violations of the longest 
duration did not necessarily attract the largest fine. For instance in Sandoz, the 
violation lasted 22 years and a fine of 800,000 ECU was imposed. In contrast, the 
offence in MDF lasted between 3 months and 2 years, yet a fine of almost 7m ECU 
was levied 125. Violations of a similar length do not appear to receive a similar fine. In 
National Panaso, tic and Fisher Price, where the violation lasted three years, fines of 
450,000 ECU and 300,000 ECU respectively were imposed. In contrast, offences of a 
similar period received much larger fines '=6. That the Commission is operating an 
increasingly penal fining policy does not appear to explain these inconsistencies. 
Whilst the latest fines imposed by DGIV have been in millions rather than thousands of 
ECU, fines of equal substance were being imposed by DGIV a decade ago'17. These 
discrepancies suggest that the Commission's fining policy is arbitrary. No clear pattern 
exists. On appeal, both MDT and AEG complained of DGIV's prejudiced approach to 
their cases. It has already been noted that, at prosecution stage, AEG in particular, 
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received dissimilar treatment. As AEG and MDF have received substantially larger 
fines than those imposed in similar offences, it would seem that this discrimination has 
extended to the fining stage of enforcement. Moreover, the effect of DGIV's case 
construction of duration is unclear. As noted earlier in Viho, Sandoz and 
Dunlop/Slazenger, DGIV used a 'continuous conduct' approach to increase the gravity 
and duration of the violation. As a result, these three cases are some of the longest 
duration under consideration. But, although fines imposed are substantial, they are not 
perhaps as large as might be expected given the duration of the offences 128. A 
probable explanation for this is that plea-bargaining or other mitigating factors 
affected the ultimate level of sanction 'Z9. It is difficult to be more certain about this. 
The lack of information given in case reports regarding DGIV's assessment of 
duration/gravity and whether plea-bargain occurred makes evaluation problematic. 
iv)Mitigalion 
A range of mitigating factors may be taken into account 130 As already noted, the 
depressed state of the market or the effects of legislation may mitigate a fine13'. The 
economic effect of the conduct may reduce the fine. In Fisher Price, the declining 
effects of the ban partially mitigated the fine 132. DGIV's attitude regarding how far 
coercion to participate in the offence will mitigate a fine is ambiguous. On occasion, 
the fine has been reduced, elsewhere no fine whatsoever has been imposed 13. Similar 
confusion exists regarding the financial problems of individual firms 134. In this 
context, it is notable that DGIV has shown a generous attitude towards SMEs 
involved 135. In eight of the distribution agreements under consideration, co-operation 
and/or the institution of a compliance programme was a major mitigating factor 16. On 
occasion, various other factors have been taken into account. In AEG and John 
Deere, the fact that the Commission was dealing with 'first' offences apparently 
mitigated the sanction, though fines here of lm ECU and 2m ECU respectively make 
this hard to believe 137. In Tippex, reliance on legal advice was treated as an 
extenuating circumstance. 
The case study reveals that DGIV's treatment of mitigating factors is as 
ambiguous as its evaluation of aggravating elements. Invariably, the Commission 
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merely noted the extenuating factor. No explanation of the precise extent of 
mitigation was provided. This makes it impossible to assess the equity and consistency 
of the Commission's conduct. However, the lack of clarity provides DGIV with 
considerable discretion over the choice and weight of factors it takes into account in 
individual cases. 
b)Tining Policy 
This section will assess the actual level of sanctions imposed in the study, considering 
the characterisation and consistency of the Commission's fining powers 18. 
i)Deterrence 
Despite DGIV's obvious antipathy towards export bans and similar restrictions, the 
Commission's fining assessment in these cases made little explicit reference to the need 
for deterrence. In Camera Care, DGIV did state that the need to deter the individuals 
involved was taken into account in calculating the actual amount of the fine 19. 
Elsewhere, deterrence was not explicitly referred to, though it was implicit in the 
numerous references to the seriousness of the offences and the threat they posed to 
economic integration "0. 
ii) Tariff 
Whilst no actual tariff of fines exists, DGIV takes into account such factors as 
turnover of the firms involved and profits derived from the infringement'". In this 
respect, the most notable feature of the study is the virtual absence of comment on 
such issues. Whilst DGIV did briefly refer to the party's market position, generally, 
the fining assessment did not mention issues of turnover or profit 142. In Sandoz, the 
Commission did state, albeit briefly, that it had taken the economic importance of the 
firm and its turnover into account 13. In Camera Care, DGIV stated it had taken 
account of the respective size of the firms concerned. But, it admitted that it had been 
unable to assess the amount of profits derived from the violation 144. In MDF, the 
defendant argued that it was unlawful for the Commision to base its fine on turnover 
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as this bore no relation to the profitability of the firm 145. The ECJ upheld DGIV's 
approach to fining 16 
iii)Fines in the Case Study 
Fines were imposed in eleven of the formally prosecuted cases in the study ". First, 
it should be noted that the overall level of fines here is somewhat lower than that seen 
in horizontal cartels. But, this can probably be accounted for by the fact that, in many 
vertical cases, the number of participants are fewer than in horizontal cartels. 
Secondly, no clear pattern of fining is evident from the study. Sanctions range from 
several thousand ECU to several million ECU. No obvious reason exists for this. This 
study has already noted that there appears to be no clear correlation between the 
duration of offences and fine imposed. Nor can the difference be explained by an 
overall increase in levels of fines 148. In these vertical cases, the market sector involved 
does not seem relevant. No single market has been singled out for stricter or more 
lenient treatment. Nor is there any obvious discrimination between firms from 
different MS 149. Plea-bargaining does seem to have reduced the level of some fines, 
but as already noted, the lack of transparency in DGIV's approach makes the precise 
impact of this factor difficult to assess. The Commission's case construction also 
seems to have had some impact on fines. Those cases in which DGIV employed a 
'continuous conduct' approach received some of the largest fines imposed, despite 
being the possible subject of a plea-bargain150. In short, levels of fines are consistently 
inconsistent. Having said that, fines of several million ECU seem increasingly more 
likely in both horizontal and vertical situations as the need to secure and maintain 
economic integration becomes more urgent15'. Given this, the penality of DGIV's 
sanctioning powers is beyond doubt. 
3)Conclusion - Commission Powers 
This examination of the sanctioning of distribution agreements discloses the width of 
the Commission's discretion in both the type and level of sanction it imposes and in the 
choice and weight of factors influencing that evaluation. DGIV's sanctioning choices 
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have a long-term effect over the firms involved and are specifically geared towards 
eradicating threats to the political goal of integration. The choices also disclose the 
penal scope and character of DGIV's sanctioning powers. 
The Commission's criminal characterisation of these violations, its formalism 
and case construction affect all aspects of the fining assessment, augmenting 
particularly the gravity and duration of violations. DGIV's penal characterisation of 
export bans as inherently anti-competitive facilitates proof of anti-competitive 
awareness, and thus sufficient culpability upon which to base a fine. By underlining 
the criminality of the conduct, this finding of wilful anti-competitive behaviour 
increases the gravity of the offence. The Commission's case construction also plays a 
part. Specifically, the notion of'continuous conduct' serves to support the criminal and 
systematic characterisation of the offence, increasing both the gravity and duration of 
violations. 
The evaluation of anti-competitive impact is also affected. DGIV's formalistic 
approach routinely allows anti-competitive object to be substituted for evidence of 
anti-competitive impact. A detrimental effect on the market is frequently assumed, but 
rarely proved. 
Overall, the study suggests that DGIV takes every opportunity to exercise its 
discretion in favour of heightening the perception of the criminality of the conduct. 
Ultimately, this has a significant impact on the level of fine imposed. 
Several aspects of the Commission's approach may be criticised. The most 
concerning feature is the almost total absence of the reasoning underlying DGIV's 
sanctioning decisions. In this respect, even less information is provided here than in 
the context of horizontal cartels. This lack of transparency makes DGIV's approach 
virtually impossible to understand or review. Moreover, the study has disclosed 
several examples of DGIV's inconsistent approach to fining. This ambiguity and 
inconsistency may serve the Commission's enforcement goals, but it does nothing to 
enhance legal certainty. Further problems exist. DGIV's reliance on formalism means 
that the fining assessment may owe more to the criminal classification of the offence 
and the Commission's prejudices than thorough analysis. Such an approach brings the 
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equity of DGIV's decision-making into question. To make matters worse, successful 
appeals against the Commission's fining decisions are difficult to achieve in the face of 
the Court's repeated deference to DGIV's discretion1S2. MDF, AEG and Hasselblad 
all challenged the disproportional and arbitrary nature of the Commission's fining 
decision. In all cases, the Court simply upheld DGIV's basic approach to 
sanctioning 153. 
Most importantly, DGIV's approach demonstrates that it possesses penal 
sanctioning powers and is prepared to use them to their fullest extent in support of 
political and pragmatic aims. Indeed, the entire process seems geared to criminalising 
and penalising conduct hindering the political goal of market integration. Case 
construction and formalism are vital tools. Both serve to increase the criminality of 
the conduct whilst making the offence easier to prove. This not only benefits the 
political object but provides appreciable pragmatic advantages too. 
K)PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE - DEFENCE RIGHTS 
1)Independent Tribunal 15' 
The discussion of horizontal offences revealed that complaints on this matter have 
been dealt with by insisting that the Commission is not a tribunal and by holding that 
defendants have failed to prove that DGIV's monolithic role has breached defence 
rights 155. A similar pattern is revealed in distribution cases. 
Only two formally prosecuted cases challenged DGIV on this issue. The most 
notable was MDF who argued that DGIV's monolithic role was contrary to Art. 6 
ECHR and therefore its decision was illegal. The ECJ dismissed MDF's argument as 
being "without relevance" and based on a "misunderstanding" 156, and imposed a 
requirement of integral fairness alone upon DGIV's conduct of enforcement. 
Moreover, the Court insisted that the present review procedure was perfectly adequate 
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for dealing with instances of procedural irregularity 157. Hasselblad also complained of 
the absence of an independent tribunal, arguing that its right to be heard was worthless 
in the light of the Commission's biased attitude. Again, the defendant failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence to establish DGIV's bias 158. 
The criticisms of this approach made in the examination of horizontal carel are 
equally applicable here 159. In particular, arguments relating to the question of whether 
the Commission is a tribunal divert attention from the real issue. It is the effect of 
DGIV's decisions on defendants that is important and which necessiti ts strict 
adherence to such procedural safeguards 160. Despite the Court's insistence that review 
procedures provide sufficient redress in cases of procedural impropriety, many would 
disagree, particularly given the difficult burden placed upon defendants at appeal 16'. 
This review reveals that DGIV again uses its control of the process to limit the 
defendant's right to merely a matter of integral fairness. This approach benefits the 
Commission by allowing it to pay lip-service to procedural fairness without hinderance 
to the effective enforcement of Reg. 17. The Commission's task is made considerably 
easier by the virtual absence of defence challenge. From the defendant's viewpoint the 
situation is bleaker. DGIV's ability to manipulate the scope of this protection renders 
it virtually worthless. 
2)The Right to be Heard 
As with horizontal cartels, the effect of the HO, the Advisory Committee and 
inconsistencies between the SO and decision on the defendant's right to comment will 
be assessed in turn. 
a)Hearing Officer 
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None of the distribution cases under consideration challenged or commented upon any 
aspect of the HO's role. Thus, his effect upon the enforcement of distribution cases 
cannot be assessed. 
b)Advisory Committee 162 
As noted in the discussion of horizontal cartels, some disquiet exists regarding the 
exact role of the Advisory Committee and its impact upon defence rights 163. The issue 
of greatest concern has been the non-disclosure of the Committee's opinion. Two 
cases in the study questioned the confidential nature of this report. In Distillers, AG 
Warner expressed unease regarding the secrecy surrounding the entire consultation 
process, particularly the Committee's failure to disclose its opinion. He questioned 
whether this was consistent with the fundamental principles of Community law. The 
Court here requested disclosure of the opinion in order to check for procedural 
irregularities, but they had to undertake not to disclose it to the defendants before 
access was permitted "'. MDT asserted that the requirement that the Committee's 
report should remain cofidential should be construed to allow confidential disclosure 
to the undertakings involved. The ECJ dismissed this argument, holding that defence 
rights were limited to an obligation of integral fairness only. By doing this, the 
Court were able to rule that non-disclosure of the opinion did not breach defence 
rights16s 
Also the quality of the Committee's decision-making has been called into 
question. Evidence suggests that DGIV is able to manipulate the evidence going 
before the Committee. In Distillers, defendants complained that the Committee did 
not have the full facts before them as several important documents were not disclosed 
to the Committee. The Court here were not required to rule to procedural issues, but 
given the ECJ's approach to the Committee's opinion in MDF as being irrelevant to 
defence rights, it is unlikely that the challenge in Distillers would have succeeded ". 
A final challenge to DGIV's consultation with the Advisory Committee came in 
Vichy, who claimed that DGIV's failure to consult the Committee prior to taking an 
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Art. 15(6) decision breached their fundamental rights. The Court upheld the 
Commission. Again, defence rights were simply based on a requirement of procedural 
fairness under which consultation with the Committee was not an issue167. 
The concerns regarding the unreviewable nature and the quality of the 
Committee decision-making have been discussed in depth in Chapter 6. This study 
shows the same problems occurring in the context of distribution cases. Again, the 
secrecy of the procedure and the lack of evidence as to the precise influence of the 
Committee's opinion makes it difficult to assess its impact on defence rights. 
Certainly, there is no evidence to suggest it protects defence rights, but evidence does 
exist indicating that it may infringe defendants' safeguards. Of particular concern is 
evidence suggesting that DGIV is able and willing to manipulate evidence going before 
the Committee. Why DGIV would do this if the Committee's opinion was of no 
relevance to the Commission's decision, as both DGIV and the ECJ insist, remains 
unexplained. This manipulation may have a serious impact on defendants, yet they are 
not afforded any opportunity to comment. Matters are exacerbated by the extreme 
burden placed on defendants. It is virtually impossible for defendants to show that a 
procedural irregularity altering the outcome of the case has occurred when the 
evidence proving this, ie the Committee's report, is withheld from defendants. Of 
further concern is the approach to defence rights taken by DGIV and the Court in this 
context. Both take every opportunity to place an extremely limited construction on 
the right to comment, ensuring that the Committee's opinion remains shrouded in 
secrecy. Again, one must question why. 
c)Problems relating to the SO and Decisio&68 
Here it is intended to evaluate the effect on the right to comment of problems relating 
to inconsistencies betwen the SO and the decision and resulting inadequacies in the 
reasoning of the final decision. 
Six study cases complained that their right to be heard had been infringed 
because of such problems 169. AEG argued that its right to comment was infringed 
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because the decision relied on documents not mentioned in the SO. MDF challenged 
the fact that the SO and decision were inconsistent regarding the duration of the two 
concerted practices 10. Conversely, Hasselblad complained that the reasoning in the 
decision was inadequate because it was identical to that in the SO ". 
Sympathy from the Court has been limited. In those cases concerning non- 
disclosure of relevant evidence, the Court have been willing to rule that evidence as 
inadmissible and to re-assess the decision on the basis of the remaining evidence. For 
instance, in MDF, the Court held that the defendant had not been able to comment on 
the longer duration of the violations as stated in the decision and proceeded to reassess 
the violation on the basis of the shorter duration stated in the SO 12. However, in all 
these cases, the Court took a very broad view of whether the evidence had been 
sufficiently notified in the SO "'. What the Court have not been prepared to do is to 
uphold procedural integrity as being of value in itself and to penalise DGIV by 
annulling the decision on the basis of procedural impropriety "'. Instead, the Court 
have taken the view that whilst defence rights have been infringed, the breach has 
not been sufficient to vitiate the decision 15. Consequently, only one of these cases 
questioning inconsistencies between the SO and decision had its decision partially 
annulled 16. Elsewhere, the Court have been even less sympathetic and dismissed 
complaints out of hand "'. However, the CFI's recent decision in AWS seems to 
indicate a greater willingness to tackle procedural irregularites. Here, AWS 
complained that DGIV's decision infringed Art. 190 because it failed to identify 
properly AWS's liabilty for violations following the defendant's taking over of the 
assets of another company. The CFI upheld the claim, finding that the lack of 
individuality in the reasoning of the decision meant that the decision did not contain 
sufficient detail to establish the defendant's liability "$. As a result, the CFI annulled 
the decision insofar as it related to AWS. 
The broad scope of Art. 190 and the Court's previous willingness to uphold 
decisions breaching defence rights provides little effective protection for defendants. 
As a result, Art. 190 regularly exercises little accountability over DGIV's decision- 
making. Permitted inconsistencies between the SO and the decision mean that the case 
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the defendant comments upon and the one he is convicted upon are not necessarily 
identical. This situation clearly limits the effectiveness of the defendant's right to 
comment. But, the situation is not entirely bleak. The CFI's approach in AWS shows 
that, where the Court is willing, Art. 190 can exact telling control over DGIV. 
In summary, although the defendant's right to comment at trial stage is recognised, 
DGIV seeks to limit its effectiveness in a number of respects. Whilst, the study 
discloses no appeals relating to the HO, this lack of challenge cannot be taken as an 
indicating an absence of problems. It may simply be due to the more compliant 
attitude of defendants involved in distribution cases. Indeed, a general absence of 
defence challenge has been a significant feature of this examination of defence rights in 
vertical cases. Problems relating to the effect of the Advisory Committee on 
defendants' protections have been noted. DGIV is able to control the quality and 
quantity of evidence going before the Committee which necessarily influences the 
Committee's opinion. This treatment has received the support of the Court. Together 
with the considerable evidential burden placed on defendants, this ensures that the 
consultation process remains shrouded in secrecy. Matters affecting the ultimate 
decision may be discussed without defendants even knowing about them, let alone 
having the opportunity to comment upon them. As such, the Advisory Committee 
offers no protection to defendants, rather it may pose a significant threat to their 
fundamental safeguards. The examination of distribution cases has revealed further 
evidence of discrepancies between the SO and the decision. Although there is no 
evidence here of the Commission altering the legal characterisation of violations as 
revealed in horizontal cartels, DGIV still attempts to use the latitude of Art. 190 to its 
advantage. On occasion, it has taken the opportunity to extend the scope and gravity 
of offences by including information in decisions not notified to defendants. Whilst the 
Court have not supported blatant breaches, its earlier attitude towards procedural 
irregularities demonstrates a belief that effective enforcement is more important than 
the defendant's right to comment. Whilst these problems do little to enhance the 
effectiveness of the defendant's right to be heard, they do benefit the Commission, 
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enabling it to dominate the latter stages of enforcement unhindered by the opinions of 
others or by procedural requirements. The CFI's more recent approach to procedural 
matters provides a refreshing contrast, seeming to indicate an increased willingness to 
insist upon procedural integrity. 
L)CONCLUSION - TRIAL AND SENTENCE 
It is now necessary to summarise the character and scope of DGIV's powers and the 
defendant's rights at trial stage noting their respective value as enforcement resources. 
The study has illustrated the Commission's continuing control of enforcement and has 
highlighted the enormous discretion enjoyed by DGIV regarding both the type and 
level of sanction imposed and the factors influencing that assessment. Here, DGIV has 
used its powers penally to exert long-term control over undertakings. Its decision- 
making has been directed specifically towards assisting the integration goal. The 
Commission's criminal classification of offences, its case construction and formalistic 
analysis have had a profound effect on the exercise of its sanctioning powers. Not 
only have they affected the fining assessment, augmenting the gravity and duration of 
violations, but they also allow the sanctioning decision to take place in the absence of 
thorough market analysis. Specifically, DGIV's formalistic evaluation means that the 
Commission's fining assessment is based largely on assumptions of the anti-competitive 
nature and effect of undertakings' behaviour. Whilst the resulting lack of explicit 
reasoning has caused problems for defendants, the ambiguity it creates has benefited 
DGIV by concealing its decision-making from effective review. As such, this use of 
the 'law as a resource' permits the conviction and punishment of conduct jeopardising 
the integration goal. DGIV's formalism ensures that this outcome is achieved by the 
most pragmatic route. 
In contrast with the Commission's considerable penal powers, defendants are in 
a significantly weaker position. DGIV again uses its control of enforcement to curtail 
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both the scope of defendants' protections and the influence of others involved in the 
process. Both the defendant's right to an independent tribunal and the right to 
comment are based on a requirement of integral fairness. As a result, defendants are 
unable to insist upon judgement by an independent arbiter. The effectiveness of the 
defendant's right to be heard is equally limited. Defendants often face difficulties in 
preventing or rectifying inconsistencies between the SO/decision, inadequately 
reasoned decisions or the questionable influence of the Advisory Committee. DGIV's 
discretion is also used to dominate other personnel in the process, thereby eliminating 
possible interference with the Commission's construction of conviction. In this way, 
DGIV is able to isolate defendants and control their knowledge and ability to comment 
upon the case against them. 
In the past, DGIV's interpretation of defendants' rights has received the clear 
support of the Court. For both Commission and Court effective enforcement often 
appears to outrank due process. The tougher stance of the CFI to procedural matters 
leaves much resting on their continued preparedness to exact telling control over 
DGIV's activities. 
Overall, significant discrepancies exist between the Commission's ability and 
willingness to impose criminal sanctions and the defendant's attenuated procedural 
protections. The Commission's continued domination of the process has been assisted 
by a notable absence of defence challenges to DGIV's use of its sanctioning powers. 
This disparity is of clear benefit to the Commission, allowing the unhindered pursuit of 
political and pragmatic goals. In so doing, it concludes the final stage in DGIV's 
incremental use of the 'law as a resource', improving conviction prospects appreciably 
and assisting the punishment of conduct endangering these goals. 
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M)CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALOGY - TRIAL AND SENTENCE 
Having considered DGIV's application of enforcement powers at trial and sentence, it 
is now necessary to draw a criminological analogy. A full analogy of the two 
jurisdictions' approach to enforcement at this stage has been undertaken in Chapter 6. 
Thus, this section will briefly compare and contrast the approach of the justice system 
with DGIV's treatment of distribution arrangements, assessing the Commission's 
enforcement approach against the main criminal justice models. 
DGIV's sanctioning of distribution agreements closely resembles the sentencing 
approach of the English criminal justice system. Both systems control enforcement 
and employ their penal powers to construct the legal context to suit their enforcement 
requirements. Both possess considerable sentencing powers and exercise wide 
discretion over the type and level of sanction and the factors influencing that decision. 
Both allow the sentencing assessment to be open to bias from a range of extra-legal 
influences, often resulting in the arbitrary application of sanctioning powers. 
Moreover, each employs case construction to reinforce the gravity of the offence and 
justify the imposition of penal sanctions. Finally, in each system the ambiguity 
surrounding the sanctioning process is used to conceal arbitrary practice and possible 
injustice from incisive review. 
Similar attitudes to the permitted extent of defence safeguards are evident. 
Each jurisdiction ensures that defence rights are tailored to prevent interference with 
prosecution and conviction. Consequently, in neither process can defendants be sure of 
judgement by independent tribunal. The composition and attitudes of the tribunal and 
the effects of case construction leave the scope of this protection at the discretion of 
the system. Each process takes steps to limit the effectiveness of the right to be heard, 
further exacerbating the disclosure problems encountered at the prosecution stage. 
Attitudes to defence rights disclose that neither system places a high value of 
procedural propriety. Courts in both jurisdictions have shown themselves prepared to 
place enforcement needs before due process. Once again, the disparity between the 
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systems significant sanctioning powers and the restricted defence safeguard is 
apparent. 
The problems and consequences of such an approach have been explored fully 
in the horizontal context, therefore they need not be examined further here "'. As 
already noted, both DGIV and the English criminal process bear considerable 
resemblance to the crime control model. These crime control features are equally 
evident in DGIV's treament of distribution cases. Specifically, the Commission uses its 
sanctioning powers punitively and ensures that neither the defendant nor others 
involved in the process are able to impede the prosecution momentum by promoting 
defence rights over enforcement needs. All possible steps are taken to limit the scope 
and effectiveness of challenges to DGIV's case. Finally, the Court's repeated refusal to 
annul for procedural breach discloses its crime control belief that the end justifies the 
means. Successful enforcement is more important than due process. Clearly, at trial 
stage, the crime control rationale dominates the Commission's thinking suggesting that 
the problems currently being experienced within the English criminal process may soon 
become a common feature of EC competition law. 
I Basketball player Dalc Berra rcfcrring to his father, Yogi. 
2 For background information, see : Whish Competition Law Buttcrworths (1993) at pp 311- 
312 ; Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law : Practice and Procedure in UK and 
EEC Graham and Trotman (1986) at pp 304-315 ; Harding EC Investigations and Sanctions : 
The Supranational Control ofBusiness Delinquency Leicester Unv. Press (1993) Ch6 ; Kerse EC 
Antitrust Procedure (3rd Edn) Sweet and Maxwell (1994) at paras 6.53-6.63 ; Van Bael 'The 
Antitrust Settlement Procedure of the EC Commission' CMLR [1986] 61 ; Van Bael 
Transparency of EC Commission Proceedings' in SLOT and MCDONNELL (Eds) Procedure and 
Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 192 ; Waelbrock'New 
Forms of Settlement of Antitrust Cases and Procedural Safeguards : Is Regulation 17 Falling into 
Abeyance? ' E, LR [1986] 268 ; Temple Lang The Procedure of the Commission in Competition 
Cases' CMLR [1977] 155 ; Bourgeois 'Undertakings in EC Competition Law' in SLOT and 
MCDONNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and 
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The cases under consideration here are National Panasonic, Viho, Dunlop/Slazenger, John 
Deere, Fisher Price, BL, Tippex, Sandoz, Distillers, Ideal and Grohe. Whether these cases indeed received plea-bargains is far from clear. They are being considered here on the basis that 
they display some or all of the features common to plea-bargained cases ie admission of guilt, co- 
operation with prosecuti6n, the giving of undertakings and a concomitant reduction in fines. 
From a reading of the cases, a definite bargains seems to have occurred in Viho (Commission 
decision) at pp 185-187, National Panasonic (Commission decision) at p 508 and Dunlop/Slazenger at pp 366,372. In John Deere at p 563, BL at p 100 and Fisher Price at p 559, 
the status of these cases as plea-bargains is unclear, though there is some evidence of a possible 
bargain. In each instance, their co-operative attitude was noted, conduct was terminated and fines 
were reduced accordingly, seeming to indicate some form of bargain. In addition, both Fisher 
Price and John Deere instituted compliance ptrogrammcs. However, Van Bael in The Antitrust 
Settlement Procedure of the EC Commission' CMLR [1986] 61 at pp 66-67, treats BL and John 
Deere as formally prosecuted. But, for the reasons outlined above, this study will treat them as 
possible plea-bargains. The situation is even less clear in Tippex (Commission decision) at p 442, 
Sandoz (Commission decision) at p 635,637, Distillers at p 2277, Ideal at p 639, and Grohe at p 
615. Here some features such as co-operation and mitigation of fines seems to have occurred, but 
the lack of clarity in DGIV's sanctioning assessments means that it is difficult to determine where 
to draw the line between a bargained case and simple mitigation of a fine. In order to cover both 
possibilities, some limited consideration of these cases as possible bargains will be given here. 
See Appendix B, Table 2, Cases 17-23, is : 
1) Murat [ 1984] 1 CMLR 219 (hereafter referred to as Murat) ; 
2)1BM [1984] 2 CMLR 342 (hereafter referred to as IBM) ; 
3)VilleroyBoch [1988] 4 CMLR 461 (hereafter referred to as VilleroyBoch) ; 
4)Kenwood Electronics [199314 CMLR 389 (hereafter referred to as Kenivood) ; 
S)Schott Ziviesel Glaswerke [1993] 5 CMLR 85 (hereafter referred to as SZG) ; 
6)Alja Romeo 14th Report on Competition Policy 1984 at p 70 (hereafter referred to 
asAlfa) ; 
7)F, iat 14th Report on Competition Policy 1984 at p 71 (hereafter referred to as 
Fiat). 
These cases have been selected in the absence of sufficient concrete information on the 
Commission's settlement of comfort letters as they provide an excellent demonstration of DGIV's 
negotiation and modification of vertical cases. All cases except Kenwood and SZG have been 
negatively cleared. These two remaining cases await full clearance. In both cases, the 
Commission notice has indicated that it intends to take a favourable view. Of course, many 
exclusive distribution agreements receive exemption under Reg. 1983/83. It is not proposed to 
deal with these as again non-publication of such exemptions makes it impossible to discuss the 
detail of individual cases. For further discussion of the general approach to exclusive distribution 
block exemption, see Whish Competition Law at pp 566-574 ; Korah and Rothnie Exclusive 
Distribution and the EEC Competition Rules Sweet and Maxwell (1992). 
Sec Ch7 supra for the discussion of the classification and analysis of distribution cases. 
Viho (Commission decision) at pp 180,187 and also Dunlop/Slazenger at p 373. Both cases 
were regarded as serious infringements because they undermined Single Market integration. In 
both instances however, the firms admitted the violation. Dunlop/Slazenger gave undertakings as 
to future conduct, whilst Viho instituted a compliance programme. Viho (Commission decision) at 
p 187, was praised for its "very constructive attitude". See also Tippex (Commission decision) at p 
442 and Fisher Price at p 559. 
7 Sec for instance, Villeroy Boch at p 469, IBA1 at p 345, Kenwood at p 391 and SZG at p 85. 
8 See discussion of the ambit of Art. 85(1) in relation to selective distribution systems in Ch7 
supra. 
9 Sec SZG at p 86, Kenwood at p 391, Alfa at p 70, IBM at pp 345-347, Fiat at p 71 and Murat 
at p 222. 
lo See SZG at p 86, Kenwood at p 319, Murat at p 223 and Vi/leroy Boch at p 470. 
11 See IBS! at pp 345-347, SZG at p 86 and Kenwood at p 391, IBM at pp 345-347 and 
Vil/croy Boch at pp 465-496 respectively. 
12 See Villeroy Boch and Murat. 
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13 Villeroy Boch at p 469. A similar approach was taken in Murat at p 223, regarding a 
minimum stocking requirement. Other offending clauses in these agreements were negotiated and 
modified. 
14 See SZG at p 86, Kenwood at p 391, Murat at p 222, IBM at pp 345-347, Villeroy Boch at 
pp 465-496, Alfa at p 65 and Fiat at p 65. 
15 See the discussion of negotiated settlements in horizontal cases in Ch5 supra for further 
details of these influencing factors. This section will principally compare and contrast DGIV's 
approach between plea-bargained and negatively cleared cases, though where appropriate, other 
formally prosecuted cases will be referred to. 
16 Fiat, Alfa, SZG, Kenwood, Villeroy Boch, IBA1 and Murat all underwent modifcation. In 
Viho (Commission decision) at p 185, National Panasonic (Commission decision) at p 508, 
John Deere at p 563 Fisher Price at p 559 and BL at p 100, conduct was terminated. In addition, 
in the borderline cases of Tippex (Commission decision) at p 442, Sandoz (Commission decision) 
at p 637, the behaviour was terminated, whilst agreements in Ideal and Grohe were modified. 
17 Dunlop/Slazenger at pp 366,372. Here DSI admitted offence and gave undertakings as to 
future conduct in mitigation of fines. Of course, if BL and John Deere are regarded as fully 
enforced cases, then the converse is also true. Termination will not automatically result in 
informal settlement. 
1s See the negatively cleared cases of SZG, Kenwood, Alfa, Fiat and Murat ; the bargained 
cases of Viho, National Panasonic, Dunlop/Slazenger, John Deere, BL and Fisher Price and the 
formally prosecuted cases of Pioneer/MDF, camera Care/Hasselblad, Ford and AEG. In 
addition, the borderline cases of Tippex, Sandoz and Distillers also involved similar restrictions. 
19 See Chard 'The Economics of the Application of Art. 85 to Selective Distribution Systems' 
E, LR [1982] 83 on the Commission's approach to price discrimination etc. 
20 The negatively cleared cases were SZG and IBM. Viho, National Panasonic, 
Dunlop/Slazenger, John Deere, Fisher Price, and BL were bargained/possibly bargained, whilst 
AEG, Camera Care/Hasselblad, Ford and Pioneerht'IDF were prosecuted. In addition, the 
marginal cases of Distillers, Sandoz and Tippex used similar tactics. 
21 As noted earlier, these two cases may have been the subjects of some bargaining during the 
prosecution process. The notified agreement in Vichy imposed a similar quantitative restriction 
and was not only prosecuted but had its immunity against fining lifted. 
22 Kenwood, IBM, Villeroy Boch and SZG imposed excessive restrictions and DGIV considered 
the systems open to abuse and discrimination. These cases were negotiated and modified. In 
contrast, customer restrictions exceeding objective necessity in Ideal and Grohe were formally 
prosecuted and modification obtained. Whilst the discriminatory application of existing 
distribution systems in Vichy, Ford andAEG were prosecuted in full. 
23 See Harding EC Investigations and Sanctions at p 100. 
24 Murat, IBM, villeroy Boch, Kenwood, SZG, Alfa and Fiat were negatively cleared. Cf the 
formally prosecuted cases of Grohe, Ideal, Distillers, Vichy, Ford, AEG and Camera Care. In 
Grohe, Ideal and Distillers, a tacit bargain may have occurred. In Distillers, the Commission 
delayed enforcing a decision against Distillers until the undertaking had established itself on the 
market as a means of resolving a conflict between economic needs and integration needs. See 
discussion by Whish Competition Law at pp 565-566. 
25 See Alfa at p 66, Fiat at p 65, Murat at pp 222-223, IBM at pp 345,347, Kenwood at p 391, 
SZG at p 85, Villeroy Boch at p 465,467. 
26 Viho (Commission decision) at p 187 and National Panasonic (Commission decision) at p 
508, were praised for their "very constructive attitude". The co-operation of Dunlop/Slazenger, 
John Deere and Fisher Price was also noted. All these firms either instituted compliance 
programmes, modified the agreement or gave undertakings as to future conduct. 
27 See BL at p 100. Also the marginal cases of Tippex (Commission decision) at p 442, 
Sandoz (Commission decision) at pp 635,637, Ideal at p 639 and Grohe at p 615. In the 
latter two cases, no fine was imposed. In Sandoz, the firms co-operation only earned a reduction 
in fines on appeal to the Court. In Distillers, the agreement Evas modified. Here DGIV delayed 
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enforcing the decision against Distillers until the undertaking had established itself on the 
market. 
28 Ford (Commission decision) at p 604. 
29 Information on this section is derived from : Green Commercial Agreements and 
Competition Law at pp 304-315 ; Harding EC Investigations and Sanctions Ch6 ; Whish 
Competition Law at pp 311-312 ; Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at paras 6.53-6.63 ; Bourgeois 
'Undertakings in EC Competition Law' ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities ! st Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7- 
1) HMSO at pp 17-19 ; Written Submissions by Reynolds, JWP, Ehlerman, Lever and Forwood to 
the Select Committee, Minutes of Evidence Reynolds at p9; p 62 ; pp 112,121,142,147 ;p 61 
and p 208 respectively. Sec also, Waelbrock 'New Forms of Settlement of Antitrust Cases and 
Procedural Safeguards'; Van Bael 'The Antitrust Settlement Procedure of the EC Commission' ; 
Van Bael 'Transparency of EC Commission Proceedings' ; D. Stevens 'The Comfort Letter : Old 
Problems, New Developments' ECLR [1994] 81 ; Korah 'Comfort Letters - Reflections on the Perfume Cases' ELR [1981] 14 ; Korah 'Selective Distribution' ECLR [1994] 10 ; Gyselen 
'Publication Policy of the Commission with Regard to Comfort Letters' in SLOT and 
MCDONNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and 
Maxwell (1993) p 217. 
30 Although no comfort letters are included in the study, it is appropriate to consider their 
legal value as they form an important element of the Commission's enforcement policy, 
particularly in vertical cases. 
31 This much has long been acknowledged by the Commission. See 5th Report on Competition 
Policy 1975 at p 9. 
32 Perfumes [1980] ECR 2327. Previous examination in Frubo v Commission [1975] ECR 
563, held that comfort letters did not bind the Commission. Also see, De. B/oos v Bouyer [1977] 
ECR 2359. Although the Court here were not required to rule on the matter, AG Mayras at p 
2376, considered that comfort letters were not "acts" within the meaning of Art. 173 of the Treaty. 
33 Three main issues required clarification : i)the legal nature of comfort letters ; ii)whether a 
national court was bound by a comfort letter, and ; iii)the effect of comfort letters on provisional 
validity. 
34 Perfumes [1980] ECR 2327 at paras 11-18, though the ECJ considered that national courts 
should take the Commission's views into account. Lord McKenzie Stuart 'Legitimate Expectation 
and Estoppel' LIE[ [1983] 53, argues that it would be difficult for the Commission to re-open the 
file in the absence of evidence suggesting a fundamental change in circumstances. However, it 
was held that comfort letters do affect provisional validity. The implications of this will not be 
addressed here as it does not affect any of the cases in the study. For a thorough critique, see 
Korah 'Comfort Letters' ; Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure Ch10 and Kon 'Article 85 Paragraph 3 
A Case for Application by National Courts' CMLR [1982] 541. 
's Sec Kerse ECAntitrust Procechre at para 6.56, who points out that what is important is the 
legal effect on the addressee. See also criticism by D. Stevens 'The Comfort Letter' and Korah 
'Comfort Letters'. Stevens at p 83, suggests that the ECJ evaded the issue because giving comfort 
letters "decision" status would have raised several problems relating to the question of delegation 
and its reviewability under Art. 173 of the Treaty. Most importantly, it would have given comfort 
letters a legality never intended by the Commission. 
36 D. Stevens 'The Comfort Letter' at p 83. Art. 189 of the Treaty provides that regulations, 
directives and decision may form the basis of an Art. 173 Treaty of Rome 1957 action. 
37 Cf the comments of AG Mayras in De Bloos v Bowyer [1977] ECR 2359 and the decision in 
Re ERTA : EC Conunision v EC Council [1971] CMLR 335, which established that "acts" could 
extend beyond regulations and decisions and that judicial review should be available against all 
measures taken by Community institutions. Comfort letters would be regarded as "measures" 
here. Also, IBM v Commission [ 1981] 3 CMLR 635 which advocated a liberal interpretation of 
"act" under Art. 173 of the Treaty focusing on substance rather than format. See discussion by 
D. Stevens 'The Comfort Letter' at pp 82-84. 
38 The aim here was to enhance the legal value of these comfort letters by publishing the 
essential contents of agreements in appropriate cases so allowing third parties to comment. See 
12th Report on Competition Policy 1982 at pt 30 ; 13th Report on Competition Policy 1983 at p 
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72 ; Practice Note OJ [1982] C343/4. Discussed by Waelbrock 'New Forms of Settlement of 
Antitrust Cases and Procedural Safeguards'. 
39 In 1990 only three were issued ; in 1991, five were issued and in 1992, only eight. See 20th, 
21st, 22nd Reports on Competition Policy 1990,1991,1992 at p 73 ;p 60 and p 62 respectively. 
See also, Appendix B, Table 8 for further statistical details of DGIV's use of comfort letters. 
40 Under Art. 2. Under Art. 19(3), the Commission must publish its intention to grant negative 
clearance in order to give interested parties opportunity to comment. An application for negative 
clearance alone does not provide immunity from fines under Art. 15(5). In practice, this is not a 
problem as most notifications apply for both negative clearance and/or individual exemption. Nor 
does negative clearance give immunity from the stricter application of domestic law. For further 
discussion, see Kerse ECAntitrust Procedure at paras 2.02-2.06 and Whish Competition Law at 
p 302. 
41 Discussed by Kerse ECAntitrust Procedure at para 2.06 ; Notice on Co-operation between 
National Courts and the Commission in applying Arts. 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty OJ [1993] 
C39/6 at paras 13,14. 
42 Art. 19/Reg 17 and Art. 173 of the Treaty. 
43 Van Bael 'The Antitrust Settlement Procedure of the EC Commission' ; Van Bael 
'Transparency of EC Commission Proceedings'. 
44 This is an unsurprising result in the negatively cleared cases. Firms involved are most 
unlikely to challenge a Commission decision declaring that their agreement falls outside Art. 85(l) 
or the means by which DGIV arrives at such a decision, as such an action would risk formal 
prosecution. In these cases, challenge by a third party is considerably more likely. 
45 Van Bacl in 'Transparency of EC Commission Proceedings' and Reynolds in his Written 
Submission to House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO, Minutes of 
Evidence at p 9, have both insisted that considerable scope still remains for improving the legal 
status of informal resolutions particularly comfort letters. Written Submissions by JWP and 
Fonvood to the Select Committee, Minutes of Evidence at p 62 and p 208 respectively, have 
asserted that comfort letters are at best only a partial remedy and may prove a false comfort. 
46 See D. Stcvcns 'The Comfort Letter' at p 81. 
47 See Written Submission by Ehlerman to House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 
(7,7-1) HMSO, Minutes of Evidence at p 112. 
48 Both firms operated selective distributions systems in consumer electrical goods, and in each, 
the selection criteria came under question. 
49 As well as including restrictive selection criteria which DGIV considered to be open to 
abuse, the agreement originally imposed a ban on parallel imports and a minimum turnover 
requirement. The case of Kenwood does not stand alone. See also SZG which, on notification, 
contained a ban on parallel sales, rpm, minimum turnover, stocking and promotion requirements 
50 For background information see Korah 'Selective Distribution' ; Goebel 'Metro II's 
Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules : Is This the End of the Road ?' CMLR 1987] 
605 ; Whish Competition Law at p 227 ; Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at paras 6.27-6.40 ; 
Pathak 'Art. 85 and Art. 86 and Anti-Competitive Exclusion in EC Competition Law - Part II' 
E, CLR [1989] 256 ; A. Evans 'EC Competition Law and Consumers : The Article 85(3) 
Exemption' ECLR [1987] 425 ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at 
pp 19-21 ; European Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy 
COM (96) 721 (1997). 
51 Sec Appendix B, Table 2, Cases 24-30 for the cases under consideration ie : 
I) Parfums Givenchy [1993] 5 CMLR 579 (hereafter referred to as Parfums 
Givenchy). On appeal as Case T87/921truidvat v Commission ; 
2)Yves St Laurent [1993] 4 CMLR 120 (hereafter referred to as Yves St Laurent). 
On appeal as Case T19/92 Societe GALEC v Commission and Case T99/22 Groupement dAchat 
Edouard Lecler v Commission ; 
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3)Grundig [1998] 4 CMLR 865, renewed as Grundig [1995] 4 CMLR 658 (both 
hereafter referred to as Grundig) ; 
4)Ivoclar [1988] 4 CMLR 781 (hereafter referred to as Ivoclar) ; 
5)Agence et Messageries de la Presse [1985] 3 CMLR 800, [1987] 3 CMLR 445 
(both hereafter referred to as AMP) ; 
6) Whisky and Gin [ 1986] 2 CMLR 664 (hereafter referred to as Whisky and Gin) ; 
7)Saba No 2 [1984] 1 CMLR 676 (hereafter referred to as Saba II). See also Metro 
II [1986] ECR 3021. 
Of these, Parfums Givenchy, Yves St Laurent, Ivoclar, Grundig and AMP are selective distribution 
agreements receiving full Art. 85(3) exemption. In AMP, a final decision has not yet been taken, 
though DGIV has indicated that it intends to take a favourable view of the agreement. On this, see 
AMP [1987] 3 CMLR 445. Whisky and Gin, an exclusive distribution case, received partial 
exemption under Block Exemption 1983/83 and partial individual exemption. Whilst Saba 11 
received partial negative clearance and partial Art. 85(3) exemption. 
52 See Yves St Laurent at pp 126-127, Parfums Givenchy at pp 579-580, Grundig at pp 873- 
874, Ivoclar at pp 781-782, Whisky and Gin at p 664, AMP [19871 3 CMLR 445 at pp 447-448 
and Saba 11 at p 685. Whisky and Gin, AMP and Ivoclar did not impose strict monitoring 
requirements. 
53 Yves St Laurent at pp 126-127, Pa, funus Givenchy at p 593, Whisky and Gin at p 664 and 
Ivoclar at p 785. Yves St Laurent and Paifimis Givenchy initially imposed a one year export ban 
on products not yet launched in the dealer's own territory. This was subsequently modified to a 
ban on active sales. In ivoclar, sales in other territories were limited but not prohibited entirely. 
54 Yves St Laurent at p 129, Parf uns Givenchy at p 558, Grundig at p 871 and Saba II at p 682. 
For further on this, sec complaint in Saba II by Metro II [[1986] ECR 3021 and discussion by 
Goebel 'Metro II's Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules'. 
55 Yves St Laurent at pp 137-140, Parfums Givenchy at pp 595-597, Grundig at pp 874-876, 
Ivoclar at pp 786-788, Whisky and Gin at pp 671-673, Saba II at pp 689-691. In Parfums 
Givenchy and Yves St Laurent, DGIV justified the initial one year ban arguing that it was 
necessary to permit the manufacturer to test the market. Reporting conditions were imposed in all 
but Whisky and Gin and Ivoclar. 
$6 See study cases of SZG, Kenwood, Alfa, Fiat, Murat and IBM. Here, only IBM openly 
imposed monitoring requirements. 
57 Sec particularly, Cannera Care and Dunlop/Slazenger which were treated as having an anti- 
competitive object. 
58 Grundig at p 873. 
59 AMP [1985] 3 CMLR 800. Discussed by Hendry 'The Not So Special Case of Newspapers 
and Periodicals' ELR [1986] 155. The Court argued that if price-fixing was the only means of 
bearing the economic burden arising from the return of unsold copies, and if the return of unsold 
copies was the only means of providing consumers with a wide choice of newspapers, then DGIV 
should take these factors into account when considering exemption. 
60 Rpm was allowed with regard to Belgian newspapers, though DGIV insisted that retailers be 
allowed to sell foreign newspapers at a lower price. See AMP [1987] 3 CMLR 445 at p 448. 
Discussed by Hendry 'The Not So Special Case of Newspapers and Periodicals' ; Goebel 'Metro II's 
Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules'. 
61 Though, as already seen, they received very different treatment. The export bans in Viho, 
Tippex, National Panasonic, Dunlop/Slazenger, John Deere, Fisher Price, Sandoz, BL and 
Distillers were formally prosecuted. The negatively cleared cases of SZG and IBM were 
negotiated and modified. 
62 Grundig at p 874 and Saba II at p 685. In Vi/leroy Boch, similar restrictions were held to 
fall outside Art. 85(l) as merely relating to the different functions of separate distribution 
channels. Yves St Laurent at p 130, imposed restrictions on mail order sales which DGIV also 
held to be outside Art. 85(1). 
63 Ivoclar at pp 781,785, Ideal at p 630 and Grohe at p 615. 
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64 Ivoclar at pp 785-788, Ideal at pp 635-637 and Grohe at pp 615-617. Ideal at pp 630-631, 
insisted that, as the products were semi-finished, the restriction protected the consumer from risk 
by ensuring that fitting was conducted by cmpetent professionals, thereby maintaining high 
standards. 
65 See complaints in Parfums Givenchy, Yves St Laurent, Saba 11 and Grundig. 
66 Yves St Laurent at pp 125-129,133 and Parfu, ns Givenchy at pp 580-581,588-589,591. 
Both cases had reporting requirements imposed. In both instances, third parties appeals by 
excluded dealers have been launched in Yves St Laurent by Groupenient d'Achat Edouard Lecler v 
Commission and Societe GALEC v Commission, and in Parfums Givenchy, by Kruidvat v 
Commission. 
67 See SABA II at pp 686-689, Metro II [1986] ECR 3021 at pp 3090-3093. In Grundig at p 
871, similar arguments were advanced. Discussed by Goebel 'Metro II's Confirmation of the 
Selective Distribution Rules' and Pathak'Art. 85 and Art. 86 and Anti-Competitive Exclusion'. 
68 Saba II at p 688. A number of third parties disagreed arguing that this would serve to 
undermine the integrity of the system Sec also, Villeroy Boch at p 468. In addition, in other 
negatively cleared cases, admission criteria were considered open to abuse and were negotiated 
and modified, egIBMand Kenwood. 
69 Metro 11 [1986] ECR 3021 at pp 3083-3085,3090-3093. Metro argued that all discount 
stores like itself were effectively excluded from all the distribution systems on the market. The 
Commission at p 3091, disagreed. Metro was particularly critical of DGIV's approach to 
economic analysis, specifically its reliance on limited, incomplete and outdated information. AG 
van Themat at p 3048, was equally critical, specifically of DGIV's failure to undertake a proper 
market study. In Grundig at p 877, DGIV also held that the concentration of systems had not led 
to price rigidity or discrimination against other types of outlet. 
70 AEG at pp 3197-3198. In neither AEG nor Metro II, did the Commission or Court indicate 
how many refusals constitute a systematic abuse. 
71 Yves St Laurent at p 136, Parfums Givenchy at pp 594-595, Saba II at pp 690-691 and 
Grundig at p 875. These advantages were seen to benefit the consumer. 
72 Grundig at pp 873-874,876 and Villeroy Boch at p 470, 
73 Yves St Laurent at p 125 and Parfums Givenchy at p 579. Discussed in Korah 'Selective 
Distribution'. Also Grundig, Ivoclar and Saba II imposed requirements as to stocking and 
promotion. In addition, AMP's selection criteria arc based on annual minimum turnover. See 
AMP [1987] 3 CMLR 445 at p 445. 
74 Yves St Laurent at p 129, Parfiuns Givenchy at p 588 and Saba II at p 682-683. 
75 Yves St Laurent at p 133, Parfums Givenchy at p 593, Saba II at p 685. See also Grundig, 
AMP and Ivoclar who admitted that such requirements restricted dealers' commercial freedom. 
76 Typically, DGIV found that the requirements would ensure a wide range of products were 
available, would assist in sales planning, would allow maximum exploitation of the market and 
would serve to enhance the brand image. See Grundig at pp 875-888, Ivoclar at p 786, Parfums 
Givenchy at pp 594-99, Yves St Laurent at pp 135-140, AMP [1987] 3 CMLR 445 at p 445 and 
Saba II at pp 688-690. 
77 Villeroy Boch at pp 468-469. See also SZG and K'enwood who imposed stocking and 
promotional requirements and Murat where purchasing and promotional obligations were 
required Initially, Kenwood incorporated a minimum turnover requirement. This was modified at 
the Commission's request to an annual sales plan requirement. In these cases, promotional 
requirements were seen as merely assisting in maintaining the brand image. But, in Ideal at p 
633 and Grohe at p 615, DG1V doubted the compatability with Art. 85(1) of stocking and 
promotional requirements. 
78 Grundig at p 871, Metro II [1986] ECR 3021 at pp 3086-3088. In Grundig, it was also 
doubted whether dealers in reality provided any advice or after-sales service. 
79 See IBM at p 342, Ivoclar at pp 786-788 and Ideal at p 627. 
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80 Art. 6, Art. 19(3)/Reg 17 and Art. 173 of the Treaty. 
81 Van Bael 'The Antitrust Settlement Procedure of the EC Commission' ; Van Bael 
'Transparency of EC Commission Proceedings'. See also discussion of informal resolutions earlier 
in this chapter. 
82 In Yves St Laurent and Parfums Givenchy, the undertakings were required to report to the 
Commission every two years, giving details of such matters as the size of the network, product 
range and minimum annual purchasing obligations imposed on dealers. In Yves St Laurent, a six 
year exemption was granted, whilst in Parfums Givenchy, the exemption was for five years. In 
SABA II and Grundig, annual reporting conditions required details relating to all refusals of 
admission into the network, terminations of dealerships and inspections of dealers records. Here, 
exemptions were granted for eight years and twelve years respectively. In Grundig OJ [1995] 4 
CMLR 658, DGIV extended the exemption for a further ten years subject to the same conditions. 
83 See Commission notice -AMP [1987] 3 CMLR 445 at p 448. The final decision in this case 
is awaited. In contrast, in Ivoclar, where customer restrictions were also imposed, and in Whisky 
and Gin, exemptions of 10 years were granted with no conditions imposed. In Ivoclar, DGIV's 
Art. 19(3) notice declared its intention to extend this exemption. See Ivoclar (No2) [1994] 4 
CMLR 578. 
84 See particularly, Whisky and Gin, Ivoclar and Grundig. This situation is heavily criticised 
by Goebel in 'Metro II's Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules' and Chard in 'Selective 
Distribution Systems'. The Commission would disagree. In its recent Green Paper, one of the 
perceived advantages of the present system was its ability to provide for a thorough economic 
assessment under Art. 85(3). See European Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in 
EC Competition Policy COM (96) 721 (1997) at p vii, Ch5. 
85 See discussion of qualitative/quantiative criteria in the formal prosecution of vertical cases in 
Ch7 supra. 
86 Chard 'Selective Distribution Systems' at pp 95-97 particularly. Goebel 'Metro 11's 
Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules' at p 619, also questions DGIV's justification for 
permitting quantitative criteria in some cases whilst not in others, particularly as all distribution 
systems face the same marketing problems. 
$7 Goebel 'Metro II's Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules' at pp 622,634. He 
argues that the Court have chosen to deal with substantive legal issues as fact-finding matters in 
order to support Commission decisions. 
88 Goebel 'Metro II's Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules' at pp 629-630. He also 
criticises DGIV's assumption that what benefits producers, benefits consumers, and the Court's 
willingness to uphold DGIV's inadequate market analysis and intuitive conclusions. A. Evans'EC 
Competition Law and Consumers', also asserts that the Commission has been careless of 
consumer interests. 
89 Goebel 'Metro II's Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules' at pp 626-627, who 
asserts that the reason for this reluctance is that, on finding market rigidity, it raises the problems 
of whether DGIV would be obliged to revoke existing exemptions or merely refuse the latest 
application for exemption. He argues that the only fair, though bizarre, answer would be to 
revoke all exemptions and moreover inform 'simple' selective distribution systems that they now 
infringe Art. 85(1). 
90 AEG is discussed by Goebel 'Metro II's Confirmation of the Selective Distribution Rules' at 
pp 616-618. 
91 See Ch5 supra. 
92 Sec Tippex (Commission decision) at p 441, John Deere at p 564, Ford (Commission 
decision) at p 607, Sandoz (Commission decision) at p 637, Camera Care at p 259 and Pioneer at 
p 487, where 'cease and desist'/'like effect' orders were made. In Distillers (Commission decision) 
at p 440, Dunlop/Slazenger at p 372, BL at p 100, AEG at p 3158, Fisher Price at p 559, 
National Panasonic (Commission decision) at p 507, Ideal at p 639, Grohe at p 625, Viho 
(Commission decision) at p 186 'cease and desist' orders alone were issued. The decision in Vichy 
is provisional and relates to fining immunity ; the final decision is awaited. Sec Appendix B, 
Table 7 for further details of the Commission's sanctioning decisions in the case study. 
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93 See Fisher Price, Viho, Ideal, Grohe, National Panasonic. In addition, the final decision in 
Vichy may impose further conditions. 
94 Sec Camera Care, Dunlop/Slazenger and BL. 
95 Camera Care at pp 259-261. In Dunlop/Slazenger, the Commission specifically ordered the 
termination of the export ban and pricing measures. In BL, the undertaking was required to 
inform DGIV of the measures it had taken to secure termination of the violation. 
96 In Distillers, Ford, Vichy, Ideal and Grohe as no fines were imposed, they will not be 
considered in the following evaluation. 
97 See Viho (Commission decision) at p 186. In eight of the eleven formally prosecuted cases 
receiving fines, DGIV found intent : Tippex, Fisher Price, John Deere, National Panasonic, BL, 
AEG, MDF and Camera Care. In Camera Care at p 256, the Commission held that the 
infringement had been committed "willingly and intentionally". In Sandoz (Commission 
decision) at p 637, DGIV held that the offence was probably intentional or at least "gravely 
negligent". In Dunlop/Slazenger at p 372, the formula was either "intentional or negligent". 
98 Eg in Dunlop/Slazenger at p 372, "could not have been unaware" and National Panasonic 
(Commission decision) at p 507, "should have been aware" that the conduct was a serious 
infringement of the Treaty. See also similar comments in Tippex, John Deere, Camera Care, 
Sandoz, BL, MDF, AEG, Vi/: o and Fisher Price. 
99 Sec John Deere at p 563, Tippex (Commission decision) at p 442, Camera Care at p 256, 
Sandoz (Commission decision) at p 637, Viho (Commission decision) at p 186, Dunlop/Slazenger 
at p 372, Fisher Price at p 559, National Panasonic (Commission decision) at p 507, MDF at p 
1903, BL at p 100 and AEG at p 3158. AEG appealed unsuccessfully against DGIV's finding of 
the systematic nature of its conduct. In John Deere, the fact that the firm had received legal 
advice indicating the illegal nature of the conduct was used as evidence of intent. 
100 MDF at pp 1902-1903. 
101 On this, see Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at paras 7.19-7.23 ; Harding EC Investigations 
and Sanctions at pp 86-87 ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist 
Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO 
Reynolds 'EC Commission Policy on Fines' ECLR [1992] 263. 
102 All formally prosecuted cases receiving a fine were treated this way. Issues relating to the 
gravity of the violation veers discussed in Dunlop/Slazenger at pp 372-374, National Panasonic 
(Commission decision) at pp 506-507, Camera Care at pp 256-259, Tippex (Commission 
decision) at pp 441-442, Sandoz (Commission decision) at p 638, Viho (Commission decision) at 
pp 186-187, Fisher Price at pp 558-559, John Deere at pp 563-634, BL at p 100, MDF at pp 
1902-1905 and AEG at pp 3158-3159. 
103 Sec Tippex, Camera Care, Sandoz, MDF, National Panasonic, Viho, Dunlop/Slazenger, 
Fisher Price and AEG. Indeed, in several cases, the producer bore the sole responsibility - 
Sandoz, Fisher Price, National Panasonic, BL, AEG and Viho. 
104 Eg AWS in Dunlop/Slazenger ; Ilford, Telos and Prolux in Camera Care ; Beirsdorf in 
Tippex. 
105 Eg Toyco in Fisher Price, Pinguin in Dunlop/Slazenger, Noric and Polack in Camera Care 
and dealers involved in John Deere and Tippex cases. 
106 This appeared to be the attitude taken by DGIV in Dunlop/Slazenger, Camera Care and 
Tippex, where large fines were imposed on producers, smaller fines were levied against 
distributors who had played a subsiduary but active role under coercion, but no fines on other 
dealers who had acceeded to pressure. 
107 Fisher Price at pp 558-559 and Dunlop/Slazenger at pp 372-374. On appeal in AWS, the 
CFI annulled DGIV's decision in Dunlop/Slazenger insofar as it related to AWS because of 
irregularities relating to Art. 190. 
108 Dunlop/Slazenger at pp 372-374. As a result, DSI's fine was substantially larger than fines 
imposed on other firms for similar offences, eg Viho, who chose to co-operate with DGIV. DSI 
did subsequently gave undertakings as to future behaviour. See also Sandoz (Commission 
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decision) at p 638, who had several opportunities to remove the words "export ban" from invoices 
and failed to do so. This was viewed as aggravating conduct. 
109 Ie John Deere, Tippex, Camera Care, Sandoz, Viho, Dunlop/Slazenger, Fisher Price, 
National Panasonic, BL, AEG and MDF In Camera Care at p 256, DGIV noted that Hasselblad 
and HGB had acted with "particular zeal". 
110 Vlho (Commission decision) at p 187, Sandoz (Commission decision) at p 638 and 
Dunlop/Slazenger at 374. Elsewhere, long duration has been viewed as an aggravating factor, eg 
John Deere at p 564, Camera Care at p 256, MDF at p 1902, AEG at p 3158, BL at p 100 and 
Fisher Price at pp 558-559. 
111 MDF at pp 1902-1905. As noted in an earlier chapter, the ECJ went on to outline the 
relevant factors the Commission should take into account. This is discussed in detail in relation to 
the gravity of horizontal offences in Cl16 supra. AEG at p 3220, also complained that the fine was 
excessive given the isolated nature of the infringing conduct. 
112 Kerse ECAntitrust Procedure at paras 7.18,7.21 and 7.24. 
113 Camera Care at p 256. A similar attitude was seen in Tippex (Commission decision) at p 
442, John Deere at p 564, Sandoz (Commission decision) at p 638, MDF at pp 1904-1905, 
Viho (Commission decision) at p 187, Dunlop/Slazenger at p 374, Fisher Price at p 559, National 
Panasonic (Commission decision) at p 507, BL at p 100 and AEG at p 3159. 
114 Compare particularly, Viho and Dunlop/Slazenger who were both accused of the same 
violation, but Dun/op/Slazenger was fined twice as much as Viho. These anomalies are discussed 
and criticised by Reynolds in his Written Submission to House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 
1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO, minutes of Evidence at pp 39-40. 
115 Though this is normally an aggravating factor. In Sandoz (Commission decision) at p 629, 
the firm was described as a multi-national company of major importance on all continents. 
Tippex (Commission decision) at p 428, was described as a medium-sized firm with a strong, but 
not dominant, position on the market. Similar comments were made in Camera Care, John 
Deere, AEG, BL, MDF,, National Panasonic, Fisher Price, Dunlop/Slazenger and Viho. 
116 Camera Care at p 234. 
117 Eg Tippex (Commission decision) at p 442, Viho (Commission decision) at p 187 and John 
Deere at p 564. 
118 Camera Care at p 257. Though elsewhere, it did state that market partitioning was 
inherently detrimental to price and therefore to consumers. See also comments above relating to 
the importance of the product. In Fisher Price at p 559, DGIV noted that the effects of the 
conduct had been progressively reduced but did not state what the effects were. 
119 See also camera Care at p 234, discussed above. As export bans seek to maintain price 
differentials between MS, the same harmful effect would result from all conduct under 
consideration. 
120 Viho and Fisher Price are typical examples of the Commission's bland approach. 
121 John Deere at p 563. 
122 Sandoz (Commission decision) at p 638. Also in MDF, it was argued that the Commission's 
authorisation under Art. 115 Treaty for France excluding Japanese hi-fi products from Community 
treatment justified the annullment of the fine. The ECJ, at paras 99-100, rejected the submission. 
123 Eg Tippex (Commission decision) at p 442, where it was held that such infringements 
"substantially impede the integration of the markets of the Community". Other cases like 
Dunlop/Slazenger at p 373, refer to such violations as undermining "one of the fundamental 
objectives of the Treaty". 
124 Kerse ECAntitrust Procedure at para 7.25. 
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125 Both fines were reduced on appeal. Sandozs fine was reduced to 500,000 ECU and MDF's 
to 3.2m ECU. A similar anomaly exists between Viho who received a 2m ECU fine for a 14 year 
violation and Dunlop/Slazenger who were fined 5.150,000m ECU for a seven year offence. It 
appears that the only difference here is that Dunlop/Slazenger contested the Commission's 
finding, whilst Viho co-operated and instituted a compliance programme. See Appendix B, Table 
7 for details of the duration of violations and sanctions imposed in the study. 
126 InAEG, an offence of 3'/2 years received a lm ECU fine whilst inMDF, an offence of 2m- 
3 years received a 6,950,000m ECU fine, reduced to 3.2m ECU on appeal. Other dissimilarities 
exist. In Camera Care, a six year violation received a 755,000 ECU fine reduced to 670,000 ECU 
on appeal. Whilst in John Deere, a seven year offence received a 2m ECU sanction. 
127 Eg Viho (1992) a 2m ECU fine, Dunlop/Slazenger (1993) a 5.1in ECU fine and AEG (1983) 
a Im ECU fine. Similarly, large fines were levied in MDF (1983) a 6.9m ECU fine, and John 
Deere (1985) a 2m ECU sanction. 
128 This is particularly so in the case of Sandoz, though DSI in Dunlop/Slazenger did receive the 
largest fine (5m ECU) imposed here on a single firm and thus is more consistent with DGIV's use 
of the'law as a resource' in sanctioning. 
129 Vi/to was a clear plea-bargain. In Sandoz and Dunlop/Slazenger, the situation is much less 
clear, but in mitigation, both admitted the offence. Sandoz co-operated with DGIV, as did 
Dunlop/Slazenger, though only in the latter stages of the case. 
130 See Kcrse ECAntitrust Procedure at para 7.34 et seq. 
13' Eg in Sandoz and John Deere. See earlier discussion in this chapter of the gravity of the 
offence for further consideration of anti-competitive impact. Also in Tippex (Commission 
decision) at pp 442-443, the fact that Tippex had taken time and money to penetrate the market 
seemed to be a mitigating factor. 
132 Fisher Price at pp 558-559. Similarly in Dunlop/Slazenger, whilst the export ban here was 
general, the fact that, in practice, it only affected a limited range of products was taken into 
account. 
133 For further, sec earlier discussion of the gravity of violations. See particularly DGIV's 
treatment of parties in Dunlop/Slazenger, Camera Care and Tippex. 
134 Eg the fine imposed on AWS in Dunlop/Slazenger was reduced. But, in Fisher Price, Toyco 
received no fine. 
135 See particularly, the approach in Dunlop/Slazenger, Camera Care, Tippex, Fisher Price and 
John Deere. 
136 See Tippex, John Deere, Sandoz, Viho, Dunlop/Slazenger, Fisher Price, National Panasonic, 
BL. In particular, the constructive attitudes of Viho and National Panasonic were noted. In 
Sandoz, the firm's co-operation was only rewarded on appeal. 
137 AEG at pp 3158-3159 and John Deere at pp 563-564. 
138 For a thorough discussion of the background to the Commission's fining policy, see Ch6 
supra. 
139 Camera Care at p 258. In MDF at para 115, the ECJ upheld the need for fines to reflect 
elements of individual and general deterrence. 
140 See eg Dunlop/Slazenger at pp 372-374, Viho (Commission decision) at pp 186-187, Fisher 
Price at pp 558-559. 
141 Art. 15(2). Discussed by Kerse ECAntilrust Procedure at paras 7.26-7.30. 
142 See cg Dunlop/Slazenger at pp 372-374, AEG at pp 3158-3159, BL at p 100, National 
Panasonic (Commission decision) at pp 506-507, Fisher Price at pp 558-559, Viho (Commission 
decision) at pp 186-187, John Deere at pp 563-564, Tippex (Commission decision) at pp 441-442. 
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143 Sandoz (Commission decision) at pp 637-638. DGIV made no reference to the profits 
accruing from the violation. 
144 Camera Care at p 258. 
143 MDF at paras 113-115. Defendants argued that DGIV's approach was particularly unfair as 
the goods involved comprised only a small part of the total turnover. 
146 MDF, in particular, at para 121. Here, the ECJ upheld the legality of taking global turnover 
into account. The Court envisaged a balancing act between total turnover and turnover of goods 
involved, On this, see Ch6 supra for further discussion of DGIV's assessment of fines in 
horizontal cartels. 
147 The eleven cases were Tippex, Fisher Price, National Panasonic, BL, AEG, MDF, John 
Deere, Sandoz, Vfho, Dunlop/Slazenger and Camera Care. Decisions alone were made in the 
remaining five cases. The decision in Vichy is an interim one. See Appendix B, Table 7 for full 
details of the fines imposed. 
148 For more detailed consideration of these discrepancies, see the discussion of DGIV's 
assessment of the duration of offences in vertical cases earlier in this chapter. 
149 The Commission's generous attitude to SME's has already been noted. 
150 See particularly, Viho where TEG was fined 2m ECU and Dunlop/Slazenger where DSI was 
fined 5m ECU. As discussed earlier under the examination of the DGIV's assessment of the 
duration of offences, the precise effect of DGIV's case construction is unclear because of the lack 
of information provided by DGIV regarding the fining assessment. 
151 Sec comments in Written Submission by Reynolds to House of Lords Select Committee on 
the European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL 
Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO, Minutes of Evidence at p 7. 
152 Reynolds 'EC Commission Policy on Fines' ECLR [1992] 263 has been extremely critical of 
this. 
153 See Hasselblad at p 594, AEG at p 3220 and MDF at paras 107-112. In Hasselblad, HGB at 
p 594, complained that its fine was excessive in comparison with the fine imposed on Hasselblad 
given the difference in respective turnovers. In AJDF at p 1902, the defendant asserted that 
DGIV's approach to the assessment of gravity was arbitrary and did not reflect the nature of the 
violation or to circumstances of the case. AEG also complained of the Commission's arbitrariness. 
Here, AG Reischl at pp 3263-3270, disagreed with the Court, asserting that DGIV had 
exaggerated the gravity of the violation and had failed to obtain a reliable evaluation of the anti- 
competitive impact of the offence. In MUF and Hasselblad, fines were reduced following partial 
annullment of the Commission's decision. 
154 For background information on this section, see : Dauses 'The Protection of Fundamental 
Rights in the Community Legal Order' ELR [1985] 398 ; Mendelson 'The ECJ and Human Rights 
YBEL [1981] 125 ; Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at para 8.12 ; Van Overbeek 'The Right to 
Remain Silent in Competition Investigations : The Funke Decision of the ECHR Makes Revision 
of the ECJ's Caselaw Necessary' ECLR [ 1994] 127. 
155 See the discussion of the defendant's right to an independent tribunal in horizontal cartels in 
Ch6 supra. 
156 MDF at p 1879 and p 1880 respectively. 
157 MDF at pp 1879-1880. The Court asserted that MDF had misunderstood the nature of the 
Commission's procedure. But, the Court acknowledged that DGIV was bound to observe 
procedural requirements of Community law, ic it must give defendant an opportunity to comment 
under Art. 19(1)/Reg. 17 and must base its decision only on objections the defendant has had the 
opportunity to comment upon. The Court took a similar approach in Van Landelvyck. 
158 Hasselblad at pp 565-567. The issue was not dealt with directly by the Court. But AG 
Slynn at p 567, stated that he was not satisfied that HGB had proved that DGIV was biased as 
opposed to the Commission having simply rejected HGB's arguments. 
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159 See the discussion of the defendant's right to an independent tribunal in horizontal cases at 
Ch6 supra. 
160 See Van Overbeek'The Right to Remain Silent in Competition Investigations'and Kerse EC 
Antitrust Procedure at para 8.12. 
161 Sec House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO, where a 
number of parties giving evidence criticised DGIV's disregard for natural justice. 
162 Background infomation on this section is derived from ; Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at 
paras 5.21-5.28 ; Harding EC Investigations and Sanctions at pp 48-50 ; Van Bael `Transparency 
of EC Commission Proceedings' ; Kuyper and Van Rijn 'Procedural Guarantees and Investigatory 
Methods in European Law, with Special Reference to Competition' YBEL [1982] 1; House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community 
Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO ; Harris 'Problems in Procedure in EEC 
Competition Cases' NLJ [1989] 1452,1457, 
163 See discussion of the Advisory Committee in relation to the right to be heard in horizontal 
cartels, Ch6 supra. 
164 See Distillers per AG Warner at pp 2292-2294 and the ECJ at pp 2264-2265. The AG noted 
that the defendants were left in the dark as to what the Commission does/does not tell the 
Advisory Committee. Moreover, he asserted that not only were defendants not informed of the 
contents of the report, but also they had no opportunity to address the Committee and this 
infringed their right to comment. In the event, the ECJ were not required to rule on procedural 
issues, but they did state that such matters were only relevant if the irregularities could have led to 
a different result. 
163 MDF, discussing the scope of Art 10(6)/Reg 17, at pp 1859,1884, and the Court at p 1885. 
The ECJ's reasoning was that the defendant's right requires that DGIV disclose evidence on which 
it intends to rely and gives the defendant the opportunity to comment on that evidence. Moreover, 
the Commission may not base its decision on undisclosed evidence. Under this definition, the 
Committee's opinion is not relevant to the Commission's decision and thus need not be disclosed. 
The Court here seemed concerned that disclosure of the report would amount to a re-opening of 
the procedure. 
166 Distillers at p 2264. The undisclosed documents included an economic report, 
supplementary replies by the defence and the minutes of the oral hearing. 
167 Vichy at pp 425-426,430. Vichy argued that, given that the decision would result in the 
imposition of a fine, the Committee should be consulted. In reply, DGIV asserted that it was not 
normal practice to consult the Committee in such situations and that the urgency of the situation 
absolved it from the requirement to consult. 
168 For additional information, see : W11ish Competition Law at p 317 ; Kerse EC Antitrust 
Procedure at paras 6.21 and 6.41 ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 
(7,7-1) HMSO. 
169 Sec AEG, Vichy, AIDF, Dunlop/Slazenger, Ilasselblad and Ford. 
170 AEG at pp 3153,3192. Here the decision cited two instances of discriminatory practices and 
relied on letters not disclosed to AEG. In. X1DF, at p 1880, DGIV also relied on documents not 
disclosed to the defence. See also Vichv at p 463, where Vichy argued that the decision should be 
annulled because it contained details of a complaint not mentioned as such in the SO. 
171 Hasselblad at p 567. This formed part of Hasselblad's argument that the Commission had 
prejudged the case. Ford at p 2744, also alleged that the decision in its case was inadequately 
reasoned. 
172 MDF at pp 1880-1882. InAEG at p 3192, the Court ruled certain documents and evidence 
of one case of discriminatory practice inadmissible. Here, the Court asserted that it was not 
merely the documents but the conclusions that DGIV drew from them that must be disclosed to 
defendants. In Vichy at p 464, the Court made similar comments, though here the Court held that 
the SO and decision did not differ sufficiently for defence rights to have been breached. 
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173 Eg in 1LIDF, the Court held that certain letters were sufficiently identified in the SO to be 
admissible evidence. A similar approach was taken in AEG and Vichy. 
174 Coppcl 'Curbing the Ruling Passion :A New Force for Judicial Review in the European 
Communities' ECLR [1992] 143 ; Doherty 'Playing Poker with the Commission : Rights of Access 
in Competition Cases' ECLR [1994] 8, is particularly critical of the Court's attitude here. 
175 Eg AEG at p 3192. 
176 MDF at p 1882. 
177 See Hasselblad at p 584 and Ford at p 2748. In these cases, the Court simply reiterated the 
broad requirements of Art. 190 and stated that the decision was sufficiently reasoned. However, the 
decision in Hasselblad was partially annulled because of DGIV's erroneous legal assessment. 
178 Moreover, the CFI insisted that DGIV could not plead error regarding its failure to name 
AWS accurately in the decision. The CFI also noted that this was not the first time that DGIV had 
made such a claim to the Court whilst failing to notify the defendant of an error relating to the 
operative part of the decision. SeeA IVS at pp 43-44. 
179 See Ch6 supra. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE RULE OF LAW' 
"Man has such a prediliction for systems and abstract deductions that he is ready to distort the truth intentionally he is ready to deny the 
evidence of his senses in order to justify his logic. "' 
A)INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will extend the evaluation of the Commission's conduct by nominally 
classifying antitrust as 'administrative' and undertaking a 'rule of law' analysis Z. In an 
administrative evaluation, one of the main concerns is to examine the extent to which 
the governing principles control the tribunal's exercise of discretion. Thus, the 
evidence already amassed will be used to consider whether DGIV's use of its 
enforcement powers is legally justified by subjecting it to evaluation against the 'rule of 
law' principles of proportionality, equality, legal certainty, legitimate expectation and 
good administration'. Consequently, the assessment will be able to consider whether 
the Commission's exercise of discretion promotes or impedes the 'rule of law', so 
disclosing the extent to which DGIV operates a consistent and fair competition policy 
and the effectiveness of the'rule of law' principles as a means of accountability. In this 
context, the analysis will consider whether DGIV's enforcement approach is 'user- 
friendly'. Here, the evaluation will extend the work done by Goyder and Wood by 
assessing DGIV's behaviour in the case study against the qualities suggested by these 
commentators as being essential'. 
This assessment will argue that the Commission's pursuit of its political and 
pragmatic goals compromises its exercise of discretion by requiring the 'rule of law' to 
be subordinated to the achievement of these twin objectives. This disrespect for 
fundamental legal principles allows the effective enforcement of Reg. 17 to prevail over 
the 'rule of law' producing a competition policy which is not so much dynamic as 
arbitrary and inconsistent. Admittedly, some flexibility is essential and necessarily 
means some loss of consistency, but the argument here is that, despite any superficial 
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discrepancies, DGIV's conduct should adhere to these fundamental principles. 
Without such compliance, caprice and injustice will become routine, reducing EC 
competition policy to little more than a visceral reaction to the immediate issues 5. 
Finally, should this appraisal disclose problems relating to the political and pragmatic 
character of competition law, it may be necessary to accept that competition is not a 
fully justiciable subject. 
First, this chapter will consider briefly the Court's ability to review adherence 
to'rule of law' principles in competition cases. Then, it will evaluate the Commission's 
conduct in the context of each principle. 
1)The Court's Powers of Review 6 
At the outset, it is clear that these 'rule of law' principles constitute a valid source of 
Community law. The Court have stated that they fall within Art. 164 of the Treaty 
which requires the Court to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty the law is observed"'. More specifically, review of competition proceedings 
takes place under Art. 173 of the Treaty where an application for judicial review of acts 
of the Commission may be made on four specified grounds : lack of competence ; 
misuse of powers ; infringement of an essential procedural requirement and 
infringement of the Treaty or any "rule of law" relating to its application 8. It is 
under this final ground that failure to comply with a 'rule of law' principle may be 
reviewed'. 
It is not propösed to undertake a detailed examination of the scope and 
application of Art. 173 as the nature of the 'rule of law' analysis does not require it 10. 
At this point, it is sufficient to note the general limitations placed on the Court's review 
powers under Art. 173. As the provision provides for judicial review of the 
Commission's actions, the Court are unable to substitute their own view for that of 
the Commission's. Instead, the Court must confine themselves to ensuring that the 
Commission has not misused its powers or exceeded the boundaries of its discretion. 
Beyond this, the Court's role is limited to verifying that the facts forming the basis of 
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the decision are relevant and accurate and that there is no manifest error of 
evaluation ". In particular, the Court recognise that the Commission enjoys a 
considerable amount of discretion in its decision-making, specifically in relation to the 
complex economic evaluation required under Art. 85 and have shown a marked 
reluctance to involve themselves in such matters 12. Where necessary, the effect of 
these limitations will be examined further in the context of individual principles. It is 
now intended to assess the Commission's conduct against these 'rule of law' principles. 
2)The Rule of Law in the Case Study" 
This section will examine each 'rule of law' principle in turn. With each one, it is 
intended to outline the basic scope of the principle and then examine the application of 
that tenet in the context of the case study. In so doing, this examination will focus on 
whether DGIV's use of its enforcement powers complements or conflicts with the'rule 
of law', considering the effectiveness of these principles as a means of accountability 14. 
Any problems, criticisms and challenges to the Commission's conduct will be noted 
a)Proporlionality 
The principle of proportionality is one of the most frequently used and well established 
principles of Community law. It requires that "the measure adopted by Community 
institutions must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective 
pursuedi15. Whilst, this tenet acts as a curb upon DGIV's conduct, the precise extent 
of the constraint is not entirely clear. Steiner asserts that the principle places the 
burden on the Commission to justify its actions and requires DGIV to consider 
possible alternatives. Kerse submits that it is unclear whether the principle of limited 
intervention should be read into the principle of proportionality in competition cases 16. 
If so, this principle would require that where various alternatives were available, each 
proportional to the objective sought, the least stringent measure must be implemented. 
Lavoie, however, asserts that the principle of proportionality places little constraint on 
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DGIV's discretion and does not impose even an obligation on the Commission to act 
reasonably ". This argument has the support of the ECJ who stated that "the legality 
of a measure can be adversely affected only if the measure is manifestly unsuitable for 
achieving the aim pursuedi18. As such, this places an onerous burden on defendants 
attempting to prove the disproportionate nature of the Commission's conduct19. 
At investigation stage, the principle of proportionality is relevant in a number 
of areas. Firstly, it must be taken into account in DGIV's choice of whether to use 
Art. 11 or Art. 14, and under Art. 14, in deciding whether to proceed by way of simple 
mandate or by decision 20. Clearly, the wide definition DGIV has given to its 
investigation powers and its use of the 'law as a resource' in its investigation choices 
form an area of potential conflict with this principle, particularly if a requirement of 
limited intervention is read into the proportionality tenet". 
Several cases challenged the proportionality of the Commission's investigation 
choices. In particular, National Panasonic questioned DGIV's conduct in this context 
asserting that the principle of proportionality had been breached because the situation 
did not fulfil the criteria for a dawn raid and that the Commission had failed to apply 
the principle of limited intervention to its investigation choices 2'. In reply, DGIV 
argued that proportionality only operated to prevent onerous measures from being 
adopted for insufficient objectives, and thus, the exercise of its enforcement powers 
would only be disproportionate in extremely limited circumstances. DGIV insisted 
that, providing its conduct was reasonable, it did not have to justify its investigation 
choices and that its decision here was consistent with the principle of limited 
intervention 23. Indeed, DGIV asserted that a dawn raid was not a particularly 
intrusive measure and was the only means available of preventing the destruction of 
evidence disclosing a serious infringement on the Treaty 24. The ECJ upheld DGIV's 
absolute discretion in its investigation choices, stating that the proportionality of the 
investigation method was dependent on the necessity of the investigation in the 
individual circumstances of the case. As the decision here was aimed solely at 
uncovering an infringement of the Treaty, the Commission's actions were not 
disproportionate 25. 
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Elsewhere, defendants have taken a different approach, arguing that the 
attitude of the parties was relevant to the issue of proportionality. Only where there 
was prior evidence of non-cooperation by defendants was a dawn raid justified and 
necessary26. Whilst the Court in Hoechst upheld a general right to protection against 
arbitrary or disproportionate intervention, the ECJ stated that DGIV's investigation 
choices were not disproportionate. Again, the Court took the opportunity to affirm 
the Commission's discretion to decide for itself the necessity for its choice of 
investigation method". 
The approach here discloses that DGIV uses its control of the process and the 
flexibility of the proportionality principle to interpret the scope of the tenet to suit its 
enforcement requirements. Thus, by placing a restrictive interpretation on what is 
disproportionate and a broad construction on the requirements of limited intervention, 
DGIV provides itself with a wide choice of permissible conduct. By down-playing the 
intrusive nature of dawn raids and setting its conduct against the overpowering object 
of Single Market integration, DGIV increases the reasonableness of its conduct. 
These techniques provide the Commission with ample scope to exercise its penal 
powers unfettered by the requirements of proportionality. This discussion also reveals 
the Court's unwillingness to exercise incisive control over the Commission. Whilst the 
Court are happy to recognise a general principle of proportionality in investigation, 
they regularly proceed to hold that the principle is not infringed in the instant case Zg. 
Instead, the Court have repeatedly upheld DGIV's discretion to decide for itself the 
necessity for its investigation choices. Combined with the heavy burden placed on 
defendants attempting to prove the disproportionate nature of the Commission's 
conduct, this approach allows potential conflict between DGIV's use of 'law as a 
resource' and the'rule of law' to go unchecked. 
A related area of conflict is the scope of inspectors' powers once on a firm's 
premises. In this context, there has been considerable criticism of the use of DGIV's 
powers and the resulting ambiguity over the extent of defence rights and obligations 29. 
The degree of precision required in Art. 14 decisions, the extent of inspectors' oral 
questioning and the duty to disclose confidential information to the Commission are all 
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subject to the proportionality principle30. Several firms in the study complained of the 
lack of specificity in Commission decisions and the use of that vagueness to conduct 
'fishing trips"'. Orkem asserted that DGIV's request for information was unnecessary 
because it already possessed sufficient evidence on which to convict, thus, further 
investigation constituted a 'fishing trip, 32. In addition, AM&S and an Landewyck 
argued that full disclosure of confidential information was not necessary to the public 
interest and therefore excessive 33. In all of these cases, the same pattern of 
Commission control and Court support illustrated above was evident. The Court 
repeatedly upheld the need to ensure effective enforcement of Reg. 17 and confined 
themselves to insisting that, whilst DGIV's powers were governed by proportionality, 
it was for the Commission to decide the issue of necessity. Particularly in relation to 
the confidentiality issue, the Court justified its approach by setting DGIV's conduct 
against the need to uncover violations of the Treaty and the Commission's role as 
guardian of the Treaty 34. As a result, only in Vann Landetivyck did the Court find that 
DGIV had infringed the proportionality tenet, and even here, the Court held that this 
impropriety did not vitiate the decision 35. Again, by handing DGIV control over the 
scope of proportionality and by setting its conduct against the integration goal, the 
Commission is able to define the principle in a way which justifies its investigation 
choices. The ambiguity created by DGIV's use of the 'law as a resource', particularly 
regarding the precise location of the dividing line between the defendant's duty to co- 
operate and his right to silence, serves only to exacerbate the problems encountered in 
assessing the reasonableness of DGIV's behaviour. Consequently, the principle of 
proportionality exercises little real control over the Commission's decision-making. 
Rather, it is co-opted to legitimise DGIV's enforcement choices. 
Proportionality is also relevant to other decisions taken by the Commission and 
the conditions imposed thereunder36. The case study has illustrated that DGIV uses its 
wide penal powers in this context to impose long-term control over defendants". This 
use of the 'law as a resource' may conflict with the principle of proportionality. Whilst 
there were no challenges in the study in relation to final decisions following 
prosecution, Transocean did question the proportionality of conditions attached to an 
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individual exemption. Similarly, Vichu complained that DGIV had infringed the 
proportionality tenet when assessing its distribution agreement in relation to an 
Art. 15(6) decision 38. In Vichy, DGIV argued that the requirements of Vichy's 
distribution system were themselves disproportionate to the needs of the system and 
emphasised the threat posed by the arrangement to economic integration. The CFI 
fully accepted this approach to assessment39 
Fines imposed by DGIV must also be proportional 40. Here the Commission's 
case construction, which serves to increase the gravity and duration of fines, may 
result in sanctions being disproportionate to the actual violation committed 41. Eight 
cases in the study complained that fines were disproportionate to the gravity and 
duration of the offence because of an erroneous assessment of their role, market size 
and/or the economic effect of the violation'. In all of these cases, DGIV's approach 
was to set the amount of the fine against the object of Single Market integration, 
emphasising the deliberate and serious nature of the threat that these violations posed 
to economic unity 43. The CFI's approach in Hercules is typical of the Court's 
response to pleas of disproportionate sanctions. Here, the Court noted the "complex 
array of factors" to be considered and DGIV's discretion in the choice and weight of 
factors to be included in the fining assessment. They went on to uphold the need to 
punish behaviour hindering the aims of the Treaty and concluded that the 
Commission's approach to assessment was correct, and thus, its decision valid 44. In 
several of these cases, the defendant's submission was rejected outright, though in 
some instances, the Court reduced the fine on other ground S45. 
Thus, it can be seen that the submissions relating to disproportional fines are 
rarely successful. This outcome not only illustrates DGIV's continuing control of 
enforcement and the Court's routine support, it also highlights problems relating to the 
nature of the Court's review powers. Under Art. 173, the Court are limited to 
assessing the Commission's decision against the broad criteria of Art. 190 and 
considering whether DGIV has taken the correct approach to the fining assessment 46. 
The remainder of the assessment is an exercise of DGIV's discretion and therefore 
outside the Court's jurisdiction. As such, the Court are both unwilling and unable to 
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hold the Commission fully to account. A further reason why proportionality fails to 
exercise control over the Commission is that it measures DGIV's behaviour against the 
political aims of the Treaty. By setting the Commission's actions against such an over- 
powering objective, it is almost impossible to dispute the proportionality of DGIV's 
enforcement choices. 
b)Equalily 
The principle of equality or non-discrimination requires that similar situations should 
not be treated differently, unless that difference can be justified objectively ". 
However, the application of this principle is problematic as what constitutes similar 
situations is debateable48. 
Equality of treatment is relevant at all enforcement stages. At investigation, 
DGIV's wide discretion over its choice of investigation method is open to 
discriminatory application. Hasselblad and AEG both claimed that the Commission 
used its investigation methods in a biased and discriminatory manner 49. National 
Panasonic argued that DGIV's Art. 14(3) decision was discriminatory as it represented 
a departure from normal practice 50. Here, DGIV asserted that its decision was not a 
departure from previous practice and that dawn raids were justified in all cases of 
serious infringement. DGIV went on to highlight the need for Reg. 17 to be 
interpreted and applied so as to give full effect to its ultimate purpose 51. The ECJ 
simply upheld DGIV's discretion over its choice of investigation method, emphasising 
the need to interpret and apply the rules to enable the attainment of the Treaty's 
objectives SZ. As such, this case reveals a familiar pattern. Again, DGIV uses the 
objective of economic and political integration to justify its enforcement choices and 
its insistence that the effective application of Reg. 17 is paramount. Again, complaints 
that the Commission's conduct undermines the 'rule of law' are met with the Court's 
deference to DGIV's discretion. This subordination of the principle of equality to 
Reg. 17 at investigation renders it ineffective as a means of accountability. 
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Similar problems exist at prosecution. The ambit of DGIV's prosecutorial 
discretion and the lack of clarity over the factors influencing those choices place 
DGIV's prosecution decisions in potential conflict with the principle of equality 53 
Whilst the study has revealed numerous examples of similar cases having been treated 
differently, this has produced few actual allegations of inequality 54. However, five 
cases did complain of discriminatory prosecution by DGIV. VBBB, Vati Latidewyck 
and Vichy all alleged that they had been prosecuted whilst similar restrictions were 
permitted elsewhere". In Polypropylene, Hercules complained that DGIV's decision 
to prosecute it but not AMOCO or BP breached the principle of equality 56. In all 
cases, the same approach was applied, asserting that the situations were not 
comparable and dismissing criticisms as irrelevant. In VBBB, differences were claimed 
on the basis that the agreement had "special characteristics" which were particularly 
restrictive and stemmed from its transnational character. DGIV also highlighted the 
need to consider the agreement in the light of Treaty objectives irrespective of any 
resulting inequality with the approach of MS. In Polypropylene, regular attendance by 
Hercules at cartel meetings was sufficient to justify DGIV's different approach. Whilst 
in Vichy, the CFI drew a distinction between a procedural decision relating to fines 
under Art. 15(6) and a similar procedural decision under Art. 15(1) 5'. As a result, all 
appeals were dismissed. In VBBB, the ECJ again took the opportunity to affirm the 
supremacy of Community law58. 
Several comments may be made. Attitudes, particularly in VBBB and Van 
Landetit yck, reveal that the Treaty and its aims are more important than the principle of 
equality. The breadth of this tenet, particularly in relation to what constitutes 
comparable situations, clearly provides DGIV with the flexibility to construe the 
principle in a way which supports its enforcement choices. Whilst the Commission and 
Court argue that situations are not similar, little substantive discussion of actual 
differences is provided. From Polypropylene and Vichy it seems that very small, often 
formalistic, distinctions can justify different treatment. Yet in Vichy, it is hard to see 
the real difference between two procedural decisions, both under the same Article and 
both relating to fines. Similarly, in Hercules, non-attendance at meetings was used to 
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justify non-prosecution. Yet, elsewhere this has not been a bar to prosecution. 
Rather, the Commission has used the concept of collective responsibility to extend 
liablility and justify prosecution 59. 
Finally, DGIV's broad discretion over fines has brought a number of appeals 
alleging discriminatory treatment. In Polypropylene, several firms argued that the 
Commission had failed to take into account mitigating factors which had been 
considered elsewhere 60. In Belasco, members of the association complained that they 
had been discriminated against in comparison with non-members 61. All claims of 
inequality were dismissed with familiar justifications. In Belasco and SSI, the 
Commission and Court found that the alleged inequalities were based on situations 
which could not be "precisely compared'. In Polypropylene, the CFI upheld DGIV's 
discretion over fines, insisting that the fact that DGIV had considered such factors in 
other cases did not oblige it to consider them here. Whilst in Woodpulp II, the ECJ 
asserted that the Commission's differential treatment of firms was irrelevant and did 
not detract from the defendants own wrongdoing. Moreover, in several cases the 
Court stated that DGIV's differential treatment was vindicated by the serious and 
covert nature of the violation 6z. 
This examination of DGIV's approach to the principle of equality reveals that 
DGIV does little to uphold its value as a fundamental legal rule. Rather, it exploits the 
breadth of the principle to vindicate its enforcement choices. The Commission's task 
here is made easier by its use of the 'law as a resource' to increase its own powers, 
whilst creating ambiguity over the extent of substantive and procedural rules. This 
control of the process makes it easy to justify differences in practice as exercises of 
discretion. Again, DGIV emphasises the needs of the Treaty and its aims. By turning 
the focus towards the eradication of illegal market behaviour, and thus away from its 
own arbitrary choices, the Commission both justifies its conduct and makes it clear 
that effective enforcement is more important than equal treatment. This approach to 
equality has the full support of the Court. As a result, the scope for potential conflict 
between DGIV's use of the 'law as a resource' and the principle of equality is 
considerable. 
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c)Good Admi, tisiration 
It seems that the range of fundamental principles that the ECJ are prepared to 
recognise is not fixed and, on occasion, the Court have referred to a "general principle 
of good administration" 63. Obviously, a principle of such wide ambit provides ample 
scope for judicial development and has been invoked in a range of situations. In 
Lucchini, the ECJ criticised the Commission's failure to respond to a communication 
as a "neglect of the rules of good administration" and reduced the fine accordingly. 
DGIV's frequent resort to pragmatic solutions, revealed in the study, may bring 
it into opposition to this tenet. Certainly, the Commission does not have a reputation 
as an efficient administrator. Over the last 15 years, the House of Lords Select 
Committee has been particularly critical of the quality of DGIV's administration 6s 
Specific concern has been expressed over the delays, inefficiencies and backlog of 
cases caused by internal bureaucracy and inadequate resources '. The absence of 
adequate direction and supervision, resulting in the haphazard conduct of 
enforcement, has also been condemned 6'. 
Not surprisingly, several cases in the study have challenged DGIV's respect for 
this principle 61. Four of these challenges related to the authenticity of the SO or 
decision 69. The high watermark was BASF where the CFI discovered such an 
extensive catalogue of maladministration that it declared the Commission's decision 
non-existent in law 70. DGIV's response was to assert that the decision Adopted 
broadly conformed with the rules and that, in any event, its own rules of procedure 
were an internal matter and breach of them did not alter the overall legal situation ". 
The CFI disagreed, declaring that in the interests of legal certainty, the procedural 
rules must be complied with 72. In VBBB, the ECJ were more sympathetic towards 
DGIV and insisted that the burden was on the defendant to establish maladministration 
and that the defendant had failed to discharge that burden73. 
Other aspects of DGIV's conduct have also been criticised as breaches of good 
administration. Here, challenges in Cement, Distillers and IAZ are relevant. In Cement, 
the Commission's refusal to disclose the whole SO to defendants was challenged as a 
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breach of good administration, as was its failure to forward the minutes of the hearing 
to the Advisory Committee in Distillers 74. Again in Distillers, DGIV attempted to 
legitimise its conduct by its construction of procedural requirements, insisting here that 
it was not expressly required to forward the minutes to the Advisory Committee'". 
The Court's response in IAZ is typical of these cases. Here, the Court criticised 
DGIV's conduct as "regrettable and inconsistent with the requirements of good 
administration" but nevertheless held that the decision was valid76. 
This examination reveals that the wide ambit of this tenet not only provides 
scope for judicial development, but also allows the Commission to use its dominance 
of the process to interpret the principle in a way which legitimises its conduct. DGIV's 
pragmatic attitude to the requirements of good administration seen in BASF and 
Distillers suggests that the Commission has little respect for this principle. Rather, 
these cases provide further illustration that political and pragmatic goals are 
considerably more important to DGIV than respect for the 'rule of law'. Whilst the 
Court have been sternly critical of the Commission, they still largely refuse to punish 
instances of breach with annulment. Consequently, this principle does little to control 
the quality of DGIV's decision-making. The Court's persistent refusal to annul serves 
only to legitimise procedural impropriety and thus promote the scope for continued 
maladministration. Once again, the CFI's tougher approach leaves much resting on 
their continued willingness to insist upon procedral integrity. 
d)Legal Certainty 
This principle requires that the application of the law to a particular situation must be 
clear and predictable. Its fundamental importance to Community law has been 
recognised by both the Commission and Court ". The tenet's wide application means 
that it has considerable implications for the interpretation and validity of DGIV's 
enforcement of competition law. In the past, it has often found expression in the 
principle of non-retroactivity, preventing administrative and legislative measures from 
taking effect without notice to those affected78. 
389 
The study has revealed countless examples of DGIV's case construction and 
formalistic analysis creating ambiguity and thus increasing legal uncertainty. However, 
the following discussion will only highlight some of the most pressing problems. 
At investigation, considerable legal uncertainty exists regarding the scope of 
both the Commission's powers and defence rights. Here, National Panasonic 
challenged DGIV's approach to investigation as undermining legal certainty. The 
defendants argued that both the vaguely reasoned Art. 14(3) decision and the lack of 
clarity regarding the established practice for dawn raids left the legal position unclear. 
As already noted, the Court upheld DGIV's argument that it was not obliged to 
explain its choices and that a summary statement of reasons was sufficient to meet 
legal requirements 79. Again, DGIV's ability to control the requirements of 
fundamental principles enables it both to meet those requirements and ensure that its 
discretion remains unfettered. 
At prosecution and trial, there were few direct challenges alleging breach of the 
principle of legal certainty as many such concerns were subsumed in complaints of 
other procedural irregularities 80. Such allegations centered around the vagueness of 
the SO, the fining assessment and inconsistencies between the SO and decision 81. 
However, it is worth noting here that in Woodpulp II, both the AG and the 
Court condemned the uncertainty created by DGIV's deliberate vagueness which made 
analysis problematic 82. Ford and Vichy did make direct challenges complaining that 
DGIV's decision left them uncertain as to their legal position and to the type of 
solution the Commission would consider acceptable 83. Both appeals received little 
sympathy. In Ford, DGIV made it clear that the onus was on Ford to ensure that its 
distribution network complied with legal requirements. Similarly in Vichy, the CFI 
held that Vichy's administrative and commercial difficulties were irrelevant to the 
legality of the decision $a. 
Again, DGIV's dominance of the process'enables it to control the principle of 
legal certainty. By shifting the burden onto the defendant, the Commission absolves 
itself from responsibility for the legal certainty of its own enforcement choices. The 
lack of clarity created by DGIV's use of the 'law as a resource' makes it difficult for 
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defendants to discharge that burden, but equally simple for the Commission to justify 
any ambiguity as an exercise of discretion. DGIV's repeated manipulation of 
substantive and procedural rules indicates that it has little respect for legal certainty. 
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the Commission's enforcement approach has a 
vested interest in creating legal uncertainty. Moreover, the unsympathetic and unco- 
operative attitude of both the Commission and Court suggests that EC competition 
law is not a 'user-friendly' system. These problems are exacerbated by the Court's 
exercise of their powers. In the past, both the EC7's activist approach and their 
inconsistent attitude towards the role of precedent have served to increase legal 
uncertainty 8S. Moreover, administrative problems encountered by the Court, 
specifically delays in hearing cases, undermine legal certainty. Particularly in the 
context of Art. 177 rulings, delays may tempt national courts to resolve issues 
themselves, resulting in inconsistencies between MS 86. Consequently, the Court may 
serve to increase confusion and uncertainty. As such, their effectiveness in holding 
DGIV to account is questionable. 
e)Legitimate Expectation 
This principle is an element of the tenet of legal certainty, but, in the interests of 
clarity, it is being dealt with separately. The principle requires that, in the absence of 
overriding public interest needs, Community measures must not frustrate the legitimate 
expectations of the individuals concerned. Thus, this tenet operates to protect 
parties who have acted in reliance upon the law as it stands or appears to stand $'. 
The wide ambit * of this principle means that it can be adapted to suit most factual 
situations. As a result, it is a frequent ground of appeal 88. 
The malleability of the law and DGIV's willingness to use that flexibility to 
meet enforcement needs may conflict with the principle of legitimate expectation in a 
number of areas. This may mean that, in practice, the principle exercises little control 
over DGIV's conduct. For instance, in relation to access, the CFI established in 
Hercules that the Commission's 12th Report created a legitimate expectation to access 
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which DGIV was bound to fulfil 8'. Despite this ruling, DGIV has made continued 
attempts to circumvent its responsibilities under this tenet, invariably by invoking a 
claim of confidentiality. Whilst this technique has met with some success, recent cases 
indicate that it may be short lived 90. Similarly, VBBB claimed that DGIV had breached 
VBBB's legitimate expectations by failing to conduct a promised sector inquiry prior 
to taking a decision. The Court placed a restrictive interpretation on the Commission's 
statements holding that they were not undertakings, but merely declarations of its 
intention to investigate the market in books throughout the Community, and so did not 
preclude DGIV from prosecuting individual agreements 9'. This ruling both makes it 
clear that enforcement is paramount and ensures that DGIV's enforcement choices are 
- not hindered by the principle of legitimate expectation 92 
The Commission and Court have also employed formalism to evade the 
requirements of this tenet. In Distillers, despite the fact that DGIV had all the relevant 
information and had negotiated with Distillers regarding exemption, the Court held 
that exemption could not be granted because the application for exemption was not 
submitted on the correct form 93. A similar pattern is repeated in IAZ, where IAZ 
claimed that DGIV's prosecution and fining of its agreement breached this tenet. IAZ 
argued that the Commission had raised a legitimate expectation in them that their co- 
operation in modifying the agreement would be rewarded with a favourable decision, 
and that no fines would be imposed in respect of agreements exempt from notification 
under Art. 4(2). DGIV escaped its duty to fulfil these legitimate expectations by 
insisting that the modifications to the agreement were insufficient and that the 
agreement was not properly notified and was not exempt from notification, and so, 
fines were justified. The ECJ upheld DGIV 94. Other cases have also complained that 
the Commission has failed to meet their legitimate expectation to have co-operation 
and other mitigating factors taken into account. These claims also received little 
sympathy from the Court 9s 
A final aspect of legal certainty/legitimate expectation is the fixing of time 
limits for the imposition of fines. In order to protect firms from unduly extended 
proceedings and to encourage the Commission to act speedily, DGIV may only impose 
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procedural fines within six years of the offence and within ten years in other 
situations'. This study has shown that DGIV's case construction, particularly its use 
of the concept of complex infringement, not only increases the gravity and duration of 
offences, but also serves to enable DGIV to circumvent its responsibilities under 'rule 
of law' principles 97. A number of cases have unsuccessfully appealed against the 
Commission's approach98. 
Once again, DGIV's dominance of the process allows it to dictate what is 
required of it under the principle of legitimate expectation. In this way, the 
Commission is able to evade its responsibilities under this tenet, whilst ensuring that its 
discretion remains unfettered. Although this technique provides DGIV with maximum 
flexiblity, it does so at the expense of the 'rule of law'. Certainly, the Commission's 
willingness to flout established caselaw on access indicates that it has little respect for 
the legitimate expectations of defendants. For DGIV, the effective enforcement of 
Reg. 17 is vastly more important. Its attitude elsewhere in the case study illustrates its 
inclination to place enforcement before principle. In so doing, DGIV not only 
undermines legitimate expectations, but also increases legal uncertainty. Clearly, the 
situation is one in which the principle of legitimate expectation does not control the 
Commission - rather the Commission controls it. 
B)CONCLUSION -'RULE OF LAW' 
This analysis has demonstrated that, at every point, the Commission's pursuit of its 
political and pragmatics goals compromises its exercise of discretion by requiring the 
'rule of law' to be subordinated to these twin objectives. This disrespect for 
fundamental legal principles allows the effective enforcement of Reg. 17 to prevail over 
the 'rule of law'. This outcome is achieved by DGIV's dominance of the process, 
which combined with the flexibility of the principles under consideration, enables the 
Commission to define the 'rule of law' to meet enforcement needs. This control over 
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the construction of these legal principles means that the 'rule of law' is co-opted and 
used to legitimise DGIV's enforcement decisions. Consequently, DGIV's choices do 
not complement the 'rule of law' - rather the 'rule of law' is used as a resource to 
promote the Commission's choices. So, although DGIV's conduct does superficially 
adhere to fundamental principles, there is little cause for celebration. The 
Commission's repeated willingness to manipulate such principles for its own purposes 
reveals an underlying contempt for the'rule of law'. 
The Commission is assisted in this approach by the Court who appear both 
unwilling and unable to exercise incisive control over DGIV's decision-making. The 
Court have shown excessive deference to the Commission, repeatedly upholding 
DGIV's discretion to decide the scope and application of the principle under 
consideration. Invariably, the Court either affirm the principle under consideration, 
but go on to hold that it has not been breached in the instant case, or they admit that 
the tenet has been breached, but insist that this does not vitiate the decision ". So, 
whilst both the Commission and Court recognise the theoretical importance of these 
principles, the case study shows that DGIV, in particular, has no intention of allowing 
'rule of law' principles to hinder the attainment of political and pragmatic goals. 
Consequently, any recognition of the 'rule of law' is little more than lip-service ; any 
adherence to it, little more than coincidence. Research has criticised several aspects of 
the Court's approach which serve to limit the effectiveness and equity of their review. 
Rasmussen has condemned the ECJ's past activism as allowing politics to prevail over 
justice. He asserts that the Court's constitution-making role has meant that political 
needs rather than legal issues have informed their decision-making, impairing their 
function as "trustworthy neutrals". He insists that the ECJ's attempts to protect Treaty 
aims and achieve "ever closer union" are actually destroying economic integration by 
undermining judicial authority and legitimacy thereby producing disrespect for, and 
non-compliance with, Community law 10°. Cruz Vilaca has also criticised the 
subordination of justice to political and pragmatic goals. He asserts that delays in 
hearing cases have hindered the efficient administration of justice, and that the 
resulting backlog of cases, combined with the ECJ's poor fact-finding ability, have 
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caused the Court to take a pragmatic approach to their decision-making. The 
consequent injustice and inconsistency have impaired the 'rule of law' significantly'°' 
A further and even more fundamental problem affects the quality of the Court's 
scrutiny. As previously noted, the Court's review powers are administrative in 
character, and thus largely confined to ensuring that the Commission stays within the 
bounds of its discretion. In contrast, DGIV possesses and employs extensive penal 
powers. Thus, a mismatch exists between the nature and scope of DGIV's enforcement 
powers and those of the Court's review powers. DGIV exploits this disparity to the 
full, using it to subordinate the 'rule of law' to Reg. 17. Earlier analysis demonstrated 
that DGIV achieved its political and pragmatic objectives by creating an imbalance 
between itself and defendants and maximising its own powers whilst curtailing defence 
rights. DGIV uses a similar technique here, employing its wide discretionary powers 
to dominate the review process and dictate both the scope and outcome of the review. 
The consequent mismatch between the characterisation and application of the 
enforcement process and that of the review process means that the Court's review is 
necessarily inadequate. Yet under Art. 173, there is little that the Court can do to 
compensate for this, leaving the Commission largely unaccountable 102. 
The outcome of DGIV's approach is target driven justice, in which the entire 
process is geared to achieving political and pragmatic goals. To this end, fundamental 
legal principles are manipulated and ignored, disclosing the considerable scope within 
EC antitrust for legitimate procedural impropriety 103. Whilst DGIV's activities may be 
legitimate, in practical terms, the Commission's use of the 'law as a resource' inflicts 
considerable damage. Its highly discretionary approach has been bought at the 
expense of fundamental principles, producing widespread evidence of inconsistency, 
inefficiency, uncertainty and substantive injustice. Given such consequences, it is hard 
to see how EC competition law can be regarded as 'user-friendly'. Goyder argues that 
a 'user-friendly' system should provide a fair procedure allowing a right to comment, 
full access to documents and clear rights of appeal 104. The study has shown that 
DGIV takes every opportunity to curtail both the right to comment and to access. 
Similarly, the burden on defendants at appeal and the inadequacy of the Court's review 
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powers make a right of appeal virtually worthless. Thus, DGIV does not provide a 
fair system. Secondly, a 'user-friendly' system should be administratively efficient and 
should provide a clear timetable for enforcement 105. This evaluation has revealed that 
DGIV's administration is characterised by delays, backlogs, bureaucratic inadequacies 
and widespread criticism of a lack of supervision and direction. As such, the 
Commission does not provide an efficient system. 'User-friendliness' also requires that 
decision-making be transparent and complete 106. DGIV's discretionary practices run 
directly counter to this requirement. The study has illustrated the Commission's vested 
interest in maintaining a state of ambiguity over the nature and scope of substantive 
and procedural rules. Moreover, the requirements of Art. 190 are so broad that 
DGIV's reasoning, particularly in sanctioning decisions, remains far from complete. 
Consequently, the Commission's enforcement approach is neither transparent nor 
complete. Finally, 'user-friendliness' requires a substantively sound system where 
matters are decided on as legal cases based on legal principles. Specifically, outcomes 
should not be political decisions dressed up as legal cases 107. The study has illustrated 
that DGIV's enforcement choices are based on political and pragmatic goals not legal 
principles. The widespread evidence of disproportionate and discriminatory treatment, 
refusals to fulfil defendants' legitimate expectations and an absence of legal certainty 
reveal that DGIV's approach is far from substantively sound. Yet, the process is 
geared to disguising these political decisions as legal matters. Thus, DGIV does not 
provide a substantively sound system. It is obvious from the above analysis that EC 
competition law is not a'user-friendly' system - merely 'Commission-friendly'. 
Above all, this 'rule of law' analysis makes clear the true focus of EC 
competition law. The repeated references to political and pragmatic goals as 
vindication of DGIV's manipulation of the law makes explicit the political and 
pragmatic nature of Commission decision-making. But, it has also made clear that this 
focus is the cause of considerable caprice and injustice. Whilst such objectives 
continue to dominate decision-making, one seems forced to accept that competition 
may not be an entirely justiciable matter. More than that, research indicates that this 
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persistent focus on non justiciable issues may ultimately undermine Community law 
and bring about economic disunity. 
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as a general principle of law. See discussion by AG Roemer in Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia v 
Commission [1960] ECR 71 at pp 88-90. 
17 Lavoie 'The Investigative Powers of the Commission with Respect to Business Secrets under 
Community Competition Rules' ELR [1992] 20 at p 27. 
18 £4 Biovilac IVY v Commission [1984] ECR 4057 at para 17. 
19 See discussion in Kerse ECAntitrust Procedure at para 8.26. 
20 It should be noted that the necessity for the investigation is explicit in both Arts. 11 and 14. 
21 See Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at para 8.27. It will be recalled that the 
Commission's use of the 'law as a resource' was particularly evident in its routine use of Art. 14 in 
both horizontal and vertical cases and DGIV's preference for dawn raids. 
22 National Panasonic at p 2050. 
23 National Panasonic at p 2050. 
24 National Panasonic at pp 2046,2048,2050. At p 2046, DGIV insisted that National 
Panasonic's arguments were based on the erroneous assumption that a dawn raid was "a drastic, 
damaging and permanent action which adversely affects the interests of the firm involved". 
25 National Panasonic at p 2059. 
26 See Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859, Dow Chemical Jberica [1989] ECR 3165 and Dow Chemical 
Benelux [1989] ECR 3150. 
27 See Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859 at paras 15-20. See also Dow Chemical Iberica [1989] ECR 
3165 and Dow Chemical Benelux [1989] ECR 3150. The Court also upheld the proportionality of 
investigations in SEP [1992] 5 CMLR 33. 
28 This tendency has been criticised strongly by Coppel in 'Curbing the Ruling Passion'. 
29 See particularly, evidence given to House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 
(7,7-1) HMSO at pp 16-17. 
30 See Kerse ECAntitrust Procedure at pars 8.26. 
31 See National Panasonic, Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859, Dow Chemical Iberica [1989] ECR 
3165, Doiv Chemical Benelux [1989] ECR 3150, LdPE, Orkent [1989] ECR 3283, Italian Flat 
Glass and Soda Ash. 
32 Orkem [1989] ECR 3283 at p 3348. 
33 See AM&S at p 1582 and Van Landewyck at pp 3238-3239. In the latter case, DGIV had 
disclosed confidential information to third party complainants. In SEP [1992] 5 CMLR 33, the 
defendant complained that DGIV's Art. 11 request for disclosure of a particularly confidential 
document was disproportionate. SEP feared that the document may fall into the hands of the 
Dutch Government with whom it had a contractual relationship and that this may affect the 
relationship. 
34 See National Panasonic at pp 2059-2060, AAI&S at pp 1609-1613, Van Landeivyck at pp 
3238-3239, Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859 at paras 15-20,42, Dow Chemical Iberica [1989] ECR 
3165 at p 3191, Dow Chemical Benelux [1989] ECR 3150 at para 10, Orkem [1989] ECR 3283 at 
pp 3330,3348, LdPE at p 418. See also Italian Flat Glass, Soda Ash and SEP [1992] 5 CMLR 
33. 
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35 Van Landewvyck at p 3239. In Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859 at para 42, the Court admitted that 
the lack of specificity in DGIV's Art. 14 decision was open to criticism but broadly fulfilled the 
requirements of Art. 190 of the Treaty. 
36 le final decisions and individual exemptions. See Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at para 
8.26. 
37 See discussion in earlier chapters regarding DGIV's penal sanctioning in Ch6 and Ch8 
supra. 
38 See Transocean [1974] ECR 1063, particularly discussion by AG Warner, Vichy at p 457 et 
seq. See also discussion in Usher 'Exercise by the ECJ of its Jurisdiction to Annul Competition 
Decisions'. 
39 See Vichy at pp 457-465. The CFI also applied a proportionality test to Vichy's agreement 
finding that the requirement of pharmacist was disporportionate to the needs of the system. The 
Court's formalistic assessment in this case has been criticised by Korah in 'Selective Distribution' 
ECLR [1994] 101. In Transocean, the Court upheld the defendant's right to comment prior to the 
imposition of conditions. 
40 See Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at para 8.26. See also cases of United Brands [1978] 1 
CMLR 429 at para 302 and BMIV Belgium [1980] 1 CMLR 370 at para 47. 
41 See discussion in Ch6 and Ch8 regarding the sanctioning of horizontal and vertical cases. 
This is also criticised by Van Bael in his Written Submission to House of Lords Select Committee 
on the European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL 
Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO, Minutes of Evidence at p 221. 
42 Firms involved in the Polypropylene and lfloodpulp cartels, IAZ, Hasselblad and MDF 
complained that fines were disproportionate to their role and economic capacity. In Belasco, 
CRAM andAE, G, fines were alleged to be disproportionate to the market effect of the violation. In 
addition, Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859 also claimed that the amount of a periodical penalty payment 
was disproportionate. PVC 11 is also appealing against disproportionate fines. 
43 In MDF at p 1902, the Commission insisted that the public interest necessitated the 
imposition of heavier fines to deter firms from reaping unlawful profits. See also AEG at p 3320, 
Hasselblad at p 594, IAZ at p 3415, CRAM at p 1695, Belasco at p 115, Woodpulp II at p 561 and 
Polypropylene, particularly Hoechst [1992] ECR 629 at p 740. 
44 Hercules at pp 322-325. See also MDF at pp 1904-1905, JAZ at pp 3417-3418, Belasco at 
pp 125-128, Hasselblad at p 594 and AEG at p 3220. 
43 InAEG, IAZ, Belasco and Polypropylene, the submission was dismissed outright. InAEG at 
pp 3263-3270, AG Reisclil disagreed with the Court and recommended that the fines be reduced 
on the basis that DGIV had exaggerated its claims of discriminatory practice, so that the fine was 
disproportionate to the market effect of the violation. In Polypropylene, Shell [1992] ECR 757 
at p 893, Shell's fine was reduced because of an incorrect assessment of its participation in the 
offence. MDF and Hasselblad's fines were also reduced because of incorrect legal assessment by 
the Commission. In Hasselblad, the Court acknowledged the relatively small size of HGB in 
reducing its fine. In CRAM and lVoodpulp II, the Court did not rule on the issue of 
proportionality because of partial annulment of the respective decisions. Hoechst's claims that the 
periodical penalty payment was disproportionate was also dismissed. See Hoechst [1989] ECR 
2859. 
46 Kerse EC Antitrust Procedure at pars 9.04. Under Art. 172 of the Treaty, the Court have 
unlimited jurisdiction to cancel, reduce or increase fines, though even here it may not remake the 
contested decision. On this, see discussion by Kerse ECAntitrust Procedure at para 9.02 and the 
CFI in SIV at para 318. 
47 See Kerse ECAntitrust Procedure at pars 8.12A ; Brown and Jacobs The Court of Justice of 
the European Communities at pp 264-265 and Steiner Textbook on EEC Law at p 49. 
48 See Steiner Textbook on EEC Law at p 49. 
49 Hasselblad at p 567 and AEG at pp 3187-3188. In AEG, AG Reischl at p 3242, criticised 
DGIV's use of its investigation powers. 
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so National Panasonic at pp 2038-2040. Until National Panasonic, dawn raids were rare, even 
in serious cases the Commission proceeded by way of Art. 11 or Art. 14(2). Discussed by Harding 
EC Investigations and Sanctions : The Supranational Control of Business Delinquency Leicester 
Unv. Press (1993) Chg. National Panasonic at p 2048. argued here that in previous Art. 14(3) 
decisions DGIV had given the party a right to be heard prior to exercising the decision. 
s' National Panasonic at pp 2039-2048. The Commission also insisted that no-one had 
complained previously about its use of dawn raids. 
52 National Panasonic at pp 2056-2057. Claims in Hasselblad and AEG were also dismissed. 
s' For further details of DGIV's varying approach to the prosecution of horizontal and vertical 
cases, see respectively Clis 4,5 and Chs 7,8 supra. 
54 As pointed out earlier, this is largely due to the negotiated and covert nature of such 
compromises. 
55 VBBB at p 29, claimed inequality because other MS permitted rpm of books ; Van 
Landewyck at p 3249, claimed that the Commission had prosecuted Fcdetab whilst allowing 
similar restrictions in other MS ; Vichy at p 423, alleged discriminatory treatment in relation to an 
Art. 15(6) decision on the basis that similar agreements had been negotiated and settled, and that 
in similar situations, DGIV had consulted the Advisory Committee before taking such decisions. 
See also Hercules in Polypropylene and KEA in li'oodpulp 11. 
56 Hercules at pp 212-213. Similarly, in Woodpulp II at pp 558-561, members of KEA alleged 
they had been discriminated against in comparison with Finncell and other producers who had not 
been prosecuted or who had been treated more leniently. 
57 See VBBB at pp 30-31, Polypropylene at pp 213,318-319, Vichy at pp 424,429, Van 
Landenyck at p 3249 and IVoodpulp 11 at p 586. In Hercules at p 213, AG Vesterdorf agreed with 
the Commission, stating that it had not been demonstrated that DGIV's conduct was based on 
anything other than objective reasons. He also upheld the Commission's broad discretion over the 
decision to prosecute. In Vichy at p 429, the CFI said that a requirement to consult the Advisory 
Committee prior to a decision to fine for providing incorrect information was no basis for 
concluding that the same procedure should be followed under Art. 15(6). 
58 See VBBB at p 64, Hercules at p 319, Vichy at p 429, Woodpulp 11 at pp 557,586 and Van 
Landetivyck at p 3249. In Van Landeivyck and IVVoodpulp II, the Court asserted that the 
Commission's treatment of other cases was irrelevant and did not detract from the defendant's own 
anti-competitive conduct. 
59 This occurred particularly in the Polypropylene and LdPE cartels. 
60 See Hercules at p 323, Hoechst [1992] ECR 629 at p 740, Shell [1992] ECR 757 at p 
897 and Huls [1992] ECR at p 619 in the Polypropylene cartel. The mitigating factors in 
question were those of sectoral crisis and co-operation by firms involved. Defendants here 
contrastd DGIV's approach to these factors in Zinc Producers and National Panasonic with its 
treatment of members of the Polypropylene cartel. Similarly SSI at p 3854, alleged it had been 
unfairly treated in comparison with Fedetab where no fines were imposed. See also, appeals by 
MDF, 11,1oodpulp II and Belasco. 
61 Belasco at p 100. Also various members of the IVoodpu/p cartel, see Woodpu/p II at p 593, 
alleged discriminatory imposition of fines in comparison with other members of the cartel. MDF 
at p 1878, complained that its fines breached the equality principle because it was much larger 
than the normal level of fine. 
62 See Belasco at p 117 (italics inserted). At p 125, the Court based the difference on the fact 
that members and non-members were not party to the same violation. In SSI at pp 3859,3880, 
here the difference was that Redetab had not imposed a binding agreement on prices. Also, 
Polypropylene at p 329 and MDF at p 1904, where the Commission's discretion was also affirmed 
and IVoodpulp II at p 593. The view here was supported by AG Darmon at p 556. In 
Polypropylene at p 329, SSI at p 3880 and 111DF, at p 1903, the deliberate nature of the offence 
was found to justify the Commission's approach. 
63 Kuhner [1980] ECR 1671 at p 1698. 
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64 Lucclzini 119831 ECR 3083 at p 3095. 
See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Coin nunity Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at pp 23-24 ; 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 8th Report, Competition 
Practice 1-IL Papers 1981/82 (91) HMSO at para 38-39 ; House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities 181h Report, Commission Powers of Investigation and Inspection HL 
Papers 1983/84 (220) HMSO at para 67. Numerous other commentators have complained, cg 
Forrester and Norall 'The Laicisation of Community Law : Self Help and The Rule of Reason : 
How Competition Law Is and Could Be Applied' CMLR [1984] 11 ; Goydcr 'User Friendly 
Competition Law' ; Van Bael `Transparency of EC Commission Procedings' in SLOT and 
MCDONNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and 
Maxwell (1993) p 192. 
66 Sec particularly, House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist 
Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at p 24 
and Written Submissions to the Select Committee by Reynolds, Lever, JWP and Van Bacl, 
Minutes of Evidence at pl; p 161 ;p 59 and pp 220-221 respectively. 
67 Sec particularly, Written Submissions by JWP and Van Bacl to House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition 
Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO, Minutes of Evidence at pp 59,61 and pp 220-221 
respectively. See also, comments in House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities 18th Report, Commission Powers of Investigation and Inspection HL Papers 
1983/84 (220) HMSO at pars 67, who urged major reform of the Commission's investigation 
practices criticising the Commission's tardiness in informing firms of the outcome of 
investigations. It recommended the imposition of a time limit on the Commission. 
69 PVC/BASF (sec also PVC I and PVC II which is currently on appeal), 1Voodpulp if, VBBB, 
14 Z, Cculent, All'S and Distillers. 
69 Sec BASF, 11'oodpulp 11, VBBB, AI VS. 
Sec PVC cartel, BASF at p 393. On appeal in PVC 1, the ECJ set aside the CFI's judgement 
and annulled the Commission's decision on the ground that it was not duly authenticated. PVCII 
is now on appeal on a number of grounds, including further breach of the principle of good 
administration. In Woodpulp 11, the defendant complained that the Commission has breached the 
principle because the SO was not signed on the day it was dated. In VBBB, the defendants alleged 
breach of the principle on the ground that the official who signed the SO was not authorised to do 
so. In Al('S, the defendant claimed that a lack of individuality and the incorrect naming of the 
firm in the decision meant that the defendant (AWS) was not sufficiently identified to establish 
liability. 
71 Sec BASF at pp 384,388. In II'oodpulp Hat p 442, the Commission excused its error on the 
grounds of heavy workload. In VBBB, DGIV asserted that the official was properly authorised. 
Error in the decision was also pleaded in AII'S. 
72 BASF at p 388. As noted above, in PVC I, the ECJ set aside the CFI's judgement and 
annulled DGIV's decision on the ground that it was not duly authenticated. In Woodpulp II, the 
ECJ did not Wile directly on the matter, but did substantially annul DGIV's decision because of 
numerous discrepancies and inadequacies relating to the SO. Here AG Darmon at pp 442-443, 
severely criticised the Commission's maladministration, but felt that it did not vitiate the actual 
decision. In both IPoodpulp 11 and SII, the Commission's methodology was also criticised by the 
Court. In AII'S at pp 43-44, the CFI dismissed DGIV's plea of error, noting that this was not he 
first time DGIV had made this plea to the Court whilst failing to notify the firm concerned of 
errors relating to the operative part of the decision. The Court accordingly annulled the decision 
in respect of AWS. 
73 I'13BB at pp 56-57. 
74 Cement at p 251 and Distillers at p 2293. Also IAZ at p 3387, challenged DGIV's decision 
to iporc a draft agreement attempting modification as a breach of the principle of good 
administration. 
Sec Distillers per AG Warncr at p 2294 (italics inserted). In ! AZ at p 3409, DGIV's 
justification of its conduct was that it doubted that ANSEAU genuinely intended to modify its 
agreement. 
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76 ! AZ at p 3409. In Cement at pp 251,257, the President of the CFI stated that the 
Commission's conduct was "intolerable for the public interest", but dismissed the application on 
the grounds that the Commission's refusal of full access did not cause irreparable damage. In 
Distillers, the Court did not rule directly on the issue, but AG Warner at p 2294, criticised DGIV's 
bureaucratic inefficiency as a prima facie breach of an essential procedural requirement, though 
he doubted that the infringement would have altered the outcome. 
77 By the Commission in cg its 7th Report on Competition Policy 1977 at p 69, and more 
recently, by Ehlcrman in his Written Submission to House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 
1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO, Minutes of Evidence at p 110. See also comments by the Court in a range 
of cases, cg Defrenne v Sabena (No. 2) [1976] ECR 455, and more recently, in Tetra Pak [1990] II 
ECR 309 at paras 32-38. For further discussion of the cases and the application of this principle, 
sec Schermers and Waclbrock Judicial Protection In the European Communities at paras 86-89 ; 
Korse ECAntltrust Procedure at paras 8.22-8.24 ; Wyatt and Dashwood The Substantive Law of 
the DEC at pp 91-95. 
78 Eg Racke 419791 ECR 69 at p 84. In competition lawv, it is particularly relevant in the 
context of provisional validity and in relation to the competency of national courts under 
Art. 9(3)/Reg. 17. On this, see discussion by Korse ECAntitrust Procedure at paras 8.22-8.23 ; 
Korah 'Comfort Letters - Reflections on the Perfume Cases' ELR [19811 14 ; Kon 'Article 85 Para 3'. For a contrary viewv, sec Steindorff 'Article 85 : No Case for Application by National Courts' 
MLR [19831125 
79 National Panasonic at pp 2047-2048,2059. 
B0 Principally breach of Art. 190 of the Treaty. 
81 Numerous cases made complaints of this nature. Ten horizontal cases and five vertical cases 
complained of problems relating to the SO or inconsistency between the SO and the decision : 
Polypropylene, IW'oodpulp II, Belasco, VBBB, SSI, Iran Landetivyck, IAZ, GCB, S11", PVC and 
AEG, Vichy, AIDF, Ilasselblad and Ford. Many firms also complained of the inadequacy of the 
fining calculation, cg Polypropylene, GCB, AIDE and Hasselblad. These cases will not be dealt 
with in detail here as they have been dealt with thoroughly elsewhere, sec Chs 4,6 and Chs 7,8 
supra. 
82 II'oodpulp Il at pp 490,572. Also at pp 448,467, AG Darmon discussed the problems 
caused by the uncertainty surrounding the substantive law relating to a concerted practice, noting 
that the effectiveness of the law was dependent on its precision. 
83 Ford at pp 2728-2729 and Vichy at p 423. The decision in Vichy is a preliminary one and 
DGIV's final decision may shed more light on the matter. Also IAZ at pp 3393-3395, alleged that 
DGIV's interpretation of Art. 4(2)/Rcg. 17 undermined legal certainty. 
84 See Ford at pp 2747-2748 and Vichy at p 424. The Court dismissed both submissions 
outright, as did the Court in IAZ at p 3413. 
Bs Arnull in 'Owning Up to Fallability', discusses fully the confusion created by the Court's 
attitude to precedent. He notes that these problems are exacerbated by the Court's failure to 
provide for reasons for departures from precedent. Rasmussen in On Law and Policy in the 
European Court of Justice and 'Between Self Restraint and Activism', critically analyses the ECJ's 
judicial activism. This is also examined by Mancini 'The Making of a Constitution for Europe'. 
For critiques of Rasmusscn's work, see Cappelletti 'Is the European Court of Justice "Running 
Wild" 7' and Weiler 'The Court of Justice on Trial'. 
86 Cruz Vilaca in The Court of First Instance', examines these issues in detail, arguing that 
their cumulative effect is to create disrespect for Community law. At pp 11-12, he notes that 
there is on average an 18 month delay in hearing Art. 177 references. These problems arc also 
discussed by Arnull 'Refurbishing the Judicial Architecture'. 
87 The scope of this principle is discussed by : Steiner Textbook on EEC Law at pp 49-51 
Wyatt and Dashtvood The Substantive Law of the EEC at pp 91-95 ; Kcrse EC Antitrust 
Procedure at paras 8.28-8.30. The principle was applied under Art. 173 of the Treaty in Topfer 
[19781 ECR 1019. In that the principle involves the raising of a reasonable expectation, reliance 
on that expectation and breach of it, it is similar to the English legal principle of estoppel. For 
further discussion of this aspect, see McKenzie Stuart ' Legitimate Expectation and Estoppel'. 
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The principle is also discussed thoroughly by Sharpston 'Legitimate Expectations and Economic 
Reality'. 
88 See McKenzie Stuart 'Legitimate Expectation and Estoppel' at p 53. 
89 See Hercules at para 54 and 12th Report on Competition Policy 1982 at paras 34-35. 
Similar comments were made in Cement at p 251 and Woodpulp II at pp 458-461. See Ch4 supra 
under 'The Right to be Heard' for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
90 The Commission's most recent attempts to exclude in the name of confidentiality have 
occurred in Cement, Soda Ash and PVC II. In Cement at p 257, the Court held that limited access 
did not effect irreparable damage as the defendant may appeal against DGIV's decision. However, 
the CFI was sternly critical of DGIV's attitude to disclosure. As Soda Ash and PVC II are 
currently on appeal, the Court has further opportunity to make clear to the Commission its 
responsibilities. For more detailed discussion on this issue, see Ch4 supra under 'The Right to be 
Heard'. 
91 VBBB at p 60. The Commission declared its intention to hold a sector inquiry on several 
occasions including in response to written question in the European Parliament. See, WQ No 
514/81 OJ [1981] C240/20 and WQ No 514/28 OJ [1981] C273/185. 
92 AEG also highlighted the paramouncy of Reg. 17, claiming that its legitimate expectations 
had been infringed by DGIV's prosecution of its distribution system. Here, AEG had previously 
received a comfort letter and no action had been taken over prior to complaints of discriminatory 
practice by AEG. Thus, the firm claimed it was entitled to assume that the selective distribution 
system was legal. The Court at p 3191, held that the Commission's previous inaction or slackness 
in enforcement could not raise a legitimate expectation and could not justify AEG's infringement 
of competition rules. See similar claims by SSI and Van Landewyck appealed under breach of the 
principle of equality, discussed earlier in this chapter. 
93 Distillers at pp 2262-2263. The Court made it clear that completion of Form AB must be 
observed to the letter as a pre-condition for exemption. 
94 Mat pp 3387,3395,3409,3414-3418. 
93 A number of firms involved in the Polypropylene cartel made this claim, particularly 
Hercules at pp 323-325, Hoechst [1992] ECR 629 at p 656 and Huls [1992] ECR 499 at p 528. 
For the CFI's response in Polypropylene, see consideration of the principle of equality discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Welded Steel is currently on appeal on this ground. Discussed by Kerse 
ECAntitrust Procedure at pari 8.30. 
96 See Art. 2(3)/Reg. 2988/74, which fixes limitation periods in competition cases. This 
regulation is discussed by Kerse DCAntitrust Procedure at para 8.47. See also Dyestuffs [1972] 
CMLR 557 at para 49 ; Commercial Solvents [1974] 1 CMLR 309. In addition, where time does 
not bar DGIV from proceeding, the principle of estoppel may come into play. This aspect is 
evaluated by McKenzie Stuart 'Legitimate Expectation and Estoppel'. 
97 Sec discussion in Ch6 and Ch8 supra, regarding the duration of fines for further details of 
the Commission's case construction. 
98 See earlier discussion of appeals by PVC, Polypropylene, LdPE, Zinc Producers, Welded 
Steel, Cast Iron Rolls and Cement in Clis 4,6 supra. 
99 Van Bacl 'Transparency of EC Commission Procedings' at p 193, has referred to this as the 
Court's "so-what" doctrine. Both he and Coppel in 'Curbing the Ruling Passion', have been 
trenchantly critical of this attitude. 
10° Rasmussen 'Between Self Restraint and Activism' at pp 30-32. He also asserts that the 
ECJ's approach has resulted in a widespread perception that the Court is no longer a fully 
"trustworthy neutral". Rasmussen's work itself has been roundly criticised. Sec Weiler 'The Court 
of Justice on Trial' and Cappelletti 'Is the European Court of Justice "Running Wild" T. 
101 Cruz Vilaca 'The Court of First Instance' at pp 12-17 particularly, discusses the threat posed 
to Community law by these problems. However, at p 54, he concludes that the introduction of the 
CFI has re-inforced the "rule of law" by providing increased judicial protection for individual 
rights. Coppel in 'Curbing the Ruling Passion'; Arnull 'Refurbishing the Judicial Architecture' 
and Due 'The Court of First Instance', also examine these problems 
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102 Dauses in 'The Protection of Fundamental Rights' and Schwarze in 'Protection of Human 
Rights', disagree. Both feel that the ECJ has done much to uphold fundamental rights. Dauses at 
p 419, insists that the fact that the Court find few infringements of fundamental principles 
indicates the healthy state of Community law. 
103 Coppel in 'Curbing the Ruling Passion' at pp 143-144, has expressed concern over the 
Court's refusal to recognise procedural integrity as a value in itself. 
104 Goydcr 'User Friendly Competition Law' at p3 and Wood 'User Friendly Competition Law 
in the United States' at p 10. 
105 See Goyder 'User Friendly Competition Law' at p3 and Wood 'User Friendly Competition 
Law in the United States' at pp 14-15. 
106 For further discussion, see Wood 'User Friendly Competition Law in the United States' at pp 
10-14 and Goyder 'User Friendly Competition Law' at pp 3-4. 
107 See Goydcr 'User Friendly Competition Law' at pp 4-5 and Wood 'User Friendly 
Competition Law in the United States' at pp 16-17. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
ANTITRUST IN AMERICA 
"America has been discovered before, but 
it has always been hushed up. " ' 
A)INTRODUCTION 
To add further depth to this examination of antitrust enforcement, the following 
chapter will undertake a comparative evaluation of competition law enforcement in the 
US 2. Limitations of space only allow for a broad overview of procedure in this 
jurisdiction. Thus, the study will concentrate on examining the central issue of the 
classification of anti-competitive conduct in the US and its nexus with the scope and 
application of enforcement powers and the ambit of defence rights. The analysis will 
undertake some evaluation of whether and how the law is used as a resource to 
achieve policy goals. Special consideration will be given to the existence, scope and 
effect of political and pragmatic objectives in this context. So, as with the EC, the 
ensuing discussion is not a comprehensive account of antitrust in this jurisdiction. 
Instead, in order to explore fully the hypothesis of the study, it will concentrate on 
evidence indicating the US jurisdiction's use of the 'law as a resource' and the impact 
of political and pragmatic goals'. In this way, the study will provide some indication 
of whether the Commmission's conduct and the problems resulting from it are typical 
of antitrust enforcement in general, revealing the prevailing policy reasons for this. By 
shedding light on the true nature of antitrust, the research should provide some 
answers to the question of justiciability and thus the most appropriate type of market 
control. 
The principal US antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act 1890 (ShA) and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 (FTC Act). Whilst other antitrust provisions 
exist, the enforcement approach under these central Acts is so typical of US antitrust 
enforcement that no further reference will be made to other statutes unless specific 
differences of approach require it. The following sections will broadly outline the US 
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enforcement process, noting the nature and scope of enforcement powers and defence 
rights and providing some consideration of whether and how these powers and rights 
are used as enforcement resources 4. 
B)ENFORCEMENT PROCESS - INVESTIGATION S 
1)Department of Justice (DOJ) Investigations 
The DOJ's detection of antitrust offences derives from a variety of leads. Its main 
sources are disgruntled employees, dissatisfied consumers and witnesses from other 
investigations 6. Interestingly, the DOJ does not rely on the Economic Analysis Group 
(EAG) for leads on antitrust offences'. Nor does the DOJ investigate purely on the 
basis of economic criteria 8. As such, the Division has no set of economic tools to 
direct the use of its investigation powers. 
The DOJ's position as the national law enforcement body gives the Antitrust 
Division extensive investigation powers. To assist the fact-finding process a number 
of guides have been issued over the years detailing powers and procedures and giving 
advice on the resolution of common problems 9. The chief lines of investigation are 
outlined below. 
a)Preliminary Investigations (PI) 
The first fact-finding method is to seek information on a voluntary basis, either by 
correspondence or by sending out an Antitrust Division investigator to visit a firm's 
offices. This is done by a staff attorney within the Division requesting a PI following a 
complaint 10. Should the lead be substantiated, further more formal investigations are 
likely to follow. Invariably, companies co-operate in order to avoid trouble later. Prior 
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to the passing of the Antitrust Improvements Act 1976, these voluntary investigations 
were much used ". 
b)Formal Investigation 
Recent years have seen the DOJ take a tougher approach towards investigation. This 
has resulted in the increased use of a wide range of criminal investigation tools to 
uncover antitrust violations. The DOJ now makes frequent use of telephone 
monitoring, body wires and videotapes. Search warrants are also obtained where the 
Division suspects that evidence may be destroyed "Z. Phone tapping and body wires 
normally require the consent of the party concerned 13. Such consents may form part 
of a bargain giving immunity from prosecution ". In non-consensual situations, 
normal criminal procedural rules apply and the DOJ must establish a 'reasonable belief 
of an antitrust violation before taking further action 15. 
c)FBI/Other Federal Agencies 
The Division also makes use of the FBI in conducting investigations, particularly in 
connection with fingerprint and handwriting identification and the polygraphy of 
witnesses 16. Over recent years, the DOJ has increased contact with other federal 
agencies with a view to both developing better means of detecting violations, and in 
order to take advantage of their investigation resources ". 
d)Grand Juty Investigations 
The grand jury is the most powerful investigative tool available to the DOJ and is used 
routinely in the investigation of criminal antitrust infringements "g. Grand juries 
possess considerable autonomy and can compel the production of documents, answers 
to interrogatories and testimony from witnesses. The grand jury's activities are only 
limited by a duty not to impose an unreasonable burden on witnesses ". During the 
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first stage of a grand jury investigation, the DOJ issues broad subpeonas, in the grand 
jury's name, for documents 20. The Division then negotiates with the firm over the 
terms of the subpoena and the scope of the search. Once the demanded documents 
have been obtained, the hearing before the grand jury takes place. Here, the DOJ uses 
the subpoenaed documents to examine witnesses and establish the crucial facts of the 
case. It should be noted that, whilst the DOJ may negotiate the terms of the initial 
subpoena, witnesses called before the grand jury have no actual right of advance notice 
of the nature and scope of the violation under investigation Z'. During the course of 
the hearing, the Division is not only able to establish the basis for an indictment, but it 
also obtains extensive discovery of documents and is able to refine its case 22. 
However, grand juries cannot compel witnesses to incriminate themselves 23. In the 
event of refusal, the DOJ may obtain a 'use immunity' order from the Court compelling 
the party to give evidence 24.. Under these orders, witnesses cannot be prosecuted on 
the basis of the compelled testimony or other information obtained as a result of the 
order 15. Naturally, use immunity is not generally granted to prime offenders as this 
deprives the DOJ of potential defendants 26. In practice, this process is highly 
adversarial. Suspected individuals are 'played off against each other, with the counsel 
of each party attempting to convince the DOJ that their client is either innocent or 
has been so co-operative to the prosecution, that immunity is justified 27. 
Grand juries hearings are closed ex parte proceedings 28. Neither counsel for 
the defendant nor witnesses has a right of audience. Indeed, the hearing is conducted 
without a judge or other 'neutral' party to supervise proceedings. Thus, the grand jury 
is very much under the prosecution's control and only the goverment's case is heard 29. 
Moreover, the result of the proceedings is kept secret 30 
The Division's use of grand jury investigation has come under considerable 
criticism for several reasons. First, it is argued that the criminal procedure is 
inappropriate for such matters. The secret, ex parte nature of the hearing has also 
caused concern. The outcome of such investigations is invariably indictment, yet the 
defence is given no opportunity to explain its actions 31. Finally, there are allegations 
that the DOJ uses grand jury investigations as 'fishing trips' to obtain sufficient 
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information upon which to base civil actions. This tactic both places a financial burden 
on firms and tarnishes their reputation unnecessarily 32. Indeed, Baker describes the 
grand jury as no more than "a vacuum cleaner for finding Goverment evidence" 33. 
However, despite the Supreme Court holding that grand jury proceedings should not 
be used where the Division only intends civil action, there has been no apparent 
reduction in their use 34. 
e)CivilInvestigation Demand (CID) 
The CID is an additional method of discovery which is used to determine whether 
there is sufficient evidence to warrant filing a civil antitrust complaint 35. These 
demands provide the DOJ with extensive powers to compel individuals and 
corporations alike to testify on oath on interrogatories and depositions and to provide 
documents relevant to the investigation 36. Some control is placed on the exercise of 
this power. In issuing a demand, the DOJ must establish a reasonable belief that the 
person under investigation is in possession of relevant documentary material and it 
must identify the required documents with reasonable precision 3. However, the 
DOJ cannot use a CID to compel disclosure of privileged material 38. 
2)Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Investigations 39 
The FTC has equally broad powers of investigation. It can compel the production of 
documents and the sworn testimony of witnesses 40. In the course of investigations, the 
FTC may obtain use immunity orders compelling tesimony under the same rules that 
apply to DOJ investigations 41. The Commission can also order the filing under oath of 
annual or special reports or answers to specific questions 42. The Special Report 
procedure is often invoked to enable a rapid industry-wide investigation 43. The only 
control placed upon the Commission's investigation is a procedural requirement that 
the purpose and scope of the investigation must be disclosed to those persons 
requested or compelled to provide information or documents 44. 
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3)Overlapping Jurisdiction 
As the US has two federal enforcement agencies, their jurisdictions tend to coincide 
considerably. Allocation of overlapping responsibilities is handled by DOJ and FTC 
liason officers. In the past, certain industries have been informally allocated on the 
basis of the relevant expertise of respective agencies 45. Thus, the DOJ investigated 
the banking, brewing and computer industries, whilst the FTC handled the milk and 
food industries and distribution practices 46. However, Hawk and Veltrop report that 
these lines appear to be blurring, with many investigations being assigned on the basis 
of informal bartering rather than as a result of rational policy decisions 47. The overlap 
of jurisdictions has attracted some criticism. Although advocates argue that the 
overlap promotes 'competition' between the agencies, and thus encourages effective 
enforcement, many others complain that it merely fosters inefficiency and 
inconsistency 48. 
C)DEFENCE RIGHTS - INVESTIGATION 
1)Right to Silence 
As already noted, the defendant has a constitutional right to silence 49. However, some 
limitations are placed upon its scope. First, the privilege only applies to individuals not 
corporations S0. Moreover, the right only applies in respect of criminal charges and 
penalties. Thus, individuals may not claim this right in order to avoid exposing 
themselves to liability in a civil action 51. The value of this protection is also limited by 
the prosecution's ability to obtain use immunity orders compelling testimony. 
Although parties are immune from prosecution on the basis of their- own evidence, 
unless their testimony is wide-ranging, defendants could face prosecution on a related 
antitrust offence where the prosecution has obtained information from other sources SZ. 
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The frequent resort to immunity orders means that the right to silence rarely hinders 
the prosecution's acquisition of evidence. But, as a result, defendants are placed at 
risk of implicating themselves in further violations 53. In addition, both the DOJ and 
FTC have extensive powers to punish all forms of non-cooperation. Under FTC rules, 
refusals to give evidence or produce documents, the giving of false or misleading 
evidence and the destruction or alteration of documents are all criminal offences 
punishable by a fine or imprisonment 54. Furthermore, the FTC may impose daily 
penalties where special or annual reports are not submitted within a specific time limit 
ss The DOJ has similar provisions 56. Moreover, perjury in legal proceedings or 
before a grand jury is a criminal offence risking stiff penalties 57. McAnneny states that 
it is DOJ policy to treat all forms of non-cooperation as serious criminal matters and to 
prosecute them with vigour S8. Finally, where parties fail to comply with a CID, the 
DOJ may obtain a court order requiring compliance. Refusal to do so is punishable as 
contempt of court 59 
2)Conhidentiality 60 
As with the evaluation of EC rules, the defence right of confidentiality at investigation 
will be considered in the context of the protection afforded by legal professional 
privilege. 
In the US, legal professional privilege is clearly recognised. A distinction is 
drawn here between 'attorney-client' privilege which covers the giving of legal advice 
at any time and 'work-product doctrine' which ensures confidentiality for the processes 
by which a lawyer develops and prepares his case for trial 61. In US law, only'attorney- 
client' privilege is the right of the client 62. Several limitations are placed upon its 
scope. In common with most jurisdictions, the US will not grant protection to 
communications made in contemplation of some wrong-doing 63. US courts are also 
prepared to disallow privilege where other "substantial abuses" of the safeguard have 
occurred '. Moreover, it has been the concerted policy of the federal courts to make 
clear that full disclosure is of greater importance to the needs of justice than the 
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protection of legal professional privilege and thus the safeguard will always be 
construed restrictively 6s 
Finally, under the ShA the full weight of the criminal law may be applied to 
acquire documents or compel testimony. In particular, the prosecution is able to 
obtain use immunity orders to circumvent claims of privilege '. 
D)CONCLUSION - INVESTIGATION 
This examination reveals that the DOJ possesses a formidable array of investigation 
tools which are patently criminal in character. The fact that the Division has the full 
range of criminal enforcement powers, combined with the assistance of other federal 
agencies at its disposal, means that it has no problem in acquiring sufficient evidence 
with which to mount a prosecution. The fact the DOD's antitrust enforcement forms 
part of the normal criminal process does mean that some procedural controls are 
placed on the exercise of its powers. But, in the face of the DOJ's extensive authority, 
the effectiveness of these controls may be reduced. Certainly, there is no evidence 
suggesting that they curtail the prosecution's acquisition of evidence in any way. The 
Division's civil powers are no less formidable. Its ability to compel sworn testimony 
and the production of documents under the CID procedure is entirely penal in nature. 
The increase in the range and use of investigation tools employed, particularly the 
routine resort to grand juries, indicates the Department's intention to construe and 
apply its powers penally in pursuit of antitrust enforcement. 
The grand jury may be the Division's most powerful and penal resource, but it 
is also its most controversial. Whilst the grand jury originated as a means of 
preventing abusive prosecutions, it has more recently been likened to the Star 
Chamber 67. It is certainly a process geared to prosecution and ultimately conviction. 
Its secret, ex parte nature denies the defendant the opportunity to comment and 
provide the jury with a balanced view of the case. In the absence of neutral 
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supervision, the proceedings are left entirely in the prosecution's control. This 
situation not only allows the Division to cast its evidential net wide, but it also makes 
indictment inevitable. The nature of the process means that no control exists to audit 
either outcome. The grand jury's decision is necessarily based on partisan evidence, 
yet it may have long-term consequences, setting in motion the prosecution momentum 
and thus significantly improving conviction prospects. 
Although only an administrative agency, the FTC possesses equally extensive 
investigation powers. Its ability to compel sworn testimony, the production of 
documents and written answers to specific questions, combined with routine use of 
these measures, indicates that its fact-finding powers are criminal in character, scope 
and application. However, the Commission's penal powers are balanced only by broad 
procedural controls. As such, these requirements neither hinder the FTC's fact- 
finding, nor are they able to exert exacting control over possible abuse of these 
investigation powers. 
Both the DOD's and FTC's investigation powers are supported by formidable 
sanctions for non-cooperation. Specifically, the threat of custodial sentences ensures 
the prosecution's investigation demands are met with regularity and alacrity. In the 
face of such penalties, it is no wonder that US firms are fabled for their deference to 
antitrust rules. The scope of the sanctions and the prosecution's willingness to penalise 
non-cooperation discloses the United States' determination to pursue an overtly penal 
antitrust policy. 
To balance the prosecution's penal approach, defendants are accorded 
substantive protections. At investigation, unequivocal rights to silence and 
confidentiality exist. But, the pressures placed upon them in antitrust cases may limit 
their practical value. So, although the right to silence is a famous Constitutional 
guarantee, both agencies are able to override this safeguard by obtaining use immunity 
orders. Whilst these orders theoretically protect witnesses, sometimes, they may pose 
more of a threat than a safeguard. Unless defendants are particularly expansive in their 
evidence, they could find themselves subject to prosecution for a related violation. 
They may also find themselves exposed to an equally damaging civil action. Clearly, 
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the protection afforded under these orders may be limited and temporary in nature. In 
return for such protection, the prosecution gains considerable advantage. The 
adversarial nature of the bargaining surrounding immunity orders allows the 
prosecutor to use this process to pit defendants against each other. In the course of 
these negotiations, defendants may reveal additional information and consent to 
telephone monitoring or body wires in order to promote their cause. This 
manipulation of the process is of clear advantage to the prosecution allowing the 
acquisition of evidence at no extra cost to the prosecution. The frequent use of these 
orders to compel testimony ensures that the defendant's right to silence does not 
hinder prosecution fact-finding. Indeed, continued insistence upon one's constitutional 
rights is met with criminal sanctions. This places defendants in a dilemma. Insistence 
upon one's rights may be rewarded with a custodial sentence ; compliance with an 
immunity order may result in prosecution and similar consequences or civil action 
awarding treble damages. Ultimately, the prosecution's control of the process may 
leave defendants with little option but to acquiesce to prosecution demands, so 
reducing the effectiveness of this safeguard. 
Legal professional privilege meets a similar fate. Whilst at the outset the 
protection is recognised, the prosecution's ability to compel the production of 
documents under immunity orders means that this safeguard may offer little real 
protection. By interpreting this privilege restrictively, the judiciary have made it clear 
where their sympathies lie. For US courts, effective enforcement is more important 
than defence rights. 
Already at investigation stage, the same pattern seen in the EC context is 
repeated here. Again, the prosecution is very much in control of enforcement. The 
DOTS and FTC's investigation powers, whether nominally 'criminal' or 'administrative', 
are clearly penal in character, scope and application. Admittedly, US defendants are in 
a stronger position, possessing substantive criminal safeguards. But, even these can be 
curtailed to some extent. This section has illustrated that the prosecution's mastery of 
the process enables them to override these safeguards as and when enforcement 
demands. Moreover, such tactics are used to the same effect. By facilitating certain 
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and cost-effective enforcement, they serve both the political and pragmatic goals of 
US antitrust. 
E)PROSECUTION `' 
After investigation, both the DOJ and the FTC must decide whether and how to 
prosecute. For the DOJ, part of this assessment involves deciding whether to mount 
criminal or civil proceedings or both. The following sections will examine the factors 
affecting this exercise of discretion, including any formal guidance provided. As DOJ 
and FTC decision-making at prosecution is similar, they will be dealt with together. 
1)The Decision To Prosecute 
a)Procedure 
The ShA places the DOJ under a duty to proceed against suspected violations 69. 
Normal litigation procedure applies to both the Division's criminal and civil actions70. 
Where indictment is envisaged, the draft indictment and a detailed statement of the 
evidence is forwarded to the Asst. AG for review. Defence counsel are permitted to 
participate in this review ". Convsequently, they are able to negotiate with the 
prosecution over whether, how and whom to prosecute". Following review, the Asst. 
AG decides which individuals and firms to prosecute. The draft indictment is then 
placed before the grand jury who invariably vote in its favour73. 
In contrast, the FTC exercises a statutory discretion to prosecute 74. This 
decision is taken by the Commissioners themselves not the Bureau of Competition. 
Defence counsel have a similar opportunity here to influence prosecution decisions ". 
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Once action has been decided upon, the FTC issues a formal complaint giving details 
of the charges and fixing a date for the hearing 76. 
b)Prosecutorial Guidance 
i)General Policy Goals" 
The shifting focus of general antitrust policy has had a direct impact on prosecutorial 
decision-making. Brennan discusses the effect of this on the recent evolution of 
prosecution policy, examining the legal, academic and political influences on 
prosecution and how they have affected the exercise of prosecutorial discretion over 
the last 30 years78. He concludes that since the Reagan Administration of the 1980s 
there has been increasingly strong political involvement in prosecutorial decision- 
making. Cases are no longer prosecuted on merit but on the basis of political 
desirability 79. This political influence has manifested itself in recent Administrations, 
producing significant changes in prosecution policy particularly in relation to certain 
offences 80. 
Whilst the Reagan Administration was trenchantly criticised for its over-lenient 
prosecution policy and its refusal to take action against many traditional offences, it 
nevertheless increased the number of criminal prosecutions for price-fixing and bid- 
rigging violations 81. The Bush Administration undertook a tougher, more active 
prosecution policy covering a wider range of offences 82. Nelson notes that whilst the 
focus of Bush antitrust enforcement remained on price-fixing and mergers, there was 
an increased willingness to prosecute rpm cases and the restrictive practices of 
professional associations 83. There are also indications that political goals have 
impacted upon evaluation lowering the prosecution standard and making prosecution 
more likely 84. This increase in the frequency and range of prosecution is also 
evidenced in a survey of antitrust lawyers carried out by Nelson 85. However, these 
lawyers expressed concern over the frequently inconsistent prosecutorial decision- 
making of both the DOJ and FTC $6. The Clinton Administration has continued to 
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pursue a more aggressive prosecution policy, the central focus remaining of the 
prosecution of criminal per se violations 87. 
Thus, it is clear that the political goals of the current Administration are a 
potent influence on the exercise of prosecutorial decision-making, dictating both 
whether and how cases will be prosecuted. 
ii) Guidelines 
Other sources of prosecuturial guidance are contained in various guidelines issued by 
the respective agencies. The most relevant here are the Vertical Restraints Guidelines 
which took a very lenient approach to assessing the legality of most vertical 
restraints"'. As these guidelines have been strongly criticised and were not adopted by 
the FTC or the federal judiciary, it is not intended to discuss their contents further8'. 
In addition, both the DOJ and FTC are issued with procedural manuals 
detailing giving advice on all aspects of enforcement". 
c) Choice of Proceedings 
As well as the DOJ deciding whether to prosecute, it must decide whether to institute 
criminal or civil proceedings. In making this choice, the Division must identify what it 
hopes to achieve by the action. Criminal sanctions can only punish past offences. 
Moreover, there is some concern that criminal sanctions are inappropriate for such 
regulatory offences, particularly in borderline situations"'. Furthermore, in some types 
of offences criminal punishment is ineffective 92. Invariably, the Division considers that 
competition can be maintained better by regulating future conduct within a market. 
Such regulation can only be obtained in civil proceedings. Thus, many major antitrust 
cases are civil ones. But, where there are flagrant, repeated breaches of antitrust laws, 
then prosecution is regarded as more appropriate 93. Present policy focuses criminal 
enforcement on unambiguously anti-competitive practices such as price-fixing, market 
division and bid-rigging 9a. 
The Division has adopted specific criteria which it uses to decide whether to 
proceed criminally. First, there must be a clear agreement between competitors where 
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the effect is to raise prices and reduce output without any prospect of pro-competitive 
advantage. The conduct must be fraudulent and covert and the offenders must have 
intended to enter into a per se illegal agreement 95. The Division's internal rules 
suggest that where it has solid evidence of illegal conduct, it will prosecute regardless 
of the volume of trade involved '. These criteria do not bind the Department. On 
occasion, it has pursued prosecution where the evidence has been weak or 
circumstantial, but there have been overriding policy requirements 97. As might be 
expected, the political influences discussed above have had a noticeable effect on the 
DOJ's choice of proceedings 98. Consequently, in the last 15 years the number of 
criminal antitrust prosecutions per annum has more than doubled 99. Of course, where 
the situation is both a blatant breach and displays the need for future regulation, the 
Department can proceed with concurrent criminal and civil actions. 
2)Case Construction 
Limitations of space do not allow a full discussion of the ambit of the substantive law 
in the US. At this point, it is sufficient to note that the provisions of both the ShA and 
FTC Act are sufficiently wide to allow prosecutors to undertake the same type of case 
construction as seen in the EC context, bringing most conduct within their purview. 
Further discussion of how the substantive law can be manipulated in order to secure 
convictions will be undertaken at trial stage when the per se/rule of reason analytical 
format is examined10°. 
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F)DEFENCE RIGHTS - PROSECUTION 1' 
1)Right to Access 
The ambit of this safeguard in both DOJ and FTC actions will be considered here, 
noting whether the requirements of confidentiality serve to limit its scope and 
effectiveness. 
Generally, the US favours broad disclosure to defendants/respondents involved 
in antitrust cases of all relevant materials obtained by the agency during investigation 
102. Some variation does exist between agencies. As enforcement proceedings arise in 
a 'true' litigation setting, discovery is governed by the normal procedural rules. The 
basic provisions are outlined below103. 
a)Discovery in DOJ Cases 
Disclosure in DOJ civil cases is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
particular, Rule 26 provides for "discovery of any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter in the pending action". It is immaterial here that some of 
the evidence may be inadmissible or useless to the defendant ; discovery is still 
permitted 10'. The extreme width of this provision allows for the discovery of a wide 
range of materials and will include investigation files, though discovery of these is 
limited by the 'work product' doctrine105. Other procedural rules permit the exchange 
of interrogatories, document demands and requests of admissions. This further extends 
the defendant's access to information and increases his ability to mount an effective 
defence106. 
In DOJ criminal cases, discovery is more limited. This is principally because of 
the stricter rules governing the confidentiality of documents 107. However, defendants 
are able to discover a range of materials, including grand jury testimonies, under 
Rules 6 and 16 108. In addition, prosecutors must disclose all exculpatory material. 
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Spratling notes that what may be classed as exculpatory is subject to interpretation and 
how this is applied may serve to limit the defendant's access to relevant material 109. 
The defendant's right of access in criminal cases has been the subject of some debate 
and development. Given the complex nature of proceedings and the range of potential 
sanctions, courts have tended to interpret the rules to permit broader discovery"o 
b)Discovery in FTC Cases 
The defendant's right of access under FTC rules is broadly similar to those in DOJ civil 
cases"'. Disclosure in FTC cases generally requires the approval of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) "Z. ALJs may approve the inspection of documents and access to 
information regarding the existence and location of documents and the identity of 
parties who may be in possession of useful information 13. Occasionally, parties are 
allowed access to special reports filed under s. 6 FTC Act 14. 
c)Limitations on Access 
In both civil and criminal cases, access rights are subject to certain limitations. As the 
situation in DOJ and FTC is similar, they will be dealt with together. 
i)Confidential Materials 
Usually access to documents submitted to the DOJ/FTC by third parties is limited to 
the respondent's counsel 15. It has become common practice for third parties to seek 
protective orders covering all information submitted by them. These orders provide 
that the submitter will receive notice and the opportunity to obtain in camera 
treatment of the documents before litigation commences 16. In order to obtain such 
status, submitters must establish that disclosure would result in "clearly defined and 
serious injury" "'. 
In criminal litigation, the other principal limitation on discovery is that of 
'informer privilege"". The importance of protecting the identity of informers has been 
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a long standing policy consideration of the criminal law in general, and has been 
held applicable in antitrust cases 19. The privilege afforded here is only a qualified one 
and it is within the judge's discretion to waive the privilege and allow the defendant 
access to the information 120. No clear test for deciding this issue exists. Rather, it is 
done on an individual case basis with the judge taking into account the importance of 
the informer's testimony in relation to the nature of the violation and the possible 
defences available 121. It seems that the issue will be decided on the basis of whether 
the defendant needs to know the informer's identity in order to be able to prepare an 
adequate defence 122 
ii)Legal Professional Privilege 
'Attorney-client' privilege is one of the most fundamental limitations on disclosure, 
though it has only limited relevance where a defendant is seeking disclosure from a 
government agency12'. The 'work-product' doctrine is more relevant and may give rise 
to both absolute and qualified immunity from discovery in all antitrust cases 'Z'. 
Documents containing the legal opinions and conclusions of agency lawyers are 
afforded absolute protection from disclosure 125. All other documents prepared for 
litigation purposes by both federal agencies are given qualified protection 126. This 
immunity may be lifted where the defendant is able to establish a substantial need for 
the material and that he cannot obtain such material from other sources'Z' 
iii)Expert Evidence 
Access to expert opinion is also limited in all antitrust cases. Whilst parties to antitrust 
suits are required to disclose the identity of expert witnesses and a summary of the 
facts and the expert's opinion which will be relied on in court, reports of experts who 
will give evidence at trial are not generally discoverable, unless, the defendant is able 
to demonstrate a substantial need for access to the material 128. Despite this, pre-trial 
orders often require the disclosure of reports by experts who will testify at trial129. 
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d)Pre-Trial Orders 
This is a standard procedure in both DOJ and FTC cases requiring an exchange of 
witness and document lists prior to trial. Information received under these pre-trial 
orders is in addition to general discovery rights and thus may nullify any limitations 
imposed upon access by the exceptions discussed above "o 
The effect of these orders is to provide defendants with detailed knowledge of 
the prosecution's case, largely removing the element of surprise. Combined with 
existing disclosure rights, the defendant at prosecution is able to acquire sufficient 
relevant data with which to formulate an effective defence. 
G)CONCLUSION - PROSECUTION 
In summary, prosecution powers are broad. The Division, although under a duty to 
enforce, still possesses a wide discretion over whether and how to prosecute. The 
FTC has a similarly broad discretion. The criteria guiding both agencies decision- 
making are broad and non-binding. Thus, they do not hamper the prosecution's 
choices. Even the more specific criteria controlling the DOD's choice of proceedings 
permit room for manoeuvre and can be overridden by political and other extra-legal 
considerations. On occasion, prosecution has occurred where the criteria have 
militated against it, but criminal enforcement has been politically desirable. Nor is 
either agency's decision-making hampered by the provisions of the substantive law. 
Both the ShA and the FTC Act are drafted in sufficiently broad terms to allow both 
federal agencies to take action against conduct they wish to deter. 
However, the basis of prosecutorial decision-making is cause for concern. The 
increasing influence that the political goals of the governing Administration exert over 
prosecutorial decision-making means that cases are not necessarily pursued on merit, 
but on the basis of political expediency, affecting both whether and how cases are 
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enforced. This political influence has caused prosecutorial discretion to be exercised 
increasingly in favour of criminal enforcement. Political factors have also been 
allowed to affect the prosecution's analysis of cases and to control legal and economic 
standards to enable politically desirable enforcement. These are clear examples of the 
manipulation of the law for political objectives. However, the changing political 
persuasion of the governing Administration necessarily alters current perceptions of 
what is politically desirable, affecting the focus of enforcement policy. This ever- 
changing prosecution focus necessarily replaces legal certainty with inconsistency and 
confusion. Such a pattern neither promotes substantive soundness nor is 'user- 
friendly'. That antitrust rules can be so easily manipulated by political whim must 
undermine the credibility and legitimacy of antitrust and the agencies which enforce 
it'3' 
Defendants at this stage in the process are in a much better position than their 
EC counterparts. The fact that US enforcement largely takes place in a 'true' litigation 
setting is of immense advantage to defendants in terms of the nature and scope of 
disclosure rights afforded. US proceedings take considerably more care in ensuring 
that there is an 'equality of arms' in the litigation process. Consequently, US antitrust 
defendants/respondents enjoy generally broad rights of access to a range of materials. 
Some limitations are placed on disclosure rights and the potential does 
exist in these situations for the legal framework to be manipulated to the prosecution's 
advantage. For instance, what constitutes exculpatory evidence is subject to 
interpretation and therefore manipulation, providing the prosecution with the 
opportunity to withhold evidence. The 'work-product' doctrine may similarly be 
employed to withhold discovery of some material, particularly investigation records. 
Finally, the criteria for lifting immunity in cases of 'informer privilege' are vague and 
are decided upon an individual basis, thus inviting inconsistency. 
But, these potential problems are balanced by some significant advantages to 
the defendant. These benefits largely derive from the litigation setting of US 
enforcement. Firstly, the requirement of pre-trial orders means that all prosecution 
evidence to be adduced at trial is revealed. This often nullifies the problems 
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encountered because of limitations on disclosure. The litigation setting also enables 
defendants to negotiate with the prosecution, particularly in indictment reviews, 
allowing defendants the opportunity to influence a range of prosecution decisions. 
Above all, the litigation context means that disclosure is a clear, substantive right. In 
the US, the nature and scope of this safeguard is not at the unfettered discretion of the 
enforcing body. Any disputes over the extent of discovery are decided upon by an 
independent arbiter, whether it be a federal court judge or an ALJ. All these factors 
serve to significantly reduce the prosecution's ability to control the quality and quantity 
of evidence available to defendants at prosecution stage. Accordingly, the US system 
offers significantly better protection to defendants than the EC. 
So, whilst both agencies have extensive prosecution powers which are clearly 
criminal in extent and application, defence safeguards are also considerable. 
Defendants both know the case to answer and are able to acquire sufficient 
information to make the right to comment effective. Thus at prosecution, there is 
significantly more parity between prosecution and defence positions than seen in the 
EC 132. The impact of political and pragmatic goals remains consistent. Political 
objectives are a dominant factor in prosecution decisions. Pragmatic influences are 
particularly evident in the bargaining at indictment reviews. Together they promote the 
cost-effective and politically acceptable enforcement of antitrust rules. 
H)TRIAL AND SENTENCE 
In this final stage of the US process, the procedure for proving antitrust offences will 
be examined, noting how the requirements of proof may be manipulated to assist 
enforcement. The nature, range and application of sanctions available will also be 
discussed. Opportunities for the informal resolution of US antitrust cases will then be 
evaluated. Finally, the nature and scope of defence rights in both formal and informal 
contexts will be assessed. Comments made in the following sections are equally 
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applicable to DOJ and FTC cases. Where differences exist, special mention will be 
made. 
1)Procedure 
a)DOJ cases 
In all DOJ cases, the normal criminal and civil litigation procedures apply 133 . 
b)FTC cases 
Following issuance of a complaint, an ALJ holds a substantive hearing, receiving 
evidence from both parties 14. The ALJ then issues an 'initial decision' which 
comprises detailed factual findings and legal analysis. This decision can be appealed to 
the full Commission by either party who will review the evidence and issue a 'final 
decision'. The Commission's decision may accept, modify or reject the ALJ's findings 
and conclusions. 
2)Analytical Approach 
The intention here is to outline the US approach to the analysis of antitrust violations, 
briefly noting the main problems and criticisms. Special attention will be drawn to the 
hidden political content of this approach. 
A central feature of US antitrust enforcement has been the development of the 
per se doctrine and the rule of reason approach as tools for the analysis of anti- 
competitive agreements. Under this format, the degree of analysis varies depending on 
the type of restraint under consideration. Basically, agreements whose object is plainly 
anti-competitive are classed as 'illegal per se' and without any economic analysis are 
prohibited 135. Market division, price-fixing, group boycotts and tying arrangements 
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normally come within this category. Conversely, restraints which, although anti- 
competitive themselves, are merely ancillary to the main objective, which is not anti- 
competitive, must be assessed for the reasonableness under the rule of reason 
approach. Here, the nature, purpose and effect of the restraint are judged in their 
market context. In order to determine their legality, many vertical agreements are 
dealt with under this rule 136. In recent decades, there has been acrimonious debate 
over which factors should inform this evaluation. For most of this century a whole 
range of legal, political, economic and social issues were considered. However, the 
development of the Chicago school of economics has had a profound impact on US 
antitrust analysis, by arguing that traditional values are irrelevant or even harmful. 
Instead, it insists that economic efficiency should be the exclusive control in 
determining anti-competitiveness 137. There has been considerable criticism of 
Chicago's exclusive focus on efficiency and fears of a hidden political agenda 138. Fox, 
particularly, argues that this restricted focus on efficiency reflects a political 
philosophy which wishes to sideline antitrust enforcement and set big business free139 
Whilst the distinction between the per se and rule of reason approach is of 
central important to US antitrust, problems do exist. The boundary between the two 
categories is not rigidly fixed and the rule of reason is difficult to define and apply as 
the concept embodies a standard which varies according to the constitution of the 
Court, the problems faced and the prevailing economic, political and social conditions 
140. The result is confusion and considerable legal uncertainty as, over time, the rules 
leave it unclear which practices fall into which category and by which criteria they will 
be evaluated 14'. Consequently, whilst the early years of antitrust saw the expansion of 
the per se doctrine because of its speed and cheapness of application, latterly, the 
Chicago perspective has reversed this trend. As a result, there has been much greater 
use of an increasingly economic rule of reason approach, even in traditionally per se 
situations, with a concomitant growth in legal uncertainty 142. These permitted 
variations in the rule of reason standard have frequently resulted in the two categories 
conflicting with rather than complementing each other and have allowed patently anti- 
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competitive practices to be validated because of overriding political and social 
reasons 143 . 
3)Proof 
This section will first examine the standards of proof required in US antitrust cases. It 
will then go on to broadly outline how the chosen analytical format affects the quality 
and quantity of evidence required to establish a violation thereby facilitating 
enforcement. 
a)Burden and Standard of Proof 
As US cases are heard in a litigation setting, normal evidential rules apply. Thus, in 
DOJ criminal cases, the Division bears the burden of proving its case beyond 
reasonable doubt'"'. In DOJ civil cases and FTC hearings, the federal agency bears 
the burden of proof under a "preponderance of evidence" standard 145. 
b)Analytical Format 
The choice of analytical format has a significant impact on the type and amount of 
evidence needed to substantiate a violation. In the US, horizontal violations are most 
frequently analysed under the per se approach. It will be recalled that under this 
format increased value is placed on circumstantial evidence with less emphasis on 
economic evidence and a lower standard of proof being required 146. This approach 
makes it substantially easier for the prosecution to establish its case 147. Consequently, 
in per se situations, the government is required to do no more than prove some form 
of agreement 148. But, the reliability of this approach has been questioned. Given the 
amorphous nature of the concept of an agreement, there has been particular criticism 
of the Court's tendency to hinge the legality of the conduct on the existence of an 
agreement 149. Burns asserts that the concept can be manipulated to conform with 
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current policy aims and is thus susceptible to political influence 150. Moreover, the 
value of circumstantial evidence has been shown to be dubious, as it is susceptible to a 
range of interpretations15'. Yet, such evidence has been regularly relied upon to prove 
major cartels 'SZ. The Supreme Court have justified this approach by stressing that 
findings are based on the cumulative weight of the evidence's' 
Clearly under the per se approach, the analytical format is able to boost 
evidential sufficiency enabling sometimes tenuous evidence to establish a violation. 
Such assistance is necessarily of profound benefit to prosecutors. Yet even with this 
substantial support, the FTC has suffered several recent reversals because of a failure 
to prove its case's'. To exacerbate matters further, problems exist over the precise 
characterisation of horizontal violations. On occasion, this has resulted in some 
traditionally per se horizontal violations being subject to a rule of reason approach 
under which analysis and requirements of proof differ considerably 155. Consequently, 
which format will be applied in a given instance is far from clear. Overall, these 
problems have resulted in significant legal uncertainty regarding both the 
characterisation of horizontal offences and what constitutes adequate proof of such 
violations 6 
Many vertical agreements are evaluated under a rule of reason approach 157. 
Again, this analytical format has an impact on proof, requiring greater market 
evaluation and thus increased reliance on economic evidence under a higher standard 
of proof 111. But, the reliability of economic evidence has been subject to criticism. 
Brunt asserts that the malleable nature of this evidence, particularly its ability to 
construct facts, calls into question its value 159. Not only may the parties mould the 
evidence, but this market evaluation may be affected by the economic persuasion of 
the judge 1G 0. A further problem in the analysis and proof of vertical offences is the 
issue of what constitutes an agreement in the vertical context. As already discussed, 
the malleability of this concept has caused concern as it can be constructed to meet 
prevailing policy needs 16'. Moreover, critics argue that the existence of a vertical 
arrangement has no evidentiary value as it is equally indicative of pro- and anti- 
competitive effects 162. What constitutes proof of a vertical agreement has been 
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particularly controversial in relation to vertical price restraints which are dealt with 
under a per se analytical format 163. Since 1911, when Dr. Miles declared vertical price 
restraints per se illegal, the scope of a vertical agreement for antitrust purposes has 
been subject to various constructions by the Court revealing the confusion and 
ambivalence towards the competitive effect of vertical arrangements "a. The first 
exception to the rule was imposed in Colgate which exempted unilaterally imposed 
price restraints 165. Since then, the Supreme Court have addressed these issues on 
several occasions. Each time they have given a different definition of the concept and 
what constitutes acceptable proof". Admittedly, each case has served to limit the 
Colgate doctrine and facilitate proof of a violation, but it has also sparked considerable 
controversy 167. More recent cases have sought to clarify matters, but their attempts to 
tighten the standard for proving an illegal agreement have merely added to the 
confusion 168. 
The Court's treatment of vertical restraints has been condemned as seriously 
undermining legal certainty. Their manipulation of the concept of an agreement 
means that it is impossible to easily ascertain where the division between a legal and 
illegal vertical arrangement lies 169. The cases of Monsanto and Sharp add further 
ambiguity as they are internally conflicting and irreconcilable with each other. Not 
only are the boundaries of Monsanto unclear, but the decision causes evidential 
problems. Precisely what proof is required under this ruling lacks clarity and, in some 
instances, the evidential requirements for an illegal agreement are compatible with a 
legal unilateral agreement 10. Moreover, the rule in Sharp conflicts with the rationale 
supporting the decision here, risking agreements which do not offend antitrust goals 
being caught as per se offences ". Furthermore, the rationale in Sharp conflicts with 
the decision in Monsanto 12. The confusion over what constitutes an illegal vertical 
agreement and the evidential requirements supporting such a finding are exacerbated 
by the difficulties encountered in distinguishing between price and non-price restraints. 
Whilst the boundary between the two is blurred, the analytical approach, and thus the 
evidential requirements under each type, vary considerably 13. Finally, many 
commentators have argued that the present distinction between price and non-price 
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restraints is economically insupportable in view of the considerable pro-competitive 
benefits attached to vertical arrangements and have called for a rule of reason 
approach to be adopted in all vertical cases 14. 
It is clear that whichever analytical format is chosen, it has a major impact on 
the proof of an offence. Yet, which format will be applied to a given agreement and 
the nature and reliability of the evidential requirements under each approach have been 
the subject of wide-ranging debate. Of further concern is the inherent malleability of 
the Court's analytical approach and the concepts involved, ultimately leaving proof of 
an antitrust violation at the mercy of enforcement requirements. 
4)Sanctioning Powers 15 
a)Civil Powers 
In DOJ civil cases, the main remedy is the injunction 16. The Court's powers in this 
respect are virtually unlimited. In practice, injunctions are extremely detailed and 
tailored to the specific needs of the situation "'. These injunctions not only regulate the 
behaviour of the parties, but create a range of rights and duties affecting third parties. 
A typical example of the breadth of the Court's powers can be seen in US v Paramount 
Pictures which involved collusion between major producers and distributors of motion 
pictures "g. On proof of a violation, the DOJ was able to obtain a decree regulating 
the working of the entire industry 19. 
Quite clearly, the Division's civil sanctioning powers are extensive. Its ability 
to obtain and enforce such incisive control over business conduct is of immense value 
in the long-term regulation of competition 180. 
The FTC's main sanctioning power is the 'cease and desist' order 18'. This 
consists of a series of detailed injunctions controlling future conduct. These orders 
have the force of law and violations of them can be fined up to $10,000'82. The 
Commission may also commence its own "action for compliance" with such an order, 
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following notification to the AG and may apply to the district court to give effect to 
the cease and desist order if it believes the order will be ignored 183. 
Thus, the FTC too, is able to exercise long-term control over defendants 184 
But, its use of sanctioning powers has been criticised as excessive. Hobbs asserts that 
the FTC has placed too much emphasis on legal sanctions and not enough on securing 
voluntary compliance 18'. 
b)Criminal Powers 
The Court's criminal sanctioning powers are extensive. Under the APPA, antitrust 
violations were upgraded from misdemeanours to felonies, following which, 
corporations could be fined up to $1m, individuals $100,000 and a maximum sentence 
of three years imprisonment could be imposed. Subsequent legislation has raised the 
level of fines even further 18'. Up to this point, the level of sanctions had been a matter 
of judicial discretion. However, in 1984, the US Sentencing Commission was 
established with the intention to ensuring consistency of sentencing 187. In 1987, this 
Commission issued comprehensive mandatory Sentencing Guidelines establishing 
specific ranges of fines and imprisonment which -must be imposed 188. These were 
updated in 1991. Hence, the sanction now imposed depends on when the offence was 
committed as well as the nature and circumstances surrounding the violation and the 
characteristics of the offender"'. 
i)1987 Guidelines 
For violations committed under the 1987 Guidelines individuals may be may fined up 
to $250,000 ; unincorporated organisations $500,000 and corporations $lm 190. 
Alternatively, a fine based on "twice the gain or twice the loss" may be imposed 
Under these Guidelines, the fine range for individuals is calculated on the basis of 4%- 
10% of the volume of commerce done by the defendant 192. Prison sentences on 
individuals range from 0-18 months depending on various factors 193 Under the 1987 
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Guidelines, fines on organisational defendants are calculated on the basis of 20%-50% 
of the volume of trade involved 194. 
ii)1991 Guidelines 
Under these Guidelines, individuals may be fined up to $350,000, unincorporated 
organisations $500,000 and corporations $10m "I. These guidelines lowered the fine 
range for individuals, but increased imprisonment levels 196. Sentencing of 
organisational defendants under the 1991 Guidelines differs considerably from 1987 
approach. It is now significantly more complicated and depends on a range of factors 
relating to the seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the defendant which are 
added onto a'base fine' calculated on 20% of the volume of commerce involved 197. 
iii)Aggravating acid Mitigating Factors 
A range of such factors are taken into account in determining the level of individual 
and organisational sanctions. Most relevant for individuals are their role and extent of 
participation in the crime and the degree to which they personally profited from the 
violation'. In calculating the fine on organisations, the Guidelines take into account 
aggravating factors such as past record, the size of the firm, its attitude and whether 
high level management were involved in the offence''. In mitigation, the Guidelines 
taken into account the existence of compliance programmes and the co-operation of 
the defendant in investigating the violation 200. 
In summary, the emphasis of these Guidelines is based on a 'just deserts' penal 
policy intent on achieving both individual and general deterrence of offenders 201. In 
determining fines, the Guidelines aim to reward corporate efforts to prevent illegal 
conduct and any subsequent co-operation and to punish any obstructive behaviour 
particularly from high level management. 
iv) Use of Sanctioning Powers 
In the past, use of criminal sanctioning powers has been sparing, though the statistics 
do reveal a general increase in their use. In the first 65 years of the ShA, only twelve 
prison sentences were imposed and most of these were suspended 202. In the following 
twenty years, 101 sentences or probationary periods were imposed. Again, many were 
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suspended 203. Fines have been similarly limited with the maximum amount rarely being 
imposed 204. 
This limited application of criminal sanctions has been criticised as reducing the 
deterrent value of antitrust laws. Blair asserts that whilst ample deterrent capability 
exists, it will not be effective until it is exercised frequently enough to instil fear 
into antitrust violators 205 
More recently, the Division has played an active role in emphasising the need 
for overtly deterrent sanctions. To this end, it has encouraged judges to impose stiffer 
sanctions and has lobbied for legislative increases in the severity of penalties 206. This 
persistence has been rewarded, most recently, in the extensive financial and custodial 
sanctions permitted under the 1991 Guidelines 207. The DOJ's overtly penal approach 
to antitrust violations is demonstrated by the statistics. Between 1981-1987,993 
defendants were indicted, during the course of which fines totalling $140m were 
levied. In addition, prison sentences were imposed on 212 defendants. The average 
sentence was 4-5 months 208. 
5)Informal Resolutions 
a)DOJCases 209 
i)Plea Bargains/Nolo Contendere Pleas 
In criminal proceedings, two related opportunities for a negotiated settlement exist. 
The defendant may either enter a plea of nolo contendere or may negotiate a plea- 
bargain. 
A nolo plea is similar to a guilty plea, but has the advantage that it does not 
constitute an admission of guilt on any particular issue. No evidence is brought before 
the Court, thus protecting the company from having the Court's findings used against 
them in a private suit 21'. 
As already noted, sentencing discretion is limited by the Sentencing Guidelines. 
However, upon the request of the DOJ, the judge is able to depart from the normal 
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fine range where the defendant has substantially assisted government investigations. 
Thus, during plea-bargain negotiations, where the defendant provides information on 
the antitrust violations of other parties, a significantly lower fine may be imposed, 
giving the defendant a strong incentive to co-operate with enforcement 21. 
Under the DOJ's current vigorous criminal enforcement policy, the Department 
tends to resist nolo pleas, preferring to insist on a guilty plea even in the context of a 
plea-bargain 212. This policy is not always successful. Despite Division resistance, 
judges may accept a nolo plea in order to reduce their case lists. 
ü)Consent Decree (CD) 213 
Most major civil DOJ cases are settled by CD following negotiation between the 
parties. There are several reasons for their popularity. Both parties are able to avoid 
protracted expensive litigation and, given the complexity of antitrust cases, this is an 
important advantage. There is an additional advantage for the defendant. Decrees are 
not admissions of guilt. No evidence is adduced in open court and decrees are not 
admissible in private suits. Thus, they afford defendants considerable protection 214 
CDs are governed by the APPA215. Once agreement is reached, the proposed decree 
must be published in the Federal Register, along with any materials the government 
"considered determinative in formulating" the decree and a "competitive impact 
statement" (CIS), 60 days before it becomes effective 216. The CIS, prepared by the 
DOJ, must outline a range of issues setting the violation in its context and detailing the 
effect of the decree on competition 21. Defendants must also disclose to the Court 
details of any contacts concerning the CD that it may have had with government 
departments other than the DOJ 218. Not all defendants comply with this requirement, 
and where they do, they rarely admit contact". 
The 60 day publication period gives third parties an opportunity to comment 
upon and obtain modification of the decree. In addition, various other methods are 
available to non-parties to influence the scope of the CD 220. These avenues vary in 
their effectiveness, but occasionally decrees have been modified following third 
party comments 221. Once this period has elapsed, the Court must decide whether the 
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CD is in the public interest. Specifically, they must assess the competitive impact of 
the decree"'. To this end, the Court have a range of powers including the taking of 
testimony and the appointing of experts 223. Generally, courts have been reluctant to 
become embroiled in active proceedings and invariably they simply affirm the 
decree ZZ'. 
Terms of CDs vary widely. They may range from simply prohibiting the 
offending conduct to imposing more detailed, wide-ranging requirements 225" In 
negotiating decrees, the DOJ has considerable bargaining power. It can withdraw 
consent to a CD at any time before final judgement. This threat of a full trial allows the 
Division to exercise considerable leverage over defendants to co-operate on the 
Department's terms 226. Previously, decrees did not contain expiry dates and often 
remained in force beyond any continued need 227. Now, most decrees contain specific 
time limits. Many also contain other conditions such as reporting and inspection 
requirements 228. Once an order is granted, its terms are binding on all parties and may 
be enforced through contempt proceedings. 
This form of negotiated settlement is not without its problems. Public criticism 
that decrees failed to protect the public interest came to a head in 1971 with 
allegations of improper political pressure by ITT on the DOJ to settle a series of 
merger cases 229. The Tunney Act was passed in the wake of this scandal and was 
intended to make the process more transparent and, in some unspecified way, augment 
the Court's role in guarding the public interest 230. However, commentators are 
unanimous in finding that the APPA has had little appreciable procedural or 
substantive effect on decrees 231. Despite attempts to curtail courts rubber-stamping 
decrees, most CDs are entered in the same terms as they were lodged 232. Moreover, 
the APPA does not control the important area of negotiations between the DOJ and 
defendant where considerable pressure may be exerted to settle 233. Nor has the APPA 
been effective in uncovering political and policy influences affecting the likelihood 
and scope of a decree23'. Thus, the Act's success in combatting the very problems that 
brought about its existence seems limited. 
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The nub of the problem appears to be the unchanging judicial attitude towards 
decrees. Courts have always been loathe to interfere with terms acceptable to the 
parties involved and have preferred to simply affirm decrees rather than become 
embroiled in active proceedings. The APPA has had no impact whatsoever on this 
attitude Z'S. The Court's public interest assessment is the cause of some concern and 
confusion. Firstly, courts have shown a marked reluctance to use the powers granted 
to them under the APPA to carry out this evaluation 236. Some confusion has arisen 
over the powers granted to the Court. Kauper explains that Congress clearly thought 
it was providing the Court with a greater role, yet the Court already possesses the 
powers granted to them under the Act 237. More pertinently, it is unclear how the 
courts can utilise these powers to make the required public interest evaluation without 
imposing the very costs on the parties that decrees are intended to avoid 238. The 
Court's solution to these problems has been to proceed much as they did before the 
passing of the Act 239. Despite these problems, Branfman asserts that the benefits of 
the APPA outweigh its disadvantages 2a°. Certainly, the popularity of CDs as a means 
of informal resolution continues unabated Za'. 
iii)Business Review Leiter (BRL) Z'2 
BRLs are similar to DGIV's comfort letters. Under this scheme, the Division reviews 
a proposed practice and states is enforcement intentions. Operation of this informal 
clearance procedure requires that the agreement is not in operation and full disclosure 
of the facts. After reviewing the material, the DOJ may state its enforcement 
intentions or may decline to comment. Usually, it is prepared to state its plans 
regarding criminal enforcement, but may reserve the right to institute civil 
proceedings 24. Even where the Department waives immediate prosecution, it may 
withdraw the waiver where there has not been full disclosure Z44. The text of a BRL is 
normally published as guidance for other businesses. However, it must be remembered 
that a DOJ release under a BRL does not preclude private enforcement. There have 
been several instances where the Division has issued a BRL permitting practices which 
constitute antitrust violations and thus form the basis of potential private actions24'. 
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Informal resolutions are clearly important to the DOD's enforcement policy. However, 
both the business and legal communities have criticised the lack of opportunities for 
informal settlement with the Division. A further drawback is that the Department's two 
favoured solutions, CDs and plea-bargains, both require the formal opening of 
litigation, and thus lack the informality desired by businesses. Nevertheless, in criminal 
cases, significantly reduced fines provide a strong incentive for defendants to seek 
some form of negotiated settlement. The Division's current zealous criminal 
enforcement policy may militate against further increases in non-adversarial 
resolutions, though the needs of pragmatism may serve to counteract this. An increase 
in the use of plea-bargains may provide the DOJ with the best of both worlds. In its 
civil enforcement the Division has relied heavily on settlement by CD, though the 
equity of some decrees has been questioned. Nevertheless, their popularity as a means 
of negotiated resolution is undeniable. Finally, of continuing concern is the amount of 
undisclosed political influence affecting the informal settlement of both the DOJ's civil 
and criminal matters. 
b)FTC Cases 246 
The FTC's potential for informal resolution is more fully developed than the DOD's. A 
number of possibilities exist. 
i)Consent Orders 
These are similar in form and content to the DOJ's CDs. Once a formal complaint is 
issued, the Commission negotiates with the firm concerned to reach a settlement. A 
consent order is then filed. Such orders are binding. Sometimes, the FTC enters 
negotiations prior to issuing a complaint. Once a settlement is reached, the complaint 
and the consent order are filed simultaneously. The Commission rarely uses this 
approach as it does not provide the FTC with the same leverage as it gains from the 
issuing of a formal complaint Z". 
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ii) Undertakings 
In addition, the FTC may close its files without issuing a complaint where the 
offending firm gives written confirmation that the unfair practice has ceased and gives 
undertakings regarding its future conduct"'. 
iii)Advisory Opinions 
These are formal written statements issued by the Commission regarding the legality of 
a prospective practice Zag. Like BRLs, there must be full disclosure and the practice 
must not be in actual operation 250. Whilst the opinion is published, it is not binding on 
the FTC 251. Where the FTC revokes an opinion, it will not take further action until it 
has notified the affected party and given them an opportunity to discontinue the 
conduct 252. Normally, opinions are only issued in matters involving important 
questions of law or public interest where no clear precedent exists 2. Other enquiries 
may be dealt with by an informal 'staff opinion letter'. These are not binding. 
iv)Industry Guides 
These are administrative guides interpreting the Commission's view of the law on a 
particular subject relevant to that industry and indicating the factors that the FTC 
would take into account in making a decision 2$4. These guidelines are not legally 
binding 255. They are generally used where the Commission considers that the legal 
issues require clarification and it believes it can obtain greater voluntary compliance by 
articulating the agency's attitude =56 
v) Trade Regulations 
These regulations are formal guidelines akin to delegated legislation ZS'. Regulations 
may outline accepted practice within a specific industry or be of general application 258. 
The FTC often uses breach of such regulations to establish unfair trading practices by 
a firm. Given the increasing need for antitrust regulation and enforcement, it is likely 
that in future the FTC will make even greater use of such regulations. 
The Commission's use of informal resolutions has been subject to on-going criticism. 
Its choices over which cases to prosecute and which to negotiate have been questioned 
on grounds of fairness 259. In the past, the Court did little to curtail the Commission's 
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selective prosecution policy. More recently, the Court have refused to defer to the 
FTC's discretion". Moreover, the FTCs overwhelming preference for litigation over 
non-adversarial solutions in the last two decades has served to alienate much of the 
business and legal communities and has encouraged calls for its abolition. Despite 
these criticisms, Hobbs believes that there is a continuing role for the FTC in the 
development of non-adversarial processes which are cheap, fast and effective26'. 
I)DEFENCE RIGHTS - TRIAL AND SENTENCE 262 
The defendant's right to comment and to an independent tribunal will be assessed in 
both formal and informal contents. 
1)Formal Proceedings 
As hearings of both DOJ and FTC cases are formal proceedings, full substantive rights 
to comment to an independent tribunal exist, providing a significant counter-balance to 
enforcement powers. Most notably, the independence of ALJs serves to safeguard 
defence rights, ensuring that decisions regarding such matters are taken by an 
independent arbiter. Some problems do exist. As noted earlier, the Court's political 
persuasion may affect the analysis of cases, thus jeopardising the independence of the 
deciding tribunal 263. The FTC's monolithic role has been criticised criticised on similar 
grounds Z6'. 
In criminal sanctioning-decisions, the Sentencing Guidelines curtail the scope 
of arbitrary sanctioning by providing greater clarity in the calculation of sanctions. 
This provides additional protection for defendants. 
Defendants derive further protection from rights of appeal operated through 
the normal court structure 265" But, the scope of review is generally limited to issues of 
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law 21. Particularly in appeals of FTC cases, the Court will concentrate on an 
evaluation of the standards and criteria employed 267. The Court of Appeals do not 
indulge in a weighing of the evidence as often undertaken by the CFI. Whilst past 
supervision of FTC cases has been open to criticism, recent review has been more 
thorough 268. Nevertheless, as it is often difficult to assess where the law ends and 
policy begins. This may mean that much of the FTC's decision-making escapes real 
scrutiny, so diminishing the effectiveness of appeal rights. 
2)Informal Proceedings 
As with informal settlement in the EC defence rights will be assessed here according to 
the legal protection they afford defendants. As DOJ CDs and plea-bargains and FTC 
consent orders all attract the same problems they will be dealt with together. 
Defendants negotiating such settlements may face difficulties. Whilst individual 
defendants may be able to exert strong political and economic power, little formal 
protection governs the bargaining process. Defendants have no right to withdraw 
from the proposed settlement and may possess little leverage to secure equitable 
terms. In this context, they may accede to terms considerably more stringent than 
necessary269. But, defendants are not at a complete disadvantage. They can express 
their concerns to judges in non-evidentiary hearings 270. More importantly, such 
settlements are binding on all parties and are supervised by the Court. affording 
defendants considerable protection. This situation is in stark contrast to BRL's and the 
FTC's Advisory Opinions neither of which bind the agency involved. As such, these 
opinions provide the same dubious legal protection to defendants as EC comfort 
letters and for much the same reasons 27. 
The central problem affecting all informal settlements is the underlying political 
influence on these solutions. This makes it difficult to assess the true degree of 
protection afforded. Changes in the political perspective of the agency involved could 
result in the withdrawal of any waiver not to prosecute. Moreover, they offer no 
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protection against highly damaging treble damages suits. Nevertheless, despite 
possible drawbacks, the popularity of negotiated settlements continues unabated. 
J)CONCLUSION - TRIAL AND SENTENCE 
It is now appropriate to assess the scope of prosecution powers and defence rights at 
trial stage, noting their value to the enforcement process. Unless otherwise stated, the 
comments below apply to both DOJ and FTC enforcement. 
Again, at trial, prosecution powers are broad, placing them very much in 
control of the process. The choice of analytical format and the evidential requirements 
necessary to substantiate an offence in any given case are at the discretion of the 
prosecutor and Court. This has been the source of some concern. It has been 
demonstrated that whichever analytical approach is chosen, it has a significant impact 
on the proof of an offence. Yet, which format will be applied to a given situation and 
the nature and reliability of the evidential requirements under each approach have been 
the subject of continuing controversy. The overall impact has been to create wide- 
ranging legal uncertainty over the analysis and evidential needs of US antitrust cases. 
Of further concern, is the inherent flexibility of the selected analytical approach and the 
concepts involved which can be used to boost evidential sufficiency and permit, 
sometimes tenuous, circumstantial evidence to prove a violation. This is of significant 
enforcement assistance to prosecutors but clearly disadvantages defendants. 
Moreover, these choices have been shown to be particularly susceptible to undisclosed 
political influence. This malleability allows proof of an antitrust violation to be 
moulded to current enforcement needs. It also means that those open to the greatest 
sanctions are convicted on the least substantive evidence. 
Both civil and criminal sanctioning powers are penal in nature and scope 
enabling the respective enforcement agencies to have long-term consequences upon 
the future business conduct of those they come into contact with. Over the years, the 
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application of these powers has become increasingly punitive. The current approach 
reveals a desire to impose maximum sanctions at every opportunity. This policy is in 
direct response to political requirements. Pragmatic needs also affect the use of 
sanctioning powers. For instance, the Sentencing Guidelines contain a clear mandate 
to reward co-operative behaviour which reduces enforcement costs. 
Both federal agencies possess a range of opportunities for informal resolution. 
In both civil and criminal contexts, these allow wide-ranging penal conditions to be 
imposed on the defendants involved. However, the opportunity for, and use of, 
negotiated settlements has been criticised. Specifically, the government's current 
preference for adversarial resolution has militated against informal settlements in 
general. Moreover, enforcement agencies' preferred routes for negotiated resolution 
often possess a degree of formality disliked by businesses. This failure to utilise the 
full range of informal resolutions has resulted in a loss of corporate goodwill and 
represents many lost opportunities to encourage voluntary compliance. The political 
and pragmatic aspects of informal resolution require comment. Firstly, it has been 
revealed that political goals clearly affect the choice of informal resolution. 
Specifically, the DOD's zealous enforcement policy shows a distinct preference for 
plea-bargains over nolo pleas. This choice allows it to exact greater advantage from 
the settlement and has significantly more penal consequences for defendants. 
Sometimes these political choices conflict with the Court's desire to accept a nolo plea 
in the interests of pragmatism, revealing an underlying tension between policy goals. 
Moreover, the likelihood and scope of a negotiated settlement may be the result of 
undisclosed political influence by both the prosecutor and the defence. Legislation 
intended to curb, or at least make explicit, this influence has largely failed to impact 
upon everyday practice. The pragmatic desire for speedy settlements has created the 
prevailing judicial tendency to affirm negotiated solutions without incisive 
consideration of the competitive impact of decrees or the influences informing 
settlements. Legislation intended to guide judges in this area has largely been ignored. 
Not least because the thorough evaluation demanded by statute conflicts directly with 
the pragmatic aims underlying negotiated resolution. Thus, once again, the underlying 
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tension between competing enforcement goals is highlighted. As it is unclear how 
these political and pragmatic conflicts will be resolved in any given case, the 
application and scope of informal resolutions remains uncertain. 
At trial, defendants are in a strong position, possessing substantive rights to 
comment and to an independent tribunal whose scope is consistent with the nature of 
the procedure. Neither are at the discretion of the enforcing agency. In criminal cases, 
the Sentencing Guidelines further reduce the scope for capricious enforcement. 
Whilst, defence rights in informal proceedings are less certain, US defendants 
remain in a stronger position than their EC counterparts. Admittedly, defendants in 
negotiated settlements are more susceptible to control by federal agencies. The 
absence of formal safeguards during bargaining means that the threat of expensive 
litigation and punitive sanctions can be used by prosecutors as leverage. But, the 
numerous practical advantages accruing to both sides from such resolutions serve to 
counteract potential difficulties, making negotiated settlements an extremely popular 
method of antitrust enforcement. So, whilst some disparity between prosecution 
powers and defence safeguards at trial stage still exists, it is notably less marked than 
in the EC, 
Overall, the study illustrates the extensive penal scope and application of 
enforcement powers at trial stage. The entire process is geared towards acquiring and 
maintaining long-term regulation of US business conduct for political and pragmatic 
ends. Again, the political nature of antitrust causes concern. In both formal and 
informal situations, undisclosed political considerations continue to affect decision- 
making, threatening the legitimacy and credibilty of antitrust enforcement. 
' Oscar Wilde. 
Z On this, see also the earlier discussion of the comparative analysis in Chl supra. 
3 For further on the central arguments of the study, see Ch1. 
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For those unfamiliar with US antitrust legislation and its enforcement process, a brief 
description is contained in Appendix A. See also, L. Sullivan Handbook of the Law ofAntitrust 
West Publishing Co (1977) ; Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA (3rd Edn) 
Cambridge Unv. Press (1980) ; Agnew Competition Law Allen and Unwin (1985) ; Whish 
Competition Law Buttenvorths (1993). 
Background information is derived from : L. Sullivan Law of Antitrust at p 751 et seq ; 
Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA Ch12 ; Agnew Competition Law ; Whish 
Competition Law ; Hawk and Veltrop 'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States Postive 
or Negative Lessons for the European Community' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) 
Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 21; 
Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation in the United States :A Comparative 
Look' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US 
Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 144 ; Hobbs'Antitrust in the Next Decade -A Role 
for the FTC' Antitrust Bulletin [1986] 451 ; Johnson and Rupert 'An Introduction to US Antitrust 
Law' LSG [1986] 122-115,126 ; Hawk US, Common Market and International Antitrust :A 
Comparative Guide Prentice Hall (1990) ; Fox 'The Modernisation of Antitrust :A New 
Equilibrium' Cornell LR [1980] 1140 ; Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings at the United States 
Federal Trade Commission' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in 
EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 203 ; Abraham The Judicial Process 
Oxford Unv. Press (1986) ; Kelly, Harrison and Betz The American Constitution - Its Origins and 
Development W. W. Norton & Co (1983) ; Fox and L. Sullivan 'Antitrust - Retrospective and 
Prospective : Where Are We Coming From ? Where Are We Going ?' NYULRev [1987a] 936 ; 
Kingdon 'Economic Argument in Antitrust Cases : An Americam Litigator's Perspective' ECLR 
[1987] 371 ; Davidow 'EEC Fact Finding Procedures in Competition Cases : An American 
Critique' CMLR [1977] 175 ; McAnneny'The Justice Department's Crusade Against Price-Fixing 
- Initiative or Reaction' Antitrust Bulletin [1991] 521 ; ABA Antitrust Section Handbook on 
Antitrust Grand Jury Investigations (2nd Edn) (1988); ABA Antitrust Section Criminal 
Litigation Manual (1983). 
6 McAnneny'The Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 529-530. 
7 The EAG is the Division's economic policy group. 
8 However, the Division has sometimes used economic profiles to assist detection. See 
discussion in McAnneny'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 531. 
9 Eg Grand Jury Guidelines BNA Trade Reg. Rept. (Oct 21,1975). Discussed by Davidow 
'EEC Fact Finding Procedures in Competition Cases' at pp 177-178. 
10 The Director of Operations grants the authority. For further information, see McAnneny'The 
Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 531-532. 
11 Also known as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR). This Act considerably expanded the DOJ's 
powers to obtain information mandatorily and discover documents. On this, see L. Sullivan Law of 
Antitrust at p 754 ; Davidow'EEC Fact Finding Procedures in Competition Cases' at p 178. 
12 On this, see Judy Whalley (Asst. AG, Antitrust Division, DOJ) Priorities and Practices - The 
Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforceinet Program Today Remarks before the Bar of the City of 
New York on Per Se Antitrust Violations (April 8,1988) at pp 4-6 ; McAnneny 'The Justice 
Department's Crusade' at p 528. 
13 Usually the informant. Wire fraud investigations allow phone tapping without the party's 
consent. Discussed by McAnneny'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 528. 
14 Under 18 USC s. 6001-6003, the Division may seek 'use immunity' orders giving certain 
parties immunity from prosecution in situations where the parties are likely to claim 5th 
Amendment protection. On this, see Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at 
p 150 and McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 532. Use immunity is discussed 
further under both 'Grand Jury Investigations' and 'The Right to Silence' infra. 
is For further information on US criminal procedure, see Wright Federal Practice and 
Procedure : Criminal (2nd Edn) at s. 350. 
16 See Whalley (Asst. AG, Antitrust Division, DOJ) Priorities and Practices - The Antitrust 
Division's Criminal Enforcenmet Program Today Remarks before the Bar of the City of New York 
on Per Se Antitrust Violations (April 8,1988) at pp 4-5. 
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17 McAnncny'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 529. 
18 The powers and procedures before grand juries are discussed in : Baker 'Investigation and 
Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at p 150 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at p 755 ; Neale and Goyder 
The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 376-377 ; McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' ; 
ABA Antitrust Section Handbook on Antitrust Grand Jury Investigations ; Abraham The 
Judicial Process at pp 105-111. 
19 Sec Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at p 376. 
20 S. 17(c) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (F. R. Cr. P. ). 
21 Discussed by Abraham The Judicial Process at pp 105-111. 
22 See L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at p 755. Usually, the DOJ begins by examining the lowest 
level individuals in a firm and works its way up. Research has shown that such parties are more 
likely to be truthful and that it is more difficult for them to conceal the facts. For further details, 
see Davidow 'EEC Fact Finding Procedures in Competition Cases' at pp 180-181 and Baker 
'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at p 150. 
23 Individuals subpoenaed may invoke 5th Amendment rights, but corporations may not 
Maricopa By-Products Inc v US 1968 Trade Cas (CCH) (9th Circ 1967). 
24 Under F. R. Cr. P. ss. 6001-6003, the judge will issue such orders where in the prosecution's 
judgement : a)the testimony sought to be immunised may be "necessary to the public interest", and 
; b)"such individual has refused to testify or is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his 
constitutional rights". 
25 Ss. 6001-6003 F. R. Cr. P.. 
26 The prosecution of individual defendants is a major clement of US antitrust largely because 
of its deterrent value. See discussion in Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation'. 
27 Baker, a former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, in 'Investigation and Proof 
of an Antitrust Violation' at pp 150-151, notes that this process is nerve racking for clients and 
counsel alike. 
28 Goverment lawyers, witnesses and jurors are the only parties permitted to be present. 
29 On this, sec Abraham The Judicial Process at p 105. The only parts of the defence case that 
are disclosed arc those elements which the prosecutor chooses to reveal. See also, Neale and 
Goydcr The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 376-377 ; L. Sullivan Laiv ofAntitrust at p 755. 
30 Rule 6(e) F. R. Cr. P.. Only the DOJ investigation staff, senior DOJ members and the defence 
(following indictment) are permitted to read the grand jury transcripts. Individual witnesses may, 
if they wish, disclose their testimony. but, they cannot be compelled to do so - except under the defendant's limited rights of discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Discussed 
by McAnneny'The Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 528-529 and L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust 
at p 755. 
31 Indictment occurs in 95% of cases, see Abraham The Judicial Process at p 105. Even 
where no indictment follows, the criminal stigma attached to grand jury hearings may damage a 
firm's reputation. On these criticisms, see Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Latins of the USA at p 
377 and Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at p 150. 
32 Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at p 377. 
33 Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at p 150. He comments that this is 
very different from its original purpose as a means of preventing abusive prosecution. 
34 See the Court's rulings in US v Proctor and Gamble Co 356 US 677,78 S. Ct. 983 2 L. Ed. 2d 
1077 (1958). Discussed by L. Sullivan Lmv ofAntitrust at p 755. 
35 CIDs are issued under the Antitrust Civil Process Act 1962 ss. 1311-1314, as amended by the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 1976. The legislation providing for this discovery 
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method was enacted following the Supreme Court ruling that grand juries could not be used to 
obtain evidence for civil actions. Discussed by Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA 
at pp 375-376 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 755-756,843-844,851-852. 
36 Ss. 3,1312 Antitrust Civil Process Act 1962. Prior to the HSR amendments, only the firm 
under investigation could be compelled under a CID. Now, they may also be issued to any person, 
legal or natural. 
37 S. 1312(a), (b) Antitrust Civil Process Act 1962. The statute requires that the demand states 
the nature of the alleged violation and describes the class/classes of documentary material required 
"with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified". The CID 
must also identify the custodian of the material and prescribe a return date for the documents. 
38 S. 1312(c)(2) Antitrust Civil Process Act 1962. The issue of privilege is discussed further 
under'Defence Rights - Investigation' infra. 
39 For further information on FTC investigations, see : L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at p 756 ; Neale 
and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 383-384 ; Davidow 'EEC Fact Finding 
Procedures in Competition Cases'; Hobbs 'A Role for the FTC' ; Lingos 'Transparency of 
Proceedings'. 
40 Under ss. 6,9 FTC Act. The FTC can compel the testimony of any person with any potential 
knowledge of the relevant facts. The Commission's procedural rules require that the investigation 
hearing is fully recorded and that the transcripts are made part of the investigation. See 16 CFR 
s. 2.8(b). 
41 Ss. 6001-6003 F. R. Cr. P.. 
42 S. 6(b) FTC Act. 
43 Under s. 6(c) FTC Act, the FTC has addititonal powers to investigate and ensure the 
enforcement of decrees following DOJ cases. Under s. 7, the Court may refer DOJ civil cases to 
the FTC requesting it in its judicial function to "ascertain and report on an appropriate form of 
decree therein". Further information on this may be obtained from Neale and Goyder The 
Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 384-385. 
44 Under 16 CFR s. 1.33. 
45 The division of responsibilities is discussed by Halverson 'Civil Investigations by the 
Goverment : New Developments' Antitrust LJ [1976] 537 ; Roll 'Dual Enforcement of the 
Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and the FTC : The Liason Procedure' Business 
Lawyer [1976] 2075 ; Steiger 'Effectively Enforcing Competition Laws : Some Aspects of the US 
Experience' in HAWK (Ed) Annual Proceedings Fordliam Corp Law Inst (1991) p 10 ; Lingos 
'Transparency of Proceedings' at pp 203-204. 
46 Discussed further in Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at p 373. 
47 Hawk and Veltrop'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States' at pp 21-23. 
48 On these points, see Hawk and Veltrop 'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States' at 
p 22. These complaints form part of the current dissatisfaction with the FTC and have fostered 
debate over whether there is a continuing role for the Commission. These problems are discussed 
in greater depth by Hobbs in 'A Role for the FTC'. 
49 The 5th Amendment to the Constitution provides that "no person... shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself'. See discussion in Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC 
Competition Cases :A Comparison with the Rules of Evidence in Common Law' ELR [1987] 315 
at pp 337-340 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at p 755. 
50 Hale v Henkel (US S. Ct. 1906) 221 US 361. Corporations cannot avoid discovery by arguing 
that all employees with relevant knowledge have invoked the privilege ; City of Philadelphia v 
Westinghouse Electric Corp (E. D. Pa. 1962) 205 F. Supp. 830. 
51 Blunt Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 at p 257. 
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52 McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 530, explains that use immunity orders 
often reveal evidence of other related offences and unwary employees may leave themselves open 
to prosecution. 
53 It should be noted that claims that use immunity orders are unconstitutional have been 
rejected by the Supreme Court ; Kastigar v US 406 US 441,91 S. Ct. 1653 32 L. 2d 212 (1972). 
54 Under s. 10 FTC Act and s. 1001 F. R. Cr. P., refusals to give evidence, produce documents or 
the making of false statinents to any federal agency are punishable by a fine of between $1,000 
and $5,000 or one year's imprisonment or both. S. 10 also provides that the destruction of 
documents or the falsifying of reports required under the Act is punishable by a fine of between 
$1.000 and $5,000 and/or three years imprisonment. S. 9 FTC Act also allows the Commission to 
apply to the Court for an order requiring compliance. Thereafter, failure to comply in punishable 
as a contempt of court. Section 9 also provides for a writ of mandamus commanding compliance 
to be sought in instances of continuing refusal. In US v Fruchturan 421 F. 2d 1019 (6th Circ 
1964), the Court of Appeals upheld a prison sentence imposed for alteration of company 
documents after the initiation of an investigation. Discussed by Davidow 'EEC Fact Finding 
Procedures in Competition Cases' at pp 180-182. 
55 S. 10 FTC Act allows the imposition of fines of $100 per day. 
56 Under F. R. Cr. P. s. 1001,1505, refusals to give evidence, the making of false statements and 
the destruction of documents are all punishable under the same sanctions discussed at note 54 
supra. 
57 Under ss. 1621,1623 F. R. Cr. P., it is subject to a fine or up to five years imprisonment. 
58 McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 527-528. In 1985, there were three 
indictments for obstruction and two for perjury before a grand jury. In 1987, there were seven 
obstruction indictments and 12 for perjury. On this, see Whalley (Asst. AG, Antitrust Division, 
DOJ) Priorities and Practices - The Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcentet Program Today Remarks before the Bar of the City of New York on Per Se Antitrust Violations (April 8,1988) at 
p 6. 
59 Antitrust Civil Process Act 1962 ss. 1314(a), (d). 
60 For background information on this section, see : Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC 
Competition Cases' ; Winterscheid 'Confidentiality and Rights of Access to Documents Submitted 
to the United States Antitrust Agencies' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure and 
Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 177 ; Epstein 
'Parameters of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Law of the United States' Swiss Review of 
International Competition Law [1985] 15 ; ABA Antitrust Section Criminal Litigation Manual. 
61 At federal level, the rule has been codified in Rule 501, Federal Rules of Evidence. The 
Antitrust Civil Process Act 1962 s. 1312(c)(2), also provides that no CID may require the 
production of documents which would be privileged from disclosure to a grand jury. The 'work- 
product' doctrine was recognised in Re Grand Jury Proceedings (CA. Fla. 1979) 601 F. 2d 162. 
The rule comes into play at the point where the documents can be said to have been prepared or 
obtained in anticipation of litigation. For further discussion, see in general Epstein 'Parameters of 
the Attorney-Client Privilege' ; Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases' at pp 340- 
345 ; Winterscheid'Confidentiality and Rights of Access'. 
'Work-product' is primarily the law%yer's privilege. See Epstein 'Parameters of the Attorney- 
Client Privilege' at p 276. 
US vAldridge (CA. Ind. 1973) 484 F. 2d 655. 
Valente Pepsico Inc (DC. Del. 1975) 68 FRD 361. Eg the privilege cannot be used to conceal 
documents from the court's view simply by forwarding them to a lawyer ; Re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Malone) (CA. Minn. 1981) 655 F. 2d 882. The privilege can also be overridden 
where "good cause" is shown ; Hickman v Taylor [1947] 329 US 495 at p 511, codified in Rule 
26 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F. R. Civ. P. ). Here there must be no other means of acquiring 
the evidence and the party must establish a "substantial need" of the documents. Discussed further 
by Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases' at pp 344-345. 
65 Foster v Hall (1831) 29 Mass (12 Pick) 89,97 ; US v Goldfarb (C-6 1964) 328 F. 2d 208 and 
Burden v Church of Scientology (DC. FIa. 1981) 526 F. Supp. 44. 
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66 See Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases' at p 343. Immunity orders are 
discussed in greater detail under the examination of grand jury investigations. 
67 Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at p 150. 
68 For background information on this stage see : L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 759-769 ; 
Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 377-386 ; Baker 'Investigation and Proof 
of an Antitrust Violation': Stark 'Transparency Policy of the Antitrust Division US Department of 
Justice' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US 
Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 197 ; Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings' 
Denis 'Focusing on the Characterisation of Per Se Unlawful Horizontal Restraints' Antitrust 
Bulletin [1991] 641 ; McAnneny'The Justice Department's Crusade' ; Nelson 'Reading Their Lips 
: Changes in Antitrust Policy under the Bush Administration' Antitrust Bulletin [1991] 681 
Brennan 'Content, Controversy and Control : Politics and the Evolution of Antitrust Enforcement' 
Law and Policy [1992] 107 ; Griffin 'Economic Rationality Alters US Antitrust Enforcement' LSG 
[1985] 775 ; Johnson and Rupert'US Antitrust Law' ; Buchheit'Justice Department Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints' BLR [1985] 103 ; Editorial 'US Antitrust Made Simple' International 
Corporate Law [1992] 10 ; Baxter 'Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
"Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law' Texas LR [1982] 661 ; Litvack 'Goverment Antitrust 
Policy : Theory versus Practice and the Role of the Antitrust Division' Texas LR [1982] 649 
Kauper 'The Role of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division Before and After the 
Establisment of the Economic Policy Office :A Lawyer's View' Antitrust Bulletin [1984] 111 
ABA Antitrust Section Criminal Litigation Manual ; Wright Federal Practice and Procedure : 
Criminal. 
69 Ss. 1 and 4 ShA. 
70 See below for further details on the decision whether to institute criminal or civil 
proceedings. Further information may also be obtained fron : ABA Antitrust Section Criminal 
Litigation Manual ; Wright Federal Practice and Procedure : Criminal ; L. Sullivan Law of 
Antitrust at pp 759-769. 
71 However, the defence are not allowed to see the draft indictment or memo of evidence. See 
Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at p 151 for further discussion. 
72 Often at this stage the defence may produce information not revealed at grand jury stage. 
For further, see Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at p 151. 
73 See McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 528-529 and Abraham The 
Judicial Process at p 105. 
74 Under s. 5(b) FTC Act, the FTC must not only have "reason to believe" that an unfair method 
of competition is being used, but also that "a proceeding by it in respect thereto would be to the 
interest of the public". However, when exercising its jurisdiction under ss. 2,3,7 or 8 of the 
Clayton Act 1914, s. 11 of the Act requires that the FTC take action whenever they have reason to 
believe a violation has occurred. 
75 Following issuance of a draft complaint, defence counsel and FTC staff meet with the five 
Commissioners individually to discuss matters. This format is followed because of the 
Government in the Sunshine Act 1990,5 USC s. 551 et seq, which prevents the Commissioners 
from meeting collectively in camera with private parties. The final decision to prosecute is taken 
by the full Commission in camera in the absence of defence counsel. 
76 See S. 5(b) FTC Act and discussion in Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 
385-386. 
77 For further discussion of policy goals see Ch2 supra. 
78 See Brennan 'Content, Controversy and Control'. In an extremely interesting discussion, 
Brennan questions whether prosecution policy should be determined exclusively by legal 
standards or whether economic, political and other factors should be permitted to influence the 
decision, He goes on to consider the impact of these factors on prosecution policy. Kauper 'The 
Role of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division' ; Litvack 'Goverment Antitrust Policy' and 
Baxter 'Prosecutorial Discretion', also discuss both the theory and practice of prosecutorial 
decision-making in antitrust cases. In addition, Langenfeld and Scheifman 'Evolution or 
Revolution - What is the Future of Antitrust' Antitrust Bulletin [1986] 287 ; Baker and 
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Blumenthal 'Ideological Cycles and Unstable Rules' Antitrust Bulletin [1986] 323 ; Gellhorn 
'Climbing the Antitrust Staircase' Antitrust Bulletin [1986] 341 and Fox 'The Politics of Law and 
Economics in Judicial Decision-Making : Antitrust as a Window' NYULRev [1986b] 554, all 
examine the changing focus of antitrust policy. 
79 Sec Brennan 'Content, Controversy and Control' at pp 109,111-112,115-117. At p 118, 
Brennan criticises this political influence at an individual case level, though not at a general 
policy level. McChesney in 'Law's Honor Lost : The Plight of Antitrust' Antitrust Bulletin [1986] 
359 and Fox in 'The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision-Making' [1986b], have 
been strongly critical of the fact that antitrust has been used over the years for political expediency 
rather than enhancing competition. Brennan contrasts the present approach with the 'legal' 
influences of the 1960s which produced a prosecution policy focused on the protection of small 
businesses and the'academic' approach of the 1970s with its focus on economic efficiency and its 
very tolerant prosecution policy. 
80 The changes in policy are discussed thoroughly in McAnneny 'The Justice Department's 
Crusade' ; Nelson 'Reading Their Lips'. 
The lenient attitude of Reagan enforcement is discussed in detail in Nelson 'Reading Their 
Lips' and in Rule (Asst. AG, Antitrust Division, DOJ) Criminal Enforce, nent of the Antitrust Laws 
: Targeting Naked Cartel Restraints Address before the ABA Annual Spring Meeting (March 24, 
1988). For an example of the criticism directed at the Reagan enforcement programme, see ABA 
Task Force Report 'ABA Task Force Calls for Stepped up Antitrust Enforcement' Antitrust [1990] 
7, which criticises the Division's "non-enforcement rhetoric" and "studied avoidance of 'bad' 
cases". McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 522, notes that criminal prosecutions 
under the Reagan Administration doubled in comparison with the Carter administration. 
Nelson in 'Reading Their Lips' discusses the policy changes between Reagan and Bush 
Administrations, noting the latter's apparently tougher prosecution policy. Nelson questions the 
precise nature of this change and the extent to which it will translate into actual prosecutions. 
NJ See Nelson 'Reading Their Lips' at pp 684-688 and Rill (Asst. AG, Antitrust Division, 
DOJ) Antitrust Enforcement : An Agenda for the 1990s Remarks before the 23rd Annual New 
England Antitrust Conference (Nov 3,1989) at p 10. Case examples of this tougher approach 
include the Ethyl case - El du Pont de Nemours and Co v FTC 729 F. 2d 128 (2d Circ 1984) and 
DOJ investigations into price signalling by airlines and FTC investigation into parallel behaviour 
by infant formula manufacturers, discussed by Nomani 'Airlines May Be Using a Price Data 
Network to Lessen Competition' Wall St Jo 28/6/1990 and 'Infant Formula Manufacturers 
Targeted for Antitrust Investigation' 323 FTC Watch 4/6/90. 
84 Though evaluation of collusion and restrictive practices by professional organisations remain 
the same. But, Rill (Asst. AG Antitrust Division) in Antitrust Enforcement: An Agenda for the 
1990s Remarks before the 23rd Annual New England Antitrust Conference (Nov 3,1989) at p6 
and Arquit (Director of Bureau of Competition, FTC) in Remarks before the Cleveland Chapter of 
the Federal Bar Association (December 14,1989), both indicated that prosecution was more likely 
and detailed various changes, noting that in particular, standards for finding barriers to entry have 
been lowered. 
85 See Nelson 'Reading Their Lips' at pp 692-697, indicating that both the DOJ and FTC are 
more active, though the FTC is more so. See Nelson ibid, particularly Table at p 694, detailing 
lawyers' perceptions of changes in DOJ/FTC prosecution policy in relation to specific offences. 
86 Nelson 'Reading Their Lips' at p 696. It seems that the problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that there arc two federal enforcement agencies both with an erratic approach to the prosecution of 
specific offences. One lawyer interviewed by Nelson at p 696, likened the FTC to an L. A. street 
gang, criticising the lack of supervision over procedural fairness, the verification of facts or the 
overall legal situation. 
87 Editorial 'US Antitrust Made Simple' at p 10. 
88 See 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,105. The application of these guidelines is discussed by 
Griffin 'Economic Rationality Alters US Antitrust Enforcement' ; Buchheit 'Justice Department 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints' ; Johnson and Rupert 'US Antitrust Law'. 
89 For criticism sec Hawk and Veltrop 'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States' at pp 
23-26. 
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90 For further details, see Davidow 'EEC Fact Finding Procedures in Competition Cases' at pp 
177-178. 
91 Kaysen and Turner Antitrust Policy Harvard Unv. Press (1959) at p 256, argued that 
"unambiguously ... bad conduct" should be listed in antitrust statutes and only listed offences 
should be regarded as criminal. Issues involved in the choice of proceedings are also discussed 
by Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 377-379 ; Baker 'To Indict or Not to 
Indict : Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement' Cornell LR [1978] 405 and 
McAnneny'The Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 525-528. 
92 Eg in monopoly situations and collusive practices, where it is more effective to seek equitable 
relief restraining the practice, and where appropriate, dissolution and divestiture. 
93 See Baker 'To Indict or Not to Indict'; McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 
525. 
94 In cases where the DOJ is less certain of the anti-competitive nature of the practice, it will 
institute civil proceedings and allow the Court to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of the cases. See McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 525. 
95 These criteria are discussed by Denis 'Per Se Unlawful Horizontal Restraints' at pp 674-649 ; 
McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 526-527 and Rule (Asst. AG, Antitrust 
Division, DOJ) Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Lmvs : Targeting Naked Cartel Restraints 
Address before the ABA Annual Spring Meeting (March 24,1988) at pp 9-15. The Supreme 
Court articulated similar criteria in US v Unites States Gypsum Co 438 US 422 (1978) at pp 435- 
436. Discussed by Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at pp 148-149. 
96 See McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 531-532, who states that, as a 
general rule, the DOJ will indict where it has two or more witnesses to a crime, or has one witness 
and strong supporting evidence. 
97 Eg US v Jack Spector Inc Cr No. 87-20084 (D. Kansas, filed 11/9/87), where the DOJ relied 
on circumstantial evidence of bid pattern data to obtain a conviction. 
98 See earlier discussion of the political influence on prosecutorial decision-making. 
99 During the Carter Administration (1977-1980), an average of 38 criminal antitrust cases 
were filed per annum. During the first seven years of the Reagan Administration (1981-87), an 
average of 80 prosecutions per annum were undertaken. In the first year of the Bush 
Administration, 91 criminal cases were pursued. This tougher approach to prosecution has been 
continued by the Clinton Administration. Between 1981-1987, there were 546 criminal antitrust 
cases indicting a total of 993 defendants, 581 of which were corporations and 412 of which were 
individuals. For further details, sec Whalley (Deputy Asst. AG, Antitrust Division) Crime and 
Punishment - Criminal Antitrust Enforcement in the Nineties Address before the ABA Annual 
Antitrust Spring Meeting (March 22,1990) and Robert Bloch (Chief, Professions and Intellectual 
Property Section, Antitrust Division) Compliance Programs and Criminal Antitrust Litigation :A 
Prosecutor's Perspective Address before the ABA Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting (March 24, 
1988). See also Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' 
100 The breadth of the antitrust rules is widely acknowledged. See further discussion of the 
substantive law in L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust Ch3 ; Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the 
USA Chs 1-3 ; Fox 'Tile Modernisation of Antitrust'. 
101 For additional discussion of these defence rights, see : Winterscheid 'Confidentiality and 
Rights of Access' ; Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings' ; Stark 'Transparency Policy of the 
Antitrust Division' ; Davidow 'EEC Fact Finding Procedures in Competition Cases' ; Joshua 
'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases' ; Archer 'Discovery for Defendants in Criminal 
Antitrust Cases' Business Lawyer [1965) 911 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 755-769 ; ABA 
Antitrust Section Criminal Litigation Manual. 
102 The Freedom of Information Act 1966 (FOIA) also provides a public right of access to 
federal agency records, subject to certain exemptions. The overall effect of these exclusions is to 
prevent disclosure of government files at investigation stage. Broad rights of discovery for 
defendants under procedural rules mean defendants do not need to resort to the FOIA for 
discovery. More often, the FOIA is used as a means of discovery in private actions. For these 
reasons, the provisions of the FOIA will not be examined here, though further discussion may 
be found in Winterscheid 'Confidentiality and Rights of Access' at pp 178-179. 
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103 Winterscheid 'Confidentiality and Rights of Access' ; Davidow 'EEC Fact Finding 
Procedures in Competition Cases' ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 755-769, all discuss these 
issues in detail. In addition, Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings' and Stark 'Transparency Policy 
of the Antitrust Division', examine the overall transparency of DOJ and FTC proceedings. 
104 Rule 26(b)(1) F. R. Civ. P. allows for the disclosure of any material "reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence". 
los For further on 'work product', see earlier discussion of legal professional privilege and also 
below under 'Limitations on Access'. The issue is also examined by Joshua 'Proof in Contested 
EEC Competition Cases' and Davidow'EEC Fact Finding Procedures in Competition Cases'. 
106 Interrogatories may be served under Rule 33 F. R. Civ. P., document demands under Rule 34 
F. R. Civ. P. and requests for admission under Rule 36 F. R. Civ. P.. 
107 See ABA Antitrust Section Criminal Litigation Manual ; Davidow 'EEC Fact Finding 
Procedures in Competition Cases' ; Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases'. 
108 See particularly, Rules 6 and 16(a)(3) F. R. Cr. P.. Discussed by L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at 
p 755 and ABA Antitrust Section Criminal Litigation Manual. 
109 Sec discussion by Spratling at the Leiden Seminar in in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) 
Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition La)v at pp 190-191. 
110 See Archer 'Discovery for Defendants in Criminal Antitrust Cases' Business Laltyer [1965] 
911. 
Here disclosure is governed by s. 5 FTC Act, the Administrative Procedure Act 15 USC 
ss. 554 and Part 3 of the FTC's Rules of Practice, 16 CFR s. 3 (1991). These rules are based on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and whilst the latter are not binding on the FTC, they are used as 
guidance in FTC procedures. Sec Exxon Corp 98 FTC 107 (1981). Discussed by Winterscheid 
'Confidentiality and Rights of Access' at pp 182-183. 
112 See FTC Rules of Procedure, 16 CFR s. 3.31(b)(1), though defendants are not required to 
show that the evidence could be obtained from other sources. 
113 Under 16 CFR s. 3.31(a), (b)(1). Ss. 3.3 and 3.34(b) of the FTC's Rules of Procedure also 
make similar provision for interrogatories, document demands and requests for admission as seen 
in DOJ civil cases. Discussed by Davidow'EEC Fact Finding Procedures in Competition Cases' at 
pp 184-185. 
114 See eg, AvnetInc. 77 FTC 1689 (1970). Disclosure has been denied where the parties filing 
the reports were promised confidentiality, eg Chock Full O'Nuts Corp 82 FTC 747 (1973). 
115 See Winterscheid 'Confidentiality and Rights of Access' at pp 180-182. This method was 
used in FTC v US Pipe and Foundry Co 304 F. Supp. 1254 (DC. DC. 1969). Other methods of 
overcoming 'confidentiality' are the editing of documents and the aggregation of data by an 
independent party in a way which preserves the anonimity of the parties - known as the "Mississippi River" treatment - see Mississippi River Fuel Corporation 69 FTC 1186 (1966). Joshua 'Balancing the Public Interest : Confidentiality, Trade Secrets and Disclosure of Evidence 
in EC Competition Procedure' ECLR [1994] 68, discusses the definition and protection of 
confidential information in the EC, UK and US. See also, Connelly 'Secrets and Smokescreens' 
Wise LR [1981] 207 and McKown 'Discovery of Trade Secrets in Litigation in the United States' 
EIPR [1993] 327. 
116 See Antitrust Civil Process Act 1962, s. 1313(c)(3) and 16 CFR 4.10(g). Discussed by Joshua 
'Balancing the Public Interest' at pp 74-75 and Winterscheid'Confidentiality and Rights of Access' 
at pp 180-182,184. 
117 This element was stressed in the FTC case of Re HP Hood and Sons Docket 7709 
(11/3/1961). This is a higher standard than normally applies to the protection of confidential 
information. Outside the litigation context, s. 6(f) FTC Act, as amended by the FTC 
Improvements Act 1980, prohibits the disclosure of trade secrets and commercial information as 
privileged or confidential where disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause substantial 
competitive harm. As such, s. 6(f) will not necessarily bar disclosure in adjudicative proceedings, 
see FTC v Tuttle 244 F. 2d 605 (CA. 2,1957). 
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118 This issue is discussed in greater depth in Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition 
Cases', who compares the EC, UK and US situations. 
119 City of Burlington, Vermont v Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (DC. DC. 1965) 246 
F. Supp. 839. 
120 Eg Roviaro v US(US S. Ct. 1957) 353 US 53 and Riley v US (CA. Ariz. 1969) 411 F. 2d 1146, 
cert. denied 397 US 906. Both cases also make it clear that the privilege is that of the agency and 
not the informer. 
121 Sec Roviaro v US (US S. Ct. 1957) 353 US 53. 
122 US v Halbert (CA-10 1981) 688 F. 2d 489, cert. denied 456 US 934. Joshua in 'Proof in 
Contested EEC Competition Cases' at p 347, states that, in practice, where the informer has been 
an active participant in the violation, his identity is usually revealed. 
123 Both the 'attorney-client' aspect and "'work product' doctrine of US legal professional 
privilege are discussed by Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases'. See also 
examination of this privilege in the context of'Defence Rights - Investigation' supra. 
124 See Hickman and Taylor 329 US 495 (1947). 
125 F. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(b)(3). 
126 F. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(b)(3). 
127 F. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(b)(3). 
128 See F. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) and 16 CFR s3.31(b)(4)(A) in DOJ and FTC cases 
respectively. In ! Nilson v Resnick 51 FRD 510 (E. D. Pa. 1970), discovery of an expert's report was 
allowed following a strong showing of need. In addition, fact/opinions held by an expert who is 
not called at trial are only discoverable in "exceptional circumstances" where it is impractical to 
obtain the information from other sources ; F. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
129 See discussion by Wintcrschcid'Confidentiality and Rights of Access' at pp 184-185. 
130 Where an agency intends to introduce certain documents as evidence at trial, these must be 
included in the exhibits list, even though the agency may legitimately have withheld them from 
discovery under one of the limitations outlined above. See discussion in Winterscheid 
'Confidentiality and Rights of Access' at p 185. 
131 See in particular, comments made by Wood 'User-Friendly Competition Law in the US' in 
SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law 
Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p6 on these issues. 
132 Though, in practice, the prosecution's more extensive resources probably mean that it still 
possesses the advantage in the acquisition of evidence and the development of its case. 
133 For more specific discussion of the mechanisms of the federal court system, see : Abraham 
The Judicial Process in general and Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at pp 
148-152. 
134 The procedure here is similar to that of a US district court sitting without a jury, see Baker 
'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at pp 152-158 and Neale and Goyder The 
Antitrust Laws of the USA at p 380 et sect. 
135 Under National Society of Professional Engineers v US 435 US 679,692 (1978), such non- 
ancilliary restraints are those "whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anti-competitive" 
that they are regarded as "illegal per se" regardless of the reasons for the practices and without 
any real inquiry into their effect. 
136 For broad discussion of this analytical approach, see : Whish Competition Law at pp 206- 
211 ; Neale and Goydcr The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 21-30 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust 
at pp 165-186. See also Hay 'Pigeonholes in Antitrust' Antitrust Bulletin [19841 133 ; Bock 'An 
Economist Considers Some Basic Issues of Antitrust Law in the US' ECLR [19901 52 ; Fox 'The 
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Modernisation of Antitrust' ; Fox and L. Sullivan 'Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective' [1987a], who all trace the development of this format and consider the factors affecting the 
characterisation of particular agreements under this approach. Schecter 'The Rule of Reason in 
European Competition Law' LILT [1982] 1; Forrester and Norall 'The Laicisation of Community 
Law : Self Help and The Rule of Reason : How Competition Law Is and Could Be Applied' CMLR 
[1984] 11 and Whish and Sufrin'Article 85 and the Rule of Reason' YBEL [1987] 1, all consider 
whether a similar analytical format exists in the EC context, and if not, whether such approach 
should be adopted. 
137 The main proponents of this approach are Bork The Antitrust Paradox :A Policy At War 
with Itself (1978) ; Posner 'Antitrust Policy and The Supreme Court' Columbia LR [1975b] 282 ; 
Posner Antitrust Law Millstein (1976) ; Posner 'The Chicago School of Antitrust' Un Penn LR 
[1979] 925 ; Posner The Economics of Justice Chicago (1981b) ; Easterbrook 'The Limits of 
Antitrust' Texas LR [1984a] 1; Easterbrook 'Workable Antitrust Policy' Mich LR [1986] 1696. 
Posner in The Economics of Justice (1981b) at pp 113-115, argues that efficiency is justice. 
138 A wealth of critical literature exists, eg Hovcnkamp 'Antitrust Policy After Chicago' Mich LR 
[1985] 213 ; Hovenkamp'Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument'Mich LR [1986] 1722 ; 
Fox'The Modernisation of Antitrust' ; Fox 'Consumer Beware Chicago' Mich LR [1986a] 1714 ; 
Sims and Landes 'The End of Antitrust - Or a New Beginning' Antitrust Bulletin [1986] 287 ; Lipsky 'Antitrust Without Apology' Antitrust Bulletin [1986] 481 ; Spiller 'Comments on 
Easterbrook and Snyder' Jo Laiv and Economics [1985] 489 ; Blake and Jones 'In Defense of 
Antitrust Columbia LR [1965] 377. 
139 Fox in 'Antitrust in its Second Century : The Phoenix Rises From the Ashes' Antitrust 
Bulletin [1986c] 383 at p 392, describes this opposition to antitrust as "capitalism with a 
vengance". The hidden political focus of antitrust is also discussed by Fox 'The Politics of Law 
and Economics in Judicial Decision-Making' [1986b] ; Fox 'Teaching and Learning Antitrust - 
Politics, Politics, Casebooks and Teachers' NYULRev [1991] 225 ; Fox 'The Modernisation of 
Antitrust' and Fox and L. Sullivan 'Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective' [1987a]. This aspect is also examined by Schwartz "'Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust Un Penn LR 
[1978-1979] 1076 ; Pitofsky 'The Political Content of Antitrust' Un Penn LR [1978-79] 1051 ; 
Kingdon 'Economic Argument in Antitrust Cases : An American Litigator's Perspective' ECLR 
[1987] 371 and McChesney 'Law's Honor Lost', who is particularly critical of antitrust's 
subversion for political expediency. 
140 These problems arc discussed in Hay 'Pigeonholes in Antitrust' ; Bock 'Basic Issues of 
Antitrust Law' ; Hawk 'The American Antitrust Revolution : Lessons for the EEC ?' ECLR 
[1988] 53 ; Kingdon'Economic Argument in Antitrust Cases' in general. 
141 The assessment of vertical restraints has been the subject of particular controversy. See 
Robinson 'Explaining Vertical Agreements : The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method' Virginia 
LR [1994] 577 ; Phillips and Mahoney 'Unreasonable Rules and Rules of Reason : Economic 
Aspects of Vertical Price-Fixing' Antitrust Bulletin [1985] 99 ; McGibbon 'Proof of a Vertical 
Conspiracy Under Monsanto'AntitrustBulletin [1985] 11 and Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" 
Element in Vertical Antitrust Restraints' Ohio State Law Journal [1990] 1. 
142 Denis in'Per Sc Unlawful Horizontal Restraints', has been particularly critical of this trend. 
143 See Fox 'The Modernisation of Antitrust' ; Hawk 'The American Antitrust Revolution' at pp 
58-60 ; Denis 'Per Se Unlawful Horizontal Restraints'at pp 642-643. 
144 This has variously been expressed in US cases as meaning that the jury must have no "doubt 
that would cause prudent men to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to themselves" 
and "almost certainly true". See Wright Federal Practice and Procedure : Criminal s. 500. Also, 
McBaine'Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief 32 California LR [1944] 242. 
145 Here the Government must be "more convincing" ; "of greater weight", see Braud v Kinchen 
310 So. 2d 657,659 (1975). In Grogan v Garner 111 S. Ct. 654,659 (1991), the Court held that 
this standard should result in "a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between the 
litigants". Other evidential matters such as hearsay and expert evidence are dealt with by Joshua 
'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases' and Brunt 'The Use of Economic Evidence in 
Antitrust Litigation : Australia' Australian Business LR [1986] 261, who compares US and 
Australian positions. 
146 See discussion by Denis 'Per Se Unlawful Horizontal Restraints' ; Burns 'Rethinking the 
"Agreement" Element' ; Brunt 'The Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation', who all 
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examine the nexus between analytical format and evidential requirements. These issues are also 
discussed in the examination of proof in EC competition cases in Ch4 supra. 
"' And concomitantly more difficult for the defendant to disprove the allegation. On this, see 
Denis 'Per Se Unlawful Horizontal Restraints' at p 644. 
148 This approach has been taken in an extensive range of cases, see eg US v Socony - Vacuum 
Oil Co 310 US 150,233 (1940), and more recently, in Palmer v BRG of Georgia Inc 111 S. Ct. 
401 (1990) and FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn 493 US 411 (1990), which made clear 
that whether the agreement was actually implemented and its market impact were irrelevant. As 
the Court of Appeals in US v Really MultiList Inc. 629 F. 2d 1351,1362-1363 (5th Circ 1980) 
explained, "The per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an antitrust plaintiff 
successfully plays it, he need only tally his score". 
149 See particularly, Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" Element' at pp 4-9 and Turner The 
Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act - Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal' 
Harvard LR [19621655. 
150 Sec Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" Element' at p 7. Compare the Court's approach in 
cases like US v Joint Traffrc Assn 171 US 505 (1898) and US v Gen Motors Co 384 US 127 142- 
143 (1966) with Sugar Inst Inc v US 297 US 553 (1936), where the Court refused to find an 
agreement for antitrust purposes. 
151 Brunt 'The Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation' at pp 284-288, discusses these 
concerns more thoroughly. For an opposing view, see Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC 
Competition Cases' at pp 328-330. 
152 US v Jack Spector Inc Cr No. 8 7-20084 (D. Kansas filed 11/9/87) ; Pittsburg Plat Glass v 
US (CA-4 1958) and Tennant v Peoria and PURy Co 321 US 29. 
153 See eg, Continental Ore Co v Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation (1962) 370 US 690, 
698-699. Though in Standard Oil Co of California v Moore (CA-9 1957) 251 F. 2d 188, the 
Court of Appeals stressed that, where the evidence was entirely circumstantial, a finding of guilt 
could only be found where the facts were not only consistent with guilt, but also inconsistent with 
any other reasonable explanation. 
154 Eg Boise Cascade Corp 91 FTC 1 (1978), 638 F. 2d 573 (9th Circ 1980), enforcement denied 
and Ethly Corp 101 FTC 425 (1983), order vacated in El Du Pont de Neinours v FTC 729 F. 2d 
128 (2d Circ 1984). The FTC has also suffered reversals on a finding that it has acted outside its 
jurisdiction, cg in Airline Guide Case 1980 ; Reuben H. Donnelly Corp 95 FTC 1 (1980), 
enforcement denied, 630 F. 2d 920 (2d Circ 1980) and Indiana Federation of Dentists v PYC 101 
FTC 425 (1983), rev'd 745 F. 2d 1124 (7th Circ 1984), petition for cert. granted, 88 L. Ed. 2d 224 
(1984). Such failures have added to criticism of the FTC and calls for its abolition. On this, see 
discussion in Hobbs 'A Role for the FTC'. 
135 This has occurred in several price-fixing cases where the Supreme Court have asserted that 
the treatment of these cases must be more than a mechanical evaluation and has insisted upon a 
rule of reason analysis of the agreement. See Broadcasting Music Inc v Columbia Broadcasting 
System Inc 441 US 1,9 (1979) ; NCB] v Board ofRegents 468 US 85 (1984) and Justice Powell's 
dissent in Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society 457 US 332,362 (1982). This has 
provoked considerable debate over the possible demise of the per se rule. See particularly, 
Easterbrook 'The Limits of Antitrust' [1984a] and Posner 'Antitrust Policy and the Supreme 
Court' [1975b]. 
156 Denis in 'Per Sc Unlawful Horizontal Restraints', has been particularly critical of these 
problems of characterisation. The issues involved are also discussed by Wirtz 'Rethinking Price- 
Fixing' Indiana LR [1987] 591 and Allison 'Ambiguous Price-Fixing and the Sherman Act 
Simplistic Labels or Unavoidable Analysis? ' Houston LR [1979] 761. 
157 This approach is used in vertical non-price restraints including location clauses and 
customer and territorial restrictions. The leading case here is Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania 
Inc 433 US 36 (1977). For further discussion of the rule of reason approach in vertical cases and 
critical analysis of this case, see L. White 'Vertical Restraints in Antitrust Law :A Coherent 
Model' Antitrust Bulletin [1981] 327 ; Carter 'From Peckham to White : Economic Welfare and 
the Rule of Reason' Antitrust Bulletin [1980] 275 ; Eastcrbrook 'Vertical Arrangements and the 
Rule of Reason' Antitrust LI [1984b] 135 and Hovenkamp 'Antitrust Policy After Chicagco' ; 
Posner 'The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution : Per Se Legality' Un 
Ch LR [1981a] 6; Pitofsky 'The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical 
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Restrictions' Columbia LR [19781 1. Price restraints in vertical agreements are dealt with under 
the per se rule. See discussion infra. 
159 See Brunt 'The Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation' at pp 266-267. 
159 See Brunt 'The Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation' in general. Much of this 
problem derives from the fact that this construction is presented as "scientific truth". 
160 On this, see Kingdon 'Economic Argument in Antitrust Cases' at pp 379-381. In this 
context, Brunt'The Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation' at pp 302-307, criticises the 
mixture of law and economics in the rule of reason approach. 
161 See discussion above and Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" Element' at pp 4-9. 
162 See Robinson 'Explaining Vertical Agreements' at pp 597-598 and Burns 'Rethinking the 
"Agreement" Element' at pp 10-16. 
163 The problems alluded to below are examined more extensively in Robinson 'Explaining 
Vertical Agreements' ; Phillips and Mahoney 'Unreasonable Rules and Rules of Reason' ; 
McGibbon 'Proof of a Vertical Conspiracy Under Monsanto' ; Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" 
Element'. 
164 Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park and Sons Co 220 US 373 (1911). 
165 US v Colgate and Co 250 US 300 (1919). Such arrangements were entirely legal and outside 
the scope of the Sherman Act. 
166 See particularly, the cases of : US v Schrader 252 US 85 (1920) ; Frey & Son v Cudahy 
Packing Co 256 US 208 (1921) ; FTC v Beech Nut Packing Co 257 US 441 (1922) ; US v Parke, 
Davis & Co 362 US 29 (1960) ; Albrecht v Herald Co 390 US 148 (1968). The Supreme Court's 
analysis of these cases is discussed in detail in Robinson 'Explaining Vertical Agreements' ; 
Phillips and Mahoney 'Unreasonable Rules and Rules of Reason' ; McGibbon 'Proof of a Vertical 
Conspiracy Under Monsanto' ; Bock 'Basic Issues of Antitrust Law'. 
167 The highwater mark came in Albrecht v Herald Co 390 US 148 (1968), which set out broad, 
easily met standards for proving a conspiracy. Whilst the Court have always been hostile to the 
Colgate exception, it has never been expressly overruled and indeed was recently upheld in 
Russell Stovers Candies Inc v FTC 718 F. 2d 256 (8th Ore 1983), where the Court reversed an 
FTC finding that Colgate was no longer good law. See also, Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Serv 
Corp 465 US 752 (1984). Not surprisingly, the Colgate decision has produced considerable 
critical literature, cg Baxter 'The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine' California LR [1987] 
933 and Flynn 'The Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules in Vertical Market Restraints' 
Washington University LQ [19801767 and Hawk 'The American Antitrust Revolution'. 
168 See Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Sen, Corp 465 US 752 (1984), ät p 764, which held that a 
supplier's termination of a dealer following complaints from the latter's competitors is not in itself 
sufficient basis for inferring an agreement. The plaintiff must also show that there was a 
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful object. Whilst 
Business Electronics v Sharp Electronics 485 US 717 (1988) held that even a showing of an 
agreement between a supplier and a dealer to terminate another dealer is insufficient unless it is 
also established that the supplier and complaining dealer agreed about resale prices. 
169 Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" Element' at pp 10,18,24-25 ; Robinson 'Explaining 
Vertical Agreements' at p 602 and McGibbon 'Proof of a Vertical Conspiracy Under Monsanto' at 
p 25, assert that many of the problems here stem from the Supreme Court's failure to recognise 
that fundamental differences exist between a horizontal and a vertical agreement. As a result, the 
Court have inappropriately transposed the rationale and techniques underlying analysis of 
horizontal agreements into the vertical context with disastrous results. 
170 McGibbon 'Proof of a Vertical Conspiracy Under Monsanto' at pp 22-33, discusses the 
problems of proof under Monsanto in detail. 
171 See Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" Element' at pp 27-29. 
172 See Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" Element' at pp 29-31. 
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173 The Court in Monsanto at pp 1470-147 1, recognised this, pointing out that often the conduct 
and the economic impact of both types of restraint are similar. Discussed by McGibbon 'Proof of a 
Vertical Conspiracy Under Monsanto' at pp 20-21 and Burns 'Rethinking the "Agreement" 
Element' at p 18. 
174 Phillips and Mahoney 'Unreasonable Rules and Rules of Reason' at pp 100-101,112-115 
Easterbrook'Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason' [1984b] at pp 140-143 ; Allison 'An 
Analysis of the Vertical Non-Price Dichotomy' Akron LR [1987] 131 ; Hay 'Vertical Restraints 
after Monsanto' Cornell LR [1985] 418, at pp 429-430 ; Posner 'Per Se Legality' [1981a] at pp 22- 
26. In this context, Robinson 'Explaining Vertical Agreements' at pp 578-579, points out that 
the Supreme Court's reasons for applying the rule of reason to non-price restraints are the same as 
those they rejected for applying the rule of reason to price restraints. 
175 Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA Chs 12,13 ; Spratling 'Fines in Criminal 
Antitrust Cases' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and 
US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 76 ; McAnneny 'The Justice Department's 
Crusade' ; Blair 'Antitrust Penalties : Deterrence and Compensation' Utah LR [1980] 57 ; Hobbs 
'A Role for the FTC'. 
176 The Division's ability to obtain consent decrees will be dealt with below under 'Informal 
Resolutions'. 
177 The Court exercise their powers under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act 1974 
(APPA), 15 USCA s. 16 (1974) - also known as the Tunney Act. 
178 US v Paramount Pictures 334 US 131,68 S. Ct. 915,92 L. Ed. 1260 (1948). Discussed by 
Neale and Goydcr The Antitrust Laws of the USA at p 168 et seq. 
179 Under the injunction, detailed rules regulated the conditions under which the companies 
made available the various runs of film. In addition, pooling arrangements between theatres were 
dissolved and joint ownership of theatres was terminated. Licensing agreements between major 
distributors and large exhibiting circuits and the block booking of film were prohibited because of 
their anti-competitive effects. 
180 Indeed, Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 394-395, note that the 
whole aini of a DOJ civil action is to obtain jurisdiction over the parties so that it can regulate 
their business conduct on a long-term basis. 
181 S. 5 FTC Act. This is similar to a court order following a civil case. 
182 S. 5 FTC Act. Moreover, each subsequent day on which the order is violated constitutes a 
separate violation and may be fined accordingly. However, the remedy is not generally enforced. 
183 S. 5(m)(B) FTC Act. 
184 Recent examples are FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn 493 US 411 (1990) and 
NCAA v Board ofRegents 468 US 85 (1984). 
185 Hobbs 'A Role for the FTC' at pp 470-471, goes on to argue that legal sanctions should be 
reserved for extreme cases where an opportunity for voluntary compliance has been given and 
refused. 
186 le The Criminal Enforcement Act 1984 and the Sentencing Reform Act 1984, as amended by 
the Criminal Fines Improvement Act 1987. The impact of this legislation is discussed below. 
187 The Commission was introduced under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 1984, 
following criticism of sentencing disparities. The Commission is an independent body within the 
judicial branch of the US government. It was directed to develop mandatory sentencing 
guidelines. These issues are discussed further in Fitzmaurice and Pease The Psychology of 
Judicial Sentencing Manchester Unv. Press (1986); WASIK and PEASE (Eds) Sentencing Reform 
- Guidance or Guidelines Manchester Unv. Press (1987). 
188 These guidelines are binding on both Court and prosecutors. As a result, they significantly 
reduced the degree of judicial discretion. See discussion in Spratling 'Fines in Criminal Antitrust 
Cases' at p 76. 
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189 The 1987 Guidelines apply to all antitrust offences occurring after 1 November 1987. The 
1991 Guidelines affect all violations committed or continued after 1 November 1991. Prior to 
1987, APPA sanctions apply. The statute of limitations in Sherman Act violations is five years. 
The date an offence was committed is now very important as the sanctions imposed under the two 
sets of guidelines vary considerably. 
190 15 USC s. 1 and 18 USC s. 3571(c)(3). 
191 18 USC s. 3571(d). le a fine the greater of twice the gross pecuniary gain the defendant 
derived from the offence, or twice the loss suffered by the victim of the violation may be imposed, 
unless the imposition of such a fine would unduly complicate the sentencing process. The 
maximum fines apply to each separate violation. In multiple offences, the maximum would be 
considerably higher. The details of such calculations are discussed by Spratling 'Fines in 
Criminal Antitrust Cases'. 
192 Or the company by which they were employed. The minimum fine here is $20,000. 
193 Eg price-fixing would receive 4-10 months sentence, bid-rigging 6-12 months. The 
imprisonment range increases with the volume of commerce involved. See McAnneny 'The 
Justice Department's Crusade' at pp 533-534. 
194 A minimum fine of $100,000 is imposed. The calculation 
allows for various aggravating and mitigation factors to be taken into account. These will be 
discussed further below. Organisational defendants include corporations, trade associations, 
partnerships and unions. 
195 Again, an alternative fine based on "twice the gain, twice the loss" may be levied. 
196 Fines are now calculated on 1%-4% of the volume of trade. A $20,000 minimum fine still 
exists. Custodial sentences of 0-46 months may now be imposed. Price-fixing violations now 
attract a sentence of 18-24 months. See Spratling 'Fines in Criminal Antitrust Cases' at p 76 et 
seq. 
197 In addition, no minimum fine is imposed. The calculations involved are discussed in more 
detail by Spratling'Fines in Criminal Antitrust Cases' particularly at pp 81-85. 
198 Eg career enhancement, bonuses etc. Discussed by Spratling 'Fines in Criminal Antitrust 
Cases' at p 80. 
199 The latter factors raises the defendant's culpability score considerably. See discussion of the 
effect of aggravating factors in Spratling 'Fines in Criminal Antitrust Cases' at p 83. 
200 Self reporting of the violation is also regarded as co-operative behaviour. See McAnneny 
'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 535 and Spratling 'Fines in Criminal Antitrust Cases' at p 
84, for details of mitigating factors. 
201 For further on 'just deserts' see Hudson Justice Through Punishment Macmillan (1987) 
Sanders and Young Criminal Justice Buttcrworths (1994). 
202 Between 1890-1940, only one prison sentence was handed down. Eleven were imposed 
between 1940-1955. For early data on criminal and civil sanctions, see Elzinga and Breit The 
Antitrust Penalties (1976) ; Posner 'A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement' J0 Law and 
Economics [1970] 365 and Flynn 'Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws' 
TexasLR [1967] 1301. 
203 Between 1955-1965, four ninety-day sentences were imposed in US v McDonough Co [1959] 
Trade Cas (CCH) No. 69,482 (S. D. Ohio) and seven thirty-day offences in the electrical equipment 
cases. From 1966-1974, ninety prison sentences were handed down, of which 75 were suspended. 
These cases and statistics are discussed in greater detail in Elzinga and Breit The Antitrust 
Penalties at pp 34-37. 
204 From 1955-1974, the maximum fine was only imposed once as part of the electrical 
equipment fines. Although corporations could be fined a maximum of $50,000, the average 
corporation fine was only $13,000. On this, see Elzinga and Breit The Antitrust Penalties at pp 
56-57 and Posner 'A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement' at p 392. 
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205 See Blair 'Antitrust Penalties' at pp 65-69. He recommends the introduction of legislation 
making certain penalties mandatory. Flynn in 'Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal 
Antitrust Laws' at p 1333, suggests that an effective deterrent might be to bar individual antitrust 
offenders from corporate office. 
206 See Memo from Asst. AG Baker to Staff Attorneys and Economists (Feb 24,1977), reprinted 
in Flynn Antitrust Supplement: Selected Statutes and Related Materials (1977) at pp 179-192 ; 
Rule 'Deterring Antitrust Crimes Through Stiffer Penalties' in Antitrust Law ABA Study Course, 
San Francisco (May 6,1988). 
207 McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 543, notes that the DOJ has been 
particularly successful from the outset in convincing the Sentencing Commission for the need to 
impose overtly deterrent sentences on antitrust violators. 
208 See McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 524. 
209 Background information is derived from : Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA 
aC pp 379-382 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 757-759 ; McAnneny'The Justice Department's 
Crusade' ; Handler 'The Shift from Substance to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - The 
23rd Annual Antitrust Review' Columbia LR [1971] 17 ; Stark 'Transparency Policy of the 
Antitrust Division' ; Anderson 'Modifications of Antitrust Consent Decrees : Over a Double 
Barrel' Mich LR [1985] 134 ; Branfman'Antitrust Consent Decrees -A Review and Evaluation of 
the First Seven Years under the APPA' Antitrust Bulletin [1982] 303 ; Johnson and Rupert 'US 
Antitrust Law'. 
210 See discussion by Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 379-382 
L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 757-759. 
211 These issues are discussed by Spratling 'Fines in Criminal Antitrust Cases' at pp 84-87, who 
also notes that organisations may avoid prosecution under the DOJ's "amnesty programme". This 
will only occur where the party self reports its own violation and the violation was unknown to the 
DOJ and unlikely to be discovered in the near future. 
2)2 McAnneny 'The Justice Department's Crusade' at p 532, who explains that the DOJ takes 
this approach because guilty pleas can be used as prima facie evidence in private actions and the 
prospect of treble damages increases the deterrent value of enforcement. 
213 Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' ; Kauper 'The Use of Consent Decrees in American 
Antitrust Cases' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds. ) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and 
US Comnpetilion Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 104 ; Anderson 'Modifications of Antitrust 
Consent Decrees'; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 757-759 ; Neale and Goyder The Antitrust 
Laws of the USA at pp 379-382 ; Handler 'Antitrust Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era' 50 
NYULRev [1975] 211. 
214 S. 5(a) Clayton Act 1914 provides that any civil/criminal judgement may be used as prima 
facie evidence in a private suit. Occasionally, the DOJ has insisted upon an admission of guilt as 
part of a decree in order to facilitate private action eg US v Allied Chemical Corp 1961 Trade Cas 
(CCH) No. 69,923 (D. Mass. 1960). The advantages and disadvantages of consent decrees are 
reviewed by Kauper'The Use of Consent Decrees' at pp 104-106. 
215 Primarily ss. 15,16 APPA. 
216 S. 16(b) APPA. On occasion, the DOJ has refused to publish "determinative documents" 
claiming confidentiality, eg US v Merck & Co Civil Act. No. 79 0962-T (S. D. Cal. 1980). Here the 
DOJ managed to rely on the provisions of a previously issued protection order to evade this 
requirement. The process for the entry of decrees is critically reviewed by Branfman 'Antitrust 
Consent Decrees'. 
217 APPA s. 16(b) The CIS must include a statement of the nature of the proceeding, a 
description of the alleged violation, an explanation of the decree and its effect on competition, a 
statement of the remedies available to private parties, a summary of the procedure for modification 
of the decree and a consideration of alternative solutions. The APPA also requires publication of 
a summary of the CD in newspapers. See Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 306-315. 
218 This provision is intended to reveal any 'lobbying' which may have taken place. This 
requirement is a direct response to criticism of the CD procedure prior to the passing of the 
APPA. These problems are discussed further below. 
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219 In US v Central Contracting Co 1982-1 Trade Cas (CCH) No. 64,489 (E. D. va 1981), the 
Court refused to grant the decree without a full explanation for the defendant's lapse. Branfman's 
research revealed that in over 80% of defence disclosures no communication with other 
government departments was reported. Only three cases admitted some form of political contact. 
See Branfman'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 316-319. 
220 Eg amicus participation, direct intervention in proceedings and instituting proceedings 
seeking a writ of mandamus. 
221 Eg in US v United Technologies Corp 1980-81 Trade Cas (CCH) No. 63,792 (ND. NY. 1981) 
and the modif ications in AT &T 552 F. Supp. 131 (DDC. 1982), affd 460 USA 1001 (1983) were 
partially in response to third party influence. Branfinan 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 329- 
341, reviews in detail the possibilities for, and effectiveness of, non-party influence. 
S. 16(c)(3) APPA. 
=3 The Court's public interest assessment is evaluated thoroughly by Branfman 'Antitrust 
Consent Decrees' at pp 324-328,348-52 and by Kauper in 'The Use of Consent Decrees' at pp 
111-112. Though as Kauper notes, the Court already possess the powers given to them under the 
Act. 
224 Eg in US v Hall Contracting Corp Case No. 78-0063. Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' 
at p 350, notes that courts tend to conclude that the DOD's agreement with the CD is strong 
evidence that it serves the public interest. Kaupcr 'The Use of Consent Decrees' at p 112, is 
critical of the Court's assessment. However, some courts have taken a more activist stance cg US 
v Gillette Co 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975). 
225 For a recent example of a simple decree prohibiting a practice, see US v Burgstiner 1991-1 
Trade Cas (CCH) No. 69,422 (S. D. Ga. ) which prohibited exchange of price information. In US v 
AT &T Co 1982-2 Trade Cas (CCH) No. 64,900 (D. D. C. ), the Court imposed a number of 
additional regulatory requirements supervised by the Court. Sometimes, the decree may prohibit 
conduct which is not itself unlawful where it is necessary to prevent repetition. See cg US v 
Massachusetts Allergy Soc Inc 1992-1 Trade Cas (CCH) No. 69,846 (D. Mass. ), where the CD 
prohibited certain defendants, who were involved in the dissemination of fee schedules through 
the society, from holding office in the society for five years. The terms of consent decrees are 
discussed by Kauper'The Use of Consent Decrees' at pp 106-108. 
226 In US v Illinois Podiatry Soc Inc 1977-2 Trade Cas (CCH) No. 61,707, this threat was 
employed to induce the defendants to modify the decree. In contrast, defendants have little 
bargaining power. This aspect will be discussed further below when defence rights at trial stage 
are evaluated. 
227 Existing CDs could be modified or terminated but few were because the procedures involved 
were cumbersome. Modification of decrees is discussed by Anderson 'Modifications of Antitrust 
Consent Decrees'. In 1982, the DOJ began a formal programme of reviewing existing decrees 
(over 1300) and seeking modification or termination of those no longer required. By 1986,50 
such decrees had been vacated. See discussion in Kauper 'The Use of Consent Decrees' at p 107, 
n 18. 
228 Eg such boilerplate' provisions were imposed in US v Massachusetts Allergy Soc Inc 1992-1 
Trade Cas (CCH) No. 69,846 (D. Mass. ). The DOJ tends to view such conditions as non- 
negotiable. 
229 US v 17T 349 F. Supp. (D. Conn. 1972) and US v 1TT 1971 Trade Cas (CCH) No. 73,665 
(D. Conn. ). It was asserted that the White House had pressurised the DOJ to accept the decrees 
because of financial contributions made to the Republican Party by ITT. This controversy formed 
part of the 'Watergate' scandal and is discussed in detail by Goolrick Public Policy Toward 
Corporate Growth : The 177 Merger Cases (1978) ; Kauper 'The Use of Consent Decrees' at pp 
110-111. L. Sullivan Laie ofAntitrust at p 758 and Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 
303-306, deal with the issue more briefly. 
230 Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at p 306, outlines the intentions of the APPA as 
intending to make explicit any strategic and policy considerations that went into the formulation 
of the decree, as well as any political pressure by defendants. Substantively, it was aimed at 
ensuring that the courts evaluated the public interest, rather than rubber-stamping the CD. 
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Handler in 'Antitrust Myth and Reality', expressed concern at the passing of the APPA asserting 
that it would be counter-productive and would undermine the effectiveness of antitrust law. 
231 See cg Kauper 'The Use of Consent Decrees' at pp 110-112 ; Branfman 'Antitrust Consent 
Decrees' at pp 328,354. 
232 Branfman'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at p 328, considers that this is partly the result of an 
absence of objections in most cases and the prevailing judicial desire to affirm decrees. 
233 The defendant is particularly vulnerable here, though the bureaucratic pressures on the DOJ 
may cause also it to accept unsuitable decrees in the interests of a speedy settlement. See Kauper 
'The Use of Consent Decrees' at pp 111-112 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at p 758 and Branfman 
'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 341-342. 
234 Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 316-317. 
235 This explains, in particular, the limited effect of third parties on the content of decrees in 
general. In 30% of decrees in Branfman's study, objections were made. In only five cases did the 
judge refuse to enter the decree in the terms lodged, and in three of those cases, a modified decree 
was granted. See Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at p 328. Judges have been particularly 
reluctant to allow direct intervention in cases eg US v Carrols Development Corp 454 F. Supp. 
1215 (ND. NY. 1978), cf Cascade National Gas Corp v El Paso National Gas Co 386 US 129 
(1967), one of the few cases where intervention was allowed. These problems are assessed 
thoroughly by Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 329-348 and Kauper 'The Use of 
Consent Decrees' at pp 112-113. 
236 In the first seven years of the APPA, no court took the testimony of an official or expert, 
appointed a consultant or sought the views of a third party - see Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at p 327. 
237 Kauper'The Use of Consent Decrees' at p 112. See cg Rule 24(a)(2) F. R. Civ. P. which gives 
the Court powers to authorise third party intervention. 
238 On this, see Kauper 'The Use of Consent Decrees' at p 112. 
239 See Kauper 'The Use of Consent Decrees' at p 112. Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at 
p 353, discloses that there is also evidence that the APPA has raised costs for the DOJ, in terms of 
publication and comment requirements and in manpowers costs and has imposed less quantifiable 
costs on defendants. 
240 Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 353-354, cf Handler 'Antitrust Myth and 
Reality', discussed above. 
241 Handler 'Antitrust Myth and Reality' at p 214, reports that between 1962-1974, an average of 
68.7% of antitrust cases were settled by decree. Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 353- 
355, found that between 1978-1981, in an average of 70.9% cases, decrees were made. Kauper in 
'The Use of Consent Decrees' at p 104, reports that, during the 1980s, 60% of civil cases were 
terminated by the issuance of a CD. 
242 Issued Under Federal Register 2442 (1968). 
243 A decision indicating no present intention to prosecute is known as a 'railroad release'. The 
use of BRLs is discussed by Stark 'Transparency Policy of the Antitrust Division' ; Johnson and 
Rupert 'US Antitrust Law' ; Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the US'A at pp 379-382 and 
L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 757-759. 
244 As yet, the DOJ has never initiated proceedings following a BRL where there has not been 
full disclosure. 
245 This was particularly so under the lenient approach of the Reagan Administration. See 
discussion by Griffin 'Economic Rationality Alters US Antitrust Enforcement' and Johnson and 
Rupert 'US Antitrust Law'. 
246 For further information on the FTC's informal settlements, see : Hobbs'A Role for the FTC; 
Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings' ; Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Lmvs of the USA at pp 
389-392 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 756-757. 
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247 Discussed further by Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 389-391 
L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 756-757. 
248 See Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 389-391 ; L. Sullivan Law of 
Antitrust at pp 756-757. 
249 These opinions are similar to the DOD's, BRLs and the EC Commission's comfort letters. 
250 Nor will the FTC issue an opinion where extensive research is required. The conditions for 
the issuance of an advisory opinion are discussed by Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings' at pp 
206-207. 
251 Before 1970, these opinions were only published in a summary, hypothetical format. Now, 
each advisory opinion is published in full, complete with the identity of the requesting party and a 
copy of the request. Discussed further by Lingos in 'Transparency of Proceedings' at pp 206-207, 
who assesses the transparency of FTC procedures. 
252 On this, see Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 389-391 and Lingos 
'Transparency of Proceedings' at p 208. 
253 In the past, the FTC has given advisory opinions on a wide range of subjects including 
pricing policies, trade association activities and mergers. 
754 These guides are issued under 16 CFR ss. 1.5 and 1.6. Discussed by L. Sullivan Law of 
Antitrust at pp 757-759 and Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 389-391. 
253 But, they are published in the Federal Register. 
256 Eg the Commission's Enforcement Policy with Respect to Vertical Mergers in the Cement 
Industry and its Enforcement Policy Regarding Mergers in the Food Distribution Industry. Both 
of these guides are discussed further by Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings' at pp 206-207. 
257 Issued under 16 CFR s. 1.12 following lengthy investigation, consultation and publication 
procedures. See L. Sullivan Law ofAntilrust at p 756. 
258 Such regulations have been used to regulate franchising. See discussion in Neale and 
Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 389-391. 
259 Both L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at p 753, and almost a decade later, Hobbs in 'A Role for 
the FTC' at p 473, criticise the Commission's case selection. 
260 Cf Moog Ind Inc v FTC 355 US 411,78 S. Ct. 377,2 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1958), where the 
Supreme Court stressed the breadth of the Commission's discretion, with Indiana Federation of 
Dentists v FTC 101 FTC 425 (1983), rev'd 745 F. 2d 1124 (7th Circ 1984), petn. for cert. granted 
88 L. Ed. 2d 224 (October 14,1985), where the Court of Appeals refused to uphold the FTC's 
exercise of discretion. These issues are discussed by Hobbs 'A Role for the FTC' at pp 461-465. 
261 See Hobbs 'A Role for the FTC' at pp 470-472, who asserts that this return to a business 
guidance approach to enforcement will do much to encourage greater voluntary compliance and 
restore lost confidence in the FTC. 
262 For background information on defence rights, see : Kauper 'The Use of Consent Decrees' 
Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' ; Stark 'Transparency Policy of the 
Antitrust Division' ; Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings' ; Branfman 'Antitrust Consent 
Decrees' ; Hawk 'The American Antitrust Revolution' ; Kingdon 'Economic Argument in Antitrust 
Cases'. 
263 See Kingdon'Economic Argument in Antitrust Cases' at pp 379-381. 
264 Hawk in 'The American Antitrust Revolution' at pp 63-64, has pointed out that the FTC's 
final decision is made by the Commission who are political appointees and is dominated by policy 
considerations. Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings' at pp 204-205,212, would disagree, 
insisting upon the institutionalised transparency of FTC proceedings. 
265 This applies to defendants in both DOJ and FTC cases. Ultimately, review by the Supreme 
Court is possible, though the Supreme Court arc extremely selective about which cases it chooses 
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to review. On this, see L. Sullivan Law of Antitrust at p 768. Appeal possibilities are also 
discussed by Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at pp 150-153. 
266 Usually findings of fact by a jury, district judge or the FTC are accepted as final. Discussed 
by Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at p 158. See also his comments at 
p 152, where he discusses criminal appeals. 
267 Specifically, such matters as the allocation of the burden of proof on important issues. 
268 The Court of Appeals approach in FTC v Indiana Federation of Dentists 476 US 447,454 
(1986) is typical of its less deferential attitude towards the FTC. Discussed by Baker 
'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at pp 156-158 and Hobbs 'A Role for the FTC' 
at pp 461-465. 
269 Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 341-342. Cf Lingos 'Transparency of 
Proceedings' at p 203, who asserts that the transparency of FTC informal proceedings offers 
defendants considerable protection. In US v Illinois Podiatry Society Inc 1977-2 Trade Cas 
(CCH No. 61,707, the DOJ used the threat of litigation to exert pressure to settle on the defendant. 
However, in US v Stewart Mechanical Ent Inc 1979-2 Trade Cas (CCH) No. 62,904, the defendant 
was able to induce modification. 
270 Though whether judges, given the non-interventionist stance of courts, would be prepared 
to become involved is another matter. See Branfman 'Antitrust Consent Decrees' at pp 341-342 
and Kauper 'The Use of Consent Decrees' at pp 110-112. 
271 See Ch8 supra for discussion of legal value of comfort letters. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE REALITY OF ANTITRUST 
"We shall not cease from exploration. 
And the end of all our exploring, 
Will be to arrive where we started, And know the place for the first time. " 
A)INTRODUCTION 
The central theme of this critical investigation of the process and substance of 
Commission decision-making has been the effect of political and pragmatic goals on 
both the classification and application of competition rules and 'rule of law' principles. 
Specifically, the study has focused on the classification of antitrust offences and the 
impact of this characterisation on enforcement choices and defence rights. It is now 
apposite to summarise the findings of the research, comparing and contrasting the 
approaches of both jurisdictions under examination. The current consequences and 
future implications of their respective attitudes to antitrust enforcement will then be 
considered. In order to highlight the role of political and pragmatic aims as the 
fulcrum of antitrust enforcement, the following sections will outline in turn the effect 
of these objectives on each aspect of the study. During the course of this discussion, it 
is hoped to provide some answers to the questions posed at the this beginning of the 
research. 
B)THE IMPACT OF 'POLITICS AND PRAGMATISM' ON THE 
CLASSIFICATION AND APPLICATION OF COMPETITION RULES 
This research has demonstrated that there is clear and repeated proof that political and 
pragmatic goals dominate all aspects of enforcement. This is so in both jurisdictions 
under consideration. These goals impact upon enforcement in a number of ways. 
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Firstly, political and pragmatic needs determine the definition and classification of anti- 
competitive conduct. Secondly, these objectives influence enforcement choices, 
specifically the nature, scope and use of enforcement powers and defence rights. 
Finally, these goals affect the choice of enforcement method employed. Each of these 
aspects will be examined in further detail below, considering their impact in both the 
EC and US. 
1)Definition and Classification of Anti-Competitive Conduct 
a)EC 
The study has revealed that political and pragmatic aims have a major impact on the 
constitution and subsequent classification of anti-competitive conduct. The imperative 
and far-reaching nature of these objectives requires that the Commission gains control 
over the widest possible range of business conduct within the EC. Initially, it does this 
by using its discretion and the generous drafting of Art. 85 to construct a definition of 
anti-competitive conduct which suits its own needs and brings potential threats to 
these goals within DGIV's purview. Consequently, under political and pragmatic 
influences, anti-competitive conduct is behaviour which hinders the attainment of these 
ends. The impact of these objectives on competition enforcement is immediate. What 
constitutes anti-competitive behaviour in the EC depends not on whether the practice 
restricts competition, but whether it threatens political and pragmatic objectives. 
Admittedly, the needs of these goals and competition may coincide. But, this is not 
necessarily so. Where their interests do conflict, the Commission has made it clear 
that the needs of the competitive process will be subordinated to those of'politics and 
pragmatism'. This is no better illustrated than in DGIV's economically questionable 
evaluation of the pro/anti-competitive effects of distribution arrangements. 
These goals also impact upon the characterisation of anti-competitive 
behaviour. Broadly, the greater the menace to political and pragmatic aims, the more 
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penal DGIV's classification of the conduct. The nexus between these factors and 
characterisation was clearly evidenced in the study. Under these goals, most 
horizontal cartels and export bans in vertical agreements are perceived as particularly 
harmful because of the direct threat they pose to economic integration. As the 
Commission's prime objective is to eradicate such threats, many arrangements in the 
study were routinely viewed as per se criminal violations. DGIV's antipathy to these 
practices was disclosed by the frequent and stern references in Commission decisions 
to the gravity, the deliberate nature and the threat to economic unity that the behaviour 
posed. 
Whilst the focus on political and pragmatic needs means that most anti- 
competitive conduct receives a criminal characterisation, this is apparently not always 
the case. From the Commission's treatment of negatively cleared and individually 
exempted vertical cases in the study, such arrangements appear to be classed as 
administrative matters. Though, as already noted, this characterisation appears to owe 
more to DGIV's arbitrary exercise of discretion than an absence of restrictive content 
in these agreements. More to the point, distribution agreements' ability to aid market 
integration and the negotiated nature of these cases promotes the political and 
pragmatic aims, thus affecting their apparent classification. 
The breadth of the Commission's discretion is felt even at this early stage, 
allowing DGIV to control what conduct is anti-competitive and the subsequent 
characterisation of that behaviour. The full extent of the benefits to political and 
pragmatic aims, accruing from DGIV's choices and classification of anti-competitive 
conduct, are revealed in its subsequent application of competition rules. 
b) US 
Here too, political and pragmatic goals impact upon the definition and characterisation 
of anti-competitive behaviour 2. Like Art. 85, both the Sherman and FTC Acts are 
sufficiently broadly drafted to allow US enforcement agencies to interpret those rules 
in accordance with their current perceptions of restrictive conduct and bring politically 
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and pragmatically threatening behaviour within their control. Specifically, political 
needs have been a major force shaping the US definition of anti-competitive conduct. 
In recent decades, the prevailing politico-economic ideology has been committed to 
maximising business freedom. This has affected the types of conduct regarded as 
undesirable. In particular, some forms of vertical arrangement are no longer regarded 
as restrictive practices. Thus, once again, there is evidence that political and 
pragmatic aims have an immediate impact on antitrust enforcement and that, from the 
outset, that influence places enforcement on the basis of political expediency rather 
than merit. 
Political attitudes also have a striking influence on the characterisation of anti- 
competitive conduct in the US. Again, the greater the threat to political goals, the 
more penal the classification of the behaviour. This nexus is particularly clear in the 
US. The economic power wielded by major horizontal cartels has long been seen as a 
grave threat to political power in the US. Such politically dangerous agreements are 
automatically given a per se criminal classification. In contrast, current political beliefs 
see many vertical arrangements, and even some horizontal agreements, as more 
acceptable conduct. Accordingly, they have been characterised as administrative, rule 
of reason matters. 
Thus, like the EC, the discretionary choices of US enforcement agencies reveal 
that, from the very outset, political and pragmatic aims exert considerable control over 
both the definition and classification of anti-competitive conduct. Subsequent events 
illustrate the far-reaching impact of these initial choices on the conduct of 
enforcement. 
It is clear from this summary that political goals are most influential at this point. In 
the EC, the aim of economic integration, and in the US, the broader politico-economic 
desire to maximise business freedom dominates decision-making and drives the initial 
definition and classification of anti-competitive conduct. As already noted, the full 
impact of these early decisions is revealed in the subsequent application of competition 
rules. 
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2)Enforcement Choices 
Not only do political and pragmatic aims have a significant effect upon the definition 
and characterisation of anti-competitive behaviour, they also impact upon enforcement 
choices, particularly the construction and application of enforcement powers and 
defence rights. The research has revealed that the need to secure these goals drives 
enforcement agencies to dominate the process. This necessarily impacts upon the 
classification, scope and use of enforcement powers and defence rights. This study has 
demonstrated that this approach is based on the incremental use of the 'law as a 
resource' for political and pragmatic ends. Under this approach, every enforcement 
action, decision and opportunity is constructed and employed to facilitate and/or 
justify the next step in the process, and therefore, the ultimate attainment of political 
and pragmatic goals. Step by step, these choices seek to secure the conviction and 
punishment of all conduct threatening these objectives. For many, the result is an 
inexorable progress towards an inevitable conclusion : conviction. 
DGIV, in particular, has two favoured tactics. The first is the creation of 
disparity between itself and others, principally the defendant, in the process. The other 
is the creation of legal uncertainty and the exploitation of the resulting flexibility of the 
law. The study has revealed that the inherent malleability of the law provides the 
Commission with the opportunity to apply its monolithic discretion to significant 
political and pragmatic advantage. At every point, there is evidence that DGIV uses 
this freedom to manipulate the character and scope of its own powers and defence 
rights to create an imbalance between the two. Moreover, the research bears evidence 
of numerous instances which suggest that this dominance of enforcement is also 
employed by DGIV to pursue a concerted policy of creating and maintaining 
ambiguity over a wide range of enforcement issues. Both tactics provide DGIV with 
considerable room to manoeuvre, enabling it to use the 'law as a resource' to meet 
current political and pragmatic demands, yet still remain within the parameters of the 
law. Both strategies serve to create difficulties in challenging the Commission's 
activities. Others in the process are simply unable to question or review DGIV's 
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conduct effectively, so permitting DGIV's version of enforcement to proceed to its 
conclusion largely unhindered. Overall, both techniques play a significant role in 
maintaining the prosecution momentum, invariably tipping the scales in favour of 
conviction. 
Under this incremental approach, the 'politics and pragmatism' rationale is 
employed at every point to justify this use of the 'law as a resource'. At every point, 
the benefit of these tactics to political and pragmatic aims is evident. At every point, 
the resulting control of the process ensures enforcement in line with current political 
and pragmatic requirements. 
It is not only the Commission who employs such tactics. The study has also 
demonstrated that this same incremental use of the 'law as a resource' for political and 
pragmatic ends is apparent in the US. The following sections summarise the influence 
of, and the advantages to, political and pragmatic goals of these incremental tactics at 
each stage of the process in both the EC and US. 
a) Investigation - EC 
DGIV's approach to the investigation of horizontal cartels sets the tenor of its entire 
enforcement policy 3. The paramouncy of Reg. 17 is assured by the Commission's 
repeated insistence that it has the exclusive ability to decide and control all aspects of 
enforcement. To this end, it manipulates relevant legal definitions and concepts to 
maximise its own fact-finding powers, whilst restricting those of defendants. The 
result is that DGIV possesses investigatory powers which are penal in nature, scope 
and application. In particular, its insistence upon its freedom of choice regarding 
investigation methods has resulted in an approach which maximises enforcement 
powers, whilst ensuring that there is no immediate check upon them. Specifically, 
DGIV's routine resort to Art. 14(3) reveals its perception of the criminality of anti- 
competitive practices and its willingness to punish non-cooperation. ` 
Similarly, the Commission's interpretation of defence rights reveals its 
reluctance to brook any interference with effective enforcement '. As a result, DGIV 
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repeatedly resolves the inherent conflict between the needs of Reg. 17 and the 
obligation to uphold due process by limiting both the classification and scope of 
defence rights. Its broad approach is to characterise defence protections as 
administrative by basing them on the highly flexible concept of 'integral fairness'. This 
provides the Commission with the ability to construct and reconstruct defence 
protections in a way which serves current enforcement demands, yet pays some formal 
recognition to due process. There is no better example of this than the right to silence 
where DGIV's wide interpretation of the defendant's duty to co-operate and its 
willingness to employ Reg. 17 punitively by fining the defendant's reluctance to 
incriminate himself, effectively secures the defendant's active participation in his own 
conviction. 
The nature and effectiveness of other fundamental rights such as legal 
representation and legal professional privilege are similarly interpreted and curtailed to 
meet enforcement demands. 
DGIV's investigation of vertical cases portrays the same approach 5. The 
notable reluctance of defendants in these cases to confront the Commission means that 
DGIV is not generally required to employ Reg. 17 in an overtly penal manner in 
vertical arrangements. But, the classification, scope and disparity between DGIV's 
powers and defence rights persists unchanged. Where necessary, the Commission 
continues to exercise enforcement powers punitively to maintain the supremacy of 
Reg. 17 and the attainment of political and pragmatic aims. 
It is evident from the above that the Commission fully exploits the malleability 
of legal rules to meet investigation demands and thereby secure political and pragmatic 
objectives. DGIV's primary tactic is to rely on the extensive discretion guaranteed by 
its monolithic position to ensure that enforcement and due process are on its terms. 
As a result, defence rights are permitted only insofar as they do not hinder 
enforcement and the attainment of the political and pragmatic goals. Indeed, 
fundamental rights are invariably defined to assist conviction. The limited effectiveness 
of defence protections means that DGIV's penal powers are bounded by few real 
controls, enabling it to secure and maintain control of all enforcement issues. 
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The Commission's investigation choices further political and pragmatic 
objectives in several respects. As well as providing a deterrent to actual and potential 
violators, DGIV's punitive approach has the political advantage of providing high 
visibilty enforcement. Moreover, at investigation, Art. 8 ECHWs inviolability 
guarantee was interpreted as being limited by the political goal of "economic well- 
being", providing an explicit indication that, for DGIV, Art. 3(g)'s goal of economic 
integration overrides fundamental rights. Finally, the disparity between prosecution 
and defence positions benefits political and pragmatic objectives by increasing 
conviction prospects considerably. The more extensive the Commission's powers and 
the weaker defendants' safeguards, the more cost-effective and certain the outcome of 
the process and the more successful the attainment of political and pragmatic goals. 
b)Investigalion - US 
The examination of the nature and scope of US antitrust investigations reveals 
equally familiar enforcement tactics 6. From the outset, both the DOJ and the FTC 
exert their dominance over the process. Both use it to exploit the flexibility of the law 
and maximise their own powers and meet enforcement demands. So, regardless of the 
initial classification of these powers, both agencies possess a formidable array of 
investigation powers which are penal in character, scope and application. At this 
point, the US and EC positions may be contrasted. Whilst the FTC and DGIV are 
both administrative agencies exercising penal powers, the FTC's ability to compel 
sworn testimony extends the range of its fact-finding skills beyond those of DGIV. 
The same is true of the DOJ's investigation. tools. In particular, its use of body wires, 
telephone monitoring and grand juries are indicative of its intention to construe and 
apply its powers with maximum penality in favour of antitrust enforcement. The 
routine employment of grand juries is of immense enforcement value. Not only does it 
significantly enhance the Department's fact-finding ability, but it places proceedings 
entirely under the DOD's control. The absence of immediate supervision over the 
Division allows it to set the prosecution momentum in motion and so take the first 
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step towards increasing the likelihood of conviction. Moreover, like the EC, US 
powers of investigation are exercised in the absence of effective procedural controls. 
The prosecution's mastery of the process and the breadth of procedural requirements 
means that, even the formal litigation context of the DOYs powers, fails to exert telling 
control over investigation choices. Methods of fact-finding are not constrained ; 
possible avenues of abuse are not curtailed, allowing the prosecution to take another 
step towards its goal of conviction whilst evading immediate scrutiny. The United 
States' impressive investigation powers are supported by extensive sanctions. Not 
only may they, like the EC, fine non-cooperation, but they may also impose custodial 
sentences. This punitive approach both ensures the defendant's deference to the 
prosecution's enforcement choices and highlights again the jurisdiction's determination 
to pursue an overtly penal antitrust policy. 
Like the EC, the US takes steps to curtail the effectiveness of defence rights 
and, where possible, employs them to assist conviction. Thus, whilst defence rights of 
silence and confidentiality are recognised, the restrictive interpretation placed on them 
by the prosecution and Court and the frequent resort to use immunity orders allows 
prosecutors to routinely override these protections. In particular, prosecutors exploit 
the adversarial bargaining surrounding these orders to assist conviction. By pitting 
defendants against one another, prosecutors invariably acquire considerable additional 
evidence at no cost to themselves. Thus, like the EC, the prosecution's mastery of the 
process, its ability and willingness to interpret defence rights in its own interests and 
the constant threat of punitive sanctions for non-cooperation all render defence 
safeguards meaningless. In reality, defendants have litte option but to accede to 
prosecution demands taking the prosecution another step towards its goal. This co- 
opting of defendants significantly enhances conviction prospects. It both enables the 
prosecution to acquire ample evidence upon which to convict, whilst rendering 
defendants unwilling and unable to challenge the prosecution's construction of 
enforcement. 
In summary, two points must be emphasised. In the US, every opportunity is 
taken to reinforce the punitive nature of antitrust enforcement. As a result, in both 
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scope and application, the penality of US investigation powers extends beyond even 
that of the EC's. Secondly, the US employs identical enforcement tactics to those of 
DGIV's with identical goals in mind. Once again, the prosecution dominates 
enforcement. Once again, enforcement powers are maximised and defence rights 
curtailed. Once again, the disparity in effectiveness between the two is exploited to 
ensure the paramouncy of enforcement demands. , 
c)Prosecution - EC 
The same pattern of Commission dominance and subordination of defendants is 
revealed at prosecution'. Here, it has been demonstrated that, in pursuit of political 
and pragmatic goals, DGIV uses the 'law as a resource' to construct a case which is 
difficult for the defendant to disprove. The study has shown that case construction has 
three main facets. In each case, it has been revealed that the criminal classification, in 
other words political and pragmatic aims, dictate and justify DGIV's prosecution 
choices. Firstly, the Commission interprets the ambit of Art. 85 to criminalise 
conduct and bring it within its remit'. To this end, it has developed several concepts 
such as 'collective responsibility' and 'complex infringement'. The breadth of these 
notions considerably enhances DGIV's powers by expediting the substantiation of an 
offence. In this respect, DGIV has undertaken a deliberate policy of creating ambiguity 
regarding the scope of these concepts, thus making it difficult to challenge the 
Commission's case construction. These notions serve to increase the criminality of the 
offence and justify DGIV's choices in the second aspect of case construction ; the type 
of analytical format employed. Here, the Commission uses its absolute freedom over 
the type and depth of legal and economic analysis employed, to choose to undertake 
only a limited evaluation of the agreement. This approach has been criticised as 
shallow, but it does have political and pragmatic advantages. Its routine employment 
allows the speedy prosecution of politically damaging cartels without requiring the 
expenditure of resources to establish anti-competitive effect. 
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In turn, -DGIV's choice of the 'object' format of analysis, combined with the 
absence of stringent evidential rules, have a significant impact upon the final strand of 
case construction ; the quality and quantity of evidence necessary to substantiate an 
antitrust violation. The combination of the two provides DGIV with the freedom to 
control all aspects of evidential sufficiency in the best interests of 'politics and 
pragmatism'. Consequently, these objectives affect the quality of evidence employed 
by dictating an extensive reliance on circumstantial evidence and a widespread 
rejection of economic evidence. Similarly, their impact upon the quantity of evidence 
has resulted in the continued absence of a clear burden and standard of proof. DGIV's 
use of the 'law as a resource' here, specifically, its focus on the anti-competitive object, 
the cumulative weight of evidence and the perpetuation of uncertainty regarding the 
requirements of proof, allow DGIV to mask any evidential insufficiency resulting from 
its politically and pragmatically necessary choices. This approach has raised concerns 
that it allows the sum of the evidence to outweigh the whole and thereby permits the 
Commission to 'convict' on evidence which on closer examination is insufficient or 
unreliable. But, the policy nevertheless permits political and pragmatic goals to control 
evidential sufficiency, masking problems of proof and enhancing conviction prospects 
considerably. 
DGIV's attitude to the defendant's right of access at prosecution reveals a 
familiar approach under which the Commission's domination of the process allows it to 
control the characterisation and scope of disclosure rights and limit them to meet 
political and pragmatic demands'. Consequently, despite caselaw to the contrary, the 
fundamental nature of this safeguard is routinely denied. Access is merely a privilege 
permitted by the Commission in the interests of 'fair play'. Its scope is similarly 
curtailed, initially, by DGIV's formalistic insistence that due process obligations have 
been discharged by the issuance of the SO. DGIV takes addititonal steps to ensure 
that the ambit of this protection is defined in a way which restricts the opportunity for, 
and the effectiveness of, the defendant's right to comment. Principally, this is achieved 
by controlling both the issues of'confidentiality' and 'relevancy'. Here, DGIV employs 
its favoured tactic of constructing such issues in an uncertain fashion. This provides 
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the Commission with flexible tools with which to manipulate the quality and quantity 
of evidence available to defendants in accordance with political and pragmatic 
demands 10. Together with the high burden of proof faced by defendants in 
establishing that DGIV has abused its position and suppressed vital information, this 
approach is capable of withholding much exculpatory evidence from defendants. 
Restricting access in this manner has proved a major asset to DGIV's attainment of 
political and pragmatic goals. Quite simply, selective disclosure constrains the 
effectiveness of the right to comment by rendering the formulation of a convincing 
defence problematic, and altering the balance of evidence in favour of political and 
pragmatic needs. In this way, due process is co-opted to achieve smooth, effective 
prosecution. The nexus between this approach and political and pragmatic objectives 
operates undenied. Indeed, DGIV has openly stated that unabridged defence rights to 
access are administratively unacceptable. Elsewhere, the political need for the 
paramouncy of Reg. 17 has been affirmed time and again. 
A broadly similar approach to case construction is seen in the Commission's 
formal prosecution of vertical cases in the study Again, it uses the tactic of 
extending definitions 'Z and creating uncertainty 13, combined with a formalistic 
evaluation of arrangements, to secure and maintain control over the scope, application 
and proof of Art. 85 violations. The flexibilty of this technique is particularly politically 
and pragmatically advantageous in the context of vertical agreements. Here, some 
arrangements directly conflict with market integration whilst others actively assist it. 
Thus, this approach allows DGIV to prosecute uncompromisingly cases which 
threaten unity, whilst showing leniency where appropriate. DGIV's construction of the 
characterisation and ambit of defence rights in vertical cases is equally similar '^. 
Specifically, the same techniques are used to limit the effectiveness of the right to 
comment. The narrow interpretation of 'relevancy', the withholding of information as 
'confidential' and the vagueness of the SO are again employed to distört the balance of 
evidence. This both makes the scope and strength of the case against the defendant 
unclear, whilst reducing the effectiveness of the defendant's right to comment. 
Inevitably, this facilitates prosecution and hinders defence. 
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Thus, the mismatch between Commission and defence positions continues 
throughout prosecution stage. The disparity created by DGIV's penal prosecution 
powers and the defendant's curtailed protections allows DGIV to set the prosecution 
agenda, making enforcement choices which serve political and pragmatic ends and co- 
opting defence rights to this end. Ultimately, this control is employed to construct a 
case which avoids problematic, resource consuming analysis and proof and ensures the 
cost-efficient and certain conviction of politically dangerous conduct. 
d)Prosecnlion - US 
The discussion of the EC's prosecution stage concentrated on the Commission's case 
construction. The litigation setting of US enforcement means that some of this case 
construction takes at prosecution stage, whilst the remainder occurs at trial. This 
section will summarise the research's findings on the initial stage of case construction, 
considering the impact of political and pragmatic goals on prosecutorial discretion. 
The study has shown that both US agencies enjoy extensive discretion 
regarding whether and how to prosecute 15. Some familiar patterns are evident. Above 
all, the research illustrates that enforcement agencies continue to dominate issues and 
that the absence of strict controls on prosecutorial decision-making allows enforcers' 
discretion to be exercised in favour of political and pragmatic needs. The earlier 
discussion on the definition of anti-competitive conduct has already highlighted the 
strong political influence which pervades the decision whether to prosecute. The 
breadth of antitrust legislation means that enforcement agencies are able to interpret 
and extend the substantive elements of the law to bring politically and-pragmatically 
damaging conduct within their control and so take the first steps towards constructing 
a case against the defendant. The breadth and non-binding nature of prosecutorial 
guidance ensures that enforcers' perceptions alone dominate these prosecution 
decisions. 
At prosecution, US defendants are significantly better protected than their EC 
counterparts. The litigation setting of US antitrust means that defendants here enjoy 
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broad, substantive rights of discovery. As a result, there is much greater 'equality of 
arms' in the US context. The research has revealed that some possibilities do exist for 
the prosecution to manipulate defence rights to serve enforcement. For instance, 
what constitutes exculpatory evidence is open to interpretation and therefore 
manipulation, providing prosecutors with an opportunity to withold evidence. 
However, these potential problems are counterbalanced by the litigation setting of 
enforcement. Most importantly, the nature and scope of defence safeguards are not at 
the discretion of the enforcing agency. Disputes are settled by an independent arbiter. 
Moreover, the litigation setting allows defendants to negotiate with prosecutors and 
influence decision-making. Such factors appreciably reduce the prosecutor's ability to 
manipulate the quality and quantity of evidence available to defendants. They also 
provide defendants with some degree of control over events, enhancing the level of 
protection afforded to them. 
So, US enforcement agencies continue to dominate proceedings with 
prosecution powers which are clearly criminal in extent and application. The degree of 
political influence on this stage of decision-making is enormous and concern has been 
expressed. The changing political persuasion of the governing Administration 
inevitably affects the current perception of what is politically acceptable, altering the 
focus of enforcement and producing long-term confusion and inconsistency. 
Nevertheless, the approach has been shown to possess more immediate political and 
pragmatic benefits. It allows these- objectives to inform all aspects of prosecutorial 
decision-making, controlling legal and economic standards and enabling the initial 
steps of politically expedient case construction and prosecution to be taken. 
Fortunately, defence safeguards at this stage are also considerable. Defendants both 
know the case against them and are able to acquire sufficient information to exercise 
their right to comment effectively. Clearly, at prosecution, there -is an appreciably 
greater equality between prosecutors and defendants than in the EC. 
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e) Trial and Sentence - EC 
Here too, DGIV has garnered wide powers to decide upon and punish cases of anti- 
competitive conduct 16. At trial, its monolithic role enables it to construct, and then 
decide upon, the probative value of the case against the defendant. Rarely does the 
Commission decide against itself ". In addition, DGIV's fining power is enormous. Its 
exercise is based on little precise guidance, leaving the Commission free to decide the 
choice and weight of aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered in the fining 
assessment. Even less explanation of how it arrived at the final level of penalty is 
provided. The study has argued that DGIV's failure to articulate its reasoning is a 
further example of its deliberate cultivation of uncertainty as a means of increasing the 
nature, scope and flexibilty of its sanctioning powers for political and pragmatic 
advantage. The approach certainly leaves it with sanctioning powers which are penal 
in scope and whose ambiguous exercise makes any accountability problematic. DGIV 
uses these penal powers to their fullest extent. At both trial and sentence, they are 
employed to reinforce the criminality of the offence and justify the imposition of 
punitive sanctions. DGIV's criminal classification of infringements and its case 
construction have been of considerable assistance here. Both serve to augment the 
criminality of the violation and therefore increase both conviction prospects and the 
ultimate amount of fine levied. The inconsistent results produced by this approach 
have raised concerns that the outcome of the fining assessment owes more to DGIV's 
perceptions of criminality, which of course are inextricably linked to political and 
pragmatic goals, than to an objective legal and econiomic evaluation of the conduct. 
However, the decisions and fines imposed upon undertakings do serve to to exert a 
serious long-term effect over firms disclosing that, despite Reg. 17's assertions to the 
contrary, DGIV's fining powers are criminal in nature, scope and application. 
In contrast, defence rights are again subordinated to enforcement 
requirements 18. The Commission's continued dominance allows it to relegate the 
defendant's safeguard to an independent tribunal to a matter of procedural fairness, 
enabling DGIV to act as arbiter of its own prosecutions. The Court's frequent 
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deference to DGIV means that it routinely prosecutes and convicts in the absence of 
exacting review. Defendants are left with no alternative but to submit to the 
Commission's monolithic discretion. The nature and ambit of the defendant's right to 
comment is similarly limited. The study has shown that DGIV employs its control of 
enforcement to ensure that other actors in the process do not interfere with its 
construction of conviction 19. Their elimination as effective avenues of accountability 
allows the Commission to isolate defendants and exercise exclusive control over the 
width and effectiveness of the defendant's right to comment. In their absence, DGIV 
exerts its influence, where necessary, to alter the characterisation of violations during 
the course of proceedings to meet enforcement needs, safe in the knowledge that the 
breadth of Art. 190 regularly fails to curtail its monlithic decision-making. Combined 
with earlier limitations upon access rights, this approach may render the defendant's 
right to comment worthless. Thus, at trial, the Commission's policy of constructing 
defence protections for its benfit rather than the defendant's is again illustrated. Whilst 
such an approach seriously hampers defendants, it does allow DGIV to formally 
acknowledge procedural fairness whilst meeting its enforcement demands unhindered 
by the substance of due process. 
Sanctioning decisions in vertical cases provide further evidence of the penal 
character and scope of DGIV's powers ý0. The Commission's choices continue to 
exercise long-term control over firms and are specifically designed to eradicate threats 
to the political goal of economic unity. Again, DGIV's criminal/quasi-criminal 
classification, case construction and formalistic analysis of formally prosecuted vertical 
arrangements all serve as vital tools in heightening the criminality of violations and so 
justifying conviction and punitive sanctioning. Similarly, DGIV continues to control 
and limit the nature and effectiveness of defence protections at trial 2'. Its 
interpretation of the defendant's right to comment and to an independent tribunal not 
only affords defendants little protection, but may be constructed to pose a significant 
threat to defendants thereby tipping the scales in favour of conviction. This co-option 
of defence rights is facilitated in vertical cases by the virtual absence of defence 
challenges to DGIV's construction of respective rights and powers. 
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Thus, at trial, DGIV exploits its continued domination of the process to 
preserve the existing disparity between itself and defendants. The research has shown 
that to this end, DGIV has secured for itself decision-making and sanctioning powers 
which are entirely punitive in scope and application. Moreover, its supremacy permits 
DGIV to emasculate, and often co-opt, defence rights and to ignore the opinions of 
other actors in the process, leaving the defendant isolated and largely unprotected. As 
a result, the Commission's construction of conviction goes unchallenged ; its pursuit of 
political and pragmatic aims unimpeded. The resulting penality of this policy provides 
a powerful deterrent with which to secure economic and political unity. 
J) 1 rial and Sentence - US 
Like the EC, US enforcement agencies at this stage exercise extensive penal discretion 
_=. These powers are directed towards constructing a case where conviction is difficult 
to avoid. Their principal tools and approach to case constrution are identical to the 
EC's ". The creation of uncertainty and the exploitation of the resulting flexibility are 
employed to exert exclusive control over all aspects of case construction. Thus, whilst 
this chapter has already noted a broad nexus between characterisation and analytical 
format, the study has also revealed that the law remains sufficiently malleable for the 
selection of analytical format in a given case to be ambiguous and at the discretion of 
the prosecutor and Court. Moreover, the inherent flexibilty of both the per se and the 
rule of reason approaches and the concepts involved are open to interpretation and can 
be constructed to boost evidential sufficiency and meet enforcement demands. 
Nevertheless, classification has a major impact on the proof of a violation with 
concomitant political and pragmatic benefits. The study has shown that whichever 
analytical approach is chosen, it has a direct impact upon the quality and quantity of 
evidence required to substantiate an offence. Per se evaluation, like the EC's 'object' 
analysis, relies on circumstantial evidence, superficial analysis and the cumulative 
weight of evidence to boost evidential sufficiency. Its selection benefits enforcement 
enormously. The minimal evidential requirements of this format make the 
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prosecution's case appreciably easier to prove. The selection of the rule of reason 
approach has its own advantages. This format's assessment of market context exploits 
the malleability of economic evidence and the uncertainty over the definition and 
evidential requirements of vertical offences to control the requirements of proof. The 
overall uncertainty regarding the selection and scope of analytical format also benefits 
political and pragmatic aims. Which format will be employed, what constitutes 
adequate proof under each approach and the reliability of that proof in any given case 
have been the subject of wide ranging confusion and acrimonious debate. The 
creation of amibiguity over the analysis and proof of US antitrust cases has been of 
immense advantage to prosecutors, permitting proof of an antitrust violation to be 
moulded to current enforcement needs, thus enhancing conviction prospects. The 
nexus between political and pragmatic goals and these case construction choices is 
clear. The definition, analysis and evidential standards in US antitrust cases have been 
demonstrated to be susceptible to a wide range of overt and covert political influences. 
Significant pragmatic benefits also accrue. The selection of analytical format, 
particularly the superficial per se approach, and the manipulation of evidential 
requirements provide a quick, cheap and certain route to conviction. 
Like the EC, the culmination of the US process results in extremely punitive 
sanctions. Both criminal and civil sanctioning powers are undisputedly penal in nature, 
scope and application enabling the respective enforcement agencies to effect the 
desired long-term consequences upon antitrust violators. Whilst Sentencing 
Guidelines exert some control over factors influencing sanction and the ultimate level 
of sanction imposed in criminal cases, much is left to the discretion of the prosecutor 
and Court. This current approach discloses a desire to impose maximum sanctions at 
every opportunity. Again, political and pragmatic goals impact. The study has shown 
that this punitive policy is a direct response to political requirements. The influence of 
pragmatism is explicit in the Sentencing Guidelines which contain a clear mandate to 
reward co-operation which reduces enforcement costs. 
The litigation setting of formal enforcement means that US defendants enjoy 
substantive rights to comment and to an independent tribunal. Neither the existence 
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nor scope of these safeguards is at the discretion of the enforcing agency, considerably 
reducing the disparity between prosecution powers and defence rights. But, political 
and pragmatic needs still have an impact. There is evidence to suggest that the 
political persuasion of the judge in DOJ cases and the monolithic role of the FTC may 
impair the independence of the deciding tribunal. 
This final enforcement stage sees the prosecution's continued dominance 
coming to fruition. The entire process is geared to acquiring and maintaining long- 
term regulation of US business conduct. Here, the strong probability of conviction 
and subsequent punitive sanctioning achieve just that. 
This review has demonstrated the immense impact of both political and pragmatic 
objectives on enforcement choices. Equally clear is the immeasurable value of the 
incremental use of the 'law as a resource' in securing the high visibility prosecution and 
conviction of politically and pragmatically damaging conduct. The legal techniques 
employed ensure that this is done in the most cost-effective and conviction-sure 
manner. Similar tactics are employed in both jurisdictions. Above all, at the insistence 
of political and. pragmatic needs, the classification and scope of prosecution powers 
and defence safeguards are constructed in such a way as to increase enforcement 
powers, whilst curtailing defendants' protections. In this way, the prosecution's 
domination of enforcement and the attainment of political and pragmatic objectives are 
assured. As a result, some disparity between prosecution and defence positions is 
apparent in both jurisdictions, though the imbalance between the respective parties in 
the EC is notably more marked than in the US. In this respect, it is apparent that the 
structure of the system in the US, ie the litigation setting, gives significantly more 
stability to the defendant's position, resulting in considerably fewer disputes and 
problems over defence protections. Nevertheless, competition authorities in this 
jurisdiction continue to do everything in their power to maximise their domination of 
the enforcement process in the interests of political and pragmatic aims. Futhermore, 
both systems take every opportunity to augment and utilise legal uncertainty to meet 
political and pragmatic demands. 
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The 'politics and pragmatism' rationale not only affects the characterisation and 
ambit of powers and safeguards, but it also impacts upon the application of 
competition rules. Again, the nexus with political and pragmatic goals is clear. Both 
jurisdictions repeatedly refer to these objectives as justification for their enforcement 
choices. As a result, enforcement powers are classified, constructed and applied 
penally, regardless of their nominal characterisation. Quite simply, all enforcement 
choices are at the behest and for the benefit of political and pragmatic goals. 
3)Methods of Enforcement 
A further way in which political and pragmatic needs affect the application of 
competition rules is in a jurisdiction's choice of enforcement method. It has been seen 
that both jurisdictions possess several approaches to enforcement, but that serious 
confusion exists over the method to be employed in any given case. Whilst in all 
instances the classification of the offence continues to reflect the political need for 
action, the examination of alternative methods of enforcement reveals that there 
appears to be no consistent correlation betweem the characterisation of conduct, the 
enforcement method employed and the eventual outcome. Nevertheless, the influence 
of political and pragmatic goals is detectable in each of these aspects. The following 
section will review the choice of enforcement method in both jurisdictions. 
a)EC 
As well as formal prosecution, the Commission undertakes alternatve, more informal 
methods of enforcement 2'. DGIV's treatment of plea-bargained, negatively cleared 
and indivdually exempted cases bears witness to a more conciliatory attitude to the 
resolution of competition issues 25. Whilst some of its individual enforcement choices 
are difficult to rationalise, the pursuit of political and pragmatic objectives remains 
paramount. The tactics for their attainment are equally recognisable. All plea- 
bargained cases are broadly constructed and are subject to a limited formalistic 
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analysis. Moreover, the evaluation of possible factors influencing the likelihood of an 
informal resolution reveals that DGIV continues to base its decision-making on 
ambiguously constructed and inconsistently applied criteria. To add to the confusion, 
the reasons underlying settlements are often identical to those justifying formal 
prosecution. Individually exempted crisis cartels and negatively cleared and exempted 
distribution agreements also receive a familiar formalistic analysis. Here too, DGIV's 
enforcement approach hinges on preserving a cloak of doubt around decision-making. 
For instance in individual exemptions, not only is there considerable uncertainty 
regarding DGIV's interpretation and application of Art. 85(3) conditions to 
agreements, but there is also signifcant confusion created both by the flexibility of the 
Metro criteria, in relation to distribution arrangements, and by the scope and validity of 
qualifying criteria for rationalisation agreements. The scant and often unconvincing 
reasoning in Commission decisions only serves to exacerbate matters. A similar 
approach is revealed in DGIV's treatment of negatively cleared arrangements. 
The attenuated nature and scope of defence rights is also displayed in these 
cases 26. The secret nature of negotiations surrounding plea-bargaining and the limited 
legal value of such settlements places defendants in a weak bargaining position, leaving 
procedural safegards entirely at DGIV's discretion. Defendants involved in negative 
clearances and individual exemptions fare little better. Whilst both resolutions are 
formal Commission decisions, allowing firms the right to comment and full appeal 
rights, the pressures placed on defendants during negotiations may significantly 
undermine the effectiveness of these safeguards. The study has shown that DGIV's 
broad case construction, its formalistic evaluation, limitations on disclosure and the 
threat of prosecution and/or substantial fines are more than capable of constraining the 
firms involved in all types' of resolution to settle on the Commission's terms. Thus, 
DGIV's conduct of informal settlements and exemptions displays the same basic 
pattern seen in formal prosecution. By introducing uncertainty and controlling defence 
rights, DGIV augments its own authority, whilst constraining the defendant's position. 
By ensuring the paramouncy of Reg. 17, this policy appreciably enhances successful 
prosecution and therefore the attainment of political and pragmatic goals. 
484 
Whilst the study reveals that classification continues to dictate the construction 
and assessment of violations and defence rights, it seems from the examination of 
resolved and exempted cases that there is no consistent correlation between 
characterisation, the enforcement method employed and the eventual outcome. All 
resolved and exempted cases studied initially contained restrictive criteria of a type 
which have been formally prosecuted elsewhere as criminal violations. Yet, in the 
instant cases the Commission chose to apply very different enforcement methods to 
them. As a result, there are many examples of similar cases receiving dissimilar 
treatment. Those selected for formal prosecution are classified as inherently anti- 
competitive and treated as criminal matters. These case receive uncompromising 
prosecution and stiff fines. Elsewhere, in the face of similar restrictions, DGIV has 
employed a more reasonable, conciliatory policy, seeking the negotiation and 
modification of problematic clauses. Consequently, such cases are plea-bargained, 
individually exempted or even negatively cleared. Yet, the basis for the Commission's 
choices is not immediately clear. The evaluation of influencing factors has shed little 
light on the true rationale underlying DGIV's enforcement choices. What it has 
illustrated is the breadth and unpredictable nature of DGIV's discretion and the far- 
reaching impact this has upon defendants. Thus, of the formally prosecuted cases 
selected for plea-bargaining, the study was unable to locate a consistent basis for this 
choice. Yet, the difference in the level of sanction levied was often considerable. 
Further anomalies occur in DGIV's choice of which agreements to formally prosecute 
and which to individually exempt. For instance, its approach to evaluation has created 
considerable problems regarding the difference in constitution between price- 
fixing/market division cartels and restructuring cartels. Yet, the former are vehemently 
opposed and heavily sanctioned, whilst the latter, despite employing similar market 
strategies, receive exemption under Art. 85(3). That it is not uncommon for a case to 
be labelled initially as a crisis cartel by DGIV only to conclude by being punished as a 
market division cartel and vice versa, considerably exacerbates matters 27. Similar 
problems and discrepancies exist between the Commission's enforcement of formally 
prosecuted export bans and comparable restrictions which are negotiated and 
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exempted or even negatively cleared. Yet again. the basis of such choices has never 
been clearly articulated, but the impact upon defendants is immense. Even amongst 
individual exemptions DGIV's approach is confused and confusing. In AMP, the 
special characteristics of the market justified the exemption of a price-fixing clause. 
This finding not only conflicts with DGIV's normally overt antipathy to price-fixing, 
but it also contradicts its treatment of such conduct in rationalisation agreements, 
which can also plead special market conditions, yet where DGIV has staunchly refused 
to exempt such restrictions. 
The serious anomalies ensuing from DGIV's choices means that its 
enforcement of competition matters is characterised by its arbitrary approach and 
disparate outcomes. Thus, in response to the research's question regarding which 
agreements are pro- and anti-competitive, the Commission's seemingly erratic use of 
its discretion means that the answer must be that whether and how a given 
arrangement will be enforced against and its eventual outcome are entirely 
unforeseeable. 
This confusion impacts upon the apparent classification of resolved and 
exempted cases, leaving their precise characterisation in disarray. As formally 
prosecuted cases, plea-bargains have a clear criminal classification. But, DGIV's 
characterisation of exempted crisis cartels is less clear. Their horizontal nature, and 
thus their potential for disrupting economic unity, certainly inclines DGIV towards a 
quasi-criminal characterisation. But, lack of information in case reports means that the 
research has been unable to conclusively establish DGIV's classification of these 
agreements. Its approach to negatively cleared and individually exempted vertical 
cases is even more problematic. As already noted, such arrangements contain prima 
facie 'criminal' restrictions, but the subsequent lenient, negotiated nature of 
enforcement endows these cases with an apparently administrative characterisation. It 
should be emphasised here that the situation is not one in which DGIV regards these 
arrangements from the outset as unproblematic, administrative matters. It still insists 
that these agreements initially offend the Metro criteria and are thus potentially 
'criminal'. But, instead of formal prosecution, the Commission enters into negotiations 
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and resolves matters administratively. So, it would seem that whilst classification 
controls the need for enforcement, it does not dictate the method employed. The 
study has suggested that DGIV's choice of enforcement method and its subsequent 
impact upon characterisation owe more to the Commission's erratic exercise of 
discretion than to objective evaluation or the absence of restrictive content in 
agreements. Indeed, the disparate nature of DGIV's enforcement choices indicates that 
other undisclosed considerations inform decision-making. This research has asserted 
that it is DGIV's pursuit of political and pragmatic goals which drives these 
enforcement decisions and produces inconsistencies. The situation appears to be to 
one in which political and pragmatic objectives impact upon both classification, and 
therefore the need for enforcement, and also the method of enforcement. But, the 
nature of these goals means that the way that they affect each aspect of enforcement 
is different and unpredictable. It is the capricious impact of these objectives which 
produces the confusion. Whilst this is impossible to establish conclusively without 
comprehensive access to DGIV's reasoning, the study has shown that the reasons 
proffered by the Commission do not always adequately explain its behaviour, but that 
its choices are entirely consistent with political and pragmatic goals. Each method of 
enforcement possesses its own political and pragmatic influences and advantages. In 
formal prosecution, political needs require and benefit from the high visibility 
deterrence of this approach. This is particularly so in the prosecution of horizontal 
cartels where the Commission is pitched against 'big business' in a battle for control of 
the market. In this context, the pragmatic need for speed and cost-effciency is met in 
DGIV's use of the resource-efficient 'object' analysis and the other 'law as a resource' 
tactics already discussed which maximise conviction prospects with the minimum 
consumption of resources. Plea-bargaining derives similar political and pragmatic 
influences and advantages to those in formal prosecution. The defendant's co- 
operation in his own conviction further serves these aims. In individual exemptions 
and other informal resolutions, the negotiation process is effective in serving political 
demands by securing bargains which promote Single Market integration and the 
overall health of the Union. This is particularly so in the case of vertical agreements. 
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In informal contexts, pragmatic aims are extremely influential. The Commission's 
straitened circumstances mean that every opportunity is taken to find the cheapest and 
quickest enforcement solution. As a result, the formalism of the 'object' analysis is 
employed. This allows the true market impact of restrictions to be ignored and thereby 
facilitates the bargaining and resolution of criminally classified conduct with significant 
pragmatic, and indeed political, benefits accruing. So, whilst the impact of political and 
pragmatic goals on decision-making results in the erratic selection of enforcement 
method with concomitant inconsistentcy and uncertainty, for DGIV, the political and 
pragmatic advantages to be gained from this approach make such risks worth running. 
b) US 
Both federal agencies possess a range of possibilities for informal settlement 28. In both 
civil and criminal contexts, these permit the imposition of wide-ranging penal 
conditions on defendants. However, both agencies have been criticised for failing to 
utilise the full range of informal opportunities. 
Defence rights in informal settlements have also caused some concern. The 
study has shown that, whilst some forms of settlement are binding, and so afford 
defendants considerable security, other types of resolution offer firms dubious 
protection. Moreover, the study has demonstrated that the absence of procedural 
protections governing the negotiation process permits prosecutors to use the threat of 
expensive litigation and the possibility of extreme penal sanctions to obtain a 
settlement. However, despite such potential drawbacks, US defendants are generally 
in a much stronger position than their EC counterparts and the popularity of 
negotiated resolutions continues undiminished. ' 
Like the EC, the initial classification of the violation continues to govern the 
construction and analysis of informal resolutions. But also like the EC, the study has 
shown that the nexus between characterisation and whether and how informal 
settlements will be undertaken is ambiguous. Whilst classification does broadly dictate 
the range of resolution possibilities available in a given case, there is no clear 
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indication of which precise method will be employed, or indeed, whether an informal 
settlement will be pursued at all. The study has revealed that many of these choices 
rest on the prosecutor's discretion. Guidance controlling these decisions has been 
demonstrated as being limited and largely ineffective. In contrast, the research has 
shown that the impact of political and pragmatic goals on these choices is substantial. 
Political needs inform all aspects of informal resolution. The recent tougher political 
stance has affected the likelihood of informal settlements. Particlarly with the FTC, 
this has resulted in a preference for litigation over informal settlement. The resulting 
selective prosecution policy has been criticised for its unfairness. Similarly, political 
aims have impacted upon the choice of resolution method. For instance, the DOT's 
more zealous criminal enforcement policy shows a preference for plea-bargaining over 
nolo pleas because of the former's ability to exact more punitive consequences. 
However, the research has shown that these political choices can clash with pragmatic 
objectives bringing Court and prosecutors into conflict. Moreover, there are clear 
indications that both the likelihood and scope of negotiated settlements may be the 
result of covert manipulation by both prosecutors and defendants. The Court's' desire 
for expediency permits such influences to flourish unhindered. Legislation intended to 
control such political influences has often been ignored in the interests of pragmatism. 
Thus, like the EC, the choice of enforcement method remains rather 
unpredictable and for much the same reasons. The very nature of political and 
pragmatic goals inevitably requires different solutions over time and circumstances. 
Changes in the political perspective of enforcement agencies inevitably alters policy. 
Both produce an inconsistent application of the rules. Uncertainty regarding how 
conflicts between political and pragmatic ends may be resolved merely exacerbates 
matters. Nevertheless, there are undoubted enforcement advantages to this approach 
for all concerned. It is a policy which ensures the cost-effective regulation of the 
majority of US antitrust issues. What is equally apparent is the US willingness to 
exercise enforcement powers for political and pragmatic benefit and a concomitant 
preparedness to create ambiguity and inconsistency, where necessary, in order to 
achieve those goals. 
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4)Conclusion - Part B 
This review has illustrated that political and pragmatic objectives have an 
overwhelming impact on all aspects of the classification and application of competition 
rules. Political factors are particularly influential in controlling the initial definition and 
characterisation of anti-competitive conduct. Both goals exert wide-ranging influence 
over whether and how antitrust rules are applied, encouraging the incremental use of 
the 'law as a resource' to secure politically and pragmatically acceptable outcomes. By 
creating uncertainty over the interpretation and application of antitrust provisions and 
corresponding defence rights, competition authorities fashion for themselves a massive 
advantage, appreciably augmenting prosecution chances whilst diminishing the 
defendant's ability to, and opportunity for, successful challenge. By maintaining a lack 
of transparency over the choice of enforcement method, prosecutors acquire sufficient 
latitude to select the most expedient prosecution method and pursue as political or 
pragmatic a settlement as required in the absence of any real scrutiny. The 
overwhelming preference for informal methods in competition enforcement bears 
witness to the enormous influence pragmatic needs have upon antitrust decision- 
making. Step by step, antitrust's policy of uncertainty and inconsistency ensures the 
cost-effective eradication of all conduct threatening political and pragmatic objectives. 
Above all, the examination of enforcement methods highlights the strength and scope 
of prosecutors' authority, particularly DGIV's monolithic discretion, and their 
willingness to exercise their powers exclusively for political and pragmatic effect. 
Indeed, such has been the extensive impact of political and pragmatic factors 
on antitrust enforcement within the study that it seemed to indicate that the use of the 
'law as a resource' for political and pragmatic ends was likely to exist throughout 
competition enforcement. To this end, an additional analysis of the impact of political 
and pragmatic goals on the classification and application of UK antitrust enforcement 
was undertaken. Limitations on space do not allow it to be included in the main body 
of the research. However, it is reproduced in Appendix D. 
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C)THE IMPACT OF'POLITICS AND PRAGMATISMUPON THE 'RULE OF 
LAW' 
This aspect of the study sought to evaluate whether the Commission's exercise of 
discretion promoted or impeded the 'rule of law' and thereby discover whether DGIV 
operated a consistent, equitable competition policy 29. The analysis demonstrated the 
extensive impact of political and pragmatic goals on enforcement. At every point, 
DGIV's pursuit of these objectives constrained its exercise of discretion by requiring 
the 'rule of law' to be subordinated to these 'higher' goals. By allowing the effective 
enforcement of Reg. 17 to prevail over the 'rule of law', this compromising of 
fundamental legal principles advances the Commission another step towards sucessful 
conviction. This outcome is secured by familiar tactics. Again, DGIV uses its 
dominance of the process, combined with the existing flexibility of the 'rule of law 
principles, to create ambiguity over their scope and thereby control their construction 
and application. This allows DGIV to define the 'rule of law' to meet political and 
pragmatic needs. This use of the'law as a resource' means that the'rule of law' is co- 
opted and employed to legitimise DGIV's enforcement decisions. Consequently, the 
Commission's enforcement choices do not promote the 'rule of law', rather the 'rule of 
law' is used to support DGIV's choices. 
The Commission's manipulation and subordination of these fundamental 
principles is aided by the Court who have shown themselves disinclined and incapable 
of exercising exacting control over DGIV's monolithic discretion. The research has 
illustrated that, not only do the Court insist upon deferring to DGIV's discretion to 
dictate the ambit and application of 'rule of law' principles, but that an even more 
fundamental flaw hinders the effectiveness of the Court's review. The study has shown 
that a mismatch exists between the nature and scope of DGIV's penal enforcement 
powers and the Court's administrative review powers. This disparity and its 
enforcement value to the Commission are familiar territory. Just as the evaluation of 
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the enforcement process demonstrated that one of DGIV's principal tactics for 
attaining political and pragmatic objectives was to create and exploit an imbalance in 
power between itself and defendants, here too, the analysis reveals that DGIV relies on 
a similar technique. Its monolithic discretion is employed to dominate the review 
process and dictate both the scope and outcome of review. As a result of such control, 
the Court's scrutiny is necessarily limited. Here too, is evidence that DGIV exploits 
this disparity extensively, using it to manipulate the 'rule of law' and justify its political 
and pragmatic choices. 
The 'rule of law' evaluation bears clear evidence of a link between the 
manipulation of these tenets and political and pragmatic needs. On numerous 
occasions in the case study, DGIV's exercise of discretion was measured against 
Treaty aims, specifically the political goal of economic unity. On each occasion, this 
objective proved to be an overwhelming justification for the Commission's chosen 
construction and application of fundamental principles and a vindication of its 
enforcement choices. Moreover, the study has already demonstrated that DGIV has a 
vested political and pragmatic interest in creating and perpetuating legal uncertainty as 
a means of maximising its own powers whilst placing all other personnel involved in 
the process at a disadvantage. Pragmatism has also had a impact. DGIV's bureaucratic 
problems have encouraged it to take a pragmatic approach to the requirements of 
good administration and it has used this principle to validate its expedient decision- 
making. Finally, the research has revealed that the Court's review of 'rule of law' 
principles has also been influenced by political and pragmatic considerations. 
This focus on political and pragmatic aims has had a major effect on 
fundamental principles. Quite simply, it has created a situation where the 'rule of law' 
does not control DGIV, rather the Commission controls it. As a result, there are many 
examples of disproportionate, discriminatory treatment, denials of legitimate 
expectations and an enforcement system which thrives on ambiguity, legal uncertainty 
and pragmatic solutions. Yet, DGIV's dominance of enforcement and review means 
that its use of the 'law as a resource' and manipulation of fundamental principles goes 
largely unchecked. Indeed, its control of the process serves to legitimise its choices, 
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illustrating the scope within the system for legitimate procedural improriety, whilst 
masking the reality of substantive injustice. Thus, in answer to the research's query as 
to whether the Commision pursues a consistent, equitable policy, the response must be 
that it does not. The hall-mark of the 'politics and pragmatism' approach is one of 
consistent inconsistency. It is a policy which has raised many concerns. Specifically, 
its subordination of both the Court and the 'rule of law' to political and pragmatic 
requirements not only leaves DGIV largely unaccountable, but may ultimately 
undermine the credibility of competition rules and Community law itself. 
Nevertheless, the approach possesses immediate political and pragmatic advantages. 
By shielding DGIV's enforcement choices from incisive review, it serves as the final 
step in a process which ensures that the Commission's political and pragmatic choices 
endure. 
D)THE CLASSIFICATION OF ANTITRUST 
Having reviewed each jurisdiction's application of competition rules and DGIV's 
treatment of 'rule of law' principles, it is now possible to comment on the overall 
classification of antitrust. The characterisation of competition rules may be gleaned by 
examining the nature and scope of enforcement powers and rights under the law and 
also in terms of the consequences the law may impose on violators. The following 
sections will briefly review each of these aspects in order to arrive at an overall 
conclusion regarding the characterisation of antitrust. 
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1)The Nature of Enforcement Powers and Rights 
a)EC 
The research has shown that DGIV's enforcement powers are extremely broad in 
nature. Specifically, the latitude of EC investigation and prosecution powers is 
comparable to that seen both in the enforcement of the criminal law and in the 
acknowledged criminal context of US antitrust. In addition, DGIV's references to 
offending conduct reveal a degree of opprobrium generally reserved for criminal 
behaviour. Moreover, the study has demonstrated that these powers are applied to 
achieve maximum punitive effect. In contrast, defendants' safeguards are of a limited, 
administrative nature. The study has shown that this curtailment is the direct result of 
DGIV's punitive approach towards enforcement. So, at every point, despite assertions 
to the contrary, there are clear indications that EC antitrust is overtly penal in nature. 
Indeed, the fact that the Commission can control not only the scope of enforcement 
powers and defence rights, but also the application of the 'rule of law', indicates the 
wide-ranging, penal nature of EC antitrust. 
b) US 
The scope of DOJ and FTC powers is even more extensive than those of DGIV. The 
DOJ of course possesses unequivocally criminal enforcement powers. However, the 
breadth afforded under the DOJ's and FTC's nominally civil powers means that there is 
little difference between the ambit of criminal and civil powers in the US. In particular, 
the intrusive, mandatory nature of fact-finding powers and prosecutors' ability and 
willingness to prosecute a wide range of conduct discloses the penality of US 
enforcement powers. Here too, the condemnation that violating behaviour attracts 
affirms US antitrust's patently criminal characterisation of such conduct. Whilst the 
litigation setting of US enforcement affords defendants substantive criminal and civil 
protections in their respective contexts, the overtly punitive interpretation and 
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application of antitrust rules reduces the actual scope of such safeguards, allowing all 
antitrust offences, whatever their nominal characterisation, to be prosecuted with 
maximum force. Such an approach leaves the criminal nature of US antitrust 
enforcement beyond doubt. 
2)Consequences of Competition Rules 
a)EC 
When viewed in terms of the sanctions the law may impose, the penality of EC 
antitrust is beyond argument. DGIV's ability to impose decisions exerting 
comprehensive and long-term control over firms and its authority to levy enormous 
financial penalties for substantive infringements, as well as procedural fines for non- 
cooperation with prosecution, disclose the Commission's intention to punish antitrust 
offenders severely. In particular, it is the far-reaching impact of these sanctioning 
powers which confers upon EC antitrust an unequivocally penal character. 
b) US 
The consequences of US antitrust are manifestly penal. The DOJ possesses clear 
criminal sanctioning powers which are exercised in an increasingly punitive manner. In 
addition, the consequences of DOJ and FTC civil enforcement allow the agencies to 
exercise detailed, long-term influence over antitrust offenders. As with the EC, the 
power this gives these agencies is unarguably punitive. Finally, both the DOJ and FTC 
may impose stiff sanctions for non-cooperation. Again, the use of these powers 
highlights the jurisdiction's intention to exact maximum retribution for these violations. 
Thus, both civil and criminal sanctions in the US are incontestably penal in 
consequence. 
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3)Conclusion - Part D 
This review reveals that for both jurisdictions antitrust is a criminal matter. In terms of 
both the nature and application and the consequences of competition rules, antitrust 
enforcement is unambiguously punitive. Elsewhere, in the UK, antitrust does have a 
different, administrative characterisation, but even here, proposed reforms would 
endow enforcement with a penal character. Thus, on the basis of this research it can be 
concluded that antitrust is essentially criminal in character. Having decided this, it is 
perhaps an apposite point at which to address Harding's concerns regarding the 
criminal nature of antitrust 30. Firstly, Harding has questioned whether a repressive, 
criminal framework is an appropriate method of regulating competition, given that 
economic regulation is generally regarded as morally neutral. But, as Harding himself 
points out, many 'economic' offences are no longer regarded as morally neutral and 
now come within the criminal law. However, Harding concludes that the ever- 
shifting nature of morality in relation to 'economic' offences militates against labelling 
such conduct as criminal 31. Two points must be made. Firstly, much conduct, 
particularly horizontal concertation, has been shown to have a far-reaching and 
detrimental impact on other traders and consumers and is widely condemned in most 
industrialised nations. Secondly, it is essential that the law possesses some flexibility. 
Providing such decisions are arrived at in a fair and orderly manner, there is no reason 
why behaviour not recognised as criminal may be brought within the criminal law 
where its detrimental effect makes a punitive response necessary. Indeed, to cast the 
law in stone invites the criticism that the law is an ass. 
Similarly, Harding argues that blunt criminal sanctions are an inappropriate, 
inflexible, and - therefore ineffective, means of controlling complex economic 
situations 32. However, this study has shown that the sanctions and other means of 
controlling anti-competitive conduct available to enforcers are extremely wide-ranging 
and flexible. This is particularly so in the EC and US where antitrust is clearly criminal 
in nature. Cease and desist orders and injunctions, in the EC and US respectively, 
have been demonstrated as being extremely adaptable and are therefore sufficiently 
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sensitive to deal with most situations. Combined with the other avenues of resolution 
available to enforcers, there is no apparent reason why the criminal nature of the law 
should hinder the sensitive and effective economic regulation of markets. Indeed, there 
is no evidence to suggest that an administrative approach would be any more effective. 
Even a cursory examination of the problems besetting UK enforcement with its 
nominally administrative context reveals that much 33. 
Finally, on the issue of the classification of antitrust, Harding asserts that an 
important question is whether the legal characterisation of antitrust violations should 
have any bearing on the degree of protection afforded to violators. He argues that 
maintaining the substantive fairness of proceedings by ensuring that defendants can 
defend themselves effectively should alone determine the scope of defence rights 
rather than a formal label of 'administrative' or. 'criminal'. He goes on, to assert that 
DGIV relies heavily on informal resolutions, and in such situations, defence rights are 
not as crucial. He considers that greater defence rights, aimed at ensuring a fair 
process, are only necessary in formally prosecuted cases where heavy sanctions are 
likely 34. It is beyond argument that the repressive, punitive character of antitrust must 
be balanced by a comprehensive range of defence rights to ensure fairness - both 
substantive and procedural. But, surely these rights should apply to both formal and 
informal situations. Permitting a situation where prosecutors can, by labelling a case 
'administrative', reduce the level of legal protection and which can be manipulated 
from case to case for prosecutors' benefit, is clearly unacceptable. Moreover, the 
coercive and unequal nature of the negotiation process in informal settlements means 
that substantive defence rights are no less crucial in this context. 
From this discussion, it can be concluded that the criminal nature of antitrust 
does not per se produce overwhelming problems or adverse outcomes. But, the way 
the law is applied does give rise to concerns 35. Whilst the criminal character of the law 
certainly highlights these difficulties, these problems cannot be attributed to the 
criminal nature of the law as difficulties are acknowledged to exist in the 
administrative context of UK antitrust. 
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E)CURRENT CONSEQUENCES 
The current consequences of the EC and US approaches to enforcement and the 
principal problems underlying these results will now be reviewed. Above all, the 
research has highlighted the importance of political and pragmatic aims to the 
competition policies of both jurisdictions under evaluation. Each system's enforcement 
of competition rules bears witness to a single theme ; an insistence that the end - 
political and pragmatic goals, justifies the means - the use of the 'law as a resource'. 
The domination of these objectives has immense implications, both *current and future 
for the well-being of both processes. For enforcers, many advantages accrue from this 
approach. For DGIV, it guarantees its exclusive control over the definition and 
subsequent treatment of anti-competitive conduct. At every stage of the process, this 
domination permits the unhindered use of the 'law as a resource' for political and 
pragmatic ends. Decision by decision, this incremental manipulation of the law 
ensures the inevitable conviction of all conduct imperilling political ' and pragmatic 
goals. At every point, these aims both dictate and justify the Commission's conduct. 
For the US, the benefits are identical. The US process too appears geared 
exclusively to controlling conduct jeopardising political and pragmatic goals. In both 
jurisdictions, that control is inescapable. In both systems, political and pragmatic 
justifications are offered in vindication. 
But, there is another side to this coin. Where the end justifies the means, 
nothing is sacrosant. Here, substantive soundness, individual justice, due process and 
the 'rule of law' are all open to attack. In pursuit of political and pragmatic ends, all 
are sacrificed to these 'higher' goals. Substantive soundness and individual justice are 
the first to be forfieted. In their place, political and pragmatic goals substitute the 
caprice of the Commission's monolithic discretion with its selective enforcement and 
erratic outcomes. These objectives also justify the means to these ends. Political and 
pragmatic aims validate formalism, case construction, the creation and preservation of 
widespread legal uncertainty, the dubious use of supporting evidence, questionable 
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economic evaluations and the repeated corner-cutting, all seen to be so typical of 
current antitrust enforcement. Where such tactics prevail, substantive soundness is 
impossible ; individual justice is imperilled. 
Next to be renounced is due process. In its place are found disparity and 
inequality. Throughout the process, political and pragmatic aims legitimise the 
curtailment and denial of defence safeguards and thus the placing of defendants at a 
permanent and irremediable disadvantage. From beginning to end, due process is 
employed not to protect defendants, but to promote political-and pragmatic goals. 
Due process simply becomes another weapon in the armoury of conviction. So, where 
political and pragmatic objectives dominate, due process is on their terms - or not at 
all. 
Not only is antitrust's manipulation of the law for political and pragmatic ends 
achieved at the expense of substantive justice and procedural integrity. In the EC, the 
'rule of law' also suffers. The realisation of political and pragmatic goals demands the 
subservience of even the most fundamental of legal principles. Such tenets are 
constructed to guarantee and validate the ascendency-of political and pragmatic aims. 
As a result, discrimination, inequality, legal uncertainty, disproportionate treatment 
and bureaucratic sloppiness are made legitimate. Consequently, where 'politics and 
pragmatism' rule, the'rule of law' does not. 
-Clearly, the enforcement advantages of this political and pragmatic approach 
are bought at a considerable price. That they are secured at the expense of substantive 
justice, due process, the 'rule of law', and indeed the integrity of the law itself, 
discloses the true consequences of this politically and pragmatically orientated policy. 
1)Politics, Pragmatism and Justice 
The fact that such system-wide problems can and do result necessarily brings into 
question the justice of the 'politics and pragmatism' approach. The following 
discussion will draw attention to the role played in this by the Commission's monolithic 
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discretion and the nature of political and pragmatic goals and will consider their 
individual impact on the overall justice of the 'politics and pragmatism' approach. 
Many problems are the direct result of the breadth of the Commission's 
monolithic discretion and its willingness to use its powers exclusively for political and 
pragmatic ends. The research has revealed that this politically and pragmatically 
orientated policy has spawned an institution with monumental authority. An agency 
which is able to control, on demand, Art. 85, Reg. 17, due process, the 'rule of law' and 
the Court itself. The research has shown that it is DGIV's monolithic role which 
places it in a position of dominance from the outset and provides it with virtually 
unfettered freedom regarding the conduct of all aspects of enforcement. It is the 
Commission's monolithic discretion which enables DGIV to manipulate the law at will 
to do its bidding, to obtain incriminating evidence by the most direct means, to alter 
the balance of proof and make weak cases strong, to sanction guilt on the basis of 
supposition and prejudice, to impose settlements and to attenuate and deny defendants' 
protections. In short; to construct conviction and render antitrust criminal. Of 
particular importance is the fact that DGIV's unassailable dominance is used to 
augment its own powers even further, specifically at the expense of defence 
safeguards, and give the Commission an enforcement advantage that others in the 
process are unable to surmount. This penal use of the 'law as a resource' to create 
disparity validates the study's hypothesis that the Commission's monolithic role 
substantially offends against defendants' due process rights and leaves the punitive 
nature of antitrust insufficiently balanced by due process protections. 
Unfortunately, the study has shown that no comfort can be derived from the 
fact that the Commission's monolithic advantage has been used to secure a just result 
and enhance the integrity of Community law. Rather, DGIV's supremacy has been 
employed exclusively for short-term political and pragmatic gain. The research has 
illustrated that this policy has resulted in ambiguity, disparity, arbitrary decisions and 
erratic outcomes. Overall. it has raised widespread concerns over the propriety and 
equity of the Commission's decision-making. DGIV's repeated disrespect for defence 
safeguards is of particular concern. Its monolithic role imposes a duty of 
500 
evenhandedness upon DGIV which has been regularly abused 36. Yet, this disregard for 
fudamental protections is perhaps unsurprising. It has long been accepted in 
Community law that fundamental defence rights are subordinate to effective 
enforcement. DGIV merely uses its monolithic discretion to take this belief to its 
logical conclusion. Community precedent necessarily validates DGIV's conduct. 
Nevertheless, the equity of such an approach is debateable, particularly given the 
punitive character and application of competition rules. That defence rights can be set 
aside with impunity surely cannot be equitable. Yet, despite weighty criticism from 
influential parties like the House of Lords Select Committee and the CFI, DGIV has 
shown little remorse and has insisted upon continuing its policy of disparity 
unabashed 37. Moreover, the study has illustrated that the Commission is prepared to 
use its monolithic discretion in any way to attain its political and pragmatic goals. Its 
doctoring of evidence in SIV discloses an explicit attempt to subvert justice in favour 
of political and pragmatic needs. One wonders how many more times this has 
occurred but has remained concealed under the breadth of DGIV's discretion. If 
DGIV is prepared to exercise its powers in this manner in open, formal proceedings, 
the propriety and equity of its decision-making in more covert conditions is necessarily 
arguable. Certainly. its behaviour has brought its integrity into doubt. - Yet, it must be 
remembered that all of the Commission's actions are entirely legitimate. The breadth of 
its monolithic discretion ensures that. Such an outcome discloses the scope within the 
Commission's monolithic authority for legitimate impropriety and DGIV's willingness 
to exploit that latitude for political and pragmatic ends. DGIV's behaviour may be 
legitimate - but it does not deliver justice. Indeed; such tactics beg the question how 
can DGIV expect compliance with, and respect for, competition rules when it 
demonstrates so little respect for the law itself. Inevitably, the Commission's 
manipulation of the law for political and pragmatic ends undermines the integrity of 
competition law itself, especially when employed so frequently and with such disparate 
results. Over the years, DGIV's application of its monolithic powers has undermined 
the fabric and credibility of competition rules, producing extensive disparity and 
discrimination and engendering the resentment and non-compliance of undertakings 
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throughout the Community. Such achievements surely provide indisputable proof that 
absolute power corrupts absolutely. It undoubtedly furnishes evidence of monolithic 
authority pursued to the dereliction of justice, to the point where DGIV's present 
conduct indicates that it would be foolish to permit the Commission to continue 
wielding so much power 38. Certainly, without the advantage of its monolithic 
authority, DGIV could not wreak so much havoc upon the integrity and credibility of 
Community competition rules. Admittedly, defendants too can indulge in an equally 
detrimental manipulation of the law for their own purposes. Space limitations have 
meant that it has been impossible to investigate this aspect of antitrust enforcement. 
Nevertheless, it too poses a significant threat to the equity and integrity of antitrust. 
But, it must also be acknowledged that such behaviour on the part of undertakings can 
never be justification for the Commission's own caprice and disregard for due process 
and the 'rule of law'. Nor can it excuse DGIV's own lack of principle. If the 
Commission wants adherence to the law, surely it should be prepared to lead the way. 
The research has argued and demonstrated that a further problem with the 
Commission's monolithic powers and its sole focus on political and pragmatic goals is 
that this combination distorts DGIV's exercise of discretion. The supremacy of the 
integration goal, as enunciated by Arts. 2 and 3(g), conflicts with Art. 85, 
compromising DGIV's independence by leaving it insufficiently distanced from the 
political forum whilst rendering it largely unaccountable. The 'rule of law' evaluation 
illustrated how the Commission's dominance of enforcement has enabled the 
subjugation of 'rule of law', and in so doing, has commanded the allegiance of the 
Court. Often, this has resulted in the virtual absence of effective challenge or review 
of DGIV's activities. Whilst the research has shown that the structure and scope of 
review powers limits the ambit of the Court's supervision, it must also be 
acknowledged that where they have so chosen in the past, the Court have found means 
of using their powers to pursue a more activist policy. Thus, the Court must shoulder 
some of the blame for allowing the Commission's monolithic enforcement to operate 
unhindered with such detrimental results. Not only has the Court's inconsistent and 
confused approach to precedent limited the scope of effective supervision, but their 
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attitude on review is disquieting. Their approach has been one of repeated affirmation 
of the Commission's monolithic discretion And the need for effective enforcement - 
whatever the price. Too often, the Court have recognised the principle under review 
but have held that DGIV's procedural irregularities do not vitiate the decision. By 
refusing to acknowledge procedural integrity as a value in itself, the Court have 
legitimised DGIV's manipulation of the law. The reasons for the Court's attitude are 
very familiar. The study has shown that for the Court too, political and pragmatic 
considerations determine and justify their attitude towards competition enforcement. 
As a result of the Court's protectionist policy, disparity, procedural impropriety and 
the widespread subversion of the law have been upheld - all in the interest of 'politics 
and pragmatism'. Quite simply, this reveals that for the Court too, political and 
pragmatic goals are more important than'justice 39. Yet, by permitting such behaviour 
to go unpunished, the Court undermine rather than uphold the integrity of the law, 
exacerbating the damage already inflicted by DGIV. The simple fact is that the 
Commission will not show proper deference to due process and the 'rule of law' until 
the Court demand it of DGIV. But, whilst the Court are controlled by political and 
pragmatic considerations, the outlook for legal integrity is grim. The only hope is the 
CFI. At present, it seems that the justice of EC competition enforcement rests solely 
on this institution's continued preparedness to minutely audit DGIV's evaluations and 
decisions. Without them, the Commission's monolithic position and construction of 
antitrust appears unassailable. 
A similar situation prevails in the US. Whilst US antitrust does not enjoy the 
same monolithic discretion as the EC, this system has taken every opportunity to 
enhance its discretion and its ability to manipulate the law and control enforcement, 
with a similar detrimental impact upon the justice and integrity of antitrust 
enforcement. However, whilst many of the criticisms made above apply equally here, 
the litigation setting of US enforcement means that the problems encountered here are 
much less severe than those in the EC. 
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Overall, this review suggests that, in the context of antitrust enforcement, 
discretion and justice are uneasy partners. Moreover, it appears that the greater the 
discretion, the more justice is jeopardised. 
As well as difficulties relating to the Commission's monolithic role, the research 
has also highlighted fundamental problems caused by the inadequacies of an appproach 
based on political and pragmatic goals, in particular, the fickle outcomes engendered 
by these aims. It has been seen that the very nature of the 'politics and pragmatism' 
approach encourages legal uncertainty, discriminatory treatment and erratic outcomes, 
leading to widespread substantive injustice in the enforcement of antitrust. Several 
aspects of this approach contribute to this overall outcome. 
Many problems result from the unpredictable demands of political and 
pragmatic objectives. For instance, the study has shown that DGIV's wide discretion 
provides it with the freedom to choose the constitution and characterisation of 
violations under Art. 85, thereby securing control over potentially troublesome conduct 
and ensuring the attainment of political and pragmatic goals. But, the basis of the 
Commission's decision-making is not a rational evaluation that such practices are 
economically harmful. but that they offend political and pragmatic aims, specifically 
the integration goal. The trouble with this approach is that it is open to covert 
political influences and is riddled with uncertainty as, over time and circumstances, 
what suits political and pragmatic needs alters. So, in changing political circumstances, 
the same agreement may be viewed as a serious criminal offence, a simple 
administrative matter or even as of no relevance to antitrust enforcement. That the 
very nature of these goals requires such different solutions at different times 
necessarily leads to confusion and inequality. In this respect, the overpowering needs 
of the EC's integration goal serve to magnify such consequences. 
The fickle demands of political and pragmatic ends can be detected in other 
aspects of enforcement. Most notably, it has had a dramatic of ect on DGIV's choice 
of enforcement method. It has been demonstrated that many similar restrictions, 
particularly those in vertical arrangements, are treated very differently. Some are 
formally prosecuted, some are bargained, others are individually exempted or even 
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negatively cleared. No objective rationale has been detected explaining these different 
outcomes. However, whilst impossible to conclusively prove, it has been asserted that 
all such decisions provide substantial political and pragmatic benefits. This approach 
has resulted in the unsatisfactory situation where no predictable correlation exists 
between the classification and treatment of offences. Political and pragmatic objectives 
have been shown to impact upon both of these aspects of enforcement, but not 
necessarily in the same way. Thus, at the dictate of these goals, a restriction may be 
classed as criminal, but for political and pragmatic reasons, it may not be enforced 
against as such. Such an outcome seriously exacerbates existing confusion and 
uncertainty. These findings validate the initial hypothesis of the research that the 
'politics and pragmatism' approach to antitrust enforcement is not dynamic -, but 
contradictory. The volatility of these goals means that they are applied routinely to 
similar agreements in different ways with often very controversial results. Clearly, the 
pursuit of such a policy must be a direct cause of the present legal uncertainty in EC 
antitrust. Again, the potency, of the EC's integration goal exacerbates such outcomes. 
Over time, such an unpredictable approach can only undermine the juridical basis of 
competition law. Admittedly, some evolution over time is necessary to maintain the 
flexibility of the law and meet the demands of justice. But, when changes occur 
because of political caprice or administrative convenience, this not only renders the 
law extremely unpredictable, but inevitably brings its equity, credibilty and integrity 
into question. 
A further problem is the nexus between political and pragmatic goals and the 
use of the 'law as a resource'. This study has shown that having such ends as the 
principal focus of antitrust has a far-reaching impact upon the application of 
competition rules. It is these political and pragmatic demands' which drive the 
manipulation and subversion of both Art. 85 and Reg. 17, as well as due process and 
the 'rule of law'. Most potently, the overpowering and imperative nature of the 
integration goal means that where political needs and justice conflict, justice is 
subordinated. Under this approach, law and economics are nothing more than tools 
used to mask covert political decisions and so endow them with legitimacy. Yet, this 
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research has also demonstrated that this use of the 'law as a resource' for political and 
pragmatic ends neither achieves economic integration, solves administrative problems 
nor encourages compliance. It merely results in widespread inequality, uncertainty and 
confusion. Given such results, the 'politics and pragmatism' approach evidently has 
serious implications for the justice and credibility of antitrust enforcement. That such 
ends are achieved at the price of substantive soundness and consistency is 
discrimination triumphing over fairness. That the law can be manipulated so readily 
and so frequently for political and pragmatic advantage, but to the detriment of others, 
places profit before equity. That political and pragmatic aims require the subversion of 
due process and the 'rule of law' advances expediency at the expense of integrity. 
Over time, such outcomes erode the credibility and integrity of antitrust. In so doing, 
they validate the research's assertion that 'politics and pragmatism' distort the 
application of competition rules with the outcome that the very aim of achieving Single 
Market integration will result in the disintegration of economic unity by undermining 
the juridical basis of EC antitrust and Community law in general. Finally, the 
Commission's insistence upon political and pragmatic goals as the central focus of 
enforcement and the manipulation of the law to those ends, discloses that, in truth, the 
EC does not rely on competitve forces to control markets ; rather the Commission 
controls them for the benefit of political and pragmatic goals. This is regulation, not 
competition, nor necessarily justice. 
The pragmatism goal has brought its own problems by encouraging the 
widespread use of informal settlements. The research has shown that this has done 
little to relieve bureaucratic difficulties. Certainly, DGIV's administrative problems are 
as great as ever. Instead, it merely adds to the problem by increasing legal uncertainty 
and encouraging both a disregard for defence rights and discriminatory enforcement. 
Again, such outcomes impact upon the long-term welfare of competition law. 
Warnings over the priorities that this approach embodies have gone unheeded. For 
almost 15 years, the House of Lords Select Committee have insisted that the goal of 
administrative convenience can never justify the denial of natural justice 40. Despite 
such admonitions, DGIV continues to promote, as the central plank of its competition 
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policy, an enforcement approach which jeopardises natural justice. Evidently, for 
DGIV pragmatism is a priority ; natural justice is not. 
Clearly, this exclusive focus on political and pragmatic needs has an immense 
impact on the equity of this approach. These goals control all aspects of enforcement ; 
characterisation, enforcement method, outcome and the strategies employed to achieve 
these ends. Yet, by their very nature, the effect of these aims on individual cases is 
necessarily unpredictable and inconsistent. Time and again, the study has shown that 
the chief legacy of this approach is widespread unfairness. This has weighty 
implications for the justice and credibility of EC antitrust. It is highly debateable 
whether such goals are an appropriate focus for the equitable control of competition 
issues. Such outcomes beg the question why should due process, the 'rule of law', and 
indeed the integrity of an entire legal system, be placed in jeopardy for such short-term 
gains. 
With regard to the other jurisdiction under consideration, the research has 
illustrated that the US broadly pursues the same ends by the same means. Here too, 
political and pragmatic goals are the exclusive focus of antitrust enforcement. To 
achieve these objectives, the US relies on the incremental use of the 'law as a 
resource'. Thus, the criticisms made above regarding the problems and inadequacies of 
this approach apply equally here. In consequence, similar implications for the integrity 
and credibility of US antitrust pertain. 
2)Conclusion - Current Consequences 
This examination of the current consequences of antitrust enforcement has shown that 
problems exist in both jurisdictions, though they are notably more severe in the EC. 
The review has highlighted the role played in these problems by the extensive 
discretion of enforcing agencies, particularly the Commission's monolithic authority, 
and the exclusive focus on political and pragmatic goals. It has shown that alone each 
of these factors is responsible for many negative consequences, but that together, they 
are a lethal combination, producing widespread uncertainty and inequity at every turn. 
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In the EC, the monolithic nature of DGIV's authority, and more potently, the strength 
and urgency of the integration goal, serve only to augment such undesirable 
consequences. Of course, any exercise of discretion permits some selection from a 
range of choices, and some political influence in antitrust is inevitable, but the research 
evidence indicates that, particularly for DGIV, this exercise of discretion is capricious 
with both law and economics being used as resources to achieve essentially political 
decisions and endow them with credibility and legitimacy. Particularly in the EC, the 
result is a system based on questionable objectives, operated by an unaccountable but 
politically biased agency, where the ends justify the means and the outcomes are 
unforeseeable and erratic. A similar, though more attenuated, situation pertains in the 
Us. 
Such uncontrolled discretion resulting in such unpredictable outcomes, 
inevitably undermines the justice, integrity and credibility of antitrust 41. Certainly, the 
capricious exercise of discretion neither promotes the justice, integrity nor credibility 
of competition law. The research findings raise fundamental concerns over the 
integrity of an enforcement approach where the end so regularly justifies the means. 
Such a rationale also places the credibility of antitrust in doubt. The use of law and 
economics as resources to legitimise the erratic outcomes of the 'politics and 
pragmatism' approach axiomatically discredits both law and economics, so diminishing 
the integrity and credibility of antitrust. Moreover, given the unreliable demands of 
these goals, it is arguable whether such objectives can ever deliver justice. In practical 
terms, these findings mean that a decision must be taken regarding whether the 
benefits of this approach outweigh and justify the disbenefits. This review of the 
current consequences of antitrust enforcement would seem to indicate overwhelmingly 
that the answer is no. 
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F)FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Further support for the conclusion that the'politics and pragmatism' rationale is unjust, 
and therefore an inappropriate focus for antitrust enforcement, is found in research 
elsewhere. Such studies indicate that the future implications for antitrust of such ends 
justifying such means are formidable. The following sections will review briefly the 
findings of the criminolgical analogy and research evidence from studies into other 
areas of regulation and assess their implications on the future of antitrust. 
1)Criminolgical Analogy 
This analogy revealed numerous similarities between the English criminal justice 
system and DGIV's antitrust enforcement. These resemblances will be summarised 
broadly below. 
For each jurisdiction, crime control dominates from the outset. Both systems 
share the same crime control objectives. For each, the sole focus is on the repression, 
by any means, of criminal conduct and the need for cost-efficient enforcement. Here, 
the analogy revealed that DGIV's exclusive emphasis on the eradication of politically 
threatening conduct and its insistence upon cost-effective enforcement, in other words 
its political and pragmatic aims, are crime control goals. 
In pursuit of these ends, both systems use familiar crime control techniques. 
Both rely heavily on the incremental use of the 'law as a resource' to achieve their 
objectives. Both pursue the creation and preservation of uncertainty. Both rely on 
formalism and case construction to make weak cases strong and ensure conviction. 
Each uses its powers to dominate enforcement, to curtail defence rights and to 
maintain the prosecution momentum and prevent effective challenge to its construction 
of conviction. Each extensively exploits due process, co-opting defendants to assist 
in their own conviction. Each makes punitive use of its powers to ensure the 
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attainment of its objectives. In both processes, every action bears witness to the crime 
control belief that the end justifies the means. 
Extensive research on the criminal justice system has revealed the inadequacies 
of the crime control approach. Above all, it indicates that these goals, pursued by 
these means, have critically impaired the justice, integrity and credibility of the criminal 
process. This has resulted in numerous miscarriages of justice, increasing non- 
compliance, the disrepute of the system and a growing sense of crisis and chaos within 
the criminal process 42. Thus, the criminolgical analogy indicates that the future 
implications of the Commission's present approach are forbidding. It suggests that, if 
continued, DGIV's use of the 'law as a resource' for political and pragmatic ends is 
destined to reap a grim inheritance. 
2)Administrative Analogy 
Research into other areas of regulation shows that the Commission is not alone in its 
emphasis on political and pragmatic goals 43. These studies have shown that other 
regulatory agencies pursue a highly discretionary approach towards enforcement. 
Moreover, like the Commission, their discretion is informed by a range of political, 
pragmatic and other extra-legal considerations. 
Research has revealed that these areas of regulation are politically sensitive and 
thus political goals play an important part in decision-making. Not only is the overall 
enforcement policy affected by the general political climate, but individual decisions 
are also influenced by the political position of the agency and the amount of political 
support it can muster ". 
Many pragmatic/extra-legal considerations have been found to impinge upon 
decision-making. The need for speedy, cost-efficient enforcement, and linked to this, 
the cost, benefit, time and trouble required to prepare a case, the fear of losing a 
prosecution with a detrimental effect upon an individual enforcer's credibility and 
promotion prospects, a desire for the agency's discretion alone to control enforcement, 
and a concomitant reluctance to employ enforcement methods which hand over 
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control to others, principally the courts, and situational factors like the individual 
relationship between the enforcer and the business concerned all impact upon a range 
of enforcement decisions 45. These political and pragmatic factors inform all aspect of 
decision-making. As with DGIV, political goals have a major impact on whether the 
conduct constitutes an offence, and if so, the gravity of the violation. This decision is 
also influenced by the individual enforcer's discretion and his relationship with, and 
opinion of, the firm concerned. Where the firm is co-operative, problematic conduct is 
viewed as accidental, where a firm has a bad reputation, the behaviour is perceived as 
a deliberate and serious violation 46. 
In turn, these decisions affect whether and how cases are prosecuted, and thus, 
case construction. As with DGIV, political goals tend to dictate the zealousness of the 
agency's prosecution policy. In addition, the pragmatic factors noted above are all 
extremely important at this stage. In particular, the desire to dominate enforcement, 
the need for cost-efficiency and situational factors have a significant impact upon case 
construction and the management of enforcement. Together these political and 
pragmatic factors militate against formal prosecution and encourage an enforcement 
approach which places great emphasis on discretion, negotiation and compromise 
and which does everything in its power to avoid confrontation and coercion ". 
Like the Commission, regulatory agengies use the 'law as a resource'. In 
particular in case construction, the law is interpreted and constructed to suit the 
agency's chosen enforcement approach. The overwhelming political and pragmatic 
emphasis on informal resolutions and the preference for obtaining co-operation and 
compliance means that cases are routinely constructed as best being resolved by 
informal means and therefore not requiring formal prosecution 48. Like DGIV, 
agencies also use the 'law as a resource' in negotiations. Here, it is employed as a 
bargaining tool. Threats of formal prosecution and heavy sanctions are widely used to 
obtain the pragmatic solution required 49. 
The overall impact of political and pragmatic objectives on the enforcement 
policies of regulatory agengies is to produce a highly pragmatic, flexible, discretionary 
approach which often rests on the perceptions and opinions of an individual enforcer. 
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This has resulted in many individualised and fragmented outcomes 50. These findings 
are supported by more general research into regulatory enforcement. In particular, 
McBarnet and Whelan emphasise the inherent malleability of the law and its use by 
regulators and regulatees as a resource in many enforcement situations 51. They also 
discuss the movement in regulation towards a broad, discretionary approach to 
enforcement and note that this approach has been criticised on a range of political and 
pragmatic grounds 52. Most importantly from the present research viewpoint, this 
pragmatic approach has been condemned on grounds of legitimacy because it creates 
widespread legal uncertainty, leading to discrimination and inequity. Such a broad, 
discretionary policy is viewed as impracticable and over-inclusive and likely to produce 
outrageous results. For these reasons this discretionary approach has resulted in 
political controversy and resistance at a number of levels within enforcement s3 
Overall, these problems have served to impair the credibility and integrity of this 
discretionary approach to enforcement. The difficulties it has caused have brought 
calls for a return to more formalised decision-making 54. 
From this brief review of regulatory enforcement, it is apparent that the 
Commission is not alone in its approach. In other regulatory areas, there is evidence 
of a highly discretionary use of the'law as a resource' driven by political and pragmatic 
considerations. But, there is also concern here for the impact of that extensive 
discretion and the influence of political and pragmatic aims on enforcement choices 
and outcomes. At the basis of this disquiet is evidence that, here too, the use of the 
'law as a resource' for political and pragmatic ends produces uncertainty, 
discrimination and inequity, ultimately undermining the integrity and credibility of the 
law. These studies of regulatory enforcement also support the contention that, if the 
Commission continues its present policy of using the 'law as a resource' for political 
and pragmatic objectives, the impact upon EC antitrust enforcement will be 
catastrophic. 
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3)Conclusion - Future Implications 
This review of criminological research on the criminal justice system and 
administrative studies into areas of regulation reveals many similarities with antitrust 
enforcement. All pursue a discretionary policy using the 'law as a resource' for 
political and pragmatic gain. Though this element of the research has focused on 
comparison with the Commission, the fact that the US employs similar enforcement 
strategies for political and pragmatic benefit, means that the implications of the above 
research findings apply equally to US antitrust 55. As such, the review has disquieting 
future implications regarding the impact of the 'politics and pragmatism' rationale on 
the welfare of antitrust as a whole. Both the criminological and administrative 
research evidence unequivocally support the contention that this approach is unjust. 
Combined with the evidence obtained from the assessment of the current 
consequences of antitrust enforcement, the findings overwhelmingly point to the 
conclusion that the use of the 'law as a resource' for political and pragmatic advantage, 
however nominally classified, however analysed, is erratic and unfair and will 
ultimately end in disaster by irremediably impairing the integrity and credibility of 
antitrust. 
G)JUSTICIABILITY AND THE FUTURE 
1)Justiciability 
The quantity and severity of problems revealed by this study lead one to question the 
very justiciability of the issues under consideration. This is particularly so given that 
the difficulties extend to the most fundamental level of 'rule of law' principles. The 
following sections will briefly address what is meant by justiciability and will then 
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consider possible aspects of antitrust enforcement which may threaten the justiciability 
of competition rules. 
The basis of justiciability is that certain issues are analytically unsuited for 
resolution by adjudicative process, ie by decision in accordance with pre-formulated 
rules, standards and principles. This may occur because some special expertise is 
required or because of the nature of the matter to be decided or the practicalities of 
enforcement. In such situations, the integrity of the decision-making process is eroded 
or destroyed because it is impossible here to jusify the decision by reference to rational 
standards 56. Examples of tasks compromising justiciability include polycentric issues. 
These are problems which involve a complex network of relationships with interacting 
points of influence. As such issues are affected by, and in turn affect, in often 
unpredictable ways, a range of matters beyond the immediate issues under they are 
regarded as non justiciable 57. The complex and far-reaching nature of competition 
issues would seem to bring such matters, at least to some extent, within the scope of 
polycentricity and therefore raise questions over their justiciability 58. Most 
importantly from the present research viewpoint, issues may be non justiciable because 
of their high economic and/or political content. It is argued that, as such issues 
involve the evaluation of many complex public interest factors, they are unsuitable for 
judicial resloution. As antitrust decision-making has a particularly high political and 
economic content, its° justiciability has been questioned on this basis 59. A further 
category of non justiciable tasks, also of relevance to the present discussion, are issues 
requiring 'a high degree of discretion to be exercised. The greater the discretion 
exercised, the less justiciable matters become G0. Clearly the high degree of discretion 
evident in antitrust enforcement would seem to threaten the justiciability of 
competition issues. As a final point, it is important to emphasise that justiciability is 
not a clear-cut issue, but is always a matter of degree. 
The ensuing discussion will examine further the justiciability of antitrust in the 
context of the present research and attempt to assess the degree to which the problems 
and issues raised by the study threaten the justiciability of antitrust. The two most 
problematic areas of present antitrust enforcement, likely to compromise its 
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justiciability are the extensive discretionary powers at work and the focus on political 
and pragmatic goals. Firstly, it has been noted already that the high degree of 
discretion in antitrust decision-making threatens its justiciability by rendering issues 
unreviewable. The most obvious starting point is to consider whether it is the 
legislative format of present competition rules which limits the efficacy and 
justiciability of antitrust either by granting an inappropriate degree of discretion or by 
providing the 'wrong mix' of rule type and enforcement strategy 61. Whilst the 
jurisdictions examined both employ broad competition legislation, the formalistic 
approach of UK antitrust has also been criticised extensively 62. This suggests that it is 
not any one rule type producing the problems. Moreover, it seems that, whatever the 
initial legislative format, most systems resort to a highly discretionary approach 63: 
Furthermore, as most systems possess a wide range of enforcement strategies, nor do 
they seem compromised in this respect. 
This opting for discretion is not necessarily at fault. Research into optimal 
forms of legal control suggests that complex, dynamic issues like antitrust are difficult 
to control successfully by strict, inflexible rules 64. Thus, some discretion in antitrust 
decision-making is clearly necessary. However, the same debate also reveals that the 
extensive exercise of discretion impacts upon both the justiciability and justice of 
decision-making. Discretion which is too broad or which is ineffectively controlled 
results in arbitrary, unpredictable, inconsistent and unaccountable outcomes 65. Such 
conclusions mirror the present study's findings on antitrust enforcement. Time and 
again, the exercise of antitrust discretion has been shown to produce uncertain, 
disparate and unreviewable outcomes. Thus, it can be concluded that discretionary 
decision-making in antitrust is not in itself harmful, but that the present amount of 
discretion, in the absence of telling control, seriously undermines both the justice and 
justiciability of antitrust and therefore its integrity. Research indicates that the greater 
the discretion exercised, the more these values are jeopardised '. The implications of 
this for the Commission's monolithic discretion are formidable. 
Next the justiciability of a system based on political and pragmatic objectives 
must be assessed. The high economic and political content of decision-making under 
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such objectives has been suggested as compromising justiciability. In this context, 
research into arbitrary decision-making is relevant 67. An arbitrary decision is generally 
regarded as one where there is no objective reasons for believing that the action is a 
rational means to a given end '. This definition of arbitrariness may be extended to 
include a link with discretion, in that the range of choices available under an exercise 
of discretion give rise to uncertainty and unpredictability as regards likely outcome. 
This itself constitutes an sense of arbitrariness 69. Moreover, the research argues that 
to act without regard for consistency is to act arbitrarily 70. 
This has considerable implications for the 'politics and pragmatism' approach. 
In the context of the present research, it suggests that political and pragmatic goals 
are improper criteria for legal control because they cause the unpredictable and 
inconsistent exercise of discretion. The present research has shown a direct link 
between political and pragmatic aims and the Commission's use of its monolithic 
authority to manipulate the law for such purposes. It has also been demonstrated that 
this use of the 'law as a resource' for political and pragmatic ends has produced the 
very arbitrary and inconsistent results forecast by the above research. Permitting such 
ends to determine the means and outcome of legal control camouflages the reality: 
The issues being decided are not legal ones. They are political and economic matters. 
The law here is merely the tool of legitimacy. Allowing political decisions to 
masquerade as legal ones, with such capricious results, neceassarily compromises both 
the justiciability and justice of the 'politics and pragmatism' policy. Worse than that. It 
significantly undermines the integrity of both the rationale and the law itself. In this 
respect, the potent demands of the EC's integration goal yet again aggravate such 
consequences. The implications of this for the EC, and antitrust in general, are 
perturbing. 
2)Recommendations for Reform 
These problems are not without their solutions. Research into legal control reveals that 
difficulties relating to excessive discretion can be overcome, at least in part, by striking 
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the right balance between rules and discretion ". In essence, greater structuring and 
accountability of discretion are required. Thus, strategies aimed at confining discretion 
within safe but effective bounds, structuring it by reference to clearly enunciated 
criteria, transparent decision-making and procedures and independent and incisive 
review are necessary to curtail the ill-effects of discretionary decision-making whilst 
retaining the benefits of this approach 'Z. 
In the context of EC antitrust, a number of reforms would be of assistance in 
solving present problems. Above all, an immmediate and major reworking of Reg. 17 
is long overdue 7. Broadly, reform of Reg. 17 should openly acknowledge the penal 
nature of antitrust and should incorporate explicit statements regarding the scope of 
both the Commission's powers and the defendant's rights. Defendants should be 
accorded broad protections sufficient to balance the acknowledged penality of antitrust 
sanctioning. It should also establish greater and more effective controls upon the 
Commission's exercise of discretion at every stage of the process. 
At investigation, such reforms would require clearer specification of the 
purpose and scope of investigations and the type of documents being sought.. More 
explicit guidance on the exercise of inspectors' powers should be provided. Greater 
scrutiny of the need for an Art. 14(3) decision is essential. Reform of Reg. 17 should 
provide a system of judicial warrants to counteract present problems'". Such reforms 
would enhance legal certainty, facilitate review and curtail the possibility of 'fishing 
trips'. Principally, reform of defence rights at investigation, must affirm defendants' 
rights to silence, to legal professional privilege and legal representation during 
investigation. In particular, Reg. 17 must address the grey divide between the right to 
silence and the duty to co-operate. The precise location of the line between the two 
must be stated. Furthermore, a decision must be make as to whether, in the event of a 
conflict, the defendant's right to silence or his duty to co-operate prevails 'S. With 
regard to legal professional privilege, the present exclusion of in-house lawyers is an 
unfair anomaly. Thus, the privilege should be extended to cover such personnel. 
Finally, the criminal nature of the law requires that DGIV inspectors should respect the 
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defendant's right to legal representation. Oral questioning should not commence until 
a legal representative is present's. 
Of paramount importance to the fairness of the entire process are reforms to 
the access procedure at prosecution stage. DGIV cannot be allowed to continue 
denying and curtailing defendants' access to evidence to suit its enforcement 
requirements. Defendants must be permited uninhibited access to exculpatory 
information. Thus, Reg. 17 should incorporate a substantive right to full disclosure. 
An independent party, either the HO or the Court, should rule on disputes 
regarding confidentiality and disclosure ". 
At trial stage, the most important reform needed is for greater clarity in the 
Commission's sanctioning assessment. DGIV should be required under Reg. 17 to 
explicitly state, in relation to each defendant, the role and weight of each aggravating 
and mitigating factor and how it arrived at the final penalty levied. Such a requirement 
can do nothing but enhance legal certainty and bring greater accountability to DGIV's 
decision-making by facilitating later review 78. 
The problems encountered in relation to the burden and standard of proof must 
also be addressed. Reg. 17 should incorporate statements outlining each. The penal 
nature of EC antitrust requires that a standard of reasonable doubt be set. A further 
area of proof requires reform. Given the frequency with which the establishment of an 
offence concerns the scope and evidential requirements of a concerted practice and the 
present, confusion surrounding both issues, it is imperative that the Court issue clear 
guidelines on these matters. It is unacceptable for DGIV to continue, as it did in PVC, 
to state that it was uncertain as to the exact duration of the offence and the number 
and identity of. participants and then proceed to levy severe penalties. If such 
sanctions are to be imposed, equity requires that it is done on the basis of sound proof. 
Thus, it is essential that the Court define explicitly the ambit of offending conduct and 
what constitutes adequate proof of it. The penal nature of the law requires that 
independent and exacting proof of the duration and impact of the violation and the 
identity and role of the perpetrators is adduced. This is particularly vital in the context 
of complex infringements where sanctions are most severe. Stricter evidential 
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requirements on such matters should assist in preventing the manipulation of the law 
and the dangers of the sum of evidence outweighing its whole. 
Reforms in relation to the HO and Advisory Committee also seem essential. 
DGIV's ability tto sideline the HO is particularly concerning. Thus, the HO's position 
in the process must be strenghened so that he can protect defendants effectively. His 
rulings, both in relation to access and to decisions made during oral hearings, should 
be accorded the status of formal appealable decisions. Moreover, in deference to 
defence rights, the : HO's Report should be published. Such reforms should enhance 
the HO's status and therefore his ability to protect due process 79. The Advisory 
Committee's position in the process has also provoked disquiet. Thus, a statement 
clarifying its role and the weight and the political content of its decisions seems to be a 
minimum requirement. Moreover, if its decisions are to have any value, it must be 
ensured that the Committee is fully informed of the case before it. Finally, respect for 
the principle of audi alteram partem requires full disclosure of the Committee's 
Report 80. 
Given the paramouncy of informal resolutions in antitrust enforcement, greater 
transparency and accountability should be introduced into such settlements. The legal 
status of all such resolutions should be upgraded to formal appealable decisions 
requiring publication. The introduction of a system of consent orders, similar to the 
US procedure should be considered 81. Furthermore, Reg. 17 should make clear that 
defendants submitting to informal settlement enjoy the same substantive protections as 
those subject to formal prosecution. Finally, to counteract the sluggishness and 
inefficiency of the bureaucratic process, time limits should placed on decision-making. 
Reg. 17 should require that, at the beginning of proceedings, a mandatory timetable is 
outlined for each stage of the process, making available sanctions for non- 
compliance 82. Such deadlines will serve to increase the legal security and certainty of 
competition proceedings. 
These reforms go a considerable way towards improving the fairness of 
antitrust proceedings. But, under them the Commission still retains considerable 
discretion. - Moreover, the criminological analogy indicates that the simple 
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incorporation of criminal law defence rights will do little on its own to ameliorate 
present problems 83. This suggests that other controls upon the Commission's 
discretion are required to prevent DGIV overwhelming defendants and to ensure 
proper respect for due process. Thus, a further option, which builds more immediate 
and effective accountability into the system, should be considered. Requiring the 
Commission, as prosecutor, to substantiate its case before the CFI seems an 
appropriate solution. Dissolving the Commission's monolithic authority would curtail 
DGIV's present use of the 'law as a resource' in defining and controlling the scope of 
Art. 85, in manipulating the quality and quantitiy of evidence required to prove an 
offence and in permitted discrepancies between the SO and the decision. Quite simply, 
this separation of powers would encourage competition issues to be dealt with as legal 
decisions based on legal principles. Allowing the CFI to audit DGIV's evidence in this 
way would enhance considerably the substantive soundness, legal certainty and 
transparency of competition proceedings and thereby assist in restoring antitrust's 
credibility and integrity 84. Indeed, the CFI have already shown themselves extremely 
capable in this respect. 
Admittedly, there are some problems in this approach. For instance, it may 
result in simply displacing discretion from one institution to another. There is the 
additional danger that the CFI may atrophy like the Restrictive Practices Court in the 
UK. The separation of prosecution and trial powers and the possibility of further 
review by the ECJ should assist in forestalling the former problem. The breadth of EC 
legislation should counteract the likelihood of formalism reducing the effectiveness of 
the Court's role. Certainly, the combination of broad legislation and the litigation of 
antitrust issues has not reduced the Court's position in the US. Moreover, whilst 
jurisdictions who enforce in a litigation setting have been shown to have their fair 
share of problems, the comparative analysis has also revealed that the difficulties 
encountered in the US, particularly in respect of defence rights, are notably fewer than 
under the monolithic discretion of the Commission. So, 'although it can be argued that 
this reform may not solve all the problems, the benefits it provides means that it is 
surely a major step in the right direction. 
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The problems created by the exclusive focus on political and pragmatic goals 
must also be addressed. The central problem is the ability of these objectives to 
manipulate the law for their exclusive benefit. This highlights the real difficulty with 
antitrust decision-making. Currently, antitrust decisions are an indeterminate mixture 
of law, economics, politics and a myriad of other extra-legal factors. This is a 
dangerous cocktail. Their undesirable impact on the integrity and credibility of 
antitrust is undeniable. Such consequences inevitably place the justice and 
justiciability of antitrust in grave doubt. But, they do not necessarily render the issues 
involved entirely non justiciable. In other areas of law, courts can and do, with 
increasing frequency, deal with matters requiring not only an assessment of legal 
issues, but also economic and political factors. So, whilst antitrust is complex, and 
assessment difficult, it is not theoretically impossible to subject such matters to legal 
control - if only to a limited degree. Nevertheless, the influence of political and 
pragmatic factors on decision-making must be addressed. Ultimately, a decision must 
be made regarding the role of these goals in antitrust. If it is decided that the focus 
must remain exclusively on these objectives, then antitrust matters should be removed 
from the legal arena and should be treated as transparently political decisions. The 
continued integrity of the law requires that political and pragmatic aims cannot be 
allowed to masquerade as the law. Alternatively, if antitrust is to continue to be 
subject to legal control, then the influence of these goals must be acknowledged and 
confined. In order to control their impact, there must be a clear statement as to the 
role and weight of political and pragmatic factors in decision-making. Moreover, the 
Court must be prepared to incisively review such issues. Above all, a return to 
substantive soundness is vital. Antitrust must no longer be treated as an area of 
applied economics and politics, but as legal cases based on legal principles. Such 
reforms would make explicit the precise influence of political and pragmatic 
considerations on antitrust decision-making thereby facilitating accountability. A 
return to substantive soundness would significantly enhance legal certainty. Together 
with the reforms already outlined to curtail the Commission's monolithic discretion, 
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these suggestions should control the use of the 'law as a resource' for political and 
pragmatic gain, ultimately enhancing the credibility and integrity of EC antitrust. 
11 T. S. Eliot Four Quartets. 
2 For further information on the influence of political and pragmatic goals on US antitrust, 
particularly its impact upon prosecutorial discretion, see Chs 2,10 supra. 
3 For further on the conclusions of the study regarding the Commission's investigation choices 
in horizontal cartels, see Ch3 supra. 
The study's findings on defence rights at investigation are discussed in Ch3 supra. 
s The findings of the research regarding enforcement choices and defence rights during the 
investigation of vertical cases are summarised at p 274 supra. 
6 The study's findings on US investigation methods are discussed in Ch10 supra. 
7 The study's findings regarding DGIV's prosecution decisions are summarised at p 104 supra. 
g This treatment of the substantive elements of Art. 85 is merely an extension of the 
Commission's initial approach to the definition of anti-competitive conduct discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
The conclusions of the study on the defendant's right to disclosure are summmarised at p 144 
supra. 
10 Thus, in access 'confidentiality' is construed broadly, whilst 'relevancy' is given a narrow 
interpretation. For further on this, see the discussion of access rights in horizontal cases in Ch4 
supra. 
11 The study's findings regarding the prosecution of vertical cases is summarised at p 295 
supra. 
12 For instance, that of 'export ban'. 
13 Particularly regarding the qualitative and quantitive criteria of selective distribution 
arrangements. 
14 For the conclusion of the study's findings on defence rights at prosecution in vertical 
agreements, see p 295 supra. 
is The findings of the research on US prosecution are summarised at p 422 supra. 
16 For a summary of the research's findings on DGIV's powers at trial and sanctioning, see p 
223 supra. 
17 Even where it does, this never amounts to more than a finding that part of the charge is not 
established. 
is See p 235 supra for the study's conclusions on the classification and scope of defence rights 
at trial. 
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19 At trial, this principally relates to the activities of the HO and the Advisory Committee. 
20 The findings of the research on in respect of sanctioning in vertical cases are summarised at 
p 352 supra. 
21 See p 360 supra for a summary of the study's findings on defence rights at trial in vertical 
cases. 
22 For a summary of the study's findings on US enforcement choices at trial, seep 424 supra. 
23 It will be remembered that case construction exploits the flexibility of substantive legal 
concepts, evidential requirements and the choice of analytical format. 
24 For the study's conclusions an DGIV's approach to plea-bargaining, negative clearance and 
individual exemptions in both horizontal and vertical cases, sec Ch5 and Ch8 supra. 
25 Except where otherwise stated, the following discussion refers to the Commission's approach 
to both horizontal and vertical cases. 
26 Defence rights in horizontal and vertical plea-bargains, negatively cleared and individually 
exempted cases are assessed in detail in Clis 5 and 8 supra. 
27 See here, the Commission's treatment of LDPE, PVC BPCL/1Cl and Synthetic Fibres and the 
discussion on the individual exemption of crisis cartels in Ch5 supra. 
28 US informal settlements are discussed in greater depth at p 433 supra. 
29 The research's findings on the 'rule of law' evaluation are assessed in Ch9 supra. 
30 The following discussion draws on Harding's comments in EC Investigations and Sanctions 
The Supranational Control of Business Delinquency Leicester Unv. Press (1993) Ch10. 
31 Harding EC Investigations and Sanctions at pp 128-130. McBarnet and Whelan in 'The 
Elusive Spirit of the Law : Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control' MLR [1991] 848, also 
recognise the criminal nature of some 'economic' offences. 
32 Harding EC Investigations and Sanctions at pp 137-138. Harding argues that the criminal 
law may not be an effective means of control as, so far, there is no evidence to show that the 
punitive level of fines has deterred potential offenders or has stigmatised those fined and resulted 
in censure from competitors or consumers. 
33 Particularly with respect to the frequency with which the DG is forced to resort to contempt 
proceedings. See Appendix D for further on the UK approach. See also, Whish Competition Law 
Butterworths (1993) Chs 3-5 ; Agnew Competition Law Allen and Unwin (1985) Ch7 ; O'Brien 
'Competition Policy in Britain : The Silent Revolution' Antitrust Bulletin [1982] 217 ; Pratt 
'Changes in UK Competition Law :A Wasted Opportunity' ECLR [1994] ; D. Jacobs 
'Competition Law' BLR [1982] 131 ; Frazer 'Defects and Effects - Competition Policy for the 
1990s' )vILR [1988] 493 ; Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices - Problems and Practice' BLR [1985] 
291 ; Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law : Practice and Procedure in the UK 
and EEC Graham and Trotman (1986) Chs 1-5 ; Swann, O'Brien, Maunders and Howe 
Competition in British Industry Umvin (1974) ; Merkin and Williams Antitrust Policy in the 
United Kingdom and the EEC Sweet and Maxwell (1984) ; Walker-Smith 'Collusion : Its 
Detection and Investigation' ECLR [1991] 71 ; Robertson 'Enforcement of the UK RTPA 
Legislation : Limitations and Legislative Proposals' ECLR [1992] 82 ; Lever 'UK Economic 
Regulation : Use and Abuse of the Law' ECLR [1992] 55, for further information on the UK 
approach and the problems encountered there. 
34 Harding EC Investigations and Sanctions at pp 136-140. 
35 These matters will be discussed shortly. 
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36 On this, see particularly comments by Coppel 'Curbing the Ruling Passion :A New Force for 
Judicial Review in the European Commmunities' ECLR [1992] 143. 
37 See here, criticism by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO, at 
para 98 ct seq. 
38 The JWP agrees with this, though the House of Lords Committee does not. See House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community 
Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 103-105. 
39 Many of the above criticisms are shared by Coppel in 'Curbing the Ruling Passion' ; 
Rasmussen On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice :A Comparative Study in 
Judicial Policymnaking Martinus Nijhoff (1986) and Cruz Vilaca 'The Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities :A Significant Step towards the Consolidation of the European 
Community as a Community Governed by the Rule of Law' YBEL [1990] 1. They are discussed 
more thoroughly in the'rule of law' analysis. 
40 See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Community Competition Riles HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 18-24, 
which itself pointed out that it had first expressed concern in House of Lords Select Committee on 
the European Communities 8th Report, Competition Practice HL Papers 1981/82 (91) HMSO, 
and that so far, their warnings had gone unheeded. 
41 In the EC, this outcome has further implications for the continued welfare of Community 
law. 
42 As acknowledged in Chl supra, this rather depressing account of the English criminal 
justice system forms only one view of the process. Nevertheless, it is the opinion of many leading 
academics. 
"; Principally, the following discussion draws on research into health and safety and 
enviromental regulations in the UK. For a more detailed discussion of the subject areas see : 
Hawkins Environlent and Enforcement : Regulation and the Social Defintion of Pollution 
Clarendon Press (1984) ; Hawkins "'Fatcats" and Prosecution in a Regulatory Agency :A Footnote 
on the Social Construction of Risk' Law and Policy [1989] 370 ; Huttor The Reasonable Arm of 
the Law ? The Law E forcenient Procedures of Enviromental Health Officers OU Press (1988) ; 
Huttor 'Variations in Regulatory Styles' Law and Policy [1989] 153 ; Richardson Policing 
Pollution :A Study of Regulation and Enforcement Clarendon Press (1982) ; Lloyd-Bostock 
'The Psychology of Routine Discretion : Accident Screening by British Factory Inspectors' Law 
and Policy [1992] 45 ; Hawkins and Huttor 'The Response of Business to Social Regulation in 
England and Wales : An Enforcement Perspective' Law and Policy [1993] 199. Research on the 
exercise of Supplementary Benefit regulations reveals a similar enforcement approach with 
similar problems and consequences. On this, see ADLER and ASQUITH (Eds) Discretion and 
Welfare London (1981) ; ADLER and BRADLEY (Eds) Justice, Discretion and Poverty - 
Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals In Britain Professional Books (1975). For a more 
general discussion of law and regulation, see McBarnet and Whelan 'The Elusive Spirit of the 
Law' ; R. Baldwin'Why Rules Don't Work' MLR [1990] 321 ; Cotterrell 'Feasible Regulation for 
Democracy and Social Justice' Jo Law and Society [198815. 
44 For further discussion of the political influences on decision-making, see eg Hawkins 
"'Fatcats" and Prosecution in a Regulatory Agency' at p 378 ; R. Baldwin 'Why Rules Don't Work' 
at pp 334-335 and R. Baldwin and McCrudden Regulation and Public Law Wiedenfeld and 
Nicolson (1987) at p 54. 
45 For further see Hawkins and Hutter 'The Response of Business to Social Regulation in 
England and Wales' at pp 200-209 ; Hawkins "'Fatcats" and Prosecution in a Regulatory Agency' 
at pp 374-377 ; Hawkins £m'iranent and Enforcement and Huttor The Reasonable Arai of the 
Law ? in general. 
46 See Hawkins and Huller The Response of Business to Social Regulation in England and 
Wales' at pp 204-209. 
47 See Hawkins Em'iroment and Enforcement ; Hutter The Reasonable Arm of the Law ?; 
Richardson Policing Pollution in general. who all deal with the impact of these factors on 
decision-making in much greater detail. R. Baldwin in 'Why Rules Don't Work', discusses the 
relationship between rule type and political and pragmatic factors and their impact upon the 
efficacy of enforcement. 
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48 Of course, where political and pragmatic needs demand it, cases can be constructed as 
serious violations requiring formal prosecution. This normally occurs in situations where there is 
a clear 'per se' type breach of the law. On this, see Hawkins "'Fatcats" and Prosecution in a 
Regulatory Agency' at pp 376-385. 
49 Hawkins and Hutter'The Response of Business to Social Regulation in England and Wales' 
at p 207, note the importance of bargaining and bluff as enforcement tools. See also on this use of 
the 'law as a resource', Hawkins Envirou, ent and Enforcement at p 93 et seq ; Hutter The 
Reasonable Ann of the Law ?; Richardson Policing Pollution. 
50 Sec Hawkins and Hutter 'The Response of Business to Social Regulation in England and 
Wales' ; Huttor The Reasonable Aren of the Laiv ?; Hawkins Enviroiuent and Enforcement in 
general. 
SI Sec McBarnet and Whelan 'The Elusive Spirit of the Law' in general. 
52 McBarnct and Whelan 'The Elusive Spirit of the Law' : at p 851, term this discretionary 
appproach "anti-formalism". 
53 Chiefly, there has been tension between regulators, regulatees, legislators and other involved 
professionals. McBarnet and Whelan 'The Elusive Spirit of the Law' at p 856 et seq, discuss 
these problems and criticisms in greater depth. 
54 See McBarnet and Whelan 'The Elusive Spirit of the Law' at p 860 ct seq. In addition, other 
critics have discussed broader concerns regarding the inadequacies of an approach based on 
excessive discretion. On this, see K. C. Davis Discretionary Justice Louisiana (1969) ; R. Baldwin 
and Hawkins 'Discretionary Justice : Davis Reconsidered' PL [1984] 570 ; Jowell 'The Legal 
Control of Administrative Discretion' PL [1973] 178 ; Jowell 'The Rule of Law Today' in 
JOWELL and OLIVER (Eds) The Changing Constitution Clarendon Press (1989) ; Diver 
'Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law' Harvard LR [1981] 393 ; Galligan 
Discretionary Powers :A Legal Study of Official Discretion Clarendon Press (1986). These 
issues will be returned to when the justiciability of antitrust is addressed later in the chapter. 
55 In particular, the striking similarity of approach between UK restrictive trade practices 
enforcement and the enforcement of other regulations within the UK should be noted. For further 
on the application of UK antitrust, see Appendix D. 
56 The issue of justiciability is dealt with in much greater depth by Galligan Discretionary 
Powers at pp 240-251 ; R. Baldwin and Hawkins 'Discretionary Justice' at p 591 et seq ; 
Horowitz The Courts and Social Policy Washington (1977) ; Jowell 'The Legal Control of 
Administrative Discretion' at pp 200 et seq. Jowell, in his discussion, distinguishes between 
strategic issues of whether legal techniques will prove effective means of achieving certain ends 
and functional issues of whether it is possible to submit any given task to legal control. For a 
consideration of justiciability in the context of antitrust, see Stevens and Yamey The Restrictive 
Practices Court :A Study of the Judicial Process and Economic Policy Wiedenfeld and Nicolson 
(1965) Ch3 and Korah 'EEC Competition Policy - Legal Form or Economic Efficiency CLP 
[1986b] 85. See also Chi supra, for a preliminary discussion of justiciability and antitrust. For a 
judicial examination of justiciability , see AG v 
Gouriet [1978] AC 435 at pp 491,512,524 ; CCSU 
v Minister for Civil Sen'ice [1984] 3 WLR 1174 at p 1183 et seq. 
57 For further consideration of this, see Jowell 'The Legal Control of Administrative 
Discretion' at pp 213-215 ; R. Baldwvin and Hawkins 'Discretionary Justice' at pp 591-592 
Galligan Discretionary Powers at p 249. 
58 See also, the discussion in Appendix C regarding the amorphous and contoversial nature of 
the concept of competition. It must be admitted here as Fuller pointed out in 'The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication' Harº'ard LR [1978] 353, that most problems are to some degree 
polycentric as their solution is likely in some way to affect the basis of future decisions. 
59 See Stevens and Yamey The Restrictive Practices Court at pp 42-50, who doubt the 
justiciability of such public interest decisions, arguing that adjudicative processes are ill-equipped 
to deal with such matters. Korah in 'EEC Competition Policy' [198Gb] at pp 91,103, also 
questions judges' ability to decide and review economic issuesin complex markets. See also, 
Koran Competition Lau' in Britain and the Common Market Martinus Nijhoff (1982a) at paras 
1.4,5.2,7.2 and Rutherford 'Restraint of Trade - The Public interest' AILR [1972] 651, who also 
comment on the justiciability of antitrist issues. 
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60 On this point, see Galligan Discretionary Powers at pp 244-246 ; R. Baldwin and Hawkins 
'Discretionary Justice' at pp 592-595. 
61 On this latter issue, sec R. Baldwin'Wh y Rules Don't Work', who explores the nexus between 
rule type and enforcement strategy employed. He concludes that rule type does affect the efficacy 
of enforcement, and that the role of rules in enforcement and the choice of rule type are affected 
by a number of factors including the type of regulatee, the type of hazard and the preferred 
enforcement strategy. 
62 See comments particularly by : Whish Competition Lmv Chs 3-5 ; Agnew Competition Law 
Ch7 ; O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law' ; D. Jacobs 
'Competition Law' ; Frazer 'Defects and Effects - Competition Policy for the 1990s' ; Pitt 
'Restrictive Trade Practices' ; Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law Chs 1-5 
Swann, O'Brien, Maunders and Howe Competition in British Industry ; Robertson 'Enforcement 
of the UK RTPA Legislation' ; Lever 'UK Economic Regulation', for further discussion of the 
UK approach and the problems encountered there. 
63 This inclination to do so within the formalistic context of UK competition law has been 
explored in particular by O'Brien in 'The Silent Revolution'. See also, the discussion of UK 
enforcement in Appendix D. 
64 The extensive literature on this subject broadly divides into a 'rules versus discretion' debate 
which critically examines the advantages and disadvantages of each appproach. For further, see cg 
Galligan Discretionary Polvers ; McCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Oxford Unv. 
Press (1978) ; Jowell 'The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion' ; R. Baldwin and Hawkins 
'Discretionary Justice' ; Diver'Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law'. 
63 See eg, Galligan Discretionary Polvers at pp 142-152 ; McCormick Legal Reasoning and 
Legal Theory at pp 268-269. 
66 See Galligan Discretionary Polvers at pp 244-246 ; R. Baldwin and Hawkins 'Discretionary 
Justice' at pp 592-595. 
67 See Galligan Discretionary Polvers at pp 142-152 ; Jowell 'The Legal Control of 
Administrative Discretion' at pp 186-192 and R. Baldwin and Hawkins 'Discretionary Justice' 
McCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory in general. 
68 See particularly, Jowcll 'The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion' at p 186 and 
Galligan Discretionamy Powers at pp 143-145. The research also acknowledges that purposes, as 
well as means, can be criticised as arbitrary. 
69 See particularly, Gilligan Discretionary Powers at pp 146-147. 
70 McCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theomy at pp 268-269. 
71 What Diver in 'Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law' at p 428 terms "optimal 
discretion". His approach is criticised by R. Baldwin and Hawkins 'Discretionary Justice' at p 593 
et seq. 
72 See in general, K. C. Davis Discretionary Justice ; Gifford 'Discretionary Decision-Making 
in the Regulatory Agencies :A Conceptual Framework' Southern California LR [19831 101 
Galligan Discretionary Powers. Davis's antipathy towards discretion is critically reviewed by 
R. Baldwin and Hawkins in 'Discretionary Justice', although they too recognise the need for 
structuring and control of discretion. 
73 This has the unequivocal support of the House of Lords Select Committee. See House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community 
Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 102,108,114,142. 
74 Such warrants would be at the discretion of the CFI. Reforms along these lines have been 
suggested on several occasions in the last 15 years by the House of Lords Select Comittee. See 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 8th Report, Competition 
Practice HL Papers 1981/82 (91) HMSO at paras 21-25 ; House of Lords Select Committee on 
the European Communities 181h Report, Commission Powers of Investigation and Inspection HL 
Papers 1983/84 (220) HMSO at paras 55-67 ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
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Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7- 
1) HMSO at paras 113-115. The Select Committee envisages that the requirement of judicial 
warrants would make explicit a right of appeal at that stage. 
75 Continued disputes on this issue could be dealt with by the Hearing Officer with appeal to 
the CFI. 
76 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 113- 
115, agrees with reforms regarding legal representation and legal professional privilege. 
77 This reform has widespread support. Again, the House of Lords Select Committee has long 
advocated the need for an 'independent person' to deal with such matters. See House of Lords 
Select Committee on the European Communities 8th Report, Competition Practice HL Papers 
1981/82 (91) HMSO at paras 27-29 ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 
(7,7-1) HMSO at paras 109-110. Joshua 'Balancing the Public Interest : Confidentiality, Trade 
Secrets and Disclosure of Evidence in EC Competition Procedure' ECLR [19941 68 at p 79 and 
Doherty 'Playing Poker with the Commission : Rights of Access to the Commission's File in 
Competition Cases' ECLR 1199418 at p 12, envisage a similar solution. 
78 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 124- 
125, whilst insisting that a sentencing tariff would be detrimental, advocated greater transparency 
in the sanctioning assessment. 
79 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 111- 
112, advocated that more HO posts be established, an increase in the HO's powers and formal 
review of the HO's decisions. 
80 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 121- 
123, doubted the Advisory Committee's ability to enhance the fairness or transparency of 
proceedings and advocated that the Committee should be involved in decision-making in 
important competition cases. Here, disclosure of the Committee's Report, at least to the parties 
involved, was envisaged. 
81 Van Bael 'Transparency of EC Commission Procedings' in SLOT and MCDONNELL (Eds) 
Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Lmv Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 192 at 
p 198, advocates a similar solution. The House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7- 
1) HMSO at paras 116-118, calls for greater clarity and more frequent publication of comfort 
letters. 
82 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, 
Enforcement of Community Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 107- 
108, has strongly urged for the introduction of mandatory deadlines. It envisages that fines or 
discontinuance of proceedings will be employed as sanctions. The House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities 181h Report, Commission Powers of Investigation and 
Inspection HL Papers 1983/84 (220) HMSO at para 67, in response to delays following 
inspections, advocated that firms should be notified of the results of that investigation within one 
year of the inspection. Goyder 'User Friendly Competition Law' in SLOT and MCDONNELL 
(Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 
1 at p 3, has also urged the use of time limits on decision-making. 
83 Cf Green 'Evidence and Proof in EC Competition Cases' in SLOT and MCDONNELL 
(Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 
127, who advocates the adoption of such defence rights as a means of solving present concerns. 
84 Under this approach, interlocutory issues such as disclosure, could be dealt with by the 
President of the CFI or by the HO, who at trial, would file his Report to the Court. The House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities Ist Report, Enforcement of Community 
Competition Rules HL Papers 1993/94 (7,7-1) HMSO at paras 104-105, has called for greater 
control on DGIV's discretion and reform of Reg. 17. But, it does not think that the separation of 
powers is essential. However, at paras 102-103, it approves of an extension to the CFI's 
supervisory role. Cruz Vilaca in 'The Court of First Instance' at pp 55-56, suggests various 
527 
improvements aimed at ensuring greater and more effective control by the courts, including the 
creation of specialised Community courts dealing with highly technical issues. Coppel 'Curbing 
the Ruling Passion' at p 147, advocates greater accountability by the introduction of a new EC 
watchdog body akin to the House of Lords Select Committee to oversee the day to day activities of 
the Commission. Both Goyder 'User Friendly Competition Law' at p1 and Wood 'User Friendly 
Competition Law in the United States' in SLOT and MCDONNELL (Eds) Procedure and 
Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p6 at pp 6-7, urge the 
need in antitrust to return to dealing with antitrust issues as legal decisions based on legal 
principles. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
FINAL CONCLUSION 
"Integrity without knowledge is weak and useless 
and knowledge without integrity is dangerous and dreadful. " ' 
The study has shown that the nature of antitrust enforcement is as much political and 
pragmatic as it is criminal. But, the research has raised some fundamental concerns 
regarding the justice and justiciability of the present political and pragmatic focus of 
antitrust. Both the examination of the current consequences and the future implications 
of this present course have made explicit the dangers of an approach where such 
political and pragmatic ends are permitted to justify the means. Here, the study has 
demonstrated that alone the exclusive focus on political and pragmatic goals and the 
Commission's use of its monolithic discretion pose fundamental problems. Together 
their impact on the justice of antitrust enforcement is immense ; the implications 
alarming. Under their guidance, due process, substantive soundness and even the 'rule 
of law' have been sacrificed to achieve the 'higher' goal of market integration. As a 
result, discrimination, uncertainty and inequity are the hallmarks of EC antitrust 
enforcement. Quite simply, political and pragmatic ends have been achieved at the 
expense of justice. The study has also illustrated that these same factors also impact 
upon justiciability, placing it too in considerable jeopardy. Overall, the research 
suggests that if this present approach to EC competition law is pursued to its ultimate 
conclusion, ironically the very aim of achieving integration may result in the 
disintegration of the Single Market, by irrevocably impairing the credibility and 
integrity of EC competiton law in particular and Community law in general. 
For the sake of both the justice and justiciability of EC antitrust, changes must 
be made. In so doing, the inherently political and pragmatic nature of antitrust must be 
recognised fully. Such is their present influence that the only equitable course may be 
to remove antitrust from the legal arena entirely. Alternatively, in order to salvage the 
integrity and credibility of the system, reforms to the Commission's monolithic 
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discretion and the influence of political and pragmatic considerations on enforcement, 
along the lines suggested, are imperative. Most importantly, an immediate and 
fundamental overhaul of Reg. 17 is vital. Much also rests on the Court's approach to 
review. The CFI's continued willingness to audit Commission decision-making 
incisively is crucial. 
Ironically, whether reform occurs depends on political and pragmatic 
considerations. Several political and pragmatic factors militate against change. 
Unsurprisingly, the Commission has demonstrated a marked reluctance towards 
reform of Reg. 17. Of course, it has much to gain, both politically and pragmatically, 
from continuing its present approach. The time, expense and the required involvement 
of the Council in major reform have also been quoted as obstacles. This is disquieting. 
If the pursuit of fairness is too much trouble, the wisdom of continuing to support an 
institution which insists and thrives upon a policy of disparity and injustice must be in 
grave doubt. If EC antitrust is to be a just and credible system, there is no option but 
to reform. In the end, the choice is a simple one. Do we want a antitrust system 
which delivers 'politics and pragmatism' or justice ?. 
FINIS 
I Samuel Johnson Rasselas. 
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APPENDIX A 
LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
EC 
A)LEGISLATION 
1)Article 85 Treaty of Rome 1957 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decision prohibited pursuant or this Article shall be 
automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the 
case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production of distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
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2)Regulation 17/62 
Article I- Basic provision 
Without prejudice to Articles 6,7 and 23 of this Regulation, agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices of the kind described in Article 85(1) of the Treaty and the abuse 
of a dominant position in the market, within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, 
shall be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required. 
Article 2- Negative clearance 
Upon application by the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned, the 
Commission may certify that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no 
grounds under Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty for action on its part in respect 
of an agreement, decision or practice. 
Article 3- Termination of infringements 
1. Where the Commission, upon application or upon its own initiative, finds that 
there is infringement of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it may by decision 
require the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to bring such 
infringement to an end. 
2. Those entitled to make application are: 
(a) Member States; 
(b) natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest. 
3. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Regulation, the Commission 
may, before taking a decision under paragraph 1, address to the undertakings or 
associations of undertakings concerned recommendations for termination of the 
infringement. 
Article 4- Notification of new agreements, decisions and practices 
1. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the kind described in Article 
85(1) of the Treaty which come into existence after the entry into force of this 
Regulation and in respect of which the parties seek application of Article 85(3) must 
be notified to the Commission. Until they have been notified, no decision in application 
of Article 85(3) may be taken. 
2. Paragraph I shall not apply to agreements, decisions or concerted practices 
where: 
(1) the only parties thereto are undertakings from one Member State and 
the agreements, decisions or practices do not relate either to imports or 
to exports between Member States; 
(2) not more than two undertakings are party thereto, and the agreements 
only: 
(a) restrict the freedom of one party to the contract in 
determining the prices or conditions of business upon which the 
goods which he has obtained from the other party to the 
contract may be resold; or 
(b) impose restrictions on the exercise of the rights of the 
assignee or user of industrial property rights - in particular 
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patents, utility models, designs or trade marks - or of the person 
entitled under a contract to the assignment, or grant, of the 
right to use a method of manufacture or knowledge relating to 
the use and to the application of industrial processes; 
(3) they have as their sole object: 
(a) the development or uniform application of standards or 
types; or 
(b) joint research and development; 
(c) specialisation in the manufacture of products, including 
agreements necessary for the achievement thereof, 
-where the products which are the object of specialisation do 
not, in a substantial part of the common market, represent more 
than 15 per cent of the volume of business done in identical 
products or those considered by the consumers to be similar by 
reason of their characteristics, price and use, and 
-where the total annual turnover of the participating 
undertakings does not exceed 200 million units of account. 
These agreements decisions and concerted practices may be notified to the 
Commission. 
Article 5- Notification of existing agreements, decisions and practices 
1. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the kind described in Article 
85(1) of the Treaty which are in existence at the date of entry into force of this 
Regulation and in respect of which the parties seek application of Article 85(3) shall be 
notified to the Commission before 1 November 1962. However, notwithstanding the 
foregoing provisions, any agreements, decisions and concerted practices to which not 
more than two undertakings are party shall be notified before I February 1963. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements, decisions or concerted practices 
falling within Article 4(2); these may be notified to the Commission. 
Article 6- Decisions pursuant to Article 85(3) 
1. Whenever the Commission takes a decision pursuant to Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty, it shall specify therein the date from which the decision shall take effect. Such 
date shall not be earlier than the date of notification. 
2. The second sentence of paragraph 1 shall not apply to. agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices falling within Article 4(2) and Article 5(2), nor to those falling 
within Article 5(1) which have been notified within the time limit specified in Article 
5(1). 
Article 7- Special provisions for existing agreements, decisions and practices 
1. Where agreements, decisions and concerted practices in existence at the date 
of entry into force of this Regulation and notified within the limits specified in Article 
5(1) do not satisfy the requirements of Article 85(3) of the Treaty and the 
undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned cease to give effect to them or 
modify them in such manner that they no longer fall within the prohibition contained in 
Article 85(1) or that they satisfy the requirements of Article 85(3), the prohibition 
contained in Article 85(1) shall apply only for a period fixed by the Commission. A 
decision by the Commission pursuant to the foregoing sentence shall not apply as 
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against undertakings and associations of undertakings which did not expressly consent 
to the notification. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply to agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
falling within Article 4(2) which are in existence at the date of entry into force of this 
Regulation if they are notified before 1 January 1967. 
Article 8- Duration and revocation of decisions under Article 85(3) 
1. A decision in application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty shall be issued for a 
specified period and conditions and obligations may be attached thereto. 
2. A decision may on application be renewed if the requirements of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty continue to be satisfied. 
3. The Commission may revoke or amend its decision or prohibit specified acts by 
the parties: 
(a) where there has been a change in any of the facts which were basic to 
the making of the decision; 
(b) where the parties commit a breach of any obligation Attached to the 
decision; 
(c) where the decision is based on incorrect information or was induced by 
deceit; 
(d) where the parties abuse the exemption from the provisions of Article 
85(1) of the Treaty granted to them by the decision. 
In cases to which subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) apply, the decision may be revoked 
with retroactive effect. 
Article 9- Powers 
1. Subject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall 
have sole power to declare Article 85(1) inapplicable pursuant to Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty. 
2. The Commission shall have power to apply Article 85(1) and Article 86 of the 
Treaty; this power may be exercised notwithstanding that the time limits specified in 
Article 5(1) and in Article 7(2) relating to notification have not expired. 
3. As long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure under Articles 2,3 
or 6, the authorities of the Member States shall remain competent to apply Article 
85(1) and Article 86 in accordance with Article 88 of the Treaty; they shall remain 
competent in this respect notwithstanding that the time limits specified in Article 5(1) 
and in Article 7(2) relating to notification have not expired. 
Article 10 - Liaison with the authorities of the Member States 
1. The Commission shall forthwith transmit to the competent authorities of the 
Member States a copy of the applications and notifications together with copies of the 
most important documents lodged with the Commission for the purpose of establishing 
the existence of infringements of Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty or of obtaining 
negative clearance or a decision in application of Article 85(3). 
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2. The Commission shall carry out the procedure set out in paragraph 1 in close 
and constant liaison with the competent authorities of the Member States; such 
authorities shall have the right to express their views upon that procedure. 
3. An Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies shall be 
consulted prior to the taking of any decision following upon a procedure under 
paragraph 1, and of any decision concerning the renewal, amendment or revocation of 
a decision pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty. 
4. The Advisory Committee shall be composed of officials competent in the 
matter of restrictive practices and monopolies. Each Member State shall appoint an 
official to represent it who, if prevented from attending, may be replaced by another 
official. 
5. The consultation shall take place at a joint meeting convened by the 
Commission; such meeting shall be held not earlier than fourteen days after dispatch of 
the notice convening it. The notice shall, in respect of each case to be examined, be 
accompanied by a summary of the case together with an indication of the most 
important documents, and a preliminary draft decision. 
6. The Advisory Committee may deliver an opinion notwithstanding that some of 
its members or their alternates are not present. A report of the outcome of the 
consultative proceedings shall be annexed to the draft decision. It shall not be made 
public. 
Article 11 - Requests for information 
1. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions 
adopted under Article 87 of the Treaty, the Commission may obtain all necessary 
information from the Governments and competent authorities of the Member States 
and from undertakings and associations of undertakings. 
2. When sending a request for information to an undertaking or association of 
undertakings, the Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of the request to 
the competent authority of the Member State in whose territory the seat of the 
undertaking or association of undertakings is situated. 
3. In its request the Commission shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the 
request and also the penalties provided for in Article 15(1)(b) for supplying incorrect 
information. 
4. The owners of the undertakings or their representatives and, in the case of 
legal persons, companies or firms, or of associations having no legal personality, the 
persons authorised to represent them by law or by their constitution shall supply the 
information requested. 
5. Where an undertaking or association of undertakings does not supply the 
information requested within the time limit fixed by the Commission, or supplies 
incomplete information, the Commission shall by decision require the information to be 
supplied. The decision shall specify what information is required, fix an appropriate 
time limit within which it is to be supplied and indicate the penalties provided for in 
Article 15(1)(b) and Article 16(1)(c) and the right to have the decision reviewed by the 
Court of Justice. 
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6. The Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of its decision to the 
competent authority of the Member State in whose territory the seat of the 
undertaking or association of undertakings is situated. 
Article 12 - Inquiry into sectors of the economy 
1. If in any sector of the economy the trend of trade between Member States, 
price movements, inflexibility of prices or other circumstances suggest that in the 
economic sector concerned competition is being restricted or distorted within the 
common market, the Commission may decide to conduct a general inquiry into that 
economic sector and in the course thereof may request undertakings in the sector 
concerned to supply the information necessary for giving effect to the principles 
formulated in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty and for carrying out the duties entrusted 
to the Commission. 
2. The Commission may in particular request every undertaking or association of 
undertakings in the economic sector concerned to communicate to it all agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices which are exempt from notification by virtue of 
Article 4(2) and Article 5(2). 
3. When making inquiries pursuant to paragraph 2, the Commission shall also 
request undertakings or groups of undertakings whose size suggests that they occupy 
a dominant position within the common market or a substantial part thereof to supply 
to the Comission such particulars of the structure of the undertakings and of their 
behaviour as are requisite to an appraisal of their position in the light of Article 86 of 
the Treaty. 
4. Article 10(3) to (6) and Articles 11,13 and 14 shall apply correspondingly. 
Article 13 - Investigations by the authorities of the Member States 
1. At the request of the Commission, the competent authorities of the Member 
States shall undertake the investigations which the Commission considers to be 
necessary under Article 14(1), or which it has ordered by decision pursuant to Article 
14(3). The officials of the competent authorities of the Member States responsible for 
conducting these investigations shall exercise their powers upon production of an 
authorisation in writing issued by the competent authority of the Member State in 
whose territory the investigation is to be made. Such authorisation shall specify the 
subject matter and purpose of the investigation. 
2. If so requested by the Commission or by the competent authority of the 
Member State in whose territory the investigation is to be made, the officials of the 
Commission may assist the officials of such authorities in carrying out their duties. 
Article 14 - Investigating powers of the Commission 
1. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions 
adopted under Article 87 of the Treaty, the Commission may undertake all necessary 
investigations into undertakings and associations of undertakings. To this end the 
officials authorised by the Commission are empowered: 
(a) to examine the books and other business records; 
(b) to take copies of or extracts from the books and business records; 
(c) to ask for oral explanations on the spot; 
(d) to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings. 
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2. The officials of the Commission authorised for the purpose of these 
investigations shall exercise their powers upon production of an authorisation in 
writing specifying the subject matter and purpose of the investigation and the penalties 
provided for in Article 15(1)(c) in cases where production of the required books or 
other business records is incomplete. In good time before the investigation, the 
Commission shall inform the competent authority of the Member State in whose 
territory the same is to be made of the investigation and of the identity of the 
authorised officials. 
3. Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall submit to investigations 
ordered by decision of the Commission. The decision shall specify the subject matter 
and purpose of the investigation, appoint the date on which it is to begin and indicate 
the penalties provided for in Article 15(1)(c) and Article 16(1)(d) and the right to have 
the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. 
4. The Commission shall take decisions referred to in paragraph 3 after 
consultation with the competent authority of the Member State in whose territory the 
investigation is to be made. 
5. Officials of the competent authority of the Member State in whose territory the 
investigation is to be made may, at the request of such authority or of the Commission, 
assist the officials of the Commission in carrying out their duties. 
6. Where an undertaking opposes an investigation ordered pursuant to this 
Article, the Member State concerned shall afford the necessary assistance to the 
officials authorised by the Commission to enable them to make their investigation. 
Member States shall, after consultation with the Commission, take the necessary 
measures to this end before 1 October 1962. 
Article 15 - Pieres 
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings fines of from 100 to 5000 units of account where, intentionally or 
negligently: 
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in an application 
pursuant to Article 2 or in a notification pursuant to Articles 4 or 5; or 
(b) they supply incorrect information in response to a request made 
pursuant to Article 11(3) or (5) or to Article 12, or do not supply 
information within the time limit fixed by a decision taken under Article 
11(5); or 
(c) they produce the required books or other business records in 
incomplete form during investigations under Article 13 or 14, or refuse 
to submit to an investigation ordered by decision issued in 
implementation of Article 14(3). 
2. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings fines of from 1000 to 1,000,000 units of account, or a sum in excess 
thereof but not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year of each 
of the undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or 
negligently: 
(a) they infringe Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty; or 
(b) they commit a breach of any obligation imposed pursuant to Article 
8(1). 
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the 
duration of the infringement. 
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3. Article 10(3) to (6) shall apply. 
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be of a criminal law 
nature. 
5. The fines provided for in paragraph 2(a) shall not be imposed in respect of acts 
taking place: 
(a) after notification to the Commission and before its decision in 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, provided they fall within the 
limits of the activity described in the notification; 
(b) before notification and in the course of agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices in existence at the date of entry into force of this 
Regulation, provided that notification was effected within the time 
limits specified in Article 5(1) and Article 7(2). 
6. Paragraph 5 shall not have effect where the Commission has informed the 
undertakings concerned that after preliminary examination it is of opinion that Article 
85(1) of the Treaty applies and that application of Article 85(3) is not justified. 
Article 16 -Periodic penalty payments 
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings periodic penalty payments of from 50 to 1000 units of account per day, 
calculated from the date appointed by the decision, in order to compel them: 
(a) to put an end to an infringement of Article 85 or 86 of the Treaty, in 
accordance with a decision taken pursuant to Article 3 of this 
Regulation; 
(b) to refrain from any act prohibited under Article 8(3); 
(c) to supply complete and correct information which it has requested by 
decision taken pursuant to Article 11(5); 
(d) to submit to an investigation which it has ordered by decision taken 
pursuant to Article 14(3). 
2. Where the undertakings or associations of undertakings have satisfied the 
obligation which it was the purpose of the periodic penalty payment to enforce, the 
Commission may fix the total amount of the periodic penalty payment at a lower figure 
than that which would arise under the original decision. 
3. Article 10(3) to (6) shall apply. 
Article 17 - Review by the Court of Justice 
The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 172 
of the Treaty to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic 
penalty payment; it may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment 
imposed. 
Article 18 - Unit of account 
For the purposes of applying Articles IS to 17 the unit of account shall be that adopted 
in drawing up the budget of the Community in accordance with Articles 207 and 209 
of the Treaty. 
538 
Article 19 - Hearing of the parties and of third persons 
1. Before taking decisions as provided for in Articles 2,3,6,7,8,1 5 and 16, the 
Commission shall give the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned the 
opportunity of being heard on the matters to which the Commission has taken 
objection. 
2. If the Commission or the competent authorities of the Member States consider 
it necessary, they may also hear other natural or legal persons. Applications to be 
heard on the part of such persons shall, where they show a sufficient interest, be 
granted. 
3. Where the Commission intends to give negative clearance pursuant to Article 2 
or take a decision in application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, it shall publish a 
summary of the relevant application or notification and invite all interested third parties 
to submit their observations within a time limit which it shall fix being not less than 
one month. Publication shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in 
the protection of their business secrets. 
Article 20 - Professional secrecy 
1. Information acquired as a result of the application of Articles 11,12,13 and 14 
shall be used only for the purpose of the relevant request or investigation. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 19 and 21, the Commission and 
the competent authorities of the Member States, their officials and other servants shall 
not disclose information acquired by them as a result of the application of this 
Regulation and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. 
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not prevent publication of general 
information or surveys which do not contain information relating to particular 
undertakings or associations of undertakings. 
Article 21- Publication of decisions 
1. The Commission shall publish the decisions which it takes pursuant to Articles 
2,3,6,7and8. 
2. The publication shall state the names of the parties and the main content of the 
decision; it shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection 
of their business secrets. 
Article 22 - Special provisions 
1. The Commission shall submit to the Council proposals for making certain 
categories of agreement, decision and concerted practice falling within Article 4(2) or 
Article 5(2) compulsorily notifiable under Article 4 or 5. 
2. Within one year from the date of entry into force of this Regulation, the 
Council shall examine, on a proposal from the Commission, what special provisions 
might be made for exempting from the provisions of this Regulation agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices falling within Article 4(2) or Article 5(2). 
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Article 23 - Transitional provisions applicable to decisions of authorities of the Member States 
1. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the kind described in Article 
85(1) of the Treaty to which, before the entry into force of this Regulation, the 
competent authority of a Member State has declared Article 85(1) to be inapplicable 
pursuant to Article 85(3) shall not be subject to compulsory notification under Article 
5. The decision of the competent authority of the Member State shall be deemed to be 
a decision within the meaning of Article 6; it shall cease to be valid upon expiration of 
the period fixed by such authority but in any event not more than three years after the 
entry into force of this Regulation. Article 8(3) shall apply. 
2. Applications for renewal of decisions of the kind described in paragraph 1 shall 
be decided upon by the Commission in accordance with Article 8(2). 
Article 24 - Implenieiilintg proi'isio»s 
The Commission shall have power to adopt implementing provisions concerning the 
form, content and other details of applications pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 and of 
notifications pursuant to Articles 4 and 5, and concerning hearings pursuant to Article 
19(1) and (2). 
Article 25 
1. As regards agreements, decisions and concerted practices to which Article 85 
of the Treaty applies by virtue of accession, the date of accession shall be substituted 
for the date of entry into force of this regulation in every place where reference is 
made in this Regulation to this latter date. 
2. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices existing at the date of accession 
to which Article 85 of the Treaty applies by virtue of. accession shall be notified 
pursuant to Article 5(1) or Article 7(1) and (2) within six months from the date of 
accession. 
3. Fines under Article 15(2)(a) shall not he imposed in respect of any act prior to 
notification of the agreements, decisions and practices to which paragraph 2 applies 
and which have been notified within the period therein specified. 
4. New Member States shall take the measures referred to in Article 14(6) within 
six months from the date of accession after consulting the Commission. 
5. The provisions of paragraphs (1) to (4) above still apply in the same way in the 
case of accession of the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and of the 
Portuguese Republic. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States. 
Done at Brussels, 6 February 1962. 
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3)Regulation 99/63 
on the hearings provided for in Article 19(1) and (2) of Council Regulation No 17 
Article 1 
Before consulting the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies, 
the Commission shall hold a hearing pursuant to Article 19(1) of Regulation No 17. 
Article 2 
1. The Commission shall inform undertakings and associations of undertakings in 
writing of the objections raised against them. The communication shall be addressed to 
each of them or to a joint agent appointed by them. 
2. The Commission may inform the parties by giving notice in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities, if from the circumstances of the case this 
appears appropriate, in particular where notice is to be given to a number of 
undertakings but no joint agent has been appointed. The notice shall have regard to the 
legitimate interest of the undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
3. A fine or a periodic penalty payment may be imposed on an undertaking or 
association of undertakings only if the objections were notified in the manner provided 
for in paragraph 1. 
4. The Commission shall when giving notice of objections fix a time limit up to 
which the undertakings and associations of undertakings may inform the Commission 
of their views. 
Article 3 
1. Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall, within the appointed time 
limit, make known in writing their views concerning the objections raised against 
them. 
2. They may in their written comments set out all matters relevant to their 
defence. 
3. They may attach any relevant documents in proof of the facts set out. They 
may also propose that the Commission hear persons who may corroborate those facts. 
Article 4 
The Commission shall in its decisions deal only with those objections raised against 
undertakings and associations of undertakings in respect of which they have been 
afforded the opportunity of making known their views. 
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Article 5 
If natural or legal persons showing a sufficient interest apply to be heard pursuant to 
Article 19(2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission shall afford them the opportunity 
of making known their views in writing within such time limit as it shall fix. 
Article 6 
Where the Commission, having received an application pursuant to Article 3(2) of 
Regulation No 17, considers that on the basis of the information in its possession there 
are insufficient grounds for granting the application, it shall inform the applicants of its 
reasons and fix a time limit for them to submit any further comments in writing. 
Article 7 
1. The Commission shall afford to persons who have so requested in their written 
comments the opportunity to put forward their arguments orally, if those persons 
show a sufficient interest or if the Commission proposes to impose on them a fine or 
periodic penalty payment. 
2. The Commission may likewise afford to any other person the opportunity of 
orally expressing his views. 
Article 8 
1. The Commission shall summon the persons to be heard to attend on such date 
as it shall appoint. 
2. It shall forthwith transmit a copy of the summons to the competent authorities 
of the Member States, who may appoint an official to take part in the hearing. 
Article 9 
1. Hearings shall be conducted by the persons appointed by the Commission for 
that purpose. 
2. Persons summoned to attend shall appear either in person or be represented by 
legal representatives or by representatives authorised by their constitution. 
Undertakings and associations of undertakings may moreover be represented by a duly 
authorised agent appointed from among their permanent staff. 
Persons heard by the Commission may be assisted by lawyers or university teachers 
who are entitled to plead before the Court of Justice of the European Communities in 
accordance with Article 17 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court, or by other 
qualified persons. 
3. Hearings shall not be public. Persons shall be heard separately or in the 
presence of other persons summoned to attend. In the latter case, regard shall be had 
to the legitimate interest of the undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
4. The essential content of the statements made by each person heard shall be 
recorded in minutes which shall be read and approved by him. 
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Article 10 
Without prejudice to Article 2(2), information and summonses from the Commission 
shall be sent to the addressees by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt, or 
shall be delivered by hand against receipt. 
Article 11 
1. In fixing the time limits provided for in Articles 2,5 and 6, the Commission 
shall have regard both to the time required for preparation of comments and to the 
urgency of the case. The time limit shall be not less than two weeks; it may be 
extended. 
2. Time limits shall run from the day following receipt of a communication or 
delivery thereof by hand. 
3. Written comments must reach the Commission or be dispatched by registered 
letter before expiry of the time limit. Where the time limit would expire on a Sunday 
or public holiday, it shall be extended up to the end of the next following working day. 
For the purpose of calculating this extension, public holidays shall, in cases where the 
relevant date is the date of receipt of written comments, be those set out in the Annex 
to this Regulation, and in cases where the relevant date is the date of dispatch, those 
appointed by law in the country of dispatch. 
Us 
A)LEGISLATION' 
The principal federal provisisons are contained in the Sherman Act 1890 (ShA), 
though these have been supplemented by other statutes, primarily the Clayton Act 
1914 (CA) and the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 (FTC Act). The provisions of 
each will be dealt with briefly. It should be noted here that there is considerable 
overlap and many anti-competitive practices violate more than one of these statutes. 
1)Sherman Act 1890 
S. l Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in 
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one million 
dollars if a corporation or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion 
of the court. 
S. 4 The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to 
prevent and restrain violations of this act ; and it shall be the duty of the several United 
States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney 
General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. 
Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that 
such violations shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties 
complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as 
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soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case ; and pending such 
petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary 
restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises. 
The ShA was the populist response to the anti-competitve abuses of the 'trusts' which 
monopolised many late 19th century US industries 2. Section 1 ShA is sweeping in its 
prohibition declaring illegal "every contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade" '. The very breadth of the Act has given rise to considerable ambiguity 
resulting in a century of debate, controversy and extensive litigation '. The Act creates 
both criminal and civil offences 5. It is enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
who share civil enforcement with private parties seeking treble damages or equitable 
relief. 
2)Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 (FTC Act) 
S. 5(a)(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. 
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed tp prevent persons, 
partnerships or corporations... from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 
(b) Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such 
person, partnership or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of 
competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it 
shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in 
the interest of the public, it shal issue and serve upon such person, partnership or 
corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respectand containing a notice of a 
hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the service of 
said complaint. 
Whilst this Act is centrally concerned with the formation and operation of the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), s. 5 declares unlawful "unfair methods of competition in 
commerce". The section is of considerable importance in widening the FTC's 
jurisdiction as it covers a broad range of conduct which would also violate the ShA 6. 
Thus, under s. 5, the FTC is able to pursue, as unfair methods of competition, 
restrictive practices which are in all but name ShA violations. In practice, s. 5 is often 
employed where reatraints are not fully blown infringements of the ShA or CA, but are 
'incipient' breaches which do not technically violate these Acts but do contravene 
fundamental US antitrust policies'. 
3)Clayton Act 1914 (CA) 
The CA was passed in order to strenghen the existing provisions of the ShA. Unlike 
the ShA, the CA specifies certain practices which are considered anti-competitive 
regardless of whether or not they are contracts in restraint of trade, or whether they 
actually damage competition. Rather, the specified practices are prohibited if their 
effect may be to substantially lessen competition 
Two sections of the CA are broadly relevant to the scope of this research ; s. 2 
which declares unlawful price discrimination and s. 3 which relates largely to exclusive 
dealing and tying arrangements. Both of these sections are subject to several 
qualifying provisions 9. Initially, s. 2 proved largely ineffective as it was drafted too 
narrowly so allowing price discrimination due to differences in eg quality, quantity or 
transportation costs. The Robinson-Patman Act 1936 amended this. It aimed to 
ensure price equalitywhere inequality of prices may substantially lessen competition by 
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prohibiting price discrimination where goods are sold for resale 10. Section 3 applies to 
tying arrengements and vertical exclusive dealing and requirements contracts. It has 
been argued that different standards of legality apply under the ShA and CA. With 
regard to tying contracts, it is argued that there is a stricter standard under s. 3 CA, as 
this section applies only to the tying of goods to other goods and is not applicable to 
services. However, recent decisions seem to view standards under both Acts as 
virtually identical ". Conversely, lower standards may apply under the CA to 
exclusive dealing and requirements contracts. Both Acts analyse these restraints under 
the rule of reason, but under the CA, the aim is to determine whether the effect may be 
to substantially lessen competition"=. Thus, unlike the ShA, there is no requirement to 
demonstrate the present effect on competition. Despite this, the courts under s. 3 CA, 
investigate fully the market context of the agreement and its effect on competition. As 
such, this approach is very similar to that under the ShA13. 
The provisions of the CA do not create criminal liabilty, but may be enforced 
through the civil courts or by the FTC through administrative proceedings before the 
Commission itself 14. 
4)Federal and State Antitrust Laws 
It should be noted that the statutes outlined above are federal laws and so can apply 
only where inter-state trade is involved 15. However, this limitation has virtually been 
interpreted out of the legislation. Generally, this requirement is satisfied even if only 
one state is affected, provided competition is substantially impaired. Certainly, under 
the ShA, entirely local violations are actionable provided there is some actual or 
threatened effect on inter-state trade, whether of a direct or indirect nature 16. 
Whilst this thesis has concentrated exclusively on the application of federal 
antitrust laws, it should be noted that many States have their own intra-state antitrust 
rules. Considerable differences in the strictness of the legislation and enforcement 
policies exists between States. Until recently, State enforcement was lax. However, 
the political importance of antitrust has made State attorneys general increasingly 
eager to enforce antitrust measures more rigorously ". Invariably, States prefer to 
take action under federal law as it offers significantly more effective remedies 'g. 
B)AVENUES FOR ENFORCEMENT 
In the US, in addition to the federal court system, two main public authorities - the 
DOJ and the FTC - share responsibility for antitrust enforcement. These laws may 
also be enforced in civil action by private parties. 
1)Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)19 
This Division is part of the executive arm of goverment and possesses considerable 
power and discretion. It is headed by an Assistant Attorney General. The Division 
employs several hundred lawyers and is divided into three main sections : 
a)a trial section dealing with particular investigations, grand jury hearings, 
court cases and enforcement of judgements ; 
b)ten field offices covering the US performing the above functions on a 
regional basis ; 
c)specialist offices, including an economic policy office, which analyses market 
structure and advises on potential problem areas. 
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THe DOJ is responsible for enforcing the ShA, having sole criminal 
jurisdiction to prosecute violations under this statute 20. Under s. 4 ShA, it is also 
under a duty to institute civil proceedings to restrain antitrust infringements 21. The 
Department plays a major role in the enforcement of s. 7 CA, but only enforces other 
provisions of the CA where they form part of serious ShA violations. 
2)Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 22 
The FTC is essentially an adminstrative agency with quasi-judicial powers. Its 
structure is somewhat complex comprising of several different layers. 
THe Commission itself consists of a President and four additional 
Commissioners 23. The Commission plays a dual role, first acting as 'prosecutors' when 
they take decisions initiating proceedings and later as' judges' when they decide cases. 
Like the DOJ, the Commission is backed by various section devoted to 
economic analysis and policy planning. The FTC also has an Office of General 
Counsel which advises it on all legal matters, including those heard by the Commission 
in its judicial capacity. This Office also reprsents the FTC at appellate level. The 
Bureau of Competition is the antitrust enforcement section undertaking the 
investigation, evaluation and litigation of antitrust complaints 24. 
The judicial arm of the FTC is entirely independent from the remainder of the 
authority. It consists of a number of Adminstrative Law Judges (ALJ) who act as 
initial arbiters of complaints made by the Bureau of Competition 25. 
The FTC's role is a wide one covering not only enforcement of antitrust 
provisions, but also dealing with a broad range of other consumer related issues 26. The 
FTC has sole jurisdiction over s. 5 FTC Act and overlapping civil jurisdiction of the CA 
27. The FTC has no criminal jurisdiction. 
Over the years, the FTC has been subject to considerable criticism in relation 
to both its enforcement approach and its failure to achieve the goals set for it by 
Congress. These criticisms wil be explored further in the main body of the research 28 " 
3)Federal Court Enforcement 
The federal court system hears antitrust cases/appeals brought by the above agencies 
as well as private actions. At the apex of the system is the Supreme Court. Its position 
and its role in interpreting the Constitution means that the Supreme Court possess 
significant legal and political influence 2'. 
However, problems exist. Antitrust's extensive reliance on the federal courts, 
each with its own set of precedents, has brought criticism of inconsistency. Moreover, 
concerns have been raised regarding the adequacy of the courts' economic expertise'o 
Whilst Supreme Court rulings do provide some consistency, its review powers are 
discretionary. Consequently, circuit conflicts may persist for many years before the 
Court intervenes to resolve matters 31. 
4)Enforcement by Individual Action 
An increasingly important means of enforcement is the private antitrust suit seeking 
treble damages or equitable relief '=. A right of private action lies under both the ShA 
and the CA, though not the FTC Act 33. Whilst most private actions are for treble 
damages, the number of litgants seeking equitable relief is increasing 34. Problems of 
proof and quantum are significant 35. Consequently, many private suits follow on from 
successful goverment litigation. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow considerable 
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scope for the acquisition of evidence 36. Courts have also assisted private litigants by 
allowing them access to grand jury materials 37. Where several individuals have been 
harmed, but it is not practical to sue individually, a class action is possible 38. 
So, whilst private litigation is complex and expensive, the possibility of treble 
damages invariably makes litigation worthwhile 3'. Indeed, it has been noted that fear 
of such actions is a compelling incentive to observe antitrust regulations 40. Moreover, 
the number of such litigants is increasing to the point where they now form the central 
plank of US antitrust enforcement ". Whether this increase in private enforcement is 
to be encouraged is debateable, as evidence suggests that many private actions are not 
used to redress the balance but to injure and thereby eliminate rival competitors 4Z. 
Background information on this section is derived from : L. Sullivan Handbook of the Law 
ofAntitrust West Publishing Co (1977) ; Neale and Goydcr The Antitrust Laws of the USA (3rd 
Edn) Cambridge Unv. Press (1980) ; Agnew Competition Law Allen and Unwin (1985) ; Whish 
Competition Law Buttcrworths (1993) ; Hawk and Veltrop 'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the 
United States : Postivc or Negative Lessons for the European Community' in SLOT AND 
MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and 
Maxwell (1993) p 21; Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation in the United 
States :A Comparative Look' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure and Enforcement 
in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 144 ; Hobbs 'Antitrust in the Next 
Decade -A Role for the FTC'Antitrust Bulletin [1986] 451 ; Johnson and Rupert 'An Introduction 
to US Antitrust Law' LSG [ 1986] 122-115,126 ; Hawk US, Common Alarket and International 
Antitrust :A Comparative Guide Prentice Hall (1990). 
2 An interesting account of the background to, and development of, this statute can be found in 
Fox 'The Modernisation of Antitrust :A New Equilibrium' Cornell LR [1980] 1140 and in 
L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust Appendix B. These issues are also discussed in Neale and Goydcr 
The Antitrust Laws of the USA and Johnson and Rupert 'US Antitrust Law'. 
3 Section 2 further proscribes the separate offences of monopolisation, attempts to monopolise 
and conspiracy to monopolise. 
4 The scope and meaning of s. 1 is discussed further in Chapter 10 under the examination of 
the enforcement process when the prosecution's use of the substantive law in case construction 
will be examined. 
$ 15 USCA ss. l and 2 (1973) and 15 USCA s. 4 (1973) respectively. 
6 Some behaviour is also likely to violate the CA. See previous discussion for further 
information on the provisions of the CA. The overlap is discussed further by Hawk and Veltrop 
'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States'. 
Further comments on this aspect are made in Johnson and Rupert 'US Antitrust Law' at pp 
115 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 752-753 ; Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the 
USA at pp 4-5. See also FTC v Brown Shoe Co 384 US 316 (1966) and FTC v Sperry Huchinson 
Co 405 US 233 (1972). 
8 The approach and scope of the CA is discussed in much greater detail in L. Sullivan Law of 
Antitrust at pp 431-470 ; Neale and Goydcr The Antitrust Laws of the USA Clts 7,8 and Johnson 
and Rupert'US Antitrust Law'. 
9 The full text of the CA is not provided here, however it is reproduced in L. Sullivan Law of 
Antitrust Appendix B. 
10 Thus, this section does not apply to sales to a consumer except to the extent that a lower 
price is justified because of lower costs to the seller. 
11 Moore vJasMattheivs and Co 550 F. 2d 1207,1214 (9th Circ 1977). 
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12 The rule of reason analytical approach is discussed further under the 'Trial' stage of 
enforcement in Ch10. 
13 The differences of approach and the problems involved are discussed further in Johnson and 
Rupert 'US Antitrust Law'at pp 112-115 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 432-434 and Agnew 
Competition Law at pp 196-198. 
14 The DOJ plays a major role in the enforcement of s. 7 CA relating to mergers, but only 
enforces the other provisions of the CA where the offences form part of serious ShA violations. 
Section 11 CA empowers the FTC to enforce ss. 2,3,7 and s. 8 CA, whilst s. 4 permits private 
parties to launch actions under the CA and ShA. See discussion by Johnson and Rupert 'US 
Antitrust Law' at p 115. 
15 The FTC Act and CA apply to practices occurring "in commerce" ie, in the course of inter- 
state trade, rather than simply affecting it. This would seem to be a stricter test. See also, Gulf 
Oil Corp v Copp Paving Co 419 US 186 (1974). 
16 This aspect is discussed further in Agnew Competition Law at p 200 ; Neale and Goyder The 
Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 13-14. 
17 In particular, the lax federal enforcement of the Reagan Administration encouraged States to 
take more action to fill the enforcememt gap. This was done primarily through the National 
Association of Attorneys General (HAAG) which issued several aggressive policy statements and 
clashed on several occasions with the DOJ. Axinn and Glick 'Dual Enforcememt of Merger Law 
in the EEC : Lessons from the Americam Experience' in HAWK (Ed) Annual Proceedings 
Fordam Corp Law Inst (1989) p 550 ; Hawk and Veltrop 'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the 
United States' ; Abrams 'Developments in State Antitrust Enforcement' NYULRev [1987] 989, all 
provide interesting discussions of federal versus state enforcement. 
18 This is particularly so since the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitirust Improvements Act 1976, s. 15 
of which enables State attorneys general to bring federal treble damages actions on behalf of 
consumers. However, States cannot enforce federal criminal law. 
19 For background information on this institution, see : L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 751- 
752 ; Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the US4 at pp 373-375 ; Hawk and Veltrop 'Dual 
Antitrust Enforcement in the United States' ; Baker 'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust 
Violation'. 
20 Ss. 1,2 ShA. 
21 S. 4 ShA. 
22 for background information on this institution, see : Neale and Goyder The 
Antitrust Laws of the USA at pp 382-383 ; L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 752-754 ; Hobbs'A 
Role for the FTC' ; Hawk and Veltrop 'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States'; Baker 
'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' ; Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings at 
the United States Federal Trade Commission' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) Procedure 
and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Laiv Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 203. 
23 To attain some balance and independence the Commissioners serve for staggered seven year 
terms. No more than three of the five Commissioners may be from the same political party. See 
discussion in Hobbs 'A Role for the FTC' at 451-456 and Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings'at 
pp 204-205. 
24 The Bureau is also responsible for enforcing compliance and developing guides for 
industries. It operates through eleven field offices supervised from Washington. For further 
details, see L. Sullivan Law ofAntitrust at pp 752-754 and Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws 
of the USA at pp 382-383. 
25 The Commission takes its decision on the record of the full adversarial trial held before the 
ALJ. ALJs are common in US administrative agencies and are similar to English judges sitting 
at first instance without a jury. 
26 See discussion in Hawk and Veltrop 'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States' 
Hobbs 'A Role for the FTC'. In many respects, the FTC is similar to the OFT in the UK. For 
further on this, see the assessment of UK law in Appendix D infra. 
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27 Ss. 2.3.7 and 8 CA including Robinson-Patman amendments to price discrimination 
provisions. 
28 The role of the FTC has been evaluated by Hawk US, Common Market and International 
Antitrust and Lingos 'Transparency of Proceedings'. A comprehensive, though partisan, review of 
the FTC's actions under Chairman Jas. Miller III may be found in Jas. Miller III The 
Performance of the FI'C 1977-1984, Report to the Sub-Committee on Oversight and 
Investigations House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Sept 1984). Hobbs 'A Role for the 
FTC' at pp 451-453, notes that the FTC arose out of dissatisfaction with the DOD's enforcement. 
Congress perceived a need to have a politically independent regulatory agency which would 
actively and effectively enforce a broad range of antitrust provisions and provide improved 
guidance for businesses. 
29 The federal court structure and the role of the Supreme Court are discussed in depth in 
Abraham The Judicial Process Oxford Unv. Press (1986) and in Kelly, Harrison and Betz The 
American Constitution -Its Origins and Development W. W. Norton & Co (1983). 
30 This is particularly so in those antitrust cases heard by juries. These problems are assessed 
further by Fox and L. Sullivan 'Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective : Where Are We 
Coming From ? Where Are We Going ?' NYULRev [1987a] 936 ; Kingdon 'Economic Argument 
in Antitrust Cases : An Americam Litigator's Perspective' ECLR [1987] 371 and Hawk and 
Veltrop'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States'. 
The Court uses the certiorari procedure to select for itself those cases which it considers 
sufficiently important to hear. In practice, it hears less than 10% of cases. On this, see Baker 
'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation'. Lord McKenzie Stuart in 'Problems of the 
European Community - Transatlantic Parallels' ICLQ [19871 183, draws some interesting 
comparisons between the ECJ and the US Supreme Court. Hawk and Veltrop in 'Dual Antitrust 
Enforcement in the United States' at pp 27-28, provide several examples of circuit conflicts 
resolved by the Supreme Court. 
32 Hawk US, Common Market and International Antitrust ; L. WHITE (Ed) Private Antitrust 
Litigation MIT Press (1988) : Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA Ch14 ; Baker 
'Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at pp 159-162 and Collins and Sunshine 'Is 
Private Enforcement Effective Antitrust Policy ?' in SLOT AND MCDONNNELL (Eds) 
Proceclure and Enforcement in EC and US Competition Law Sweet and Maxwell (1993) p 50, all 
give thorough accounts of private litigation 
33 This right originated under s. 7 ShA. It has since been expanded and codified under s. 4 CA. 
34 Examples include Interplioto Corp vMinolla Corp 417 F. 2d 621 (2d Circ 1969) and Telex 
Industries v Brunswick Corp 410 F. 2d 380 (3d Circ 1969). 
35 To sustain a claim, the private litigant must not only demonstrate that an antitrust violation 
has occurred, but that this breach has damaged him personally by having a direct impact upon his 
business. Moreover, the effect of this impact must be financially quantifiable. At the base of the 
claim, must be a significant restraint of trade which both harms competition in general and the 
plaintiff in particular. Requirements and problems of proof are discussed in Baker 'Investigation 
and Proof of an Antitrust Violation' at pp 159-162 and Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of 
the USA at pp 425-428. 
36 These provisions are discussed further by Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA 
at pp 421-424. 
37 Although such material is normally secret, plaintiffs have sometimes been allowed access 
where they have demonstrated special circumstances. Discussed by Neale and Goyder The 
Antitrust Laws of the USA at p 423. 
38 Rule 23 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1966. For further discussion of class actions, see 
L. Sullivan Law of Antitrust at pp 777-785 and Benston 'A Comprehensive Analysis of the 
Determinants of Private Antitrust Litigation with Particular Emphasis on Class Action Suits and 
the Rule of Joint and Several Damages' in L. WHITE (Ed) Private Antitrust Litigation MIT Press 
(1988) p 31. 
39 There has been recent criticism of treble damages awards and calls for its abolition. See 
discussion in Baumol and Ordover 'Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competiton' Jo Law and 
Economics [1985] 237 ; Klien'Strategic Sham Litigation : Economic incentives in the Context of 
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the Case Law' Int Rev Law and Econ [ 1986] 241 ; Easterbrook 'Detrebling Antitrust Damages' Jo 
Law and Economnics [1985] 445. 
40 On this, see Neale and Goyder The Antitrust Laws of the USA at p 422. 
41 In 1970, there were 877 private actions. By 1984, the number had risen to 1,100. Such 
actions far outnumber US goverment cases which totalled 56 cases and 101 cases in 1970 and 
1984 respectively. See L. WHITE (Ed) Private Antitrust Litigation Table 1.1. Hawk and Veltrop 
in 'Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United States' at p 27, also note that US courts decide ten 
private cases for every goverment case. 
42 See in particular, Baumol and Ordover 'Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competiton' ; Klien 
'Strategic Sham Litigation'; Breit and Elzinga 'Private Antitrust Enforcement : The New Learning' 
Jo Law and Economics [1985] 405 ; L. WHITE (Ed) Private Antitrust Litigation in general. For a 
contrary view, sec Jas. Miller III 'Comments on Baumol and Ordover' Jo Law and Economics 
[1985] 267. 
APPENDIX B 
TABLES AND STATISTICS 
TABLE 1 
Case List of Selected Cases 
- Horizontal Cartels 
Formally Prosecuted Cases 
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1)PVC Cartel [1990] 4 CMLR 345 (hereafter referred to as PVC). Appealed to 
CFI as BASF [1992] 4 CMLR 357 (hereafter referred to as BASF). Appealed to ECJ as 
Case 137/92 PVC I [1995] 5 CMLR 8 (hereafter referred to as PVC 1). Further 
Commission decision - PVC 11 OJ [1994] L239/14. PVC II is currently on appeal; 
2)Polypropylene Ca, 7el [1988] 4 CMLR 347. Appealed as Hercules [1992] 4 
CMLR 84 (hereafter referred to as Polypropylene or Hercules); 
3)Soda Ash Cartel [199114 CMLR 169, [1994] 4 CMLR 454, [1994] 4 CMLR 
645 (hereafter referred to as Soda Ash). Also related case of Soda Ash [1994] 4 CMLR 
482. Soda Ash is on appeal to CFI as Case T30/91; 
4)LdPE, Cartel [1990] 4 CMLR 382 (hereafter referred to as LdPE). On appeal as 
Case T165/89 Dow Chemicals; 
5)Peroxygen Cartel [1985] 1 CMLR 481 (hereafter referred to as Peroxygen); 
6)Zinc Producers Cartel [1985] 2 CMLR 108 (hereafter referred to as Zinc 
Producers) and interim appeal AM&S [ 1982] ECR 1575 (hereafter referred to as AM&S); 
7)Woodpulp Cartel [1985] 3 CMLR 474 (hereafter referred to as Woodpzilp). 
Appealed as Woodpulp 11 [1993] 4 CMLR 407 (hereafter referred to as Woodpulp 11); 
8)Belgian Roofing Fell Cartel [1991] 4 CMLR 130 (hereafter referred to as 
Belgian Roofing Felt). Appealed as Belasco [ 1991] 4 CMLR 96 (hereafter referred to as 
Belasco); 
9)Italian Flat Glass [1990] 4 CMLR 535 (hereafter referred to as Italian Flat 
Glass). Appealed as SIV [1992] ECR 1403 (hereafter referred to as SIV); 
10)Meldoc [1989] 4 CMLR 853 (hereafter referred to asMeldoc); 
]])Dutch Books Cartel [1984] ECR 19 (hereafter referred to as VBBB); 
12)Dutch Cigarettes Cartel [1982] 3 CMLR 702 (hereafter referred to as Dutch 
Cigarettes). Appealed as SSI [1985] ECR 3831 (hereafter referred to as SSI); 
13)Rolled Zinc Products [1983] 2 CMLR 285 (hereafter referred to as Rolled 
Zinc). Appealed as CRAM [1984] ECR 1679 (hereafter referred to as CRAM; 
14)Cast Iron and Steel Rolls [1984] 1 CMLR 694 (hereafter referred to as Cast 
Iron and Steel); 
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15)Be, relzix Flat Glass [1985] 2 CMLR 694 (hereafter referred to as Benelux Flat 
Glass); 
16)GB-INNO BM v Fedelab [1978] 3 CMLR 524 (hereafter referred to as 
Fedetab). Appealed as Van Landeiiyck [1980] ECR 3125 (hereafter referred to as Van 
Landewyck); 
17)French-West African Shipowners' Committees 22nd Report on Competition 
Policy 1992 at p 98, OJ [1992] L134/1, [1993] 5 CMLR 446 (hereafter referred to as 
FWA). Appealed as Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports [1997] 4 CMLR 273 
(hereafter referred to as Compagntie Maritime Belge); 
18)Dutch Builders Cartel [1993] 5 CMLR 135 (hereafter referred to as Dutch 
Builders). On appeal as Case T29/92 SPO: 
19)ANSLAU [1992] 2 CMLR 193 (hereafter referred to as ANSEAU). Appealed as 
IAZ Belgium [1983] ECR 3369 (hereafter referred to as IAZ). Also Re IPTC Belgium 
[1984] 2 CMLR 131; 
20) Welded Steel Mesh [ 1991] 4 CMLR 13 (hereafter referred to as Welded Steel); 
21) Uniform Drirochegrres [1985] 3 CMLR 434, Eurocheque . Helsinki Agreement 
OJ [1992] L95/50. Appealed as Groupment De Bancaires [1994] ECR 49 (hereafter 
referred to as GCB); 
22)SA Cimenteries [1995] 4 CMLR 327 (hereafter referred to as Cement or 
Cement Cariel). See also interim appeals SA Cimenteries [1993] 4 CMLR 243 ; SA 
Cimenteries [1993] 4 CMLR 259. 
Art. 85(3) Exemptions/Crisis Cartels 
23)Tiansocean Marine Paint [1967] CMLR D9, [1974] ECR 1063 (hereafter 
referred to as Ti ansocean); 
24)Nalional Sulphuric Acid Association Ltd [1980] 3 CMLR 429 (hereafter 
referred to as National Sulphuric Acid); 
25)Synrthetic Fibres [1985] 1 CMLR 787 (hereafter referred to as Synthetic 
Fibres); 
26)BPCL/ICI [1985] 2 CMLR 330 (hereafter referred to as BPCL/ICI orBP/ICI); 
27)Enichem/ICI [1989] 4 CMLR 54 (hereafter referred to as Enichem/ICI); 
28)Bayer/BP [1989] 4 CN LR 24 (hereafter referred to as Bayer/BP); 
29)ENI/Montedison [1988] 4 CMLR 444 (hereafter referred to as 
DNI/Montedison); 
30)EMC/DSM OJ [ 1988] C 18/3 (hereafter referred to as EMC/DSM); 
31)Stichling Baksleen [1993] 4 CMLR 385, [1995] 4 CMLR 646 (hereafter 
referred to as Stichling Bakslee; r); 
32)Shell/AZKO ! 4th Report on Competition Policy 1984 p 85 (hereafter referred 
to as Shell/Azko). 
TABLE 2 
Case List of Selected Cases 
- Vertical Arrangements 
Formally Prosecuted Cases 
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1)Tippex [1989] 4 CMLR 425. Appealed as Tippex [1990] ECR II 261 (both 
hereafter referred to as Tippex ); 
2)John Deere [1985] 2 CMLR 554 (hereafter referred to as John Deere); 
3)Camera Care v Hasselblad [1982] 2 CMLR 233 (hereafter referred to as 
Camera Care). Appealed as Hasselblad [1984] 1 CMLR 559 (hereafter referred to as 
Hasselblad); 
4)Sandoz [1989] 4 CMLR 628. Appealed as Sandoz [1990] ECR 45 (both 
hereafter referred to as Sandoz); 
5)Pioneer [1980] 1 CMLR 457 (hereafter referred to as Pioneer). Appealed as 
MDF [1983] ECR 1825 (hereafter referred to asMDF); 
6)Bulloch v Distillers [1978] 1 CMLR 400. Appealed as Distillers [1980] ECR 
2229 (both hereafter referred to as Distillers); 
7)Viho/Toshiba [1992] 5 CMILR 180. Appealed as Viho/Toshiba [1995] 4 CMLR 
299 (both hereafter referred to as Viho); 
8)Newitt v Dunlop/Slazenger [1993] 5 CMLR 352 (hereafter referred to as 
Dunlop/Slazenger). Appealed as All Weather Sports Benelux [1995] 4 CMLR 43 
(hereafter referred to as A WS); 
9)Fisher Price/Quaker Oats Ltd - Toyco [1989] 4 CMLR 553 (hereafter referred 
to as Fisher Price); 
10)National Panasonic [1983] 1 CMLR 497, interim appeal National Panasonic 
[1980] ECR 2033 (both hereafter referred to as National Panasonic; 
11)DerekMerson v BL [ 1984] 3 CMLR 92 (hereafter referred to as BL); 
12)AEG-Telefunken [1982] 2 CMLR 386. Appealed as AEG-Telefunken [1983] 
ECR 3151 (both hereafter referred to as AEG); 
13)Ford Werke [1984] 1 CMLR 569. Appealed as Ford Werke [1985] ECR 2725 
(both hereafter referred to as Ford); 
14)Vichy OJ [1991] L75/57, interim appeal Vichy [1992] ECR 415 (both hereafter 
referred to as Vichy); 
15)Ideal Standard [1988] 4 CMLR 627 (hereafter referred to as Ideal); 
16)Grohe [1988] 4 CMLR 612 (hereafter referred to as Grohe). 
Negatively Cleared Cases 
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17) Mira! [1984] 1 CMLR 219 (hereafter referred to as Mural); 
18)IBM [1984] 2 CMLR 342 (hereafter referred to as IBM); 
19)Villeroy Boch [1988] 4 CMLR 461 (hereafter referred to as Villeroy Boch); 
20)Kenwood Electronics [1993] 4 CMLR 389 (hereafter referred to as Kenwood); 
21)Schotl Zwiesel Glas-werke [1993] 5 CMLR 85 (hereafter referred to as SZG); 
22)Alfa Romeo 14th Report on Competition Policy 1984 at p 70 (hereafter 
referred to as Alfa); 
Fiat). 
23)Fia! 14th Report on Competition Policy 1984 at p 71 (hereafter referred to as 
Ar1.85(3) Exemptions 
24) Parfums Givenrchy [1993] 5 CMLR 579 (hereafter referred to as Parfums 
Give»chy). On appeal as Case T87/92 Kruidvat v Commission; 
25)Yves St Laurent [1993] 4 CMLR 120 (hereafter referred to as Yves St Laurent). 
On appeal as Case T19/92 Societe GALEC v Commission and Case T99/22 Groupement 
d Achat Edouard Leder v Commission; 
26)Grundig [1988] 4 CMLR 865, renewed Grundig [1995] 4 CMLR 658 (both 
hereafter referred to as Griaidig); 
27)Ii'oclar" [ 1988] 4 CMLR 781 (hereafter referred to as Ivoclar); 
28)Agence el Messageries de la Presse [1985] 3 CMLR 800, Agence ei 
Messageries de la Presse [1987] 3 CMLR 445 (both hereafter referred to as AMP); 
Gill); 
29)WVhisky and Gin [1986] 2 CMLR 664 (hereafter referred to as Whisky and 
30)Saba No 2 [1984] 1 CMLR 676 (hereafter referred to as Saba II). See also 
Metro II [1986] ECR 3021. 
TABLE 3 
Investigation Method - Horizontal Cartels 
Case Name Art. 14 Art. 11 
PVC * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(1)** 
Art. 11(5) 2 
Polypropylene * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(nk)** 
Some Art. 14(2) 
Soda Ash * Art. 14(3) Art. ll(nk)** 
LdPE * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(5)**, 2 
Peroxygenr * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(nk)** 
Zinc Producers * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(nk)** 
Woodpulp * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(nk)** 
Belgian Roofing Fell * Art. 14(3) - 
Italian Flat Glass * Art. 14(3) - Some Art. 14(2) 
Meldoc * Art. 14(nk) Art. 11(nk)** 
VBBB - Art. 11(nk) 1 (Notification) 
Dutch Cigarettes - Art. Il (nk) 1 
(Notification) 
Rolled Zinc * Art. 14(3) - 
Cast Iron and Steel Art. 14(3) Art. 11(nk)** 
(In UK, Beigium (From the Bund- 
France and Italy) eskartellamt) 
Welded Steel * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(nk)** 
Benelux Flat Glass * Art. 14(3) - 
Fedetab - Art. 11(nk)** 1 (Notification) 
FWA * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(5)**, 2 
Dutch Builders Art. 14(2) Art. 11(1)** 
ANSEAU * Art. 14(3) Art. 11(nk)** 
GCB - Art. 11(nk)** 1 (Notifications 
x 2) 
Cement Art. 14(3) Art. 11(nk)** 
Art. 14(2) 
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TABLE 3 (cont) 
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Notes - Table 3 
nk - denotes that it is unclear from the Commission decision which provision of the Article 
was employed. 
*- In 16 cases, Art. 14(3) was used as a primary means of investigation. Only in one case 
- Dutch Builders - was Art. 14(2) used entirely. 
** - In 14 cases, Art. 11 was used as a follow-up procedure. 
1- In four cases, VBBB, Dutch Cigarettes, Fedetab and GCB, investigation was under 
Art. 11. In the latter three cases, it was unclear from the Commission decision whether 
Art. 14 was also used. 
2- Art. 11(5) decisions were issued in PVC, LdPE and FWA. 
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Case Name 
PVC 
Polypropylene 
Soda Ash 
LdPE 
Peroxygeir 
Zinc Producers 
TABLE 4 
Concepts Employed In Horizontal Cartels 
Concerted Collective Single 
Practice Responsibility Complex 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Offence 
* 
Woodpulp 
Belgian Roofing 
Felt 
Italian Flat 
Glass 
Meldoc 
VBBB - 
Dutch Cigarettes 
Rolled Zinc 
Cast Iron 
and Steel 
Welded Steel 
Benelux Flat 
Glass 
Fedetab 
FWA 
Dutch Builders 
ANSEA U - 
GCB - 
Cement 
Total 19 
*- denotes the existence of the relevant concept 
** 
Undertaking - Liability 
Parent 
Liability 
** 
*_ 
Undertaking 
Identity 
* 
Parent 
Liability 
* * 
Parent - Liability 
* 
* 
* 
10 13 
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Case Name 
PVC (1990)* 
Polypropylene 
(1988) 
Soda Ash (1991)* 
LdPE (1990)* 
Peroxygen (1985) 
Zinc Producers 
(1985) 
Woodpulp (1985) 
Belgian Roofing 
Tell (1991) 
Italian Flat 
Glass (1990) 
Meldoc (1989) 
VBBB (1984) 
Dutch Cigarettes 
(1982) 
Rolled Zinc (1982) 
Cast Iron 
and Steel 
(1984) 
Welded Steel 
(1991) 
Benehix Flat 
Glass (1985) 
Fedetab (1978) 
FWA (1992) 
Dutch Builders* 
(1993) 
ANSEAU (1982) 
GCB (1992) 
Cement (1995) 
TABLE 5 
Sanctions - Horizontal Cartels 
Type of Duration 
Decision of Offence 
CD/L 4yrs 
CD/L 6yrs 
CD/L 17yrs 
CD/L 7yrs 
CD/L 10-20 
yrs 
CD** 13yrs 
CD/L' 7yrs 
CD/L 6yrs 
CD/L 3-5yrs 
CD 6yrs 
CD - 
CD/L 3-5 
months 
CD/L 3yrs 
CD 12yrs 
CD/L 5yrs 
CD** 4yrs 
CD/L 
CD/L 5yrs 
CD/L 12yrs 
CD/L 3yrs 
CD** 6yrs 
CD/L I lyrs 
Total Fine 
in ECU 
23.5m 1 
57.85m 2 
18m 
37m 
9m 
3.3m 
4.125m 3 
Im 
13.4m 4 
6.5m 
1.475m 5 
900,000 6 
1.25m 
9.5m 
4m 
15.3m 
22.5m 
944,000 
6m8 
248m 
TABLE 5 (cont) 
Notes - Table 5 
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*- Case currently on appeal. 
** - Decision of declaratory value only. 
CD - Cease and desist order. 
CD/L - Cease and desist/like effect order. 
1- PVC fine quashed by the ECJ. The Commission decision in PVC II imposed a fine of 
19.25m ECU. 
2- Polypropylene fine reduced on appeal to 54.5m ECU. 
3- Woodpzilp fine reduced on appeal to 130.000 ECU. 
4- Italian Flat Glass fine reduced on appeal to 1.6m ECU. 
5- Dutch Cigarettes fine reduced on appeal to 1.425m ECU. 
6- Rolled Zinc fine cancelled on appeal. 
7- FWA fine reduced on appeal to 9,090,000m ECU. 
8- GCB fine reduced on appeal to 2m ECU. 
TABLE 6 
Investigation Method - Vertical Arrangements 
Case Name Art. 14 Art. 11 Other 
Tippex Art. 14(nk) Art. 11(nk)** 
John Deere Art. 14(nk) Art. 11(nk)** - 
Camera Care* Art. 14(3) -- 
Sandoz Art. 14(nk) Art. Il (nk) 1- 
Pioneer/MDF Art. 14(nk) -- 
Distillers - Art. 11(nk) - (Notification) 
Viho Art. 14(nk) Art. l l (nk)** - 
Dunlop/ Art. 14(nk) Art. 11(nk)** - 
Slazenger 
Fisher Price Art. 14(nk) -- 
National Art. 14(3) -- 
Panasonic* 
BL Art. 14(nk) -- 
AEG Art. 14(nk) Art. ll(nk)** - 
Ford 3 - - Notification 
Vichy 3 - - Notification 
Ideal 3 - - Notification 
Grohe 3 -- Notification 
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Notes - Table 6 
nk - Denotes that it is unclear from the Commission decision which provision of the Article was used. 
*- In only two cases, Camera Care and National Panasonic, was Art. 14(3) clearly used. 
In nine other cases, it is unclear from the report which provision of Art. 14 was employed. 
- Denotes that Art. 1l was used as a follow-up procedure. This occurred in five cases. 
1- In Sandoz, Art. 11 was used prior to Art. 14. 
2- Distillers was the only case which used Art. Il as a primary means of investigation. 
3- In Ford, Vichy, Ideal and Grobe information was obtained primarily from notification 
of the arrangement. 
TABLE 7 
Sanctions - Vertical Arrangements 
Case Name Type of Duration Total Fine 
Decision of Offence in ECU 
Tippex (1989) CD/L 4yrs 410,000 
John Deere CD/L 7yrs 2m 
(1985) 
Camera Care CD/L 6yrs 755,000 1 
(1982) 
Sandoz (1989) CD/L 22yrs 800,000 2 
Pioneer/MDF CD/L 3 months 6.95m 3 
(1983) - 2yrs 
Viho (1992) CD 14yrs 2m 
Dunlop/ CD 7-13yrs 5.15m 4 
Slazenger 
(1993) 
Fisher Price CD 3yrs 300,000 
(1989) 
National CD 3yrs 450,000 
Panasonic 
(1982) 
BL (1984) CD 3yrs 350,000 
AEG (1983) CD 3.5yrs lm 
Distillers CD - - (1980) 
Ford (1984) CD/L - - 
Vichy (1991) N/A 5 - - 
Ideal (1988) CD - - 
Grohe (1988) CD - - 
Notes - Table 7 
CD - Cease and desist order. 
CD/L - Cease and desist/like effect order. 
1- Camera Care fine reduced on appeal to 670,000 ECU. 
2- Sandoz fine reduced on appeal to 500,000 ECU. 
3 -MDT fine reduced on appeal to 3.2m ECU. 
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TABLE 7 (cont) 
Notes - Table 7 (cont) 
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4- On appeal, the fine on A WS was cancelled. Total fine imposed in Dunlop/Slazenger 5m 
ECU. 
5- Not applicable. Final decision in Vichy is still awaited. 
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TABLE 8 
Statistics - Commission Decisions 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Substantive 9 11 9 15 20 
Decisions 
Procedural - 10 4 2 - 
Decisions 
Comfort - - - - (3) Letters 1 
Informal 183 121 479 343 211 
Resolutions 
Cases 4,203 4,365 4,199 4,138 4,194 
Pending 
TABLE 8 (cont) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Substantive 15 21 16 25 15 
Decisions 
Procedural 12 - 42 3 - - 
Decisions 
Comfort (2) 74 57 36 46(3) 
Letters 1 
Informal 1,1854 283 334 419 382 
Resolutions 
Cases 3,313 3,522 3,427 3,451 3,239 
Pending 
TABLE 8 (cont) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Substantive 15 13 20 12 33 
Decisions 
Procedural - I- 2 6 
Decisions 
Comfort 158(3) 146(5) 176(8) 180(3) 197(2) 
Letters 1 
Informal 710 676 553 734 525 
Resolutions 
Cases 2,734 2,287 1,562 1,231 1,058 
Pending 
TABLE 8 (cont) 
Notes - Table 8 
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"- Data derived from Commission Annual Reports on Competition Policy. 
1- The number of formal comfort letters included in the total is given in brackets. 
2- This decision was issued under Art. 11. 
3- In 1987,31 of these decisions were issued under Art. 11(5), whilst 11 were made under 
Art. 14(3). 
4- In 1985,1,043 of these resolutions were notifications. 
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APPENDIX C 
THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITION 
"A lawyer who has not studied economics.... is very apt to become a public 
enemy. " 1 
A)INTRODUCTION 
The principles of the free market dominate most Western economies and central to the 
free market system is the concept of competition. An understanding of the law relating 
to competition is virtually impossible without some appreciation of the economic 
theories and principles which support the legal regulation. Thus, it is intended within 
this appendix to place competition law within its economic context, providing an 
overview of the central theories and concepts relating to competition. In particular the 
meaning and functions of competition will be examined. 
A very basic definition of competition involves a contentious striving for 
superiority which, in commercial terms, can be seen as a struggle for custom and 
business in the market-place. Similarly, the primary objective of competition policy 
may be defined as the promotion of effective, rivalrous competition under conditions 
of uncertainty whilst preventing abuse of market power and thereby protecting 
consumers. However, further scrutiny reveals that, beneath these simple definitions, 
the meaning and functions of competition and competition law are the subject of a 
highly complicated and often confusing economic debate. Thus, it is important from 
the outset to recognise the problematic nature of the economics surrounding 
competition law and realise that a study of this area invariably raises more questions 
than it answers. Economists themselves cannot agree and often interpret the same 
facts differently resulting in diverging policy recommendations. Similarly, different 
economic theories attribute competition law with different aims. Moreover, many of 
these established theortical frameworks do not readily translate into practical 
competition policies. The notion that competition law has been ascribed many 
different and frequently conflicting economic, political and social goals and the ensuing 
problems are themes that have been discussed in the course of this research. However, 
to reduce this subject to comprehensible terms some of the more important, recurring 
concepts and aims of competition will be highlighted here 2. 
The next two sections will broadly question what antitrust rules are all about. 
This discussion of the objectives of competition will be considered under its economic 
and non-economic aims. 
B)ECONOMIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW3 
In order to discover what, in economic terms, competition rules seek to achieve, some 
of the main economic theories will be examined to discover what aims they ascribe to 
competition and the type of competition policy normally associated with that particular 
economic theory. All economies however organised must decide how resources, in 
terms of goods and services, are to be allocated. Economists have identified two 
chief aims of resource allocation ; efficiency and equity. It is this notion of efficiency 
which dominates the economic aims of competition law. Efficiency may simply be 
defined as achieving maximum output from the resources available to the economy, 
but as will be demonstrated, each economic approach defines efficiency differently 
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which in turn affects its role within competition policy and the overall application of 
that policy in the real world. It seems that economists have little to contribute 
regarding the concept of equity. Indeed, whether any competition policy can achieve 
such an objective is controversial and has been examined in Chapter One 4. 
The chief economic forces shaping competition law must now be considered. 
One of the most influential economic theories ever postulated was that of Adam 
Smith's s, who suggested that the forces of competition, the "Invisible Hand", could 
bring about the reconciliation of individual, uncoordinated, self-interested behaviour 
with the general social good. This argument still possesses tremendous force and is 
the basis of modern mainstream economics 6. 
1)Neo-Classical Economics 
This mainstream school of economic thought has spawned several different versions, 
each influencing the objectives of competition in different ways. Some of these 
variations will be dealt with below'. 
a) The Orthodox Approach 
In essence, this approach is the basic law of supply and demand. Here the goal is the 
maximisation of consumer welfare $. This is done under conditions of perfect 
competition '. Given such conditions, allocative efficiency results. This is an ideal 
state in which all resources in all markets are allocated to their first-best use in view of 
consumers' wants and willingness to pay the price. Here, the fewest resources are used 
to produce the goods and satisfy consumers' demands. This is termed productive 
efficiency The economically efficient or optimal level of output is reached when the 
marginal cost 1° is equal to the price that consumers are willing to pay and so the 
system achieves equilibrium. Thus, the aggregate effect of allocative and productive 
efficiency is the maximisation of society's wealth. In sum, this modern version of 
Smith's "Invisible Hand" measures efficiency in terms of consumer welfare which is 
maximised through output decisions constrained by competitive pressures which push 
prices down to marginal cost and produce efficient levels of output. Further 
advantages flow from perfect competition. In the long-term, the mechanism of free 
market entry ensures the elimination of any excess profits and encourages producers to 
research and innovate. As can be seen, the concept of competition under this model is 
limited ; rivalry as such does not exist as each firm faces the market rather than 
identifiable rivals 
The situation under monopoly conditions is very different. The monopolist is 
responsible for total output and, through the mechanism of supply and demand, he is in 
a position to affect market price. Moreover, the absence of competition gives him no 
incentive to minimise his costs. The result is allocative and productive inefficiency, 
the taking of supra-competitive profits and an overall loss to society sometimes 
known as the "welfare cost of monopoly" 12. 
However, orthodox economics suffers from fundamental limitations. The most 
important criticism is that perfect competition is unrealistic and unattainable as perfect 
competition and pure monopoly rarely occur. Furthermore, it assumes that all 
businessmen act rationally and aim to maximise profits. But, this is not necessarily so. 
Moreover, because it is based on a static model of behaviour, this theory fails to take 
account of the dynamic nature of markets. Finally, the 'Second Best' theory argues 
that given that perfect competition is unattainable, to aim for a second best solution, 
that is the best position actually achievable, could well be extremely dangerous as it 
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may exacerbate allocative inefficiency and harm consumer welfare. In terms of 
competition law, the implication is that by dealing with a market failure in one sector 
of the economy, the goverment may create another elsewhere. As well as possessing 
thoeretical limitations, orthodox economics produces an equally limited competition 
policy. Here the only goal of competition law is to improve allocative efficiency and 
thereby enhance consumer welfare. Thus, proponents argue that antitrust should 
govern only conduct which artifically lowers and thus impairs consumer welfare. So, 
competition law would challenge only inefficient conduct and inefficiency would be 
measured by that firm's power to restrict output. Consequently, antitrust policy would 
probably be aimed at monopolies, oligopolies cartels and possibly mergers. However, 
the restrictive definition many neo-classical economists place on a producer's ability to 
control and limit his output means that very few acts would actually be challenged 
under this theory ". 
b) The Chicago School 
In recent decades, this formidable variation of neo-classical theory has dominated 
economic analysis, particularly in the US, and has generated considerable literature and 
heated debate. Chicago economists have challenged many dearly held tenets of 
competition law, and in particular, have swept aside as irrelevant, and indeed positively 
harmful, the socio-political values which have informed so much of antitrust thinking 
this century. Similarly, they have de-emphasised traditional problems relating to 
market structures, concentrations, vertical integration and exclusive dealing. As 
Fox ", succinctly remarks, the main gap between Chicago and its critics is its social 
and political philosophy 15. 
For Chicago economists, the exclusive goal is allocative efficiency thereby 
enhancing consumer welfare and maximising the nation's wealth. However, Chicago 
does not use consumer welfare in the orthodox sense but instead argues that what is 
good for big business is good for the consumer. Thus, the Chicago solution is to give 
maximum autonomy to private business. Chicagoists argue that to inhibit the 
promotion of efficiency in order to assist rivals imposes a tax on efficiency for the 
purpose of subsidising the inept. Consequently, Chicago analysis first examines a 
firm's cost/price ratio to determine whether it possesses market power with a high 
differential indicating such power. Where market power exists, whether such power is 
temporary or enduring is then assessed. Only where market power persists does 
intervention occur. However, Chicago is largely sceptical of market power believing it 
to be invariably temporary. This chiefly arises from their belief that generally entry 
barriers 16 are low and that all firms possess perfect information on the costs and 
benefits of entering a market. Thus, in such a situation, the threat of new competition 
will operate to discipline incumbent firms and prevent them from misusing their power. 
So for Chicagoists, the market is self-correcting ". 
Clearly this restrictive approach leaves only a minimal role for antitrust. 
Translated into actual competition policy, the approach would be extremely non- 
interventionist and only in instances of traditional price-fixing or market sharing cartels 
and some large horizontal mergers would inervention be required. Competition 
authorities would also be concerned with any other artificial entry barriers which were 
not forms of superior efficiency and which prevented the market mechanism from 
eroding those market positions not based on superior efficiency 18. 
There has been considerable criticism of Chicago. On economic grounds, it 
has been criticised as unduly assuming that everyone possesses perfect information and 
as being too static and therefore underestimating the dynamic aspects of many business 
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practices. The political basis has also been challenged. Fox 19, in particular, criticises 
the view that efficiency has been, or ever should be, the sole aim of antitrust and 
considers that such economic arguments mask political value judgements. She asserts 
that choosing efficiency as the fulcrum of the Chicsgo paradigm and giving it a narrow 
definition reflects a political philosophy which wishes to ensure that antitrust 
enforcement is sidelined on the basis that a non-interventionist approach is cheap, 
predictable and secures considerable autonomy for big business. As a result of this 
criticism, there is, in the USA, a growing reaction against Chicago labelled the 
'nouvelle vague' which embraces many traditional values whilst attempting to develop 
more dynamic theories on strategic behaviour and predation. However, the extent of 
its influence on antitrust and its ability to sweep aside Chicago economics are, as yet, 
unknown 20. 
2)The Structure-Conduct-Performance Approach/The Harvard School 
The deficiencies of orthodox theory have encouraged other approaches to economic 
analysis. The structure-conduct-performance approach, first outlined by Mason in 
1937, argues that there is a direct causal link between the structure of an industry, its 
conduct and the quality of its economic performance. Harvard's main argument is that 
profitability is positively related to the level of seller concentration, the height of entry 
barriers, the extent of product differentiation and the rate of the growth of demand. 
Harvard economists use complicated statistics to measure the relationship between 
these concepts and thereby attempt to identify those structural factors which lead to 
unacceptable behaviour and those which promote satisfactory performance Z'. 
A competition policy based on this approach would operate with the above 
economic concepts in mind, and where industry structure was wrong, intervention 
would be necessary to deconcentrate the market. Where conduct was at fault, 
intervention would probably take the form of requiring the registration of restrictive 
practices 22. 
However, whilst several studies do demonstrate a positive link between 
concentration and profit levels, this economic paradigm suffers from several 
deficiencies. The Chicago school has criticised Harvard at every stage. Chicagoists 
argue that market structure alone cannot be used to indicate market power and 
comment that if a certain structure is an historically inherent product of the market 
mechanism, then deconcentration will be futile, as in time, the market will restore the 
structure. Chicago economists are equally critical of the conduct aspect, believing that 
little scope exists for intervention to control restrictive practices. Finally, market 
performance, usually measured by accounting profits, yields only obscure, vague and 
often conflicting information and therefore fails to provide a secure basis for 
intervention. The statistical methods used have been criticised by many as being 
indirect and circumstantial and thus failing to explain directly the strength of 
competition in a market. Such measurements fail to say anything conclusive about the 
competitive process itself giving no indication of how hard firms are competing and 
whether the competition is aggressive or passive. Moreover, many feel this approach 
defective as it is uni-directional and takes no account of the way in which performance 
may impact on structure and conduct. Another fundamental objection is the 
ambiguity, and consequently problematic interpretation, of these statistical 
measurements. Demetz " in particular, has demonstrated that the same factual 
relationship between concentration and profits could arise from an entirely different, 
and indeed beneficial mechanism, reflecting satisfactory market operation. 
Unfortunately, thus far, no conclusive test has been developed enabling economists to 
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ascertain the true situation. So whilst this approach may have clarified some of the 
issues involved, it does not at present appear to afford a reliable foundation for 
competition policy 24. 
3)Workable Competition 
Another response to the inadequacies of mainstream economics has been the theory of 
'workable competition' which accepts that perfect competition is unattainable and 
instead aims to achieve the best competitive arrangement practically possible. It is 
argued that a workably competitive market structure will produce beneficial effects in 
terms of conduct and performance. A competition policy based on this concept would 
seek to maintain a workably competitive enviroment by controlling abuse of market 
position by dominant firms, monitoring mergers which concentrate markets and 
preventing firms entering restrictive agreements which possess no beneficial effects u. 
However, this approach is limited. Economic analysis has failed to formulate 
suitable criteria for workable competition and thus this concept has been criticised as 
vague and unworkable. Moreover, many structural and behavioural norms that have 
been identified as requisite elements of a workably competitive industry are 
approximations of perfect competition and are therefore subject to crticism under the 
'Second Best' theory 26. 
4)Contestability 
The theory of 'contestable markets' provides a radical departure from traditional 
approaches. The details of the theory are complex. Thus, only the key elements will 
be discussed here 27. The central feature of contestability is that a market should be 
vulnerable to competitive forces even when occupied by a monopolist/oligopolist so 
that potential entry or competition for the market will discipline behaviour as 
efficiently as actual competition within the market and thus ensure an optimal 
allocation of resources. In order to achieve this type of control, contestability focuses 
on two main concepts : entry barriers and sunk costs. In a perfectly contestable 
market, entry to the market must be possible and profitable. Indeed, both entry and 
exit should free and easy, thus allowing incumbents and new entrants to compete on 
equal terms and enabling firms to exit an industry without loss when profitable 
opportunites disappear. This theory believes that often many entry barriers are less 
problematic than is usually believed and that the real major deterrent to entry is sunk 
costs. These are non-recoverable costs which cannot be eliminated even by the 
cessation of prodution. Clearly, where sunk costs are low, entry to the market is easy 
and the threat of potential competition increases commensurately thereby disciplining 
the incumbent firms and encouraging economic effiency. Clearly then, contestability 
provides a new benchmark to the unattainable standard of perfect competition. A 
perfectly contestable market need not be a perfectly competitive one. Consequently, 
this theory is more readily applicable to the real world. Furthermore, contestability 
alters the focus of competition policy. Intervention is not necessarily directed at the 
market itself but at market parameters. So providing a market is contestable, previous 
contra-indications of effective competition are irrelevant and intervention is not 
required. Only where markets are not contestable is goverment intervention necessary. 
This would take the form of ensuring low entry barriers and the reduction of sunk 
costs. This could be achieved by having sunk costs borne by the goverment or by 
leased or shared use of these cost committments. Plainly, contestability's radically 
different focus has major implications for the concept of competition and the form and 
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functions of competition law and policy. However, as this approach is a relatively new 
one, it is unclear how significant the theory will be in the formulation of modern 
competition policy '. 
5)The Austrian Approach 
The Austrian approach which has found favour with recent Conservative goverments 
in the UK, argues that capitalist economies must be viewed in dynamic terms. Here 
competition is seen as a process where markets are in disequilibrium, where no-one 
possesses perfect information and different firms have differing abilities. A central 
concept is the entrepreneur who employs creativity and foresight to earn profits and 
thus provides the driving force of the capitalist system '. 
A competition policy based on this approach would be essentially non- 
interventionist : direct intervention is regarded as highly damaging. A fundamental aim 
of antitrust policy would be to secure the free functioning of the market which is seen 
as vital to long-term growth and prosperity. Thus, competition law would seek to 
promote entrepreneurship by encouraging initiative and enterprise and ensuring that 
markets are allowed to transmit the right signals in terms of reward and opportunity. 
As profits are seen here as reward for initiative, all policies to eliminate excess profits 
would be eschewed. So, in general, no action would be taken against monopolies or 
restrictive practices 30. 
C)NON-ECONOMIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW 
A traditional approach to the concept of competition is the populist view influential in 
the US for many decades. This view rests on a distrust of corporate power which is 
considered a threat to democracy, individual freedom of choice and economic 
opportunity. Big business is seen as being responsible for many of society's problems ; 
enviromental destruction, the hindering of technical progress, the extraction of supra- 
competitive profits at the consumer's expense and the extinction of small businesses. 
In the US, these beliefs led to an aggressive, interventionist competition policy aimed 
at the promotion of economic equity rather than economic efficiency, central themes 
being the dispersal of power and the redistribution of wealth, and the protection of 
consumers from abuse and small firms against powerful rivals 31. 
Competition law has been assigned other social and political functions. For 
instance, it may be used to pursue policies on such issues as regional development and 
unempolyment. A particularly important function of competition law is as a political 
tool used by goverments of all political philosophies. Currently, it is being employed 
by the EC to achieve single market integration. It is also used by big business as a 
political strategy to maximise autonomy and eradicate competition by injuring rivals 'Z. 
1)Competition as a Process 
Many of the above themes are unified in the traditional notion of competition as a 
process. This approach was castigated and discarded by the Chicago economists, but 
is now being reaffirmed as part of the current reaction against the Chicago paradigm. 
The notion of competition as an ongoing, strategic process views competition law as 
dynamic and fluid and embodying many political, economic and social functions. The 
overall aim of this approach is to create an enviroment conducive to rivalrous 
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competition, thus producing competitive pressures of varying types and degrees. The 
resulting competitive struggle will ensure that firms operate efficiently in order to 
survive and will offer consumers considerable protection from exploitation. This 
approach perceives markets as inherently imperfect and in constant disequilibrium and 
new entrants to the markets as vital sources of energy and progress 33. Competition 
policy based on this approach would seek to promote competition by keeping markets 
fluid and open, encouraging diversity, maintaining low entry barriers and providing 
greater opportunities for entry. This process places consumer interests as central, but 
also seeks to integrate other non-economic and economic goals, according economic 
analysis and the notion of efficiency subordinate roles by using them to achieve open 
markets, the dispersal of power and the freedom to compete on the merits 34 
D)CONCLUSION 
It can be seen fom this brief examination that the central economic aim of antitrust is 
the promotion of efficiency. However, beyond this there is no consensus with 
different economic theories defining efficiency differently. Indeed, there is little 
agreement on even the basic concept of competition or which forms of market 
behaviour are anti-competitive and how best to tackle these problems. Moreover, 
inherent difficulties exist in measuring whether the right amount and type of 
competition has been achieved. Furthermore, the role of non-economic values within 
antitrust is unclear and particularly contentious. Numerous, often conflicting, 
objectives are ascribed to competition law with no agreement on which of these non- 
economic factors should be validly considered or their relative weight within the 
decision-making process. Although, this conflict within competition law may not be so 
much about striving towards a particular goal as who makes the important economic 
decisions This in itself raises problems. If there is any consensus to be gleaned from 
the above economic approaches in terms of competition policy, it would seem to be 
that direct intervention is believed to be less effective than relying on market 
mechanisms. The general belief is that competition is best promoted by seeking to 
ensure that the dynamics and discipline of the market mechanism are permitted to 
work unimpeded. This is achieved by focusing on market parameters thus ensuring 
that the market is disciplined by an absence of entry barriers 3s 
Most importantly it must be recognised that competition is an elusive, multi- 
faceted concept which raises many complex issues to which there seem to be no clear 
answers. The definition and objectives of competition seem almost infinite. Arguments 
persist regarding the concept and role of efficiency and the inclusion of non-economic 
values in the equation. Moreover, the difficulties and conflicts involved in formulating 
an effective means of regulation raise doubts as to the justiciability of competition 
issues 36. Yet, competition is so fundamental to the successful working of so many 
economies that it is vitally important that this concept and how it is applied in practice 
are fully understood. In conclusion, McNulty 37, eloquently summarises the findings 
of this appendix : 
"... there is probably no concept in all of economics that is at once more 
fundamental and pervasive, yet less satisfactorily developed than the 
concept of competition. " 
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APPENDIX D 
THE ANGLO-SAXON PERSPECTIVE 
"Nothing is illegal if a hundred businessmen decide to do it. " ' 
A)INTRODUCTION 
This appendix will undertake an evaluation of the classification and enforcement of 
competition law in the UK, examining the scope and application of enforcement 
powers and defence rights and their effectiveness in securing policy goals. Limitations 
of space mean that is only possible to review the approach under the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act 1976 (RTPA) Z. This appendix will follow the same format as 
used in the main text. First, the goals of UK antitrust and the guidance available to UK 
enforcers will be examined. Then, the legislation and the institutions involved in 
enforcement will be outlined. Finally, the enforcement process will be evaluated. 
B)GOALS AND GUIDANCE 
1)Guidance 
As with most jurisdictions, the UK chooses not to define competition, to provide 
explicit guidance on decision-making, or to enumerate policy goals. But, it is clear 
from official reports that competition is regarded as important in promoting economic 
welfare by providing a spur to efficiency and enhancing consumer sovereignty 3. 
Little guidance exists to aid decision-makers. Some official booklets giving 
guidance to industry have been issued 4. They are not legally binding and the UK's 
emphasis on pragmatic decision-making means that there is no guarentee that the 
guidance given in the booklets will be followed by the OFT. Additional guidance is 
provided in the Director General's (DG) Annual Reports, but is normally very general 
in character. Various reports do discuss further the criteria applied in selecting 
agreements for exemption under s. 21(2) RTPA, where restrictions are not significant 
S. The Reports make clear that the DG's approach is pragmatic with each case being 
examined on its merits, considerind whether competition is restricted or public 
detriment results 6. 
In face of the UK's pragmatic approach to decision-making, the goals of UK 
competition policy are difficult to identify. This has resulted in there being no coherent 
approach to UK competition policy'. Some goals can be detected and these will be 
outlined below. Discussion is necessarily brief as it is a feature of UK competition law 
that scant information is available on the subject. 
2)Economic/Non-Economic Goals 
a)Politics 
Whilst there is no clear mandate requiring UK competition authorities to adhere to any 
particular economic theory, the recent Conservative goverment's strong emphasis on 
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free market enterprise, clearly linked to the Austrian economic theory, means that 
competition decisions will inevitably reflect this political ideology 8. Consequently, the 
UK is strongly committed to promoting competition in all spheres. This has had 
considerable impact on the UK's competitive enviroment, resulting in a programme of 
privatisation and the removal of all restrictions and barriers on competition allowing 
entrepreneurs to operate and flourish. As such, this desire to maximise business 
freedom forms a clear political goal of UK competition enforcement 
b)Contsunier Sovereignty 
A further fundamental aim of UK policy is the enhancement of consumer sovreignty. 
On several occasions, the DG has discussed how competition policy and consumer 
protection complement each other 10. He has argued that the competitive process only 
works efficiently when consumers can make informed choices regarding their 
purchases, thereby requiring suppliers to meet those demands and resulting allocative 
efficiency. Moreover, that consumers exercise their rights of redress is regarded as an 
important part of the process " 
c)Pragmatism 
Whilst the economic objectives of UK competition policy are significant, of 
considerable importance in the UK is the non-economic goal of pragmatism. Although 
this more an approach to decision-making than an objective, within the UK, the cost- 
efficient, non-adversarial negotiation of competition issues is seen as an end in itself 
and it dominates most UK decision-making. Official reports time and again endorse 
pragmatism as the only approach to competition decisions. It is regarded as essential 
to ensuring flexibility and allowing competition policy to adapt to political and 
commercial developments 'Z. As a result, great emphasis is placed on the low-key, 
conciliatory resolution of competition matters. This pragmatic approach is not only 
cost-effective, but is also consistent with the prevailing political ideology's deference 
to entrepreneurial freedom. 
At the basis of this pragmatic approach is the concept of public interest and 
UK competiton law's insistence that each case is assessed individually against the 
public interest. Borne acknowledges that it is a "difficult and controversial" concept, 
but argues that its paramouncy within the UK system ensures adaptability and 
vitality 13. Little formal guidance on what constitutes the public interest exists, leaving 
considerable discretion in framing the ambit of this concept 14. Furthermore, the 
pragmatic implementation of competition law ensures that the definition of the public 
interest is not immutable. The amount of discretion at work within UK competition 
policy seems to be increasing. O'Brien argues that behind the facade of form-based 
legislation, there has been a "silent revolution" in the operation of UK competition 
policy from a very legalistic approach to a highly discretionary process 15. So, 
although reform of UK competition law is imminent, the pragmatic nature of UK 
decision-making may well remain unchanged. Indeed, Borrie has indicated that 
competition law must remain flexible, striking a balance between economic efficiency 
and fairness. He warns that competition must never be regarded as an end in itself and 
that the public interest must always remain paramount 16. Inevitably this discretionary, 
pragmatic approach brings with it problems. It creates uncertainty and may result in 
inequality, bringing it into direct conflict with articulated goals of fairness and 
transparency. Moreover, the very flexibility of the approach ensures that there is no 
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clear standard against which to assess the equity and consistency of UK competition 
decisions ". 
3)Conclusion 
Like other systems, the UK fails to define competition, to make explicit its chosen 
goals or to provide clear guidance on decision-making. Like the US, the UK has no 
counterpart to the EC's objective of market integration. The most notable goal in the 
UK is its insistence on a non-adversarial approach to enforcement, making pragmatism 
itself a vital aim of UK competition law. 
In comparison with other systems, the UK places very little emphasis on 
economic efficiency. Whilst efficiency is broadly endorsed as part of the prevailing 
political ideology, the UK's emphasis on public interest makes it difficult to identify 
efficiency as a precise objective of UK antitrust, considerably reducing its significance 
as a specific goal of UK law. 
The UK's approach to non-efficiency goals also differs somewhat from other 
systems. Its primary focus on pragmatic decision-making is of such extent that it 
masks the other aims of UK antitrust. 
But, much common ground exists with other jurisdictions. Like other 
processes, political and pragmatic needs form clear aims of enforcement. In the UK, 
the political goal may be viewed in terms of the needs of the prevailing political 
ideology. Like other systems, the UK faces resource shortages which obliges it to 
apply antitrust rule cost-efficiently. But, in addition to and quite apart from resource 
considerations, the UK culture places great emphasis on the non-adversarial resolution 
of all defferences, thus making the needs of pragmatism its primary focus 
C)LEGISLATION - RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1976 '8 
Broadly, this Act requires certain restrictive agreements involving collusive behaviour 
to be registered with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). Unless the parties are able and 
willing to modify the agreement, the Director General (DG), with some exceptions, 
must refer the agreement to the Restrictive Practices Court (RPC) for a decision 19. 
1)Registrable Agreements 
Generally, the RTPA deals with horizontal rather than vertical restraints. Indeed, the 
Act exempts from registration many common types of vertical agreement 20. Four 
categories of restrictive agreement relating to the supply of goods or services and 
information agreements on goods or services are registrable under the Act 21. Any 
agreement which is caught partially by one provision and partially by another is not 
registrable as the sections are discrete and not cumulative 22 
a)Restrictive Agreements Relating to Goods 2l 
Section 6(1) deals with agreements relating to the supply of goods which contain 
restrictions regarding price-fixing, market sharing, terms and conditions and with 
whom to deal. The main elements of s. 6 will be briefly outlined 24 
i)Agreement 
As with similar legislation, the offending conduct must be the result of some form of 
agreement. Whilst the precise scope of this requirement has been the subject of 
recurring controversy, the Act and subsequent caselaw make it clear that the entire 
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spectrum from formal agreement to informal arrangements and practices are 
registrable where the essential elements of mutual rights and obligations exist 25. 
ii)Restriction 
For an agreement to be registrable, two parties must accept a restriction 26. Again, 
problems of scope exist. Whilst the Act provides that a restriction includes a negative 
obligation, problems abound, particularly in determining whether a positive contractual 
obligation imposes a registrable restriction 27. The Court's attitude has been to place a 
narrow construction on this requirement '. 
iii) Two or more persons carrying on business within the UK 
To be registrable, the agreement must be between two or more persons carrying on 
business within the UK. Where only one party operates within the UK, whilst not 
registrable under the RTPA, the agreement may be subject to investigation under other 
legislation 29. In addition, the restraints must be accepted by at least two parties to the 
agreement. These parties need not carry out business within the UK, providing at least 
two other parties to the arrangement do. 
b)Exemption from Registration 
A further complication is that some agreements which would otherwise be registrable 
are exempted from registration under ss. 9 and 28 RTPA. Section 9 requires that 
certain restrictions be disregarded when determining the registrability of the 
agreement. The most important provisions are ss. 9(3), 9(4), both of which are highly 
complex and the subject of some debate. - Section 9(3) provides that any term relating 
exclusively to the goods supplied should be disregarded. However, s. 9(4) states that 
where there is also a horizontal restriction, s. 9(3) does not apply. Thus, these 
subsections reflect the Act's overall concern with horizontal rather than vertical 
restraints, by clearly facilitating the imposition of vertical restrictions, particularly 
territorial restraints. This position is in stark contrast to the European 
Commission's tough stance against export bans 30 
In addition, s. 28 exempts certain types of agreement listed in Schedule 3. This 
provision bears some similarity to EC block exemptions 31. 
D)INSTITUTIONS 
One of the central features of UK competition law is the excessive number of 
institutions concerned with its application and enforcement. Those concerned with the 
enforcement of restrictive trade practices will be reviewed below. 
1)Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
This department is headed by the DG and is the main body concerned with 
competition policy 'Z. The DG has come to play an increasingly central role in the 
formulation, implementation and enforcement of competition law. One important 
feature is the DG's independence from the government in many areas. Thus, he may 
personally instigate monopoly and competition references, though elsewhere, he may 
only advise the Minister 33. In relation to the RTPA, the DG maintains a register of 
agreements. Where appropriate, he refers these agreements to the RPC. One of the 
DG's most valuable functions is in maintaining the UK's pragmatic approach to 
enforcement, by obtaining the amendment or abandonment of anti-competitive 
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restraints and securing undertakings from firms as to their future behaviour 34. In 
addition, the OFT liases with the European Commission on EC competition matters 3s 
2)Restrictive Practices Court (RPC) 36 
The RPC is of compound composition 37. Their role is to decide whether restrictive 
practices and rpm are in the public interest. In practice, firms' unwillingness to defend 
their agreements in court has meant that the RPC's role in competition policy has 
atrophied 38. 
3)Secretary of State 
The UK system of competition law is headed by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry who exercises many important powers 39. In relation to restrictive practices, 
he may authorise the DG's s. 21(2) directions and may exempt from enforcement 
agreements of national importance 40. 
4)Civil Courts 
The High Court may be used to invoke the common law restraint of trade doctrine and 
to take private actions for damages where loss resulting from anti-competitive conduct 
has been suffered 4'. In addition, RPC decisions may be appealed to the Court of 
Appeal on points of law. Where appropriate, further appeal to the House of Lords is 
possible. 
E)ENFORCEMENT PROCESS - INVESTIGATION 42 
The remainder of the appendix will examine the enforcement process under the RTPA. 
Unfortunately, the current state of UK enforcement policy means that there is a 
general lack of information and critical commentary on UK competition law. 
However, as with other jurisdictions, the evaluation will attempt to assess the 
character and scope of enforcement powers and defence rights. Consideration will be 
given to whether and how these powers and protections are used as enforcement 
resources. 
This section will assess the initial stages of the enforcement process 
considering the DG's investigation powers. Defence rights will then be discussed. 
1)Registration 
Details of registrable agreements must be forwarded to the DG who keeps a register 
which is open to public inspection 43. The public nature of the register is extremely 
unpopular with industry. Anticipated reforms would abolish this 44. Currently, 
provisions do exist to allow confidential information to be withheld from public 
inspection 45. Where there are doubts over registrability, the OFT may be notified 
under the 'fail-safe' procedure, whilst reserving the question of registrability. This 
effectively passes the problem over to the OFT. Not surprisingly, the OFT has some 
reservations about this procedure, particularly as it may be used to notify the OFT of 
unmeritorious agreements. As the parties here have complied with their obligation to 
furnish particulars, these arrangements would be legally enforceable 46. Numbers of 
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agreements submitted for registration have steadily increased. In 1980,123 
agreements were submitted for registration compared with 1,251 in 1993 47. 
Where parties fail to register a registrable agreement, certain consequences 
ensue. Firstly, the agreement is void in respect of the restrictions and cannot be 
enforced 48. Moreover, the arrangement cannot be defended before the RPC 49. Most 
importantly, the DG may apply to the RPC for a's. 35 order' requiring the cessation of 
the agreement or any other unregistered registrable agreement 50. Breach of the 
injunction is punishable as a contempt of court. Finally, whilst s. 35(2) makes it clear 
that failure to register is not a criminal matter, the parties involved may be sued for 
breach of statutory duty by anyone injured by the agreement. Problems of proof and 
quantum mean that actions are rarely brought and have, thus far, never been 
successful S'. 
2)Fact-Finding Powers 
In order to uncover covert cartels, the DG has certain, rather limited, fact-finding 
powers. Where he has reasonable cause to believe that a person is a party to an 
unregistered registrable agreement, he can serve a notice requiring that person to 
furnish particulars of any registrable agreements to which he is a party. The DG can 
also apply to the RPC for the party to be cross-examined under oath 52. Criminal 
penalties exist for parties who fail to comply with a s. 36 notice or who provide false 
information ". In addition, the DG may send a less formal 'polite inquiry' to the party. 
Such letters have no legal force and parties are not obliged to reply. It should be 
noted that this comprises the full range of investigation powers available to the DG. 
No power of search is granted s4 
Walker-Smith details a range of factors which govern the OFT's use of s. 36 
powers in detecting cartels. Broadly, the OFT will examine a number of structural and 
organisational factors which should indicate the likelihood of a cartel being in 
operation and which would facilitate the organisation, policing and maintenance of 
that cartel ". It is interesting to note that these criteria are largely economic in nature 
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In practice, the application of the OFT's investigation powers has varied 
considerably. During the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a steady increase in the use 
of s. 36 notices S". More recently, the use of these powers has waned dramatically. 
For instance, in 1993, whilst the OFT began 50 new investigations, only ten s. 36 
notices were issued that year S8. Even less use has been made of s. 37 and s. 38 
powers. Both sections have been employed only once 5. The sparing use of these 
fact-finding powers is in stark contrast to the increasing number of complaints of anti- 
competitive behaviour received by the OFT 60. 
A major problem has been the requirement that the DG must establish a 
reasonable belief in the existence of a covert agreement before a s. 36 notice can be 
issued. The Court of Appeal have taken a strict approach to this, insisting that the DG 
must adduce strong prima facie evidence of improper conduct 61. Consequently, in 
several recent cases, the DG has encountered difficulty in acquiring sufficient detailed 
information to obtain a s. 36 notice '. The Court's restrictive interpretation has a 
further consequence. Where the DG is unable to obtain a s. 36 notice, his other 
powers under s. 37 and s. 38 simply do not come into play. Combined with the absence 
of search powers, this situation makes it extremely difficult for the OFT to acquire 
sufficient evidence to take action under the RTPA. A number of commentators, 
including the DG himself, have criticised the unsatisfactory nature of these 
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investigation powers 63. Indeed, Robertson notes that the provisions appear to be 
designed to assist evasion of competition rules '. 
3)Defence Rights 6s 
As with other jurisdictions reviewed, the existence and scope of the defendant's rights 
of silence and confidentiality at investigation will be examined here. 
a)Self Incrimination 
No mention is made of this safeguard in the RTPA. But, the civil litigation setting of 
the legislation means that rules of civil procedure apply. This privilege is restricted in 
English civil proceedings. Evidential rules provide that this safeguard only applies in 
relation to criminal charges and penalties '. Section 35(2) states that a failure to 
register is not a criminal matter. More importantly, only the sanction of voidness may 
be imposed under the RTPA. This is clearly non-penal in nature. Thus, the defendant is 
not afforded any protection under these procedural rules. Moreover, the privilege 
does not generally apply to statutory requirements, like s. 36, ordering disclosure 67. 
Thus, in RTPA enforcement, the defendant is afforded no protection against self 
incrimination. Indeed, the legislation places him under a duty to co-operate. The fact 
that this may require defendants to reveal details of prohibited conduct will not justify 
non-disclosure. This obligation is reinforced by penalties 68 . In practice, the defendant's right to silence at investigation has provoked little 
interest or concern. No caselaw exists discussing this right and there is little critical 
review of such issues. Indeed, the OFT has never employed its power to sanction non- 
cooperation. 
b)Confidentiality 
As elsewhere, the defendant's right to confidentiality will be examined in the context of 
legal professional privilege 
Again the rules of civil procedure govern this safeguard. These rules afford 
substantive protection to lawyer-client communications made for the purpose of giving 
or receiving legal advice, even before litigation is contemplated. Once litigation has 
commenced, a broader immunity exists to protect documents coming into existence for 
the specific purpose of the litigation 69. Disputes over the scope of privilege are 
decided by the Court. In contrast to the EC position, English law extends this 
protection to cover communications between in-house lawyers and other members of 
the firm 70. 
Once again, there is an absence of reported cases and information on the 
practical application of this protection within RTPA enforcement, making it difficult to 
assess its effectiveness. 
4)Conclusion - Investigation 
In summary, this account illustrates that the ambit and application of UK investigation 
powers are limited, particularly in comparison with those encountered in EC and US 
jurisdictions. The absence of search powers, the curtailed use of s. 36 and the 
preference for informal enquiries reveal the administrative, non-adversarial character 
of UK restrictive trade practices enforcement. Indeed, Walker-Smith asserts that these 
powers are not strictly investigatory, but are merely an enforcement mechanism to 
support the legislative requirements regarding registration ". It is perhaps 
incongruous that in such a clearly administrative context the DG's s. 36 powers should 
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be subject to the criminal control of 'reasonable belief. It seems that this control 
reflects a basic political desire not to interfere unnecessarily in the business affairs of 
individuals 72. Certainly elsewhere, the tenor of the legislation illustrates the political 
belief that cartels are not criminal. Thus, it appears that, in the UK, the law is 
interpreted and applied to promote that view. The formalism of the RTPA, the 
generous time limits and confidentiality provisions of the Deregulation Act, the 'fail- 
safe' procedure and the 'reasonable belief control of s. 36 all operate in favour of the 
defendant and therefore serve to maintain freedom of business conduct. Ultimately, it 
is this political belief which underpins the pragmatic conciliatory approach that is so 
characteristic of UK competition enforcement. 
The RTPA's non-adversarial approach to enforcement is also evident in the 
classification, scope and application of defence rights. At investigation, the 
characterisation of defendants' safeguards is essentially administrative in nature. Their 
existence and scope are governed by civil procedural rules. Consequently, a privilege 
against self incrimination is non-existent. In its place is a duty to co-operate. Whilst 
sanctions for a refusal to assist are penal in nature, the OFT's failure to exact such 
sanctions means that, in practice, they pose little real threat to defendants. In contrast, 
legal professional privilege is recognised as a substantive right. Its broad scope may 
afford defendants some protection in the absence of a right to silence. Any disputes 
over the ambit of this safeguard are decided by an independent arbiter, reinforcing the 
level of protection afforded. The conciliatory approach to enforcement is also 
illustrated in the application of defence rights. Its most noticeable feature is the virtual 
absence of caselaw or concern over defence safeguards and a long-standing refusal to 
penalise non-cooperation under s. 38. This suggests that, as with the interpretation of 
investigation powers, the law is used here to facilitate the pragmatic, non-adversarial 
resolution of enforcement issues. 
Finally, whilst the OFT is clearly in control of the process, the mismatch 
between the OFT's powers and defence rights, noted in other jurisdictions, is not 
apparent here. The central theme of RTPA enforcement is the use of its administrative 
context to encourage a low-key, pragmatic approach to enforcement which is 
consistent with the prevailing political ideology. So, whilst political and pragmatic 
goals remain the central focus of antitrust enforcement, the means of their attainment 
under the RTPA are in marked contrast with zealous approach of the EC and US 
jurisdictions. 
F)PROSECUTION 
This section will first outline the procedure at prosecution and then go on to consider 
the factors affecting the decision to prosecute. Defence rights will then be addressed. 
1)Procedure 
Once registered, the DG is under a duty to refer agreements to the RPC 73. Before 
doing so, the DG may attempt to persuade the parties to withdraw or amend offending 
restrictions. In addition. s. 21 grants the DG a discretion to refrain from bringing 
proceedings in certain cases. The most important provision is s. 21(2) which permits 
evaluation of the arrangement in its economic context 74. 
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2)The Decision to Prosecute 
Whilst some guidelines outlining the DG's likely approach to restrictive practices do 
exist, more potent forces affecting prosecutorial decision-making are the legislative 
format and the prevailing policy goals 75. 
a)Legislative Format 
The format of the RTPA has had a major effect on the decision to prosecute and has 
been subject to trenchant criticism 76. The most serious complaints may be 
summarised as follows. First, the legislation is formalistic and unnecessarily 
complex ". One of the most bizarre aspects of the RTPA's formalistic approach is the 
crossover problem. To be registrable, an agreement must fully satisfy the provisions 
of a particular section. It is not sufficient that it may satisfy particular aspects of 
several sections ; registrability cannot arise cumulatively 78. Often this formalism 
results in manifestly anti-competitive agreements not being registrable because they do 
not fall clearly within one category 79. Moreover, this form-based approach 
encourages avoidance rather than evasion of the rules. Careful drafting can place an 
agreement outside the scope of the Act, largely reducing the effectiveness of the 
legislation 80. This problem has been exacerbated by the Court's restrictive 
interpretation of many elements of the RTPA 81. Formalism has other consequences. 
The complexity of the legislation and the dislike of the public register have led to an 
estrangement of the law and frequent non-compliance. Indeed, the incomprehensibility 
of the rules has created the very legal uncertainty that the form-based legislation 
sought to avoid 82. These problems have led many to dismiss the RTPA as inadequate 
and obsolete. The court-based approach to enforcement has served only to aggravate 
these difficulties and has been denounced as cumbersome and costly 83. Such obstacles 
often discourage parties from defending agreements before the RPC 84. 
b)Prevailing Policy Goals 
The limitations placed on effective enforcement by the legislative format have served 
to highlight the political and pragmatic policy goals underlying RTPA enforcement 85. 
Their overall impact has militated against formal enforcement of the RTPA with the 
result that the application of UK competition rules appears to be in a state of 
suspended animation 86. O'Brien suggests that the reality of UK competition 
enforcement is not that it is non-existent, but that political and pragmatic influences 
have driven it underground. He argues that behind the facade of form-based 
legislation, there has been a "silent revolution" in the operation of UK antitrust, from a 
very legalistic, overt approach to a covert, pragmatic approach 87. He asserts that, 
since 1973, competition legislation has placed increasingly greater power into the 
hands of the DG, to the point where he now plays a pivotal role in the formulation, 
application and enforcement of UK competition law 88. Under the RTPA, this 
pragmatic approach takes place under s. 21(2). Here, the DG's negotiating skills are 
vital in obtaining the amendment of unacceptable restrictions, thereby avoiding the 
need for full scale application of the formalistic element of the law 89. 
The Deregulation Act 1994 has placed even greater emphasis on pragmatic and 
political solutions. Provisions for speeding up the decision-making process via the 
'fast-track' procedure, The increased acceptance of undertakings in lieu of formal 
investigations and the enlargement of the de minimis rule have all enhanced the 
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pragmatic, flexible nature of competition enforcement 90. Deregulation also permits 
greater political influence by taking enforcement issues out of the public arena, thus 
allowing them to be subject to increased centralised political influence 91. The 
essentially political and pragmatic nature of UK competition policy has been noted 
elsewhere 92. As a result of these influences, only 1% of cases are referred to the 
RPC 93. 
Clearly, the formalistic nature of the RTPA and the influence of political and pragmatic 
goals have a major impact on the DG's prosecutorial decision-making. At every point, 
they encourage the pragmatic, informal resolution of restrictive practices. 
3)Informal Resolutions'' 
This section will first evaluate the resolution of cases under s. 21(2). Then, other 
informal processes will be considered. 
a)S. 21(2) 
This section attempts to overcome the RTPA's inflexibility by entitling the Secretary 
of State to discharge the DG from his duty to refer an agreement to the RPC where 
the restrictions "are not of such significance as to call for investigation by the 
Court" 95 
The first stage in the s. 21(2) resolution process involves, sometimes extended, 
negotiations with the OFT to obtain the abandonment or modification of problem 
restrictions. Once only insignificant restrictions remain, the way is clear for a 
representation to the Secretary of State under s. 21(2) 96 
Clearly, of central importance is what constitutes a significant restriction. 
Unfortunately, this term is not defined by the RTPA or by subsequent caselaw. The 
OFT has provided some guidance. The DG has indicated that a restriction will be 
significant if it is detrimental to consumers or traders or results in unfairness or 
discrimination 97. Quite what this encompasses has been the subject of some academic 
debate. Green insists that the assessment of significance is entirely an economic matter 
which does not allow public interest considerations to be taken into account. Other 
commentators, whilst making it clear that an economic evaluation of the market 
context is important, clearly envisage that the assessment may take into account non- 
competition issues 9. Indeed, the DG himself has made it clear that his wider brief of 
ensuring fair trade affects his evaluation of s. 21(2) 1. What is clear is that the OFT's 
evaluation is pragmatic and individual in nature and focuses on the restriction 
involved 10°. In this way, it differs from the EC's de minimis provisions under which 
certain agreements fall outside Art. 85(1) because the agreements themselves are 
economically insignificant. Moreover, under the de minimis doctrine, the guiding 
factors are the size and turnover of the firm involved, whilst s. 21(2) is concerned with 
the nature of the restriction accepted 101. The DG's 1980 Report did provide some 
guidance on the types of arrangement generally regarded as suitable for s. 21(2) 
directions. They include joint ventures and franchises 102 
Once the DG is satisfied that the restrictions are insignificant, a representation 
is submitted to the Secretary of State. This submission takes the form of a detailed 
legal and economic analysis of the agreement 103. Parties have no right to inspect 
the representation. Even where the Secretary of State accepts the insignificance of the 
restrictions, he is not bound to grant the DG directions discharging him from his duty 
to commence proceedings 104. Directions may be withdrawn where there has been a 
material change in circumstances 105 
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In practical terms, s. 21(2) directions are of fundamental importance to RTPA 
enforcement 106. In contrast with the handful of agreements which go before the RPC, 
large numbers of cases are resolved under s. 21(2) 1°7. Sometimes details of s. 21(2) 
directions are mentioned in the DG's Annual Reports. Most recently, the Reports have 
discussed directions granted in respect of the Building Societies Association, and 
agreements by Birmingham Taxi Drivers and the Heating and Ventilating 
Contractors'Association 108. Occasionally, the DG indicates that he wishes to examine 
the effect of an agreement before acting under s. 21(2). This occurred most recently in 
relation to the Switch agreement 109. 
b) Other Informal Processes 
As well as obtaining resolution under s. 21(2), the other provisions of s. 21 provide 
additional means of informal settlement 10. For instance, the DG may negotiate with 
firms to obtain voluntary non-binding assurances as to future conduct, thereby 
avoiding formal proceedings. Most recently, such assurances were received from 
certain firms involved in the milk retailers' price-fixing and collusive tendering 
agreements "'. 
However, there has been some criticism of informal resolutions, particularly those 
occurring under s. 21(2). Whish has condemned the mystery surrounding the 
provision's assessment of 'significance'. He argues that, despite the section's 
fundamental importance to enforcement, scant information is available regarding the 
criteria employed in the evaluation and their relative weight in the assessment of 
individual agreements. He asserts that the information provided is so generalised as 
to be valueless "Z. In addition. the negotiations surrounding s. 21(2) settlements can 
be protracted. Overall, the result is to create extensive legal uncertainty regarding the 
application of s. 21(2) 13. Whish maintains that this legal uncertainty reduces the 
effectiveness of UK competition policy in promoting joint ventures and research and 
development projects under s. 21(2) 14. Finally, whilst it seems that no overt public 
interest assessment by the OFT is permitted under s. 21(2), ultimately, the decision is at 
the Secretary of State's discretion, allowing covert political influences to occur 15. 
4)Defence Rights 116 
This section will evaluate the existence and scope of the defendant's right of 
disclosure and the safeguards available during informal resolution. 
a)Access 
As enforcement of the RTPA takes place in a civil litigation setting, defendants have a 
substantive right to 'discovery'. This process requires the mutual disclosure of all 
relevant, non-privileged material "'. 'Public interest immunity' will generally operate 
to protect the confidentiality of internal government documents "g. In acquiring such 
information, defendants face an onerous burden. A very strong case of relevance and 
necessity must be established before disclosure of such documents would be 
ordered "'. 
As regards the disclosure of other confidential information, such as business 
secrets, the public nature of the register makes much information accessible unless the 
parties succeed in having it placed on the special section of the register 120. This 
situation would seem to make it difficult for the OFT to withhold disclosure to serve 
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enforcement needs. However, the recent extension of the special section of the 
register may give the OFT greater lee-way for manipulation of the law 121 
Once again. little information exists on the practical exercise of this safeguard. 
No evidence of problems or complaints in relation to RTPA enforcement is available, 
making its effectiveness difficult to gauge. 
b)Defence Safeguards in Informal Resolutions 
In contrast to the substantive rights enjoyed by defendants in formal litigation, no 
clear defence rights exist in the context of informal resolutions under s. 21(2). Though 
it would seem that the OFT are under a basic duty to act fairly 122. As noted 
elsewhere, the context of informal resolutions does pose a problem for defendants. 
Again, the process tends to operate very much in the prosecution's favour and to the 
defendant's disadvantage. Several points are worth mentioning. The informality of the 
procedure permits the OFT to pressurise . 
defendants to settle under threat of 
protracted and expensive reference to the RPC. Following negotiations, defendants 
have no right to be involved in the drafting of the representation to the Secretary of 
State. Indeed, they do not have a right to inspect the document. Consequently, the 
reasoning and conclusions of the report could bear little resemblance to the discussions 
in which they participated. Yet. defendants' ignorance of this would them powerless to 
act. Finally, while the DG undertakes a legal and economic evaluation of the 
agreement under s. 21(2), the ultimate decision on the matter is essentially political 123 
This situation permits covert political factors to influence the decision. Again, the 
defendant would be unaware of such influences and so be unable to intervene 124. In 
contrast, the s. 21(2) process benefits the DG enormously, delivering pragmatically 
and politically effective enforcement on a routine basis. 
Section 21(2) directions do offer defendants some protection. Directions may 
not be withdrawn unless there has been a "material change in circumstances" 125. It 
seems that the Secretary of State would face a high evidential burden in establishing 
this 126. Whilst withdrawal has never been used, the threat of it has been employed as 
leverage to obtain variations of agreements. Moreover, s. 21(3) may be used for 
political ends 127. However, s. 21(2) directions will not protect parties from private 
actions 128 
Defendants' rights of appeal may offer some protection. Both the DG's and the 
Secretary of State's exercise of discretion under ss. 21(2) and(3) are subject to judicial 
review 129. However, the wide margin of discretion afforded under these provisions 
and the absence of clear criteria for their use, renders review problematic 10. The 
effectiveness of judicial review has been limited further by the Court's non- 
interventionist stance which has stressed the need for "good public administrationi131 
Asa result, few firms attempt judicial review and even fewer succeed 13Z. 
5)Conclusion - Prosecution 
It is now apposite to review the classification, scope and enforcement value of the 
DG's powers and defence rights. At prosecution, the DG possesses wide discretionary 
authority. At every point, this discretion is used as a resource to obtain the 
pragmatically and politically acceptable resolution of enforcement issues. The UK's 
preference for informal processes is nowhere better evidenced than in the ratio of cases 
resolved under s. 21(2). This approach provides significant political and pragmatic 
advantages, routinely ensuring the cost-effective negotiation of agreements with the 
ultimate decision being taken by a political superior. Indeed, this evaluation reveals 
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that the very structure of the legislation militates against formal enforcement, thus 
encouraging more informal solutions to be sought. Inevitably, this discretionary 
approach brings problems. Overall, it creates uncertainty and may result in inequality. 
The absence of clearly enunciated criteria, the possibility of covert political influence 
and the general flexibility of the approach make it difficult to forecast how these 
powers will be exercised, raising concerns over the equity and consistency of 
prosecutorial decision-making. Despite this, there is no clear indication that this 
political and pragmatic enforcement approach will change 133. Indeed, the UK's most 
recent response has been towards deregulation which only serves to promote this 
policy. Most potently, deregulation takes enforcement out of the public arena 
encouraging greater use of pragmatic resolutions and allowing covert political 
influences to flourish. As such, deregulation gives legislative effect to O'Brien's claim 
that competition enforcement has gone underground. The adoption of such a secretive 
approach is a strange a response at a time when other jurisdictions are opting for 
more overt control. More worringly, deregulation may be viewed as a move towards 
the abandonment, or at least the reduction of, UK antitrust enforcement :a move 
which Fox has condemned ad "capitalism with a vengance" 134 
Defence rights at prosecution vary in scope, though their classification is 
clearly admiinstrative. In formal situations, defendants enjoy a broad right to the 
discovery of documents. Whilst this safeguard is a substantive one and thus should 
afford significant protection, the absence of information on its application makes it 
impossible to assess its effectiveness in upholding the defendant's right to be heard. 
In informal situations, defendants are afforded few safeguards. No substantive 
defence rights exist. In their place is a broad duty on the OFT to act fairly. This 
places due process safeguards entirely at the discretion of the enforcement authority. 
As a result, this requirement may be routinely interpreted to meet political and 
pragmatic enforcement needs. Defendants are afforded little procedural protection 
from the OFT exerting pressure on them during s. 21(2) negotiations, or under s. 21(3) 
to obtain a solution acceptable to enforcement requirements. Nor are defendants 
permitted to comment upon, or indeed have any knowledge whatsoever of, the final 
representation to the Secretary of State. The lack of transparency regarding s. 21(2) 
criteria leaves no clear standard by which to assess the OFT's conduct, limiting the 
defendant's ability to appeal. Thus, the OFT's duty to act fairly may serve to limit the 
defendant's knowledge of the case against him and the effectiveness of his right to 
comment. Nor does the OFT's obligation protect defendants from covert political 
influences on decision-making. Indeed, the final decision is taken by a politician, 
raising questions over the independence of the tribunal under s. 21(2). Clearly, the 
informal context enables the OFT to place serious limitiations upon the scope and 
effectiveness of defence rights in the interests of enforcement. Yet, this approach is 
affirmed by the Court's robust support of political and pragmatic rationales at judicial 
review. 
In summary, during formal enforcement the strengths of the prosecution and 
defence are broadly balanced. But, in negotiated resolutions, the disparity between the 
two positions is marked. The overwhelming use of s. 21(2) means that defendants are 
routinely placed at a disadvantage. Two features of RTPA prosecution must be 
emphasised. Firstly, there is a striking absence of caselaw or comment upon the 
existence and scope of defence rights at this stage. It appears that defence safeguards 
simply do not feature in RTPA enforcement. Finally, and most notably, is the 
continued insistence at prosecution that enforcement occurs in line with political and 
pragmatic objectives. 
G)TRIAL AND SENTENCE "s 
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1)Reference to the Court 
It is intended only to undertake a brief examination of this procedure because of its 
relative unimportance to RTPA enforcement in practice 136. 
Where alternative means of resolution are unobtainable or inappropriate, the 
DG must refer the agreement to the RPC for a decision on its status. The RPC 
operate from the presumption that the agreement is contrary to the public interest and 
void, unless the parties can demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the 
agreement satisfies one of the statutory defences known as 'gateways' 137. These 
gateways largely relate to the economic benefits of the arrangement, though some 
identify social and political advantages 138. Even if the parties succeed in passing 
through a gateway, they must overcome the 'balancing tailpiece' of s. 10. Here, the 
parties must establish that the restriction is not unreasonable, having regard to the 
identified benefit(s) of the agreement and any wider issues of detriment to the public 
interest. This assessment is similar to the balancing of benefits and detriments under 
Art. 85(3) of the Treaty. 
In practice, very few agreements are referred to the RPC and even fewer 
succeed 19. Many agreements go undefended, whilst numerous others are simply 
abandoned 1"There are several reasons for this state of affairs. Firstly, whilst many 
of the gateways are unproblematic in scope, some are so narrowly drafted that they 
have never been penetrated successfully14'. Conversely, the width of gateway (b) has 
evoked extensive criticism because it requires the Court to indulge in economic 
speculation. Many of the RPC's economic evaluations have been denounced as 
unpredictable and inconsistent 142. The gateways have also been condemned in terms 
of the policies they embody and the decisions they generate. This is particularly so of 
those gateways which contain explicit political considerations 143. Considerable 
controversy also surrounds the 'balancing tailpiece' of s. 10 which requires the RPC to 
undertake a public interest assessment of the agreement. The complex balancing act 
which this requires of the Court and the RPC's frequently narrow interpretation of the 
public interest has attracted criticism from economists and has raised questions over 
the justiciability of the issues involved 144 
There has been considerable censure of the nature of proceedings before the 
RPC. The expense, the delays and the "bullying tactics" of the adversarial process 
have all been condemned by businessmen 145. More pertinently, Lever asserts that 
many outcomes are merely the result of the adversarial process and the placement of 
the burden of proof which allows one outcome rather than another to be reached 146. 
Consequently, the adversarial process, particularly in the legalistic context of the 
RTPA, has been denouced as an inadequate and inappropriate means of economic 
regulation because of its inability to take account of the wider economic context "'. 
The overall consequence of these problems is that it is almost impossible to 
negotiate s. 10 successfully. This has discouraged many beneficial collaborations 
between firms and has increased calls for reform 148. More worringly, it has 
encouraged widespread non-compliance with the RTPA. Given the lack of deterrence 
and the improbability of detection, many firms prefer to run the risk of operating an 
unregistered, registrable agreement rather than defend it before the RPC. That many 
firms evade registration seems to be confirmed by the relatively high proportion of 
cases coming before the RPC under s. 35 149. Even so, the Court hear very few cases 
each year, leaving many to conclude that it is all but redundant 150 
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2)Sanctions'S' 
Sanctions under the RTPA are extremely limited. Where the agreement fails the 
requirements of s. 10, the Court may make a declaration that the agreement is contrary 
to the public interest and thus void 152. Following this, the Court must decide whether 
the offending restrictions may be severed from the agreement. Normal contractual 
principles apply 'S'. In addition to its declaratory powers, the RPC may also make 
orders restraining the parties from giving effect to the offending restrictions or from 
making further agreements "to the like effect" 154. Some, problems have arisen in the 
interpretation of this phrase. First, there is little judicial guidance on what degree of 
similarity must exist between original and subsequent agreements for this test to be 
satisfied 'ss The resulting uncertainty has been aggravated by the Court's insistence 
that the evaluation is very much an individual one dependent on the circumstances of 
the case 156 Moreover, the RPC have tended to view matters liberally making it even 
more difficult for parties to avoid concluding an unacceptably similar agreement's'. 
In addition, powers exist allowing the variation and suspension of court 
orders 158. Interim injunctions are also possible '59. The high burden of proof on the 
DG means that these powers are rarely used. More often, the threat of s. 3 
proceedings is employed to obtain the abandonment of restrictions t60. 
Instead of issuing an injunction against the parties involved, the RPC may 
accept undertakings from them16'. This practice is widespread. Undertakings in lieu 
of court orders have been accepted in many recent price-fixing/market sharing 
cases 162. Breach of the Court's order is a civil contempt and punishable as such. The 
RPC have taken a strict approach and imposed fines in a number of cases, most 
recently in Ready Mixed Concrete 163. The Court have made it clear that individual 
employees are punishable as well as the firms themselves. In Ready Mixed Concrete, 
two employees were fined £2,200 in total for aiding and abetting the contempt. 
Imprisonment is also possible''. Custodial sentences are most likely where there has 
been a deliberate flouting of a court order 165 
Recent developments in respect of contempt proceedings may have made 
enforcement against restrictive agreements more difficult. In DG/OFT v Smith's 
Concrete Lid, the Court of Appeal quashed the RPC's finding that the firm was 
vicariously liable for an employee who had entered a price-fixing agreement and was 
thus in contempt ". The Court held that, as the firm had instituted a compliance 
programme which expressly forbade the entering of restrictive agreements, it had 
taken all reasonable steps to prevent a breach of the order. Thus, it was not 
vicariously liable for the employee. On further appeal, the House of Lords reversed 
the Appeal Court's decision, holding the firm vicariously liable 167. This difference 
of opinion between the Lords and the Appeal Court's attitude may have significant 
implications for the OFT. To enforce against contempt; the DG must now establish 
both participation in a registrable agreement and that the empolyees concerned were 
acting deliberately and within the scope of their authority. This may be extremely 
difficult to achieve where a compliance programme exists '6. Robertson has been 
particularly critical. He argues that not only may these developments further limit the 
DG's weak enforcement powers, but they may relieve firms from the obligation to 
institute meaningful compliance programmes making reform of the RTPA imperative 
169 Doubtless such a conflict of opinion will encourage further challenges and it may 
be some time before the law in this area is clear. 
Overall, sanctioning powers under the RTPA have been extensively censured 
as inadequate and ineffective 10. The sole sanction of voidness provides no real 
deterrent to determined cartelists. In effect, a party must offend twice before they can 
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be sanctioned by a fine. The stark contrast this poses with the sanctioning powers of 
other jurisdictions has served to heighten calls for urgent reform 
3)Defence Rights 
At trial, the main defence safeguards are the rights to comment and to an independent 
tribunal. These protections may be dealt with briefly. As proceedings take place 
before the RPC, defendants have a substantive right to both safeguards. Little 
additional comment can be made about their effectiveness, as once again, there is little 
critical comment and even less caselaw on the matter. However, widespread dislike of 
the adversarial process and reports of the intimidation of witnesses in court do raise 
questions about the practical value of these rights "Z. In addition, concerns exist over 
the independence of the judiciary and its inclination to take decisions which uphold the 
Conservative Party's political viewpoint 13. 
Some appeal possibilities exist. These may afford defendants further 
protection. However, opportunities for appeal are limited. The RPC's decisions are 
not open to judicial review. Appeal is to the Court of Appeal on points of law only 
174 Consequently, cases are rarely appealed 15. 
4)Conclusion - Trial and Sentence 
Having examined enforcement powers and defence rights at trial, it is now necessary 
to assess their classification and enforcement value. The civil litigation context of 
enforcement powers at this stage gives trial powers a clearly administrative 
characterisation. The ambit of s. 10 does embody some political and pragmatic 
advantages. For instance, some gateways allow for explicitly political considerations, 
whilst the public interest assessment permits both political and pragmatic objectives to 
influence decision-making. But, the scope and application of enforcement powers has 
been the focus of extensive criticism. The narrow, legalistic drafting of s. 10, the 
adversarial tactics of the litigation process and the heavy burden on defendants at trial 
have all been used as resources to ensure that few agreements are referred to the RPC 
and even fewer succeed at trial. Moreover, the equity of a system which can dictate 
the outcome by the politic placement of the burden of proof rather than on the basis of 
substantive evidence, must be questioned. Far from assisting the transparent and 
effective enforcement of RTPA rules, the chief outcome of this restrictive approach 
has been the widespread evasion of the law and the virtual redundancy of the RPC -a 
structure intended to be the central focus of the system. Once again, the Act's 
formalism has served to limit the usefulness of enforcement powers, militating against 
formal enforcement and encouraging more pragmatic and covert solutions. These 
themes are repeated in the context of sanctioning. 
Sanctioning powers are of mixed classification. Whilst the main sanction of 
voidness and the provision for interim and final injunctions is administrative in nature, 
sanctions following contempt are clearly penal. However, they all suffer from the same 
problems. Their scope and the limitations placed upon their application reduce their 
enforcement value and discourage their use. Over the years, the sanction of voidness 
has proved itself a worthless enforcement tool. The inability to impose a fine at the 
outset has deprived the RTPA of any deterrent value, encouraging evasion rather than 
compliance. Moreover, the Court's interpretation of its orders has caused problems. 
The liberal construction and lack of clear guidance regarding 'like effect' orders has 
created legal uncertainty, producing problems for firms attempting to conclude an 
acceptable contract. The high burden placed on the DG in obtaining interim 
injunctions and in contempt proceedings has curtailed the value of these enforcement 
powers. Particularly in contempt actions, the burden placed on the DG by the Court 
encourages firms to pay only lip-service to compliance. As such, these sanctions serve 
to protect offenders and incite them to flout the rule of law. Such perverse and 
ineffective powers encourage the DG to seek more pragmatic means of enforcement. 
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At trial, this is seen in the use of interim powers as leverage to obtain settlements, and 
most vividly, in the DG's preference, even in formal situations, for undertakings rather 
than formal court orders. This conciliatory approach towards cartellists is in marked 
contrast with the attitude of other jurisdictions. But, its true value must be questioned 
given the regularity with which the DG is forced to pursue s. 35/contempt proceedings. 
That such actions comprise the majority of the DG's trial activities, suggests that, in 
reality, this indulgent attitude assists rather than prevents evasion of competition rules. 
The influence of political aims on sanctioning is also apparent. The RTPA's 
formalism, the high burden of proof on the DG, the preference for undertakings and 
the total absence of real deterrents all reflect a political desire to deal with cartellists 
leniently. These political undercurrents have rendered the RTPA impotent. 
Defendants at this stage enjoy substantive rights at trial and appeal of an 
administrative character. Some questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness 
of these safeguards. Unfortunately, the absence of clear data has made it difficult to 
assess the extent of these problems. Once again, the central feature of the evaluation 
of defence rights has been the lack of critical commentary on defence issues. It would 
seem that the very structure of the RTPA, which discourages formal enforcement and 
encourages conciliatory resolutions, militates against an insistence upon, or discussion 
of, formal defence protections. 
In summary, the dearth of incisive sanctions and the hurdles placed in the way 
of the DG's enforcement powers at this stage, offer considerable protection to those 
who behave anti-competitively. In practical terms, this places defendants at a 
significant advantage. Thay may act as they please, safe in the knowledge that the DG 
can do very litte about it. Above all, the evaluation has revealed that the central 
themes of RTPA enforcement remain unchanged at trial. The limitations placed upon 
the scope and application of enforcement powers continue to discourage formal 
solutions whilst protecting enforcement methods which serve political and pragmatic 
requirements. As a result, the reality of restrictive practices enforcement in the UK 
relies exclusively on the private negotiation and conciliation of anti-competitive 
agreements - O'Brien's "silent revolution". 
TABLE 1 
UK Enforcement Statistics * 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Complaints/ 681 982 959 908 972 
Enquiries 
received by 
OFT 
S. 36 Notices 19 22 - 20 
Total Number 123 258 154 198 221 
ofAgreements (63) (67) (65) (127) (83) 
added to 
Register 1 
S. 21(2) 38 49 29 27 71 
Directions 
Agreements 1--1 -2 
Referred to 
RPC 
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Complaints/ 
Enquiries 
received by 
OFT 
S. 36 Notices 
Total Number 
of Agreements 
added to 
Register 1 
S. 21(2) 
Directions 
Agreements 
Referred to 
RPC 
Complaints/ 
Enquiries 
received by 
OFT 
S. 36 Notices 
Total Number 
of Agreements 
added to 
Register 1 
S. 21(2) 
Directions 
Agreements 
Referred to 
RPC 
TABLE 1 (cont) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
1,037 962 1,122 804 1,207 
28 55 22 97 32 
296 458 700 973 998 
(127) (215) (325) (512) (520) 
121 177 234 666 1,070 
-3 664 - 7 4 
TABLE 1 (cont) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
1,514 1,690 1,643 1,577 1,622 
72 715 156 107 12 
676 619 589 686 622 
(nk) (nk) (nk) (nk) (nk) 
467 321 503 711 742 
4 6 1 2 2 
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Notes - Table 1 
*- Information derived from DG/OFT Annual Reports. All totals relate to the total 
number of goods and services agreements in that year. 
nk - Amount not known as details were not provided in the DG/OFTAnnual Report. 
1- The number of goods agreements included in the total is given in brackets. 
2- In 1984, no new agreements were referred to the RPC, but some contempt 
proceedings took place. 
3- In 1985, no new cases were referred to the RPC, but two Court orders were made. 
4- Of these agreements, 64 were goods agreements relating to the `Read_y 'Mixed 
Concrete cartel. 
5- In addition, in 1991,62 new investigations were started. 
6- In addition, in 1992,50 new investigations were started and a number of formal 
letters were issued. 
7- In addition, in 1993,50 new investigations were started and a number of formal 
letters were sent. 
I Andrew Young. 
2 As will be seen, this statute is broadly analogous with Art. 85, though in practice, the 
provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973 and the Competition Act 1980 may be used against 
restrictive practices. For further information on these Acts, see Whish Competition Law 
Buttcrworths (1993) Chs 3-4. Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references below refer to 
provisions of the RTPA. 
3 See cg Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1985 HC Papers 1985/86 (403) HMSO at p 
11 ; Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1989 HC Papers 1989/90 (502) HMSO at p 13. 
4 See eg OFT Guides Restrictive Practices (1985) and Cartels : Detection and Remedies 
(1991). 
5 S. 21(2) will be discussed further later in the analysis of the informal settlement of UK cases. 
See 'Informal Resolutions' infra. 
6 See Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1980 HC Papers 1980/81 (354) HMSO at pp 49- 
51. 
7 This much has been acknowledged by a former DG. See Borne 'Competition Policy in 
Britain : Retrospect and Prospect' IntRev Law and Econ [1982] 139. 
8 For further discussion, see Liesner and Glynn 'Does Antitrust Make Economic Sense? ' ECLR 
[1987] 344 at pp 361-362. As yet, it is uncertain what effect the recent change from a Tory to a 
Labour goverment will have on matters, though it seems likely that free market enterprise will 
continue to be promoted. 
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9 For further on the programme of privatisation, see Whish Competition Law Ch10. Many 
acknowledge the importance of promoting business freedom in UK competition law. On this, see 
eg Borne 'Retrospect and Prospect' ; Liesner and Glynn 'Does Antitrust Make Economic Sense? ' ; 
Korah Competition Law in Britain and the Common Market Martinus Nijhoff (1982a) Ch5 
lo Sec cg DG/O1TAnnual Report 1989 HC Papers 1989/90 (502) HMSO. 
11 DG/OFTAnnual Report 1980 HC Papers 1980/81 (354) HMSO at pp 13-18. 
12 On this, see DG/OFT Annual Report 1985 HC Papers 1985/86 (403) HMSO at pp 10-13 ; 
DG/OFTAnnual Report 1991 HC Papers 1991/92 (38) HMSO at pp 9-10. Also Borne 'Retrospect 
and Prospect'. 
13 For further, sec Borne 'Retrospect and Prospect' at p 141. 
14 Some guidance on the meaning of public interest is given in s. 10 RTPA. Additional 
guidance may be gleaned from s. 84 Fair Trading Act 1973 which deals with public interest in 
relation to monopolies. 
is O'Brien 'Competition Policy in Britain : The Silent Revolution' Antitrust Bulletin [1982] 
217. 
16 Borne 'Retrospect and Prospect'. 
17 These problems are discussed further in O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' ; Borrie 'Retrospect 
and Prospect' ; George and Joll The Legal Framework' in GEORGE and JOLL (Eds) 
Competition Policy in the UK and EC Cambridge Unv. Press (1975) p 14. 
18 Background information is derived from : Korah Competition Law (1982a) ; Whish 
Competition Law Ch5 ; Agnew Competition Law Allen and Unwin (1985) Ch7 ; GEORGE and 
JOLL (Eds) Competition Policy in the UK and EEC ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law : 
A Wasted Opportunity' ECLR [1994] ; D. Jacobs 'Competition Law' BLR [1982] 131 ; Frazer 
'Defects and Effects - Competition Policy for the 1990s' MLR [1988] 493 ; Pitt 'Restrictive Trade 
Practices - Problems and Practice' BLR [1985] 291 ; Green Commercial Agreements and 
Competition Law : Practice and Procedure in the UK and EEC Graham and Trotman (1986) Chs 
1-5 ; Swann, O'Brien, Maunders and Howe Competition in British Industry Unwin (1974) ; 
Merkin and Williams Antitrust Policy in the United Kingdom and the EEC Sweet and Maxwell 
(1984). Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references in this appendix refer to the RTPA. The 
effect of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 (hereafter referred to as the Deregulation 
Act) on the RTPA will be discussed later under the 'Prosecution' stage. 
19 S. 1 RTPA. 
20 Eg Exclusive dealing and resale price maintenance, though such conduct is caught by other 
legislation. See Whish Competition Law Ch5. 
21 S. 1(1). Each category is individually defined, see ss. 6,11,7 and 12 respectively. 
22 This leads to the crossover problem which will be discussed later at the 'Prosecution' stage. 
23 Most of the comments made here are equally applicable to the other categories of 
agreements. Thus, it is not intended to discuss specifically ss. 7,11 and 12 in further depth. 
Further information may be obtained from Whish Competition Law Ch5 ; Green Commercial 
Agreements and Competition Law Clis 1-5 ; Agnew Competition Law Ch7. 
24 For a more detailed discussion of s. 6, see Whish Competition Law at p 126 et seq ; Green 
Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at pp 4-11 ; Agnew Competition Lmv at p 112 et 
seq. 
u See s. 43(1) and Re Austin Motor Car Ltd'sAgreements [1958] Ch 61 LR 1 RP 6; Re British 
Basic Slag Ltd's Agreement [1962] 3 All ER 247 and Re Mileage Conference Group of Tyre 
Manufacturers' Conference Ltd'sAgreement [1966] 2 All Er 849, all of which discuss the ambit of 
an agreement under the RTPA. For further discussion, see Cunningham The Fair Trading Act 
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1973 Sweet and Maxwell (1973), who criticises the definition of arrangement as vague and asserts 
that industry is entitled to an unambiguous definition of what constitutes a registrable agreement. 
Also assessed by Stevens The Duke, The Intentional Arousing of Expectations in Others and the 
Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreemeents' MLR [1963] 547. 
26 It is important to note here that, unlike Art. 85, there is no reference in the RTPA as to 
whether competition is restricted. It is restraints on conduct not competition which govern 
registrability under s. 6. This point is assessed further by Whish Competition Law at p 132 ; Green 
Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at pp 14-16 and Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices'. 
27 Sec s. 43(l). Black in 'Competition and Negative Obligations' ECLR [1993] 53 and Pitt 
'Restrictive Trade Practices', both discuss the problems and issues involved. 
28 Sec Re Cadbury Schweppes Ltd'sAgreement [1975] 2 All ER 307, where the Court refused 
to imply a restriction, and Re Ravenseft PropertiesApplication [1978] QB 52. Both of these cases 
arc discussed by Whish Competition Law at pp 132-135. 
29 In common with other competition legislation, s. 43(2) treats companies within the same 
group as one company, thus any agreement between them would not be registrable. Arrangements 
excluded from RTPA control may be investigated in the UK under the Fair Trading Act 1973 and 
the Competition Act 1980 and, of course, Arts. 85 and 86 of the Treaty. 
30 For a more detailed analysis of the problems raised by these subsections, see Lever 'Bipartite 
Agreements and the Restrictive Trade Practices Acts 1956 and 1968' LQR [1969] 177 and Whish 
Competition Law at pp 142-146. 
31 To be exempted, the agreement must fall entirely within the provisions of a given 
exeception. Such exempted agreements include those relating to patents and trade-marks and to 
exclusive dealing. Further exemptions are contained in ss. 29-34, but are not discussed here. For 
further information see Korah Competition Law (1982a) at p 129 et seq and Whish Competition 
Law at pp 146-149. The Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 also allows the Secretary of 
State to exempt "minor" agreements from registration. This Act is discussed by Hutchings 
'Deregulation Inititative - Spotlight on UK Competition Law' ECLR [1994] R129 and C. Miller 'A 
Change for the Better ?' NLJ [1994] 790. 
32 The OFT was established under the Fair Trading Act 1973. The DG has a wide brief and is 
also concerned with matters such as consumer protection. Agnew Competition Law at pp 14-15 
and Whish Competition Law at pp 21-22, outline the range of activites undertaken by the OFT. 
33 Sec Fair Trading Act 1973 and Competition Act 1980. Notably, in relation to mergers, the 
DG may only proffer advice. Of course, the Minister normally accepts this advice. O'Brien in 
The Silent Revolution' provides an extremely interesting discussion of the DG's increasing 
discretion. It should be noted that the long awaited reform of UK competition rules would further 
enhance the DG's discretion. Sec recent Green and White Papers on the subject : Review of 
Restrictive Trade Practices Policy (Cm 331) HMSO (19880 ; Opening Markets : New Policy on 
Restrictive Trade Practices (Cm 727) HMSO (1989) ; Abuse of Market Power (Cm 2100) HMSO 
(1992). The proposed reforms have generated considerable literature. See eg Burke Gaffney 
'Restrictive Trade Practices Policy' LSG [1988] 23,25-26 ; Carlisle 'UK Competition Law :A 
Case for Radical Review' BLR [1987] 24 ; Groves 'Restrictive Practices : The Green Paper' BLR 
[1988b] 161 ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law' ; Singleton 'The White Paper : Will It 
Make You Blush Red? ' ,V [1989] 1354. 
34 This aspect is discussed further by O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' ; Borrie 'Retrospect and 
Prospect' ; Whish Competition Lmv at pp 21-22 ; Agnew Competition Law at pp 14-15. 
35 The DG is a member of the EC's Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and 
Monopolies. 
36 Now constituted under the Restrictive Practices Court Act 1976. 
37 The Court consists of Three High Court judges, one judge of the Court of Session, one judge 
of the Supreme Court of N. Ireland and up to ten lay members appointed by the Lord Chancellor 
and noted for their knowledge and experience in commerce and industry. 
38 Unlike MMC Reports, the decisions of the RPC are binding on all parties. Issues of appeal 
from the RPC will be discussed later in the context of defence rights at 'Trial' stage. For further 
discussion of the RPC, see Whish Competition Law at pp 121-124 ; Stevens and Yamey The 
595 
Restrictive Practices Court :A Study of the Judicial Process and Economic Policy Wiedenfeld 
and Nicolson (1965) 
39 Given the centrality of the Secretary of State in enforcement, Whish Competition Law at p 
24, has criticised the frequent changes in the incumbency, noting that between May 1979 - January 1993 there were I1 holders of this post. 
40 Exemption occurs under s. 29. The DG's activities under s. 21(2) will be evaluated later in 
the context of informal resolutions. 
41 Private litigation, whilst possible, is much less common than in the US. The 1989 White 
Paper, Opening Markets : New Policy on Restrictive Trade Practices (Cm 727) HMSO (1989) at 
paras 5.15 - 5.19, envisages greater use of this avenue of redress. 
42 Background information on this section is derived from : Whish Competition Law Ch5 
Agnew Competition Law Ch7 ; Korah Competition Law (1982a) Ch6 ; Pitt 'Restrictive Trade 
Practices' ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law' ; Hutchings 'Deregulation Inititative' 
Walker-Smith 'Collusion : Its Detection and Investigation' ECLR [1991] 71 ; Robertson 
'Enforcement of the UK RTPA Legislation : Limitations and Legislative Proposals' ECLR [1992] 
82 ; Joshua 'The Element of Surprise : EEC Competition Investigations under Art. 14(3) of Rcg. 17' 
E, LR [1983] 3; Joshua 'Information in EEC Competition Law Procedures' ELR [1986] 409 
Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases :A Comparison with the Rules of Evidence in 
Common Law' ELR [1987] 315 ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
18th Report, Cocamission Powers of Investigation and Inspection HL Papers 1983/84 (220) 
HMSO 
43 See ss. 1(1), (2) and S. 24. Ss. 2 and 24 detail which particulars must be provided and the 
relevant time limits. the Deregulation Act 1994 relaxes these time limits. See Hutchings 
'Deregulation Inititative'. Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law' at p 91, criticises this change 
as reducing the deterrent value of the law. 
44 Opening Markets : New Policy on Restrictive Tracle Practices (Cm 727) HMSO (1989) Ch4. 
Livingstone and Sherliker 'Confidentiality in UK and EEC Antitrust Procedures JBL [1982] 31, 
also criticise this public right of inspection. 
45 S. 23(2). Also, under the Deregulation Act, parties may request for particulars of an 
agreement to be kept on the confidential section of the register where publication would 
"substantially damage the legitimate business interests of any person" For further examination, see 
C. Millcr'A Change for the Better T; Hutchings 'Deregulation Inititative'. 
46 These problems are discussed further by Whish Competition Law at pp 156-157. 
47 Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1980 HC Papers 1980/81 (354) HMSO at pp 46-47 ; 
Home Office DG/OF'Annual Report 1993 HC Papers 1993/94 (551) HMSO at pp 38-41. Only 
686 of the agreements submitted in 1993 were actually added to the register. The total number of 
registered agreements now stands at over 11,000. Sec Table 1 infra for additional statistical 
details. 
48 See s. 35(1)(d). A number of firms have relied on the sanction of voidness as a defence 
against breach of contract actions, eg Topliss Showers v Gessey and Sons Ltd [1982] ICR 504 
Snushalls Team Ltd v Marcus (unreported judgement of 21 March 1990). 
49 Though the DG may be prepared to consider an application under s. 21(2). 
so S. 35(3). The first such order was made in Re Flushing Cistern Makers Ltd's Agreement 
[1973] 3 All ER 817. For additional discussion of these orders, see Pitt 'Restrictive Trade 
Practices' and Whish Competition Law at pp 172-173. 
sl However, there have been out of court settlements, cg the Post Office accepted £9m. from the 
producers of wires and cables. See Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1979 HC Papers 
1979/80 (224) HMSO at p 37. Increasing awareness of competition law may result in more 
actions being brought. 
$2 S. 36 and s. 37 respectively. The Court may also order the production of documents. Failure 
to comply with the Court's order under s. 37 is punishable as contempt of court. 
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53 Under s. 38, a failure to comply with a s. 36 notice may be subject to a fine. Where false 
information is provided or documents are altered/destroyed, a fine or a custodial sentence or both 
may be imposed. S. 38(4) allows the imposition of daily fines after a conviction until the 
documents are properly furnished. For further, see Green Commercial Agreements and 
Competition Law at pp 156-157. 
54 See discussion by House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 18th 
Report, Commission Powers of Investigation and Inspection HL Papers 1983/84 (220) HMSO at 
pp xxxiii-xl, who contrast the search powers available in other related areas of UK enforcement. 
Korah Competition Law (1982a) Ch6 ; Whish Competition Law Ch5 ; Walker-Smith 'Collusion'; 
Robertson 'Enforcement of the UK RTPA Legislation' ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law' ; 
Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices', all discuss the fact-finding powers of the DG. Walker-Smith 
provides an interesting account of the conduct of several recent investigations into glass, fuel oil 
and ready mixed concrete cartels. 
55 Walker-Smith 'Collusion' at pp 72-73. At p 77, he explains that the OFT now also use 
computer programs to analyse price information etc. to detect the existence of covert cartels. 
56 Eg many relate to an assessment of entry barriers and demand and cost conditions. 
37 In 1986,1988 and 1990 ; 55,97 and 72 such notices were issued respectively. See Home 
Office DG/OFF Annual Report 1986 HC Papers 1987/88 (6) HMSO ; Home Office DG/OFT 
Annual Report 1988 HC Papers 1988/89 (440) HMSO ; Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 
1990 HC Papers 1990/91 (502) HMSO. Table 1 infra also provides statistical details of the DG's 
enforcement activities. 
58 Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1993 HC Papers 1993/94 (551) HMSO at p 40. A 
similar situation existed in 1992, where out of 50 new investigations, only 15 s. 36 notices were 
sent ; Home Office DG/OF! 'Annual Report 1992 HC Papers 1992/93 (719) HMSO at p 32. Both 
reports indicate that a number of 'polite inquiries' have been sent. However, precise figures are 
not supplied. 
59 Cross-examination was ordered in Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements v W. H. Smith 
& Son (1969) LR 7 RP 122. Walker-Smith, an OFT official, states in'Collusion' at p 72, that the 
s. 38 power has never been used. But, Green in Connnercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 
157, notes that in DPP vAutomatic Telephone & Electric Co (1968) 112 SJ 109, two firms were 
fined under s. 38 for suppressing onformation when registering their agreements. 
60 In 1980,681 complaints were received. The figures for 1987 and 1993 were 1,122 and 1,577 
respectively. These figures represent the total number of complaints received by the OFT on all 
competition matters ; see Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1980 HC Papers 1980/81 (354) 
HMSO at pp 46-47 ; Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1987 HC Papers 1987/88 (544) HMSO 
at pp 30-34 ; Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1993 HC Papers 1993/94 (551) HMSO at pp 
38-41. 
61 See Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements v IV. H. Smith & Son (1969) LR 7 RP 122. 
The Court made it clear that suspicions of a general belief in the industry that cartel exists are 
insufficient. Usually, before a s. 36 notice can be issued the DG must know the names of some of 
the parties and have clear idea of how the cartel operates. See discussion by Walker-Smith 
'Collusion' ; Robertson 'Enforcement of the UK RTPA Legislation'. 
62 See Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1988 HC Papers 1988/89 (440) HMSO at pp 37- 
38 ; Walker-Smith 'Collusion' at pp 74-75, who discusses recent OFT investigations into glass, 
cement and fuel oil cartels. 
63 In his 1986 Report Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1986 HC Papers 1987/88 (6) 
HMSO at p 13 the DG remarked that it was a "Gilbertian absurdity" that he should be required 
to produce evidence of the existence of a cartel before he can issue a notice to discover whether a 
cartel exists. See also comments by Whish Competition Law at pp 171-172 ; Robertson 
'Enforcement of the UK RTPA Legislation' ; Walker-Smith 'Collusion' ; Pitt 'Restrictive Trade 
Practices'. Moreover, this strict objective test under s. 36 may be contrasted with the subjectiveness 
of the DG's investigation powers in relation to a monopoly reference. See s. 44(1)(b) Fair Trading 
Act 1973. 
64 Sec Robertson 'Enforcement of the UK RTPA Legislation' at p 85. 
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For background to this section, see : Kerse EEC Antitrust Procedure (3rd Edn) Sweet and 
Maxwell (1994) ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 18th Report, 
Conunission Powers of Investigation and Inspection HL Papers 1983/84 (220) HMSO ; Joshua 
'The Element of Surprise' ; Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases' ; Philip 'EEC 
Competition Law and Privilege Against Self Incrimination in English Law' LIE! [1981] 49 ; Van 
Overbeek'The Right to Remain Silent in Competition Investigations : The Funke Decision of the 
ECHR Makes Revision of the ECJ's Caselaw Necessary' ECLR [1994] 127 ; Livingstone and 
Sherliker 'Confidentiality'. 
66 S. 14(1) Civil Evidence Act 1968 provides that the privilege only applies only "as regards 
criminal offences under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and penalties provided for by 
such law". See also AT&T and Others [199213 All ER 523, which examines the scope of this 
protection in English civil proceedings. Joshua 'The Element of Surprise' ; Joshua 'Information in 
EEC Competition Law Procedures' ; Kerse EEC Antitrust Procedure at para 3.44, both consider 
the ambit of this safeguard in competition and other UK regulatory proceedings. 
67 Further details may be obtained from : Joshua 'The Element of Surprise' at pp 13-15 ; Joshua 
'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases' at pp 336-340 ; Kerse EEC Antitrust Procedure at 
para 3.44 ; House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 18th Report, 
Commission Powers oflnvestigation and Inspection HL Papers 1983/84 (220) HMSO at p xxxv. 
Examples of restrictions on this privilege in other areas of regulation include : Bishopgate 
investment v Maxwell [1992] 2 All ER 856 (Insolvency Act 1986) ;. In re London Inveshnents plc 
17 January 1992 (Companies Act 1985) ; Bank of England v Riley and Another [1992] 1 All ER 
769 (Banking Act 1987). For the situation regarding self incrimination before UK courts in the 
context of Art. 85, sec R7Z Corp v Westinghouse Elec Corp [1978] 1 All ER 434 HL. This case is 
assessed in depth in Philip 'EEC Competition Law and Privilege Against Self Incrimination in 
English Law'. 
69 S. 38 allows the imposition of a fine for a refusal to supply information. Supplying false 
information or destroying documents are both criminal offences and may be punished by a fine or 
imprisonment or both. For further, see Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at 
pp 156-157. 
69 In particular, this protection would cover communications between lawyers and third parties. 
The scope of legal professional privilege in English law is discussed by Murphy in A Practical 
Approach to Evidence Blackstone Press (1980) Chll and, in the context of competition 
regulation, by Joshua in both 'The Element of Surprise'at pp 15-17 and 'Proof in Contested EEC 
Competition Cases' at pp 340-345. 
70 See Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise 
(No. 2) [1974] AC 405. 
71 Walker-Smith 'Collusion' at p 71. 
72 A similar belief has long pervaded English contract law. 
73 Under s. 1(2)(c). 
74 S. 21(2) will be discussed later in detail in the context of informal resolutions. The other 
provisions of s. 21 permit non-reference to the Court where the agreement has been terminated 
under s21(1)(b)(i), and where the restriction has been removed, under s. 21(1)(b)(ii). Further 
details of all aspects of s. 21 may be obtained from Whish Competition Law at pp 158-161 ; Green 
Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 157 et seq. 
75 The OFT has published several booklets outlining its approach to competition enforcement. 
See eg An Outline of UK Competition Policy : Restrictive Trade Practices : Provisions of the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 ; Cartels : Detection and Remedies -A Guide for Local Authorities ; Restrictive Trade Practices in the Bus 117dushy. 
76 The defects of the present system and the prospect of reform have been the only areas to 
attract critical commentary. See eg Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices' ; Pratt 'Changes in UK 
Competition Law' ; D. Jacobs 'Competition Law' ; Robertson 'Enforcement of the UK RTPA 
Legislation' ; Frazer 'Defects and Effects' ; Burke Gaffney 'Restrictive Trade Practices Policy' ; 
Carlisle 'UK Competition Law' ; Groves 'Restrictive Practices' [1988b] ; Singleton 'The White 
Paper'. 
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77 Here Merkin 'The Future of Restrictive Trade Practices Policy' JBL [1988] 338, points out 
that part of the problem is that the statute contains too many exceptions. 
78 Equally, an agreement may satisfy several sections and so be registrable under each. 
79 The Leisner ReportA Review of Restrictive Trade Practices Policy (Cmnd 7512) HMSO 
(1979), noted the frequency with which this occurred and suggested that the matter should be 
investigated. So far, no action has been taken, though proposed reforms would eliminate the 
problem. Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices' at p 291, notes that the converse also occurs with 
competitively harmless agreements being enforced against. 
80 This problem is discussed particularly by O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' at p 237 and Pratt 
'Changes in UK Competition Law' at p 91. 
91 See discussion supra regarding the legislative outline of the RTPA. Also, Green Commercial 
Agreements and Competition Law Chl ; Whish Competition Law Ch5. 
82 Singleton 'The White Paper; D. Jacobs 'Competition Law' ; Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices' 
; Lever 'UK Economic Regulation : Use and Abuse of the Law' ECLR [ 1992] 55, all address these 
issues. Singleton particularly, notes that many businesses and lawyers are totally unaware of the 
existence of RTPA legislation. 
83 See Lever 'UK Economic Regulation', who discusses the problems of economic regulation by 
legal means, particularly courts, and concludes that administrative bodies are more effective. In 
contrast, Burke Gaffney 'Restrictive Trade Practices Policy', is critical of reform proposals which 
take decision-making out of the Court's hands and place it at the discretion of a monolithic 
administrative authority. See also Singleton 'The White Paper'. 
$' Sec D. Jacobs 'Competition Law' at p 132 ; Swann, O'Brien, Maunders and Howe 
Competition in British industry at pp 80-82, who explain that the routine adversarial tactics of 
"intimidation and bullying" of witnesses reported by businessmen following their court 
experiences under the RTPA, have produced a disaffection with court-based enforcement. 
85 These political and pragmatic policy goals are also discussed supra under 'Goals and 
Guidance'. 
86 Pres. Carter has described this appproach as one of "benign neglect", UK civil servants 
prefer to term it "masterly inactivity". On this, see de Metz 'Anglo - Saxon Attitudes - How to 
deal with EEC Directives' BLR [1990] 313 at p 313, for an interesting account of the UK 
approach. Whilst an absence of enforcement activity is certainly true of RTPA legislation, there is 
substantially more enthusiasm and action regarding the regulation of privatised utilities. For 
further discussion of this regulation, see Whish Competition Law Ch10. 
87 See O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' at p 218. D. Jacobs 'Competition Law' and Borrie 
'Retrospect and Prospect', agree that the formalism of the RTPA has encouraged pragmatic 
solutions. 
88 See O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' at pp 224-231. In particular, the Fair Trading Act 1973 
and the Competition Act 1980 have empowered the DG. Also discussed by Cook 'Competition 
Policy - The End of an Era? ' In House Lawyer [1993] 22. 
89 Informal resolutions under s. 21(2) will be discussed in greater detail later in this appendix. 
90 Greater lee-way has also been provided in respect of time limits for registration and 
regarding placement of the agreement on the public section of the register. 
91 Deregulation is discussed by both Hutchings 'Deregulation Inititative' and C. Miller 'A 
Change for the Better ? '. 
92 Cook in'Competition Policy', discusses the increasingly pragmatic nature of UK competition 
enforcement in general and the use of competition rules as political tools, noting that this has 
enhanced the importance of the OFT's role. These influences are equally evident in other areas of 
UK enforcement. In relation to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Pass and Sparks 
'Dominant Firms and the Public Interest :A Survey of MMC Reports' Antitrust Bulletin [1980] 
437, note its highly discretionary and pragmatic approach. 
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93 Sec Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 157. For instance, in 1993, 
686 agreements were added to the register. In contrast to the two cases heard that year by the 
RPC, 711 cases were settled under s. 21(2). See Home Office DG/OFI'Annual Report 1993 HC 
Papers 1993/94 (551) HMSO at pp 39-40 for further details. 
94 For background information, see : Agnew Competition Law at pp 123-124 ; Green 
Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at pp 157-176 ; Whish Competition Law at pp 
158-161 ; Korah Competition Law (1982a) at pp 130-132 ; Borne 'Competition Policy in Britain : 
Big Bangs and Lesser Detonatations' JBL [19861358. 
9s S. 21(2). 
96 Borrie 'Big Bangs and Lesser Detonatations' and Green Commercial Agreements and 
Competition Law at pp 157-176, explain in detail the s. 21(2) resolution process. 
97 Home Office DG10FTAnnual Report 1979 HC Papers 1979/80 (224) HMSO at p 44. These 
criteria have been reiterated on several occasions. See eg Home Office DG/OIT Annual Report 
1980 HC Papers 1980/81 (354) HMSO at pp 50-51 ; Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1986 
HC Papers 1987/88 (6) HMSO at p 29. See also comments by Borrie, a former DG, in 'Big 
Bangs and Lesser Detonatations'. 
98 See Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at pp 164-166, cf Whish 
Competition Law at p 160 and Borrie 'Big Bangs and Lesser Detonatations' at p 368. The OFT's 
comments in the 1975 Report clearly envisage some assessment of the public interest, Home 
Office DG/0P7'Annual Report 1975 HC Papers 1975/76 (35) HMSO. 
9' See particularly, Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1989 HC Papers 1989/90 (502) 
HMSO, which deals in depth with the nexus between competition policy and consumer protection. 
10° This point is made in Home Office DG10FTAnnual Report 1980 HC Papers 1980/81 (354) 
HMSO at p 50. See also, Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 166 ; Borne 
'Big Bangs and Lesser Detonatations'. 
101 This point was highlighted in Home Office DG/OPT Annual Report 1980 HC Papers 
1980/81 (354) HMSO at p 50. Discussed by Whish Competition Law at p 159 and Green 
Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 166. Thus, price-fixing would rarely be the 
subject of a s. 21(2) direction, but may well fall outside Art. 85(1) on de minimis grounds. 
102 Codes of practice, group buying and the sale of businesses are also likely to receive 
directions. Conversely, the 1980 Report notes that price-fixing, market sharing and collusive 
tendering arc rarely suitable for s. 21(2) directions. See discussion in Home Office DG/OFT 
Annual Report 1980 HC Papers 1980/81 (354) HMSO at pp 50-52 and Borrie 'Big Bangs and 
Lesser Detonatations' at p 367. 
103 The factors covered are detailed by Green in Commercial Agreements and Competition Law 
at p 173. 
104 See Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 174, who notes that the 
Minister may confer with other goverment departments, particularly the Treasury, before coming 
to a decision. 
105 Under s. 21(3). This has never been done, see Whish Competition Law at p 161. 
106 Home Office DG10FTAnnual Report 1987 HC Papers 1987/88 (544) HMSO at p 31 
acknowledged that "most agreements are dealt with in this way". Sec also, Whish Competition 
Law at p 159 and Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 157, who both assess 
the importance of s. 21(2) directions. Statistics reveal the provision's increasing value. In 1980, 
38 goods/service agreements were dealt with under s. 21(2). By 1990, the figure had risen to 467 
agreements. In 1993,711 arrangements were the subject of s. 21(2) directions. See Home Office 
DG/OPTAnnual Report 1980 HC Papers 1980/81 (354) HMSO at pp 46-47 ; Home Office 
DG10FTAnnual Report 1990 HC Papers 1990/91 (502) HMSO at p 39-40 ; Home Office 
DG/OFTAnnual Report 1993 HC Papers 1993/94 (551) HMSO at pp 38-41. Sec also Table 1 
infra for further statistical data. 
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107 In total, of the 11,194 agreements placed on the register by the end of 1993,4,598 were dealt 
with under s. 21(2). Information derived from DG/OFT Annual Reports. See also Table 1 infra 
for further statistical data. 
108 Additional details of these agreements may be found in Home Office DG/OFT Annual 
Report 1984 HC Papers 1984/85 (327) HMSO at p 33 ; Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 
1987 HC Papers 1987/88 (544) HMSO at p 31. 
109 See Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1990 HC Papers 1990/91 (502) HMSO at pp 39- 
41, where, following negotiation and modification of the arrangement, the DG is currently 
assessing the agreement in operation before taking further action. 
110 Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 157 et seq discusses these 
provisions in depth. 
See Milk Retailers. For details of the case and the undertakings given, see Home Office 
DG/OTTAnnual Report 1993 HC Papers 1993/94 (551) HMSO at p 41. The 1982 Report, Home 
Office DG/017Annual Report 1982 HC Papers 1983/84 (20) HMSO at p 34, outlines assurances 
given by the Scottish Milk Marketing Board regarding its pricing policy and by Wadham Stringer 
Ltd in connection with a refusal to supply a trader. Also, Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 
1983 HC Papers 1983/84 (495) HMSO at p 34, gives details of undertakings given in connection 
with Booscy Hawkes plc's franchising agreement. Both reports give information on other non- 
statutory undertakings. 
112 Whish Competition Law at pp 159-160. DG/OFT Annual Reports rarely provide precise 
details of s. 21(2) directions. Where they do, they amount to no more than a short paragraph 
outlining the agreement. Little or no reasoning is provided. The ambiguity surrounding s. 21(2) is 
admitted by a former DG. See Borne 'Big Bangs and Lesser Detonatations' at p 367 at p 368. 
113 Borric 'Big Bangs and Lesser Detonatations' at p 367 at pp 358,362, discusses these 
problems. He notes that this uncertainty causes considerable difficulties for businesses who need a 
quick and clear response from the OFT in order to protect their commercial interests. 
114 Whish Competition Law at p 159. 
115 This point is noted, though not criticised by Green in Commercial Agreements and 
Competition Law at p 174. 
116 Background information on this section is derived from : Green Commercial Agreements 
and Competition Law ; Borne 'Big Bangs and Lesser Detonatations' at p 367 ; Cook 
'Competition Policy' ; Joshua 'Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases' ; Hornsby 'Judicial 
Review of Decisions of the UK Competition Authorities : Is the Applicant Bound to Fail? ' ECLR 
[1993] 183. 
117 RSC Order 24 and CCR Order 14. For further discussion of this procedure, see O'Hare and 
Hill Civil Litigation Longman (1986) ; Cowsill and Clegg Evidence : Law and Practice 
Longman (1987). 
118 This will include both deliberations regarding individual cases and considerations of broader 
policy. This immunity is discussed more thoroughly by Murphy A Practical Approach to 
Evidence Chll ; Cowsill and Clegg Evidence : Law and Practice Ch6. Joshua 'Proof in 
Contested EEC Competition Cases' at pp 348-350, discusses the privilege in the competition 
context. 
119 SeeAir Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 1 All ER 910 (HL). 
120 The difficulties here have already been discussed above. See also, Livingstone and Sherliker 
'Confidentiality', for further details. 
121 The Deregulation Act makes it easier to have information witheld on grounds of 
confidentiality. In addititon, the common law offers some protection of confidential information. 
For further discussion of this aspect, see Joshua 'Balancing the Public Interest : Confidentiality, 
Trade Secrets and Disclosure of Evidence in EC Competition Procedure' ECLR [1994] 68 and 
Coleman The Legal Protection of Trade Secrets Sweet and Maxwell (1992) Ch2. 
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122 This is true of informal investigations by the OFT and presumbly applies to their other 
informal processes. Sec Maxwell v DTI [1974] QB 523 (CA), discussed by Green Commercial 
Agreements and Competition Law at p 224. 
123 See Green Couunercial Agreements and Competition Law at pp 173-174. 
124 Though the Minister could be questioned in the House of Commons on the exercise of his 
powers. Sec discussion in Korah Competition Law (1982a) at p 21. 
125 Sec s. 21(3). 
126 Green in Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 174, suggests that the 
Secretary of State may only withdraw a direction where the change in circumstances has affected 
an essential part of the reasoning which led him to grant the initial direction. 
127 This tactic has been openly acknowledged by the OFT, see Home Office DG/OFT Annual 
Report 1979 HC Papers 1979/80 (354) HMSO at p 47 ; Green Commercial Agreements and 
Competition Law at pp 175-176 ; Whish Competition Law at p 161. 
129 Either for common law restraint or one of the economic torts. See discussion in Whish 
Competition Law Ch2 ; Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (14th Edn) Sweet and Maxwell (1994) 
Ch18 ; Terry 'Unfair Competition and the Misappropriation of a Competetitor's Trade Values' 
MLR [1988] 296 ; Rutherford 'Restraint of Trade - The Public Interest' MLR [1972] 651. 
129 Under Order 53 RSC and s. 31 Supreme Court Act 1981. The grounds for judicial review are 
discussed in depth by Wade Administrative Law (5th Edn) Oxford Unv. Press (1982). See also, 
Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at pp 222-226 and Hornsby 'Judicial 
Review', who discuss review of competition issues. 
130 Hornsby in 'Judicial Review' at pp 184-186, discusses the high burden faced by appellants in 
demonstrating that the authority's procedures were "manifestly unfair" and notes that even if they 
succeed in discharging this burden, there is no guarantee that the decision will be overturned 
completely. See also, Green CommercialAgreements and Competition Law at pp 223-225. 
131 See particularly, Rv MMC ex parte Argyll Group [1986] 2 All ER 257 at p 266, where the 
MR made it clear that the courts were more concerned with the substance rather than the form of 
the authority's actions. He also stressed the need for speed and finality of decision-making. 
132 No cases have applied for review of ss. 21(2), (3). Only one recent case has succeeded in 
review of a competition authority's decision. Sec Rv DG/OF' ex parte Southdown Motor 
Services Ltd (not yet reported). This case is discussed by Hornsby 'Judicial Review' at p 188, 
who is particularly critical of the inadequacies of judicial review of competition issues. He has 
urged a change in attitude in order to protect firms from the OFT's increasingly monolithic 
discretionary powers. See similar comments by Cook in'Competition Policy'. 
133 As yet, the precise approach of the recently elected Labour goverment to competition issues 
is unclear. 
134 Fox'Antitrust in its Second Century : The Phoenix Rises from the Ashes' Antitrust Bulletin 
[1986c] 383 at p 392. 
135 For background to this section, see Whish Competition Law Ch5 ; Agnew Competition 
Law Ch7 ; Korah Competition Law (1982a) Ch5 ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law' ; 
O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' ; Lever 'UK Economic Regulation' ; Pitt 'Restrictive Trade 
Practices' ; Frazer 'Defects and Effects'; D. Jacobs 'Competition Law'. 
136 As already discussed, less than 1% of agreements are referred to the RPC. 
137 S. 10 and s. 19 RTPA which provides similar gateways for service agreements. See Whish 
Competition Law C115 for text and discussion of s. 10. 
138 Eg ss. 10(1)(b) and (e). The scope and application of these gateways are dealt with in much 
greater detail in Green Connnercial Agreements and Competition Law Ch5 ; Korah Competition 
Law (1982a) Ch7 ; Whish Competition Law Ch5. 
139 Less than 1% of cases go before the Court. Since 1956, only 11 agreements have 
successfully passed through one of the s. 10 gateways. The last successful case was in 1965, see 
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Re Distant Water Vessels Development Scheme [1966] 3 All ER 897 (RPC). This aspect is 
discussed by Whish Competition Law at p 161 and Green Commercial Agreements and 
Competition Law at p 157. 
140 For instance Home Office DGIOFTAnnua! Report 1988 HC Papers 1988/89 (440) HMSO at 
p 38, outlines a number of price-fixing and collusive tendering agreements by manufacturers of 
polyester resin, iron and steel operators and estate agents. None was defended and the RPC found 
all agreements against the public interest. These problems are assessed by Pratt 'Changes in UK 
Competition law' at p 91 ; O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' at p 233 ; Frazer 'Defects and Effects' 
at p 494 ; Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices' at p 294. 
141 Eg gateways ss. 10(1)(a) and (c). Many other gateways have been pleaded successfully only 
once, cg s. 10(1)(d) in Re Sulphuric Acid (1966) LR 6 RP 210, RPC ; s. 10(1)(e) in Yarn Spinners 
[19591 2 All ER 1, RPC ; s. 10(1)(f) in Re Water Tube Biolermakers'Agreen: ent [1959] 3 All ER 
257, RPC. Discussed by Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at pp 185-201 
Whish Competition Law at pp 162-165, who both highlight the problems of the gateways. 
142 Under s. 10(1)(b), the parties must prove that the agreement provides specific and substantial 
benefit to purchasers, consumers and users. Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law 
at p 186 and Korah Competition Law (1982a) at pp 162-163, note that much of the problem stems 
from the Court's qualitative interpretation of the words "specific" and "substantial". See also 
criticism by D. Jacobs'Competition Law' at p 132. 
143 Eg S. 10(1)(e). Economists have been extremely critical of cases such as Yarn Spinners, 
where economic and political considerations conflicted directly. See also, Re Black Bolt and Nut 
Association's Agreement [1960] 3 All ER 122, RPC. See also discussion in Stevens and Yamey 
The Restrictive Practices Court Chs 4,5 which assesses the RPC's approach to economic 
evaluation. 
144 Yarn Spinners failed the 'balancing tailpiece'. For detailed discussion of the justiciability 
aspect, see Stevens and Yamey The Restrictive Practices Court ; Hunter Competition and the 
Law (1966) ; Cunningham The Fair Trading Act 1973 ; Lord Kilmuir Political Adventure (1964) 
at pp 261-263, where he discusses his problems as Lord Chancellor in overcoming judges' anxiety 
at their becoming involved in complex economic problems. For more recent criticism, see Lever 
'UK Economic Regulation' ; D. Jacobs 'Competition Law'. 
145 O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' at p 233 ; D. Jacobs 'Competition Law' at p 132 ; Swann, 
O'Brien, Maunders and Howe Competition in British Industry at pp 80-82, deal with this. 
146 Lever 'UK Economic Regulation' at p 58, where he insists that if tha burden had been 
reversed, the opposite result would have been reached. 
147 Stevens and Yamey The Restrictive Practices Court and Lever 'UK Economic Regulation', 
havebecn particularly condemning. 
148 Sec especially, discussion by Frazer 'Defects and Effects'; Carlisle 'UK Competition Law' 
Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices' ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law'. 
149 Recent referrals include Offshore Supply Vessel Operators Home Office DG/OFT Annual 
Report 1988 HC Papers 1988/89 (440) HMSO at p 38 ; Glass Manufacturing and Distribution 
and Steel Reinforcing Bars Home Office DG/OFTAnnual Report 1990 HC Papers 1990/91 (502) 
HMSO at pp 41-41,111-112 ; Bus Operators in Leicestershire, North Eastern Fuel Oil Cartel 
and Steel RoofPurlins DG/OFTAnnual Report 1990 ibid at pp 3 9-40. On-going investigations 
include grounds maintenance, sugar, concrete and newsagents, see Home Office DG/OFTAnnual 
Report 1993 HC Papers 1993/94 (551) HMSO at p 40-41. O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' at p 
233 ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law' at p 91 ; Frazer 'Defects and Effects' at p 494, all 
discuss the problems of non-compliance. 
150 See Table 1 infra for statistics of the number of cases dealt with by the RPC in recent years. 
Also comments by O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' ; Frazer 'Defects and Effects'. 
Ist The scope and application of sanctioning powers is discussed further by : Green 
Commercial Agreements and Competition Law Ch5 ; Korah Competition Law (1982a) Ch6 
Whish Competition Law Ch5. 
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152 S. 2(2). Eg Re AIJTA's Agreement [1984] ICR 12, RPC, where the Court struck down 
restrictions which inhibited the emergence of new competition, though other restraints were found 
to be in the public interest. Conversely, where an agreement passes through s. 10, the RPC may 
make a declaration to that effect. 
153 The RTPA does not deal specifically with this issue. For further on severance, see Chitty on Contracts (26th Edn) Sweet and Maxwell (1989) at paras 1281-1292. 
154 Sec s. 2(2)(a)-(c). 
155 Green Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at p 180, asserts that this difficulty 
is the result of insufficiently detailed reasoning in original judgements, particularly in relation to 
the public interest assessment. This is exacerbated by the number of undefended agreements 
where no analysis of the restriction occurs. See also Whish Competition Law at p 166. 
156 Sec comments by Megaw J. in Re Mileage Conference Group [1966] 2 All ER 849, RPC. 
157 See Re Mileage Conference Group [1966] 2 All ER 849, RPC ; Re British Concrete Pipe 
Association'sAgreement [1982] ICR 182, RPC. 
158 Ss. 25 and 26 Competition Act 1980. These powers are discussed more fully by Green 
Commercial Agreements and Competition Law at pp 182-183 ; Whish Competition Law at pp 
169-170. The power of suspension was employed in Re ABTA's Agreement [1984] ICR 12, RPC 
and [1985] ICR 122, RPC. 
159 Under s. 3 RTPA. 
160 This power has only been used successfully on one occasion in the recent case of Re Institute of 
Independent Insurance Brokers [1991] ICR 822, RPC. Bright 'Interim Relief in UK Law' ECLR 
[1992] 21, provides a critical analysis of the s. 3 procedure. The threat of s. 3 proceedings secured 
the abandonment of the agreement on football coverage betwwen LWT and the Football League. 
For further details of this, see Home Office DG/OPT Annual Report 1979 HC Papers 1979/80 
(224) HMSO at p 46. 
161 These are incorporated into the RPC's order. Discussed by Green Commercial Agreements 
and Competition Law at p 179 and Whish Competition Law at p 166. 
162 Eg in Glass Manufacturing and Distribution, Steel Rebars, Bus Operators in Leicestershire 
and Thermal Insulation, a mixture of undertakings and court orders were made. See Home Office 
DG/OFT Annual Report 1990 HC Papers 1990/91 (502) HMSO at pp 41-42 ; Home Office 
DG/017Annual Report 1991 HC Papers 1991/92 (38) HMSO at p 39 ; Home Office DG/0F7 
Annual Report 1993 HC Papers 1993/94 (551) HMSO at p 40. Undertakings alone were accepted 
in Steel Roof Purlins, North East Fuel Oil Cartel and Bus Operators in Plymouth. See Home 
Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1991 HC Papers 1991/92 (38) HMSO at p 39 ; Home Office 
DG/O1TAnnual Report 1992 HC Papers 1992/93 (719) HMSO at p 32. Further examples may be 
found in Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1984 HC Papers 1984/85 (3327) HMSO at p 34 
and Home Office DG/OPTAnnual Report 1988 HC Papers 1988/89 (440) HMSO at p 38. 
163 See Honic Office DG/OFI'Annual Report 1990 HC Papers 1990/91 (502) HMSO at pp 111- 
112, where fines totalling £81,000 were imposed. See also, Re Galvanised Tank Manufacurers' 
Association's Agreement [1965] 2 All ER 1003, RPC : £102,000 ; Re Mileage Conference [1966] 
2 All ER 849, RPC : £80,000 ; Re British Concrete Pipe Association's Agreement [1982] ICR 
421, RPC : £185,000. Breach of an undertaking is also civil contempt. For more extensive 
discussion of contempt proceedings, sec Borne and Lowe Contempt of Court (1983) ; Korah 
'Contempt of the Restrictive Practices Court' LSG [1980] 961 ; Green Commercial Agreements 
and Competition Law at pp 208-214 ; Whish Competition Law at p 168 ; Robertson 'Enforcement 
of the UK RTPA Legislation'. 
164 See Ready Mixed Concrete Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1990 HC Papers 1990/91 
(502) HMSO at pp 110-111. This is the first occasion on which action against an individual has 
been taken. Threats of imprisonment were made in Re Galvanised Tank Manufacurers' 
Association's Agreement [1965] 2 All ER 1003, RPC and Re British Concrete Pipe Association's 
Agreement [1982] ICR 421, RPC as well as Ready Mixed Concrete. 
165 Employees in Ready Mixed Concrete were told that they were fortunate to avoid 
imprisonment following their contempt. See Home Office DG/OFT Annual Report 1990 HC 
Papers 1990/91 (502) HMSO at pp 110-111. 
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166 [1991] 4 All ER 150, CA. Smith's were part of the Ready Mixed Concrete cartel. 
167 See DG/O17 v Pioneer Concrete (UK) [1994] 3 WLR 1249, HL. The Lords held that the 
company was liable for the contempt where employees acted deliberately in away which breached 
an injunction, even though their actions may be in the face of a direct prohibition and without the 
company's knowledge. Fines of £81,000, originally imposed by the RPC in Ready Mixed 
Concrete [1991] ICR 52, were restored. 
168 The problems that this poses for the OFT are discussed in Home Office DG10FT Annual 
Report 1991 HC Papers 1991/92 (38) HMSO at pp 15-16. 
169 Robertson 'Enforcement of the UK RTPA Legislation' at p 82. The DG in Home Office 
DG/OFT Annual Report 1991 HC Papers 1991/92 (38) HMSO at p 16, agrees that immediate 
reform is essential. 
170 Eg Robertson 'Enforcement of the UK RTPA Legislation' ; Pitt 'Restrictive Trade Practices' ; 
Frazer 'Defects and Effects'. 
171 See eg Robertson 'Enforcement of the UK RTPA Legislation' at p 86, who asserts that, for 
the RTPA to be taken seriously, it must be able to exact more from firms than a promise not to do 
it again. 
172 Sec comments by Swann, O'Brien, Maunders and Howe Competition in British Industry 
O'Brien 'The Silent Revolution' ; Pratt 'Changes in UK Competition Law'. For additional 
discussion of civil litigation procedure and its due process safeguards, see O'Hare and Hill Civil 
Litigation. 
173 On this, see Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary Fontana (1981). 
174 See s. 10 Restrictive Practices Court Act 1976. Further apppcal to the House of Lords is 
possible. 
175 Recently, an appeal was lodged in ReABTA'sAgreement [1985] ICR 122, RPC. 
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